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SECTION ONE
Introduction
The objective of the following study is to try and answer two questions*
Firstly, has China and those countries sharing a consnon political boundary
with Peking managed to impose their political influence upon the state areas
to the extent of modifying the geography, and have geographical consider¬
ations also affected political factors? Secondly, and related to the prior
question, do the political boundaries provide a division within the land¬
scape? Such being the aims of the study it would appear reasonable to des¬
cribe it as an exercise in political geography. However, before proceeding
to discuss the geographical and political factors at work in the specific
examples chosen the author felt a need to define his interpretation of pol¬
itical geography in order that the dimensions of the thesis framework might
be appreciated, and then to outline briefly the approach to answering the two
inter-related questions posed. This is followed by a chapter devoted to dev¬
eloping at some length the suggestion within political geography that the im¬
position of a political boundary upon a landscape may provide a dividing
feature within the geography of an area, in fact a somewhat broader, world
wide, look at the second question within the thesis.
Perhaps no scholar in this century has contributed so much to defining
1
political geography as Richard Hartshorne. He states that 'Political geog¬
raphy ... may be described as the study of the variation of political phen¬
omena from place to place in interconnection with variations in other feat¬
ures of the earth as the home of man. Included in these political phenomena
1. R.Hartshornes 'Political Geography in the Modern World';
Journal of Conflict Resolution i960., Vol. IV., No.I., p.52.
are features produced by political forces and the political ideas which gen¬
erate these forces'. This is a simple and attractive definition from which
to begin, namely that political geography consists of seeing political organ¬
ization and ideology in a geographical context.
2
Pounds provides further understanding of the scope of the subject,
stating, 'political geography is concerned with politically organized areas,
their resources and extent, and the reasons for the particular geographical
forms which they assume. In particular, it is concerned with the most sig¬
nificant of all such areas, the state'. What, from the political geographer's
viewpoint, is a state? A state is a politically organized area, such as the
politioal unit of China or Afghanistan. States have a certain viability which
varies with eaoh of the examples which will be dealt with in this study and
consists in the effectiveness with which any state can be administered to ful¬
fil certain purposes for which it was created. Within the state there are
forces for integration and disintegration which influence the extent to which
the political administration can modify the geography of the state area.
Often within the state area there will be a 'nation' or a number of
'nations*. It is rare for the state area to coincide with a particular
3
'nation*, iv'acartney defined the 'nation* concept as follows, 'when men bard
together they do so in an association which is a personal bond between man
and man, an extension of the family tie, a 'Blutgemeinshaft*. This community
may fairly be called a nation'. Within the area taken for this study the
nation is usually a force for disintegration within the state.
A feeling of personal nationality is based on a m3lee of factors, one
of the most distinctive being common language. Of lesser importance today
2. N. J.G-. Pounds? 'Political Geography' J McGray-Hill, New York 1963, p«l«
3. C.A.Macartney: 'National States & National Minorities'* Royal
Institute of International Affairs, London 1934, p.22.
ill many areas is religion. Tradition leads to the regionalism of Scotland
and V ales within the United Kingdom. Perhaps the least easy factor to sub¬
stantiate is the belief in some kind of biological brotherhood; this unfort¬
unate concept of race can be important in producing a feeling of personal
nationality although it has been used most effectively to achieve political
nationality. Racism was important to Hitler as a means of welding together
his Third Reich, a belief in racial distinctiveness demands a certain amount
of gullibility on the part of the group concerned.
Although Asia does not provide as many examples of personal nationalism
as certain other areas of the world such as Kurope often a growth of national
awareness begins with the cultivation of folkways and customs; certainly Mon¬
gol nationalism owed much of it. growth to the emphasis of cultural differ¬
ences between the Mongols and the invading Han Chinese.
4
Within the state Hartshorne labelled the forces for integration and dis¬
integration 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal'. Within the United Kingdom the
allegiance to the Crown might be termed a centripetal force, whilst Welsh
and Scottish nationalism would be considered centrifugal forces• Throughout
i,'lost of the countries dealt with in this study poor communications can be
5
termed 'centrifugal'. As Stephen Jones has pointed out the uniformity of the
political map is most deceptive. This uniformity is perhaps nowhere more de¬
ceptive than with regard to China and its bordering states.
6
Freeman defines political geography as a study 'of states, nations,
their resources, their relations one to another, all based on their regional
geography'. The need for a regional description as a basis for a study in pol-
4« R.Hartshorne: 'The Functional Approach in Political Geography'; Annals of
the Association of American Geographers, Vol.4Q, 1950, p.27»
5» S.Jones: 'View of the Political World'; Geog. Review Vol.45, 1955# P«30l«




itioal geography has been recognised in this thesis for a regional geography
implies a knowledge of the physical characteristics of the land and the people,
a study of culture and history, and an acquaintance with the economic factors
at work. Prom such a knowledge the political geographer has a reasonable
foundation from which to ascertain the political impact upon the geography of
the state area, the influence of geography upon politics, plus an appreciation
of the position of the state within the larger global pattern.
The world pattern is of prime importance as 'in an age of global political
relations ... the political geographer is required to keep constantly in mind
7
the world as a whole*. Two thousand years ago a world view was not so import¬
ant as there were distinct regions almost totally unaware of each ocher (e.g.
the Roman and Chinese i&apires;. But by 1914 the assassination of an Austrian
royal prince at Sarajevo would involve in the next four years of ft orld War
such diverse states as those of China, the United States, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, South Africa, French Indochina and Australia to name only a few of the
participants. Since the First World War the rapid improvement in means of in¬
ternational communication has further emphasised state interdependence. The
isolationist America of the Nineteenth Century contrasts with the United
States in the I960'a which can be deeply affected by plans made in Moscow, or
Peking, or Saigon. Similarly the political geography of a state such as
China professing a Communist ideology is affected by its relationship to the
United States which is 5/000 miles awayj to cite one example only Sino-
Amerioan hostility influences the distribution of new industry within China
with all the attendant results of, say, introducing manufacturing amongst
the Uighur nation of Sinkiang.
7» R.Hartshorne in 'American Geography: Inventory & Prospect*,
edited by P.E.James & C.F.Jones; Syracuse University Press 1954# p. 143*
Political geography with a global view first caught the attention of the
8
academic world in 1904- when H.J.ilackinder presented a controversial paper
before the Royal Geographical Society. It not only tried to analyse the pol¬
itical make-up of the world, but also attempted to formulate a means of pre¬
dicting future developments on the world political scene. Briefly, ISacKind-
er recognised a 'geographical pivot of history* consisting of the interior
of Eurasia inaccessible to ships and sea power. Enclosing the pivot area to
the west, south and east was a 'marginal (inner) crescent* which, unlike the
pivot region, is drained to a sea or ocean and therefore is accessible to
sea power. Outside the marginal crescent which stretched from Gcandinavin
to Manchuria, were the lands of the 'outer (insular) crescent'• The marginal
crescent was partly continental and partly oceanic, but the outer crescent
was wholly oceanic (North America, South America, Britain, South Africa,
Australia and Japan). According to Eackinder there was a 'certain persist¬
ence of geographical relationship' between the pivot area and the inner cres¬
cent based on an outward pressure from the former on the latter. Impressed
by what had been achieved by the pivot area nomads equipped only with the horse
and camel kiackinder forecast even greater mobility for the peoples of the reg¬
ion with the building of railways. If the Genrens and Russians allied them¬
selves, or the Chinese were organised by the Japanese to take over the Russian
Empire, then iiackinder envisaged the marginal crescent countries such as
France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea becoming 'so many bridgeheads where the
outside navies would support armies'.
9
Hackinder later modified his original thesis so that in 1919, for ex-
8. H.J.Mackinder: 'The Geographical Pivot of History' j Geographical Journal
Vol.23., 1904. R eprinted in 1951 by the Royal Geographical Society.
9» See H.J.MackinderJ 'Democratic Ideals & Reality*! Constable, London
1919., & 'The Round V.orld & the Winning of the Peace'; Foreign Affairs,
July 1943.
6
ample, his pivot area was renamed ' the heartland' and extended;1 the Heart¬
land, for the purposes of strategical thinking, Includes the Baltic Sea,
the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia,
Persia, Tibet and Mongolia*• The First World War had shown Mackinder that
naval power could be denied certain areas which he had assumed were open
to it.
Maekiner's 1904 paper was 60 years too late as he wa3 speaking of the
significance of the railway age at the beginning of the air age. But his
work has importance for the political geographer as it was a pioneer attempt
to formulate a global view. A little before Mackinder' s paper the Ajoerican
naval officer A.T.Mahan had produced a bock entitled 'The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History 1660-1783' • This was of less interest to the political
geographer than Mackinder's work, but nevertheless was a 'world view' taken
in the closing years of the 19th. Century. Italian wrote of the six factors
affecting naval power; the geographical location of the state, the config¬
uration of its coastline, the extent of its territory, the size of the pop¬
ulation upon which the state could draw, the national character of the
people, and the nature and policy of the state's government. Mahan was 'well
10
grounded in the geography and technology of his age* but the events of the
20th Century have outdated his views, lisban's purely naval view of the
world suffers even more from the ravages of time than does that of P&ckinder.
The writings of Mackinder, and to a lesser extent kahan, made a great
impact upon later political geographers. One of the most notable attempts
to adjust Mackindcr's heartland thesis to changing conditions was that of
11
N.J.Spykoan. Spykraan gave greater importance to those states which enr
10. N.J.G.Pounds; 'Political Geography', McGraw-Hill Inc; New York 1963.p»396.
11. K.J.SpyknanJ 'The Geography of the Peace'; Harcourt, Brace & Co;
Hew York, 1944.
circled the heartland and termed this surrounding band the 'Rimland'j the
rimland approximated lackinder's inner crescent. Spykman suggested that
* there has never really been a simple land-power - sea-power opposition.
The historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the Rim-
land with Russia, or Great Britain and Russia together against a dominating
rimland power. * In many respects Spykraan'a suggested policy for the United
States, which was basically the control of the Rimland, is similar to G.F.
12
Kennan' a suggested 'containment' of the Soviet Union by the United States.
Physical geography tea been stressed by both Mackinder and Spykman, but
13
in 1956 D.W.Meinig emphasised the cultural geography in another modificat¬
ion of the heartland concept. Meinig's heartland was smaller than either
ASacklnder's or Spykiaftn* s, and he divided the Rimland into continental and mar¬
itime subdivisions. The Rimland subdivisions einig illustrated by the exam¬
ple of China, a fortunate choice with regard to this study. 'Land based
northerners have dominated Chinese culture throughout most of her history and
whenever they have been in political control, as tinder the Han, fang, Mongol
and lAanchu Dynasties, China has been oriented primarily inwardly as a landed,
peasant society with her strategic frontier resting upon the steppe 2 one of
the heartland region. On tin© other hand, when control was exercised by the
South China groups, as under the Southern Bungs, the Mings, and the recent
Nationalist government, a strong maritime outlook was emphasised.' Today the
continental and maritime Aimland is delimited by the Conmunist boundary with
the rest of tine world, and supposedly American 'containment' prevents the
continental Rimland absorbing any more of the maritime Rimland. Meinig's
12. G.F.KennanJ 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'; Foreign Affairs, Vol.25# 19<W>»
13* IBW.Meinig; 'Heartland & Rimland in Rurasian History'; Western
iolitical Quarterly, Vol. 9# 1956.
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hypothesis has the advantage that it is not as rigid in its delineations
as that of Mackinder*
Mackinder's work stimulated much interest in northern Europe, notably
influencing Kjellen of Sweden and Haushofer of Germany* Kjellen, Profess¬
or of Political Science at Uppsala, was the first scholar to use the word
'geopolitik'. Also important amongst the north European group was Ratzel's
'Politische Geographic* which had appeared in 1897* Ratsel placed his em¬
phasis upon space and position, which lie felt determined the destiny of
each part of the earth's surface* Space was the major aim of a state's am¬
bitions* It was Ratsel who first suggested the idea of the state as an or¬
ganism, an hypothesis which was taken up later by Iiaushofer and Maull in
Germany*
Baushofar's name will always be associated with the German brand of
so-called geopolitical thinking which flourished between the two World Vvara*
In 1934 Haushofer defined the difference between geopolitics and political
geography as he saw it, 'Geopolitics is dynamic, in contrast to political
14
geography, it is a way of educating the masses in the concept of space*.
In fact for General Haushofer geopolitics became a justification of milit¬
ant German nationalism} politics with a minimum window dressing of pseudo-
geography. Bowman was being generous when he referred to the * recent
"science11 of geopolitics which assumes that political events depend upon
15
the soil** The exaggeration and manipulation practised by the Haushofer
school in Germany prior to the Second world War, plus the association of
14* K.Hauahofert 'Ate.nwaite, Lebenaraum und Gleiohberechtigung auf
Erdent'} Seitschrift fur Geopolitik, Vol*IX, 1934* See also G.Kiass
'Political Geography into Geopolitics*} Geographical Review, Vol*32,
1942, P*641*
15* I.Bowmen: 'Geography va* Geopolitics'} Geog* Review, Vol»32, 1942,
p*648*
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these scholars with the Hitler regime, has soiled, perhaps forever, the term
'Geopolitics* *
The work of Haushofer, and to a somewhat lesser extent Mackinder, is no
15
longer fashionable* By 1942 Bowman could state with authority that 'neither
Hackindar nor Hauahofer had theories that could stand up to the facts of air
power and its relation to industrial atre/igth*' Nevertheless a debt oust be
acknowledged to Mackinder for emphasising the importance of a world view in
political geography. As will be seen throughout this study in trying to an¬
swer the two questions posed it is difficult to abandon a world view*
What, then, is political geography? The author favours the five sections
16
listed by Pounds which entail an investigation into:
1* 'The geographical coincidence of state and nation* This raises the quest¬
ion of political boundaries and claims to territory, of dissident groups
within and of related groups without the limits of the state*'
2* 'The resources which the state can coiaaiand in the pursuit of its object¬
ive, the well-being and integrity of its people. These resources con¬
sist of the location, size, and shape of the state, which influence its
strategy and defence and, through conmunieations and transportation, its
cohesion; second, the population, its structure, competence, and skills;
and, lastly, naturally occurring resources, their utilization, and the
degree of industrial and technical development.'
*
3* 'The social cohesion of the population* Since this is in all respects
an important factor in national power, the focus of loyalties within
the state and the division of the state for administrative purposes ac¬
quire in some instances a political importance. In some respects the
15* I*Bowawai 'Geography vs. Geopolitics* I Geog* Review, Vol.32, 1942,p.648.
16* N*iouads; 'Folitmcal Geography'; McGraw-Hill; New Xoaek 19^3# pp*19-20*
social cohesion within a state is reflected in the geographical patterns
of voting habits, which thus become an important element in the study of
political geography*'
4* 'The state does not rely wholly on its ovm internal resources* It is
likely to have allies and dependencies which in varying degrees support
it in the pursuit of its primary objective* The geographical pattern of
its alliances, the distribution of colonies, dependencies, and bases,
and the division or joint use of resources are all factors in the power
of a state**
5* 'Every state carries on trade, however limited in scope this c^y bo in
some instances* Trade may be a source of strength, or excessive depend¬
ence upon certain goods and markets may spell weakness* Trade can be,
and sometimes has been, used as an instrument of policy, and an evalu¬
ation is necessary of the significance of trade in the power potential
of the state*'
Each of these sections has a certain relevance in the following study*
The subdivisions are largely self-explanatory, but perhaps there is a certain
need to elaborate, notably with regard to the first of Pounds' sections where
there is reference to 'political boundaries'* As the latter are of such im¬
portance with regard to the two questions which this thesis attempts to an¬
swer a little wore concerning political boundaries must be said at this point.
Boundaries are used politically to delimit the jurisdiction of one state
from another* Within boundaries a state is largely its own master, even to
the extent of controlling the air space above its territory (although so far
satellites are free agents) • With increasing nationa l a«iarenes« the political
boundaries have often been centres of dispute* The ill-defined frontier area
between two states demands precise delineation into a boundary line once the
, r
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adjoining states are caught by the fever of nationalism, this can be seen
happening along many of China's borders.
A boundary can either be delimited, or it can be delimited and de¬
marcated. These terms were introduced by Sir Henry MacMahon, who had been
largely responsible for the delimitation of the Tibeto-Indian and Sino-
17
Burmese boundaries in 1915-14. Later he wrote "'Delimitat ion" I have taken
to comprise the determination of a boundary line by treaty or otherwise, and
its definition in written, verbal terms; "Demarcation" to comprise tho actual
laying down of a boundary line on the ground, ana its definition oy boundary
pillars or other similar pl>ysical means'.
The territorial boundary is still of immense importance, and its related
problems of delimitation and demarcation, but the area chosen for study is
further complicated regarding the answering of the questions posed by the in¬
trusion of an ideological boundary. It is impossible to ignore the fact that
China favours a Communist creed of revolutionary flavour when viewing the eff¬
ect of, for example, the political boundary between China and Hong Kong upon
the local geography.
The table of contents has been designed with the intention of trying to
take into account the various relevant aspects of the author's interpretation
of political geography and applying them to an attempt to answer the two
questions which were posed at the beginning of this introduction, namely have
the states which are dealt with imposed their political authority within their
areas and thereby modified the geography within the state unit (and have
geographical factors modified political considerations), and, looking outside
17* Sir H.MacMahPn 'International Boundaries'> Journay of the Royal
Society of Arts, Vol.34, 1954, p.lib.
the state areas, are the political boundaries between China and the surround¬
ing states divisions within the geographical landscape?
As has previously been mentioned the second part of the first section of
the study is a further look at the political boundary as a dividing feature
in geography, in fact it might be termed a further introduction to the second
question to be answered. In this chapter a look is taken at the differences
between frontiers and political boundaries, of much significance where China
is concerned, end the functions and variety of boundaries. At the sane time
the geographical impact of the political boundary is shown by means of a num¬
ber of examples throughout the world so that the significance of political de¬
cision to the geographer may be appreciated. Also dealt with is the relative
effectivenaso of states at certain stages of development and of different forms
of government in the implementation of political decision.
The second section Is devoted firstly to dealing with the phenomena of
Conrnaiiam, and then with China, which is the centre piece of the thesis and
a Communist state. State of mind is so important where the various peoples
of a country are concerned that it would be impossible to attempt any study in
political geography without dealing with the forces that mould popular opinion.
Just as Fascism was the dominant ideological force in Germany from 1933 until
1945 so to .an even greater extent Cormunism is the moulding force within China,
North Korea, Worth Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Re¬
public; in China it is not even challenged by any religious belief. As Coimr-
unism pervades most aspects of life within these states, and influences the
bordering countries, it is necessary to try and establish briefly the nature
of the xdeology and its distribution throughout the world. Following on
from this the final chapter of the second section endeavours to present a
18
reasonably comprehensive regional geography of the Asian dynamo of Communism,
China.
Section Three is an attempt to place the political boundaries involved
into four main categories based on the political opinions, and to a certain
extent size, of the states bordering China. Heedless to say this has many
limitations, but does help to clarify the political situation with regard to
the boundaries and states and makes more manageable the material involved in
answering the two thesis questions. "With the exception of one example from
each of the categories the various states are dealt with in the second chapter
of this section, beginning with the minor neutralist countries, followed by
the major neutralist, the western committed, and finishing with the Corammist.
Briefly in each example an attempt is made to produce a geographical picture
of the state, and notably the boundary area between the state and Chins before
answering the two questions which provide the theme of the essay. Having
chosen China and its surrounding states it was realised from the beginning of
the study that olden the main difficulty would be procuring certain geo,graphi¬
cal information, and so the material is at times far less comprehensive than
the author would have wished; to cite a few inadequacies to illustrate the
problem, the Chinese have not published any economic statistics for the period
after I960, there is no treeise delimitation of many of the tribal areas along
the Chinese political boundaries, and map coverage is often non-existent.
18. There is by no means coigplece agreement on the delimitation of Asia's
area, but throughout this study the example of (r.Wlnt is followed
(i.e. 'spotlight on Asia', 1939, P*i8) in that 'geographically the
Arab countries of the Middle Bast (except Egypt) belong also to Asia.
So does Turkey. But recent custom has promoted the Middle East into
being almost a continent of its own. Its problems ... are usually
treated as being distinct from those of the rest of Asia'. If the so-
called Middle East is excluded from Asia, China and the surrounding
states account for well over half the continent.
14.
Each of the examples omitted from Section Three is given a separate
section following. Thus Section Pour consists of a study of Nepal as a rep¬
resentative state from the minor neutralist category. This permits a lode at
the state and political boundary concerned in greater detail, something which
the author would have liked to have done for all the states bordering China,
but which would have proven unmanageable in length. The treatment is similar
to that for China in Section Two beginning with an outline of the historical
development of the state, followed by a more brief discussion of the physical
characteristics of the land, then a description of the people, and finally the
economy, ilexe the aim is to discover the nature of the political unit which
is in this oase called Nepal, and this enables the final chapter of the section
to be used for locking more closely at the political geography of the Sino-
Nepalese boundary before answering the two questions related to the boundary
and the influence of Nepal's administration on toe country's geography. Sim¬
ilarly, Section Five attempts a like approach to the major neutralist example
of India's North East Frontier Agency which is not a state, but which provides
something of a political unit within a state. Section Six has the western
committed example of Hcng Kong, and Section Seven the communist category rep¬
resented by the Mongolian People's Republic.
The Conclusion represents a look at the whole of China's political
boundary in the light of the two thesis questions, and based upon toe material
which has been dealt with in previous sections. If a title was given to this
section, it might well be 'The Political Geography of China's Boundaries'.
CHAPTER ONE
The Political Boundary as a Dividing Feature in Geography
As the political boundary is of such significance within this study, and
notably with regard to the answering of the second of the two thesis questions,
it is as well to go into a little more detail concerning the nature and effects
of such a line upon the landscape. It is a complex subject which needs further
discussion before a close lode is taken at the Chinese examples*
Throughout most of the modern world the territorial limits of any state
are defined in terms of boundaries. It should be appreciated at this point that
not only are there lines delimiting the area of the state, but also within the
state there are often political subdivisions marked by boundaries. To quote one
example there is the main United States-Canada boundary dividing the North Amer¬
ican continent, but within Canada there are further lines for such provinces as
Ontario or Manitoba. Similarly within the United Kingdom there is the county
boundary. Whether it is an international boundary such as that between China
and Afghanistan, or a provincial one such as that between Chinghai and Sinkiang
within China, in either case it is a line which is the outcome of human decision,
and as such is an artificial phenomena in every example. There is no such thing
as a 'natural' boundary. But this is not to say that geographical distributions
cannot have considerable impact upon the boundary and influence it extensively
and, similarly, a political boundary can modify most effectively the geography
of the border zone.
The linear boundary develops from the frontier which is a barrier zone
between two states or two different cultures. The most well known frontier
within the Anglo-Saxon world was that of the United States where the barrier
zone was continually on the move mainly in an east to west direction following
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the first settlements along the Atlantic coastlands. The indigenous Indian
cultures inhibited, but failed to stop, the more advanced European culture.
For 150 years the frontier between European settlement and the Indians was
marked by the Appalachians, then towards the end of the Eighteenth Century
the Mississippi gave a rough guide to where the frontier within the United
States existed. The frontier continued to move westward helped by the pol¬
itical impetus provided by such actions as the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from
Napoleon I, and the Texas Annexation of 1845-48. Where American expansion¬
ism was eventually checked along the frontier with Canada or that with Mexico
the barrier zone was defined more precisely as a boundary.
In much the same way, but less satisfactorily, the British under Sir
Henry MacMahon in 1913-14 endeavoured to change the frontier zone between
British India and Burma, and the Chinese Empire and Tibet into a boundary, a
process which China is today still involved in as can be seen from the Sino-
Burmese boundary agreement of 1960 and the Sino-Indian border conflict of
1962. The frontier is a vaguely defined area where a state's effective con¬
trol is usually least. With the advent of a political boundary a well organ¬
ised central authority can then begin moulding the area involved into a closer
resemblance to the rest of the state. The 1961 delimitation and later demar¬
cation of the Sino-Nepalese frontier into a boundary has led to increased act¬
ivity on both sides to bring the former frontier zone within the respective
political frameworks.
But once a boundary has been drawn between two states its functions are
often viewed differently by the particular governments concerned, and there¬
fore the geographical implications of the line may vary. The differences in
ideological outlook between East and West Germany makes the boundary between
the two states of greater geographical significance than that between Kenya
and Tanganyika which possess a closer political outlook; the hostility between
the two Germanys leads to a greater effort to integrate the state area on each
side of the boundary.
1
S.W.Boggs has listed a number of functions of modern boundaries with re¬
gard to both persons and to materials. The boundary can place restriction on
immigrants* visitors, and foreign working men, the reasons ranging from fear
of competition for employment, to unwelcome political ideas, to fear of ideol¬
ogical contact with the state's citizens. At the boundary aliens or nationals
may be examined and detained because of disease or for reasons of Justice, and
similarly persons engaged in the illegal movement of things may be apprehended.
The boundary also serves as a place to collect duty on imports and exports,
where the influx of foreign goods to compete with domestic production is
stopped. Money and precious metals can be controlled, as can be flights of
aircraft across the state area. Lastly Boggs mentions the exercise of sanit¬
ary measures such as animal quarantine. This is not a complete list, and it
should be emphasised that only a number of the functions are carried out at
the border, and with the growing importance of such modes of transport as air
travel it is a decreasing number. A boundary marks the limit of a state's Jur¬
isdiction and it is therefore always secondary to the state itself. However,
Buggs' list does demonstrate some of the factors which can affect the geog¬
raphy of the state; to quote one example at this stage it can be seen that Aus¬
tralia' s immigration restrictions have prevented an influx of Asians to swell
the ranks of its citizenry which would have modified the cultural geography
of the continent. The attitude of the states involved leads to a wide variety
in the functions of boundaries, and similarly the boundary functions may
1. S.W.BoggsJ 'International Boundaries'; Columbia University Press,
New York 1940, p. 5*
operate selectively so that it is much easier far a Briton to emigrate to the
United States than it is for on Italian* The impact of the boundary upon
the geography of the states involved usually depends largely upon the funct¬
ions served by the boundary*
The extent to which a boundary is an obstacle is affected by a number of
factors* Firstly there is the question of the precision of its definition* A
good guide to this is whether it has been both delimited and demarcated* After
there has been a territorial allocation in the frontier zone a boundary may be
delimited by treaty only, or this stage of the political settlement may be foll¬
owed by demarcation* Whereas delimitation defines a boundary, demarcation in¬
volves a field operation and the erection of pillars as in the recently demar¬
cated Sino-Nepalese borderline, or perhaps forest clearing as along parts of
the U*S* — Canada boundary*
Following the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary between the two
states immediately involved it is often important that the line should be acknow¬
ledged internationally before its full effect oan begin to come into play* There
are ' de facto' boundaries which are acknowledged but not accepted by all states,
such as that along the 17th parallel in Vietnam, and 'da jure' lines which are
recognised by all states in international law as with most boundaries* The
greater stability offered by the second category of boundary usually leads to
more influence by the state upon the area's geography although there are ex¬
ceptions as witness South Vietnam where the whole village pattern has been
changed to one of a defensive nature throughout the country due to North Viet¬
nam's acknowledging the boundary, but showing its non-acceptance by the use
of an active fifth column*
Perhaps of greater importance to the geographical effect of a boundary
is the attitude of the people on each side of it* If like the Kenya-Tanganyilca
borderline you have a nomadic tribe such as the Masai within die area and
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practically oblivious of its existence its significance is limited; similarly
the Lapps appear to be unaware of the international boundaries between the
Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden and Korway# But where the people on either
side of the boundary regard it very much as an international division, as
between the Soviet Union and Turkey for example, its impact is far greater#
Boggs ('International Boundaries') divides boundaries into four categ¬
ories, namely 'Physical', 'Geometric', 'Anthxopcr-geographic', and 'Com¬
pound'# Although only limited use is cade of such classifications in this
study it is useful to look at both the work of Boggs and Hartshorn© in order
to throw further light on the characteristics of political boundaries# Boggs'
•Physical' type is that which conforms to some physical feature such as a
river, or mountain creatlino, or watershed. In the past the 'Physical' Bound¬
ary was often of defensive importance as it provided a check# Although modern
technology has decreased even further the effectiveness of such a boundary be¬
tween states amongst others the hypothesis that it might be of defensive im¬
portance to a state prevailed into modern times, as witness the Soviet Union
using this as an excuse to absorb the Pripet marshes at the end of the Second
World War# rStM 'Geometric* or 'Mathematical* boundary is largely self-explan¬
atory and refers to the use of straight lines, or arcs of circles and the like
by the states involved. These tend to disregard geographical factors and per¬
haps display to the fullest extent Just how an arbitrary political decision can
eventually become an easily recognisable geographical division, - iuch of the
U#3# - Mexico boundary is made up of straight lines, and yet despite a certain
amount of diffusion each aide of the border it marks a well defined division
between two very different cultures and economies# Despite its Spanish name
nobody could doubt that San Diego is an American Town although it is only a
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short distance from the straight line which divides the United States from
Mexico. Similarly Santo Toraas on the other side of the boundary retains the
characteristics of a sleepy Mexican village. 'Anthropo-geographic' boundar¬
ies are related to same aspect of human oocupance. The most notable attempt
to define such lines followed World War I in Europe when new states were set
up delimited by boundaries which supposedly separated areas with different
ethnic tre its within them. In theory this was an experiment in drawing a bound¬
ary along some geographical division such as language, religion or tribal aff¬
iliation. The difficulty with such 'Anthropor-geographic' boundaries is that
it is rarely possible to exclude minority groups as there are no sharply de¬
fined limits to the cultural area. Ag the new states which emerged after the
First World War from the rubble of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires
were delimited along 'Anthropo-geographio' boundaries they provide an inter¬
esting study in the effectiveness of such efforts to make an apparently geog¬
raphical division serve as a political line. By 1945 Rumania, Hungary and
Yugoslavia were squabbling over the Banat area along their borders, Yugo¬
slavia and Austria over Slovene Garinthia, Rumania and Hungary over 'Transyl¬
vania, Roland and Czechoslovakia over the Teschen area, and Bulgaria and
Greece over Macedonia, to mention but a few examples. As is usually the case
if the central authorities involved had been effective enough in their state
areas, and the international situation favourable, given time the frontier
zones might have been integrated into the state areas on either side. Fin¬
ally Boggs writes of 'Compound* boundaries which he considers represents a
compromise between several approaches? this incorporates two or more of the
other categories so if the U.S. - exico boundary is taken the western part
is 'Geometric*, but in the east it follows the course of the Rio Grande and
is therefore composed of a 'Mathematical* and a 'fhysical' section, and in
its entirety is a 'Compound' boundary.
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In 1936 Hartshorne carried out an interesting attempt at the classifi¬
cation of boundaries. The three main subdivisions he named 'Antecedent',
'Subsequent* and 'Consequent*, not very original terns, but it must be re¬
membered that this was an early venture in the field. Within the 'Anteced¬
ent ' category Hartshorne had further subdivisions, the first being what he
termed the 'Pioneer' boundary; this was a line drawn before any extensive
settlement takes place in an area and well represented by some of the bound¬
aries Boggs called 'Geometric'. America during the Nineteenth Century saw
the drawing of many such boundaries by the authorities in Washington, a sort
of casual armchair decision on delimitation of scantily explored lands. Little
respect was shown for geographical features as witness the boundaries of Col¬
orado which make an oblong outline despite there being such favoured physical
phenomena as rivers, watersheds, and mountain crestlines in the area. The
second division of the 'Antecedent' category of boundary Hartshorne lists is
the 'Relict' line, a boundary which has been abandoned for political reasons,
but which can still be discerned in the cultural landscape. This type ill-
ustrates much of the powerful impact a political boundary can have upon the
geography of an area. An example of a 'Relict' line would seem to be provi¬
ded by the inclusion of the Serbs within the Yugoslav state. It should be
noted with regard to the Yugoslav example that the newer state boundaries
are taking effect with the passing of time despite Hie Serbs having been
vigorous opponents of the Yugoslav state following its establishment after
the First World War. With an increasingly effective state administration
2. R.HartshomeJ 'Suggestions on the Terminology of Political
Boundaries'} Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol.26, 1936* pp.36-57*
Sorb opposition to Yugoslavia grows yearly leas, despite the President
being a Croat* and therefore a member of a group which is traditionally
hostile to the Serbs# If the central authority within the state is power¬
ful enough 'Relict* boundaries eventually disappear#
Hartahome'a 'Subsequent' category is composed of those boundaries
which conform to some major or minor geographical division of a physical
or cultural area* which is similar to Bogga' 'Phyaioal* and 'nnthropo-
geographic* classification, plus Those boundaries which have been superim¬
posed on the landscape, but have been accepted by the states and people on
either side# An example of the first type is provided by the use of the
Amur River to divide the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China*
but in this area the U#S.S«R# has not been as effective in moulding its im¬
age and its former friendship with Comaunist China has led to less emphasis
upon this boundary# Peking has hinted at dissatisfaction over the Amur as
a boundary so the situation is such as to inhibit the development of a well-
established political line# Being as yet something of a pioneer area both
for the Soviet Union and China the effect of political decision on the geog¬
raphy has not been obvious# The second category of hartshorns'a 'Subsequent'
boundaries can be seen in Furope where there are lines such as that between
Belgium and France which divides the French speaking Wallons from the terr¬
itories of France# The Belgian-French boundary is superimposed upon the
landscape and yet in the main is accepted by both the people and the states
on either side# Often such a superimposed boundary can develop as a very
distinct geographical division as is beginning between Fast and ..est Germany*
although in this case it has not been fully accepted by either the Germans
or their respective governments# The Bisrsarckian superimposed boundary be¬
tween Denmark and Germany has led to different ways of life on either side
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of it although until the Nineteenth Century Schlemvig-Holstein was part of
Denmark. Both the Banes and the Germans have now accepted their canman
boundary and it has itself become something of a geographical feature#
Where a geographical feature has acted as a dividing line -within a
landscape Hartshorn© referred to it as a 'Consequent' boundary when it has
been used for political delimitation, for it is a political boundary which
is consequent upon the dividing feature. Again, this is a subdivision of
Boggs* 'physical' boundary category. Hartahorne splits 'Consequent' border¬
lines into 'Static' and 'Kinetic' types. The former is a zone of limited den¬
sity of population between more highly populated areas, such as the use of
the Gobi Desert along part of the China-Beople' a Republic of Mongolia bound¬
ary. Usually in these cases the political line does not have as ouch effect
upon the region's geography as when more highly developed zones are favoured.
The 'Kinetio Consequent' boundary is a physical hindrance between two regions
such as the Himalayan borderline between Nepal and Cldna. To what extent this
type is a physical hindrance depends upon the technology of the border states,
even a backward country like China was capable of launching 15 or so divisions
through the Himalayas and into India in 1962. Although security has often bean
an important factor in the location of boundaries any 'Kinetic Consequent' line
can only assist a state in defence as there is no such thing as a barrier to
a determined military force as witness Hannibal's march into Italy.
Although the boundary classifications of two well-known authorities have
been taken it should be appreciated that neither is fully accepjtable as each
boundary has a quality of uniqueness* no two boundaries serve exactly the sane
functions, nor do thoy cross identical landscapes, nor have they the sane
history, nor do states have the same outlook where boundaries are concerned.
But the work of Boggs and Hartshorn© does provide a broad foundation upon
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which to construct a fuller picture of political "boundaries and their geog¬
raphical and political implications.
Previously reference has been made to the stage of technology of the
states on either side of the boundary. This, and the country* s territor¬
ial maturity, is of great relevance. A state canto said to be territor¬
ially mature when the power of the central authority is equally effective
throughout its area. A look at Braail shows that this is not true of the
situation as the state has not integrated successfully much of the country' a
interior area. Similarly the state must have satiated its appetite for fur¬
ther expansion at the expense of its neighbours. The United Kingdom is
territorially mature as it lias integrated its area under one central author¬
ity and has no expansionist ambitions. Nasi Germany, with its policy of
• lebensraum*, was not so. Once a state is territorially mature its boundar¬
ies will become stabilised, and the borderline will usually more greatly
affect the geography of the area. Similarly the higher the stage of techno¬
logical achievement within the state the greater one would expect the impact
of the central authority to "be within the state area so that if there are
two distinctive ways of life such as the Communist system of East Germany
sharing a boundary with the Democratic state of west Germany it would be
expected that if the two areas continued under these conditions within the
foreseeable future there would be a political boundary acting as a geog¬
raphical division. An advanced technology is an impressive vehicle for pro¬
ducing greater conformity within the state area, especially if it is backed
by a strong central authority. Within the United Kingdom the greater powers
of the administration in London and the increasing technological abilities
of the population yearly makes the Angland-Gcotland, and the iingland-Wales
I
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boundaries of leas significance. Shis is the case with most provincial lines
in areas of advanced technology. But conformity within the state area does
not imply international conformity; it leads in fact to sharper divisions
along the various state boundaries so that such lines as that between Franco
and Spain become well defined because the governments involved not only de¬
sire to produce an easily recognisable political unit, but have the ability to
move towards that goal.
The type of government will also affect the geographical significance of
a boundary. It la possible to divide the political institutions of the world
into absolutist and parliamentary categories, and as the power of the former
is wider and greater in most cases one would expect its impact on the state
area to be fuller, an absolutist monarchy such as that of the Shah of Iran
has certain advantages over political or totalitarian dicta torahips as in the
main there is no succession problem thus giving the state greater stability.
The matter of stability and the time in wiiich a boundary has to take effect
is of importance to the geographer, as the political line which has remained
the same for 150 years or so, as for example the Portugese-Spanish boundary,
will be more of a geographical divide than one such as the Bunaa-China border¬
line which has been under dispute for over a century and has not had any
stability until the Sino-Burraeae agreement and delimitation of I960.
A political dictatorship like that of President de Gaulle in Prance has
more power than a prime minister in a parliamentary democracy, but less eff¬
ect "Chan a totalitarian dictatorship audi as that which Stalin wielded in
the Soviet Union. The Gauliist regime ruling France gives a very definite
impression that the administration is having a greater influence within the
sta+e area than the democracy which ruled prior to tho taking over of power
by de Gaulle, it is interesting to note that whereas before de Gaulle began
governing Prance the Caramon Market was advancing methodically towards a
breaking down of the boundaries between the six member countries, since then
political dictatorship has led to a further emphasising of France as a dist¬
inctive unit within the Coranon Market.
But there are limitations cm the power wielded by a political dictator¬
ship which are not so apparent in a totalitarian dictatorship* The totalit¬
arian despot endeavours to control all aspects of life within the state area,
Stalin controlled the sort of music the people of the Soviet Union were per¬
mitted to listen to which is something it would be hard to visualise happen¬
ing within modem France. Similarly within Cossnuniat China, except for Mao
Tse-tung'a 'hundred flowers* episode, even the thoughts of the citizens are
regimented. In totalitarian dictatorship there usually is the moot effective
emphasis upon the political boundaries, and where the totalitarian state
shares a boundary with a country administered by a different form of govern¬
ment there tends to develop very rapidly a distinct geographical division.
The advent cf Hitler upon the German seem in 1933 rapidly led to the further
emphasis of the Franco-German 'boundary with evun the physical landscape being
changed with the building of vast networks of military installations. On one
side there was the totalitarian state of Germany being welded into a unit by
means of the autobahn system and intensive propaganda, and on the other side
the French democracy with a different attitude towards the fazver, not on a
war economy basis with regard to industry, and a population enjoying much
.greater freedom in all matters of daily life. Given an adequate technology
a totalitarian regime can act more quickly than perhaps any other form of
government so that Y/ith the development of hostility between the two Coixiurr-
l»t regimes administered from Moscow and Peking an effective curb has been
placed on the migration of the tribes within Central Asia. In a matter of
months the Sino-Soviet boundary has become a geographical fact to the nomadic
herders of Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia and will change a way of life
which has been favoured for many centuries. A permeable boundary has become
impenetrable and will therefore modify the human geography on either side of
it. As the Han administration gains momentum in Sinkiang and the rule of the
Soviet Union in the Central Asian republics these nor®die herdsmen who are
being forced to settle will become more and more culturally assimilated by
their respective states. Whereas a democracy usually has to persuade its cit¬
izens to follow its lead, a totalitarian government can force such minorities
as the Uighurs to conform.
Democracies can be divided into those which adhere to the monarchical
system, such as the United Kingdom, and those which have a Republican govern¬
ment with a president as head. The crown in Britain or Belgium is a heredit¬
ary position wielding little actual power, but providing a suitable figure¬
head to the elected governing body. A democratic president has more power,
but the amount varies. The American president endeavours to rule the state,
but the West German president is more of a figurehead. But whether a democ¬
racy ha3 a monarchy or an elected president it has in common the citizen's
right to vote for the person he or she would like to see in parliament, the
body which governs the state. As the people of the country are active
participants in the government there is a limit on Just vhat measures such a
body as the British cabinet can carry out. A democratic government is
accountable for its actions whilst a totalitarian regime is not. Under
certain circumstances a democratic government can carry out the sort of
programme favoured by the totalitarian states, such as Ottawa's adrainistra-
tion and development of Canada's Northwestern Territories or Canberra's
participation in Australia's Northern Territory, but these are exceptions.
And yet democracies are often forced to become less democratic, and there
is a greater governmental interference in the freedom of the individual.
Within Britain the increase of population pressure on resources leads to
legislation to limit such things as the use of land. The powers of all
the democratic governments are growing and so much their impact upon the
geography of the state. If one example is taken it can be seen how state
characteristics are modified. The government's right to impose tariffs
on the import of foreign faroi produce into the United Kingdom., and its sub¬
sidization of British farming mesne that the agricultural prosperity and
land use are the outcome of there being political boundaries between the
United Kingdom and Denmark and the Netherlands which are across a few miles
of water. Denmark and the Netherlands are able to produce dairy products,
bacon, flowers, vegetables and the like more cheaply than the fhrrrasrs of
the United Kingdom so that if the British boundaries and all they imply were
removed it would seem probable that much of the agricultural land within
Britain would either fall into disuse or be used for other purposes. Also
within the United Kingdom there is a subsidization of the development of
what are less economically attractive areas, such as the Northeast of Eng¬
land, by the prosperous regions of the Midlands and South under a deliber¬
ate governmental policy which again might not take place if the state bound¬
aries were no longer in existence. Within China strategic considerations
have led to a similar situation where industry is being directed to the in¬
terior of the state despite, for example, Sinkiang being so far less att¬
ractive than the more highly developed areas of the coastal provinces.
Republican democracies like West Germany and the United States have
federal governments which brings the topic to the question of the relative
importance of provincial boundaries to the geographer# Germany was a
Nineteenth Century edifice made up of a number of political unit3 such as
Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony which were of singular significance to the geog¬
rapher of that time, at least one historian has suggested that the reason for
Germany entering the First World War was to stop the confederation of states
from falling apart* Under Hitler the effort to break: down the former bound¬
aries was increased with the myth of the German 1 nation* endeavouring to
flatten the actuality of Bavarian citizenship. Since World War II the sig¬
nificance of the provincial boundaries has continued to decline although the
state is named the Federal Republic. The counties of Britain still have pow¬
ers over education within their areas, plus local roads, libraries, building
permission, the health service and other functions. Within the United States
the battles between Washington and the southern states demonstrate that the
provincial boundary is often hard to overcome. As yet it is not possible for
the geographer to dismiss altogether provincial boundaries, to ignore such a
line as that between Tibet and the Han Chinese provinces within China i3 not
realistic.
Again, of primary importance is the attitude of the people towards the
boundary. Bismarck thought of himself as a Prussian, not as a Gorman, and
German unity came about almost in spite of his attitude. But by the time
■the Austrian Adolf Hitler was fighting in the First World War the German idea
was much stronger in the minds of the German speaking people. Similarly
there is on international boundary in Ireland because six Ulster counties
were unwilling to be part of the Republic of Ireland, and since then North¬
ern Ireland lias continued to grow apart from the rest of Ireland. A boundary
■which did not exist until the Twentieth Century has led to a distinct geog-
graphic division so that one can cross from the primitive smallholdings of
Donegal to the subsidised and heavily capitalised farming landscape of Lon¬
donderry. It seems doubtful that Donegal and Londonderry were that differ¬
ent before the partition of Ireland, but today the people feel themselves
loyal to different states and the landscape demonstrates this variety of out¬
look. Without the necessary attitude towards the political boundaries on the
pert of the governments concerned and the peoples governed the lines would
still be there, but would be unimportant to the geographer. If the 'boundar¬
ies exist, but sre ignored they will not have much effect on the geography of
the states involved. If the Common Parket experiment was followed to its
logical conclusion so that the boundaries between Italy, Germany, "ranee, Bel¬
gium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg ceased to function, and the attitude of
the people also changed, then the boundaries around the C-onsaon Market would
3till be of importance as geographical divisions, but the effect of the in¬
ternal lines would quickly diminish*
The Common Haricet is as yet largely an economic union, but Eastern Eur¬
ope's connections with tho U.3.S.R. are both economic and political. The Sov¬
iet Union has tied such countries as Poland, i ast Germany, and Czechoslovakia
to it both in forme of government, and in auch things as co'jmunications, orien¬
tation of industry and markets. Czechoslovakia sells its manufactures mainly
within tho Iron Curtain states and gets its needs from its fellow Communist
countries. Poland has a Coronunict government and would find it hard to adjust
its economy to the states of .-astern Europe after 20 years of serving "die re-
quiremerits of the U.S.S.R.
The political "boundaries of Worth America are of interest to the
geographer wishing to see the effect of such lines. European coloniz¬
ation wasjof vital importance to the geography of the continent, to take
one instance the relief runs from north to south whilst this has largely
been ignored in the political decisions of the immigrants. With the ex¬
ception of the Canada-Alaska boundary the lines between Mexico and the
United States and Canada and the United States run from east to west. So-
called 'natural1 boundaries in North America were only accepted politi¬
cally when human settlement considered them well suited to the purpose.
Man-made and artificial limits were of importance. Quebec province in Can¬
ada owes much of its character to the Roman Catholic Church which was active
in colonization and moulded much of the landscape, and its boundary with
Ontario is of importance in so far as it acts as a division between Wrench
Quebec and British and Protestant Ontario. If Canadian election campaigns
are any sort of indicator the boundaries of Quebec still have significance
for the French-speaking Canadians who make up the majority of the prov¬
ince's population.
Within the United States large areas were formerly either part of the
Spanish New World Empire or the Mexican Republic, but have been incorpor¬
ated into Washington's dominions. And yet few vestiges of the Spanish and
Mexican administration remain. Texans are often referred to as 'super-
Americans' a3 they possess more of the characteristics the world has come to
associate with the United States. Since the United States-Mexican War of
the 1840's the Texan has seemed to be intent on turning both himself and his
environment into the most American of the states, as if the nearness to the
alien Mexican environment acted as a challenge. To the Texan the boundary
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with Msxioo is of prim© significance. And Mexico is different for her© the
brilliance of the IrecxxLuiribian Mayan, Toltec and Astec cultures was mixed
with the invading Spanish civilisation to produce a unique quality which
is not found in the rest of North America. Both Canada and the United
States are of obvious European origin, hut in Mexico of equal importance
has been the Indian population.
The cultural influence of Mexico has been driven back to the boundary
by the United States and each side of the line a different economy has dev¬
eloped with different settlement patterns, and a different orientation to
the transport systems. The western part of the boundary is an arbitrary line
which has successfully been superimposed upon the landscape. Somewhat in con¬
trast to this the northern frontier of the Chinese Empire used to be delimited
by the Chinese ability to introduce their irrigated agriculture into an area.
Where the Chinese could not settle because their technological ability was
not adequate to overcome the irrigation problems the lands of the nomadic
tribes began. Efforts were made by the Chinese to demarcate this line by build¬
ing the various Great Walls of China which were not so much for defence as to
show the limits of the Chines® dominions. The physical geography of the north-
em areas limited permanent Chinese expansion until the arrival of the more
advanced technology of Europe. With the building of railways the Chinese made
rapid inroads into the lands of the Manchu, Mongol and Uighur tribal areas.
She Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of China today has five Chinese farmers
for every Mongolian. Outer Mongolia felt the challenge of Chinese expansion
during the Nineteenth Century and actively solicited the support of Tsarist
Russia and later the U.S.S.R. to counteract it. In 1921 the Mongolian
People's Republic was established under Soviet protection. Outer Mongolia
has since developed as a satellite of the Soviet Union, an arrangement which
is popular in Ulan Bator# With Soviet support the Mongols stopped the ad¬
vance of the Chinese at the newly established international boundary, and
in 1947 managed to get the recognition of Nationalist China# In 1962 the
boundary between Communist China and the Mongolian People* s Republic was
dealt with in a Sina-Mongolian agree:,ient, the details of which are as yet
unavailable# The Soviet Union has followed a policy of encouraging the Mon¬
gols to concentrate on their traditional econony of atockraising, and in
I960 over 95/0 of the mongolian exports to the U.S.S.R# (by value) were animal
products# In contrast to this China has been actively promoting the develop¬
ment of Inner Mongolia as a wheat and cereals area# The Mongolian People* s
Republic is organised along Soviet Lines whilst Inner Mongolia is rapidly be-
comii^ Chinese# What was once an area of Mongol pastoralism has been radi¬
cally changed by a political boundary (dealt with more fully in Section Seven).
Although, as lias been previously stated, each political boundary, like
each state, is unique it was felt that there are certain factors which most
have in common and in this chapter it is hoped that most of these have been
covered# A number of the boundaries dealt with later in this stucjy have been
mentioned, but to broaden the interpretation of phenomena related to the
boundaries examples from other parts of the world have also been used# China
is a totalitarian state with a number of frontiers in the process of changing
into effective political boundaries; under such circumstances it is rewarding
to look at the political implications of totalitarian government on political
boundaries, and to study more mature examples to see what happens when a
frontier has developed into a functioning boundary# Similarly, such general¬
izations as Bogga* and Hartshome*s boundary classifications add to the know¬
ledge available regarding political boundaries# Not cmly is it impossible to
endeavour to answer the two questions posed in this thesis without further
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understanding regarding the background of states and political boundaries,
but until an effort to procure such an understanding is attempted it will
not perhaps be appreciated to what extent the two questions are inter¬
related. As it is hoped it can now be seen the effectiveness of political
influence within the state area is directly related to the extent to which
the political boundaries, those lines delimiting the state's jurisdiction,
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Little progress can be made with regard to a discussion of the polit¬
ical geography of China and the surrounding states without knowledge of the
Canmunist ideology# To answer questions relating to the effectiveness of
state administrations within the state area, or to try and assess the eff¬
ect of a political boundary upon the landscape, lacks practicability in
Asia unless they are specifically related to a Comauniat framework. In no
continent is Coranunlam more a crucial political factor than in Asia, and,
therefore, in this study it is the overwhelming political consideration.
Such being the case it was felt necessary to use the first two chapter's
of this section to look at it more closely, firstly as a world wide political
movement, and then to deal with it in an Asian context. Following these two
chapters it then becomes more meaningful to describe China as a 'Communist
state* with all the implications this involves regarding the neighbouring
states.
Karl Mane is always claimed as the ideological father of Communism.
Marx was born the eldest son of Keinrich and Henrietta Marx on Ifiay 5th, 1813
in Trier in the German Ehineland. At the Congress of Vienna Trier became
part of Prussia. hrx's parents were Jewish, but the Prussian government
was unsympathetic to Jews and in 1816 passed anti-Jewish legislation which
threatened Heinrich Marx* a position as a lawyer, so he entered the Lutheran
Church in 1817. 'The hostility of ... (Karl Iforx) ... to everything conn¬
ected to religion, and in particular to Judaism, may well be partly due to
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the peculiar and embarrassed situation in which such converts found thenr-
1
selves. • It seems that the warm friendship shared by Karl Marx and his
father led also to a sympathy in ideas. Anyway, Heinrich Marx was much
influenced in his ideas by the French Revolution, as were so many intell¬
ectuals of his generation, and brought up Karl in the belief that society's
future upheavals would depend upon the working classes for their success. It
is possible to see in this basic concept an idea which would appeal so
strongly to the Chinese peasant's son Mao Tse-tung.
Imbued with the notion that the future belonged to the working classes
Marx tried to demonstrate that the great political trends of historic times#
for example liberalism or democracy or socialism, in fact corresponded to
certain classes of society. As the middle classes had already succeeded to
power in most of western Europe the next logical step was the triumph of the
working classes. 'Marx believed that the proletariat, by the natural course
of industrial progress and the increase of destitution and exploitation which
2
he supposed went with it, became more revolutionary every day', so he consid¬
ered western Europe was ripe for a working class revolution which would bring
the lower strata of society to power.
But before the teachings of Marx could gain the phenomenal internat¬
ional popularity which they have enjoyed during the Twentieth Century they
had to be modified with regard to one particular point. Being a Western
European Marx thought only in terns of the industrial working classes. It
was left to the 1917 Russian Revolution under Lenin to disprove the Marx
hypothesis that an agricultural society was unsuited to the needs of a worfc-
1. I.Berlin: 'Karl Maxx'j Oxford University Press, hew York 1959,p. 27*
2. F.Borkenau: 'World Coimtunism' } University of Michigan Press
edition, Ann Arbor 1962, p.44*
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ing class rebellion. Lenin's contention that a peasant economy was .just
as useful as an industrial one for the needs of a Communist revolution
ma emphatically confirmed in 194-9 t<3 Mao's successes in China.
Stripped down to its bare bones the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Communist
ideology has an appeal which is difficult to challenge* It is most effect¬
ive in those states where economic contrasts between the classes *l.g the most
blatant# the past two notable examples being the Soviet Union and China. In
such countries as the United Kingdom the appeal of Cooaaunisra has been largely
negated by the rising expectations, usually fulfilled, of the working classes.
Similarly the graft and corruption practised in the China of Chiang Kai-shek
prior to 194-9, and emphasised by the war with Japan, would have helped any
party professing an interest in the harsh life of the bulk of the population.
The belief of the Communists that they can improve the lot of a state, both
economically and socially, is a simple but effective piece of propaganda for
people who are hungry and without a future.
Of significance to the geographer is the unacceptability of all other
forms of government to the C taaunist world. Communist ideology demands the
overthrow of other regimes until all the states of the world have Ccaanunist
administrations. Although the Soviet Union, for example, has the appearance
of having abandoned her revolutionary plans this is deceptive. The differ¬
ences between China and the U.S.S.R. are not in goals, but in methods of
achieving such goals. Beginning tentatively in 1956 at the 20th Party Con¬
gress in Moscow Krushchev suggested that war might not be inevitable and
violent revolution necessary to bring about Communism in the non-Coumunist
states. Mao'* China disagrees and states that the world Coemuniat revolution
can only be brought about by a clash of arras. Despite the contrast in app¬
roach to the geographer what is of greater importance is the sincerely held
IAPI.THEcommunistworld
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belief tiiat one day all countries will have Conramist administrations. Thus
where a Caauunist state shares a political boundary with a ncnHJomtaunist
country the line is also an ideological divide. Such boundaries are often
impose i rigidly upon the landscape so that the human geography on either
side begins to diverge in character, even where formerly there had been a cul¬
tural unity as between the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Democratic
German Republic. The imposition of the boundary upon the landscape is most
noticeable between the Canmuniat states and those countries supporting the
United States' stand in the so-called 'Cold War', but can also take place be¬
tween Communist and uncommitted states, such as along the Sino-Indian bound¬
ary following the 19&2 conflict between the two states, or between Coiaaunist
states as with the Sino-Soviet boundary following the ideological split be¬
tween China and the U.S.S.R*
ISvery state has a quality of uniqueness about it both in its actions and
its characteristics, so a map of the Communist world is deceptive in its
apparent solidarity (Map I.). Besides the ideological split between the
U.S.S.R. and China, much of which can be laid at the door of Russian and
Han Chinese nationalism, there are other differences* One of the more int¬
eresting ones is whether a state has had a successful revolution, or whether
it has had a Communist regime imposed upon it by either the Soviet Union or
the People's Republic of China. In the former category is the Soviet Union,
China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Cuba and Yugoslavia. The reason for the
Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, hast Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Albania and North Korea can be traced to the expansionism of the
U.S»3.R. under Stalin during the latter part and after the Second World




part of China by military conquest. Yugoslavia, the most independent
minded of the sraaller Caoauniat states, does not fit easily into either
the Chinese or Soviet camps.
Where Comraunisa lias been imposed upon the state by either the U.S.S.B.
or China there is usually less effective state administration because the
majority of the population does not fully aooept the situation. The re¬
volts in Hungary and Tibet demonstrate this important factor. Where there
has been a successful revolution, as in China, the co-operation of the bulk
of the population makes the control of the central authority over the state
area initially and increasingly more effective. The geographical impact of
the state*s political boundaries is limited until either they are imposed
upon the landscape by the alien military forces, or the population of the
state has accepted the type of government thrust upon it.
Despite these differences within the Cooraunist bloc there are enough
similarities to justify a political geographer dealing with the Marxist-*
3
Leninist-ifeoist states together. Toyhbee raade an interesting comparison
between Comuunism and Islam which helps to partly explain the dynamic nat¬
ure of the former; *Like Communism Islam was an anti-Western movement which
was at the same time a heretical version of a Western faith; and, like Conn-
unism, it wielded a sword of the spirit against which there was no defence
in material armaments*. 'Hie Communist states of the world tend to believe
that the peoples of other countries desire a Communist revolution and it is
only the governments with which they are in conflict. This belief that all
but the governing elite are awaiting the arrival of the Communist revolution
is another factor which leads to an active attitude along many of the boundr-
3. A.Toyhbee: * Civilization on Trial* J Meridian Books,
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aries between Communist and non-Cormiunist states, as in Laos, South Viet¬
nam and South Korea for example.
Of the actual distribution of Communist states throughout the world
at present (Map i) there is a vast area covering Eurasia from Eastern
Europe to the Pacific and from the Arctic Ocean to the Himalayas. To this
main bloc can be added the Caribbean island of Cuba. Despite the great
publicity given to the United States-Cuba Crisis in 1963 it is along the
periphery of the Eurasian Communist bloc that there is the greatest effort
to put into action the concept of World Revolution. This might be expected
as it is geographically easier to support the Pathet Lao in Laos when China
shares a common boundary with the state (and so does North Vietnam) , than
to effectively equip the sizeable Conmunist following in Brazil or Venezuela.
Par example, although the Communist insurrection in the Philippines which
began in 1948 had the support of a discontented peasantry and could by 1950
claim an army of 40,000 threatening Manila the revolt was isolated from the
Soviet Union and Mao was not fully established in Peking. With American aid
President Magsaysay crushed the Philippines' uprising.
Europe provides a useful area in which to study the space relationships
between modern Comnunism and non-Communist states. With regard to Map 2,
the criteria for labelling the Conanuniat states is (aembership of the Warsaw
Pact, for having anti-Communist sentiments membership of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, and those other states shown are assumed to be uncomm¬
itted (although many Coomnist states would feel that there was no such
political stand). This leaves Yugoslavia unplaced, but as Tito's Govern¬
ment professes Canriunism the state has been included in. the category of
those within the Warsaw Pact.
With the notable exception of Yugoslavia the Cojnmmiat states which
fringe the Soviet Unicoi's western boundaries are the outcome in their pol¬
itical loyalties of having been geographically closest to the U*S.S.R. at
the end of the Second v.orld war when Stalin was putting into practice where
he could the overthrow of nan-Conramist countries by force* It in inter¬
esting to note that of the European states which had Comnunist regimes
thrust upon them by the Soviet Union the one which has shown the most in¬
dependence from the U#S.S.R. in the Sino-Soviet dispute is the one which is
the least accessible to Soviet power geographically, namely Albania which
has N*A*T*0* committed Greece along the southern boundary, the Adriatic Sea
in the West, and shares her other boundaries with the independently minded
state of Yugoslavia* Geographically it would be much mora difficult for
the Soviet Union to bring force to bear upon Albania than it was upon Hung¬
ary in 1956»
As is shown in the next chapter jN*A*T*0* is not the only ncrrCoKnwnist
grouping which has been stimulated by 'Cold v.ar* thinking* The most notable
of the other organisations are S.S.A.T.O* and the Central Treaty Organisation,
the former operating in eastern Asia and the latter in western Asia* But
K.A.T.O* is an excellent example for studying reactions to (kmraunist ideol¬
ogies and expansionism* Throughout the world in most areas where there is
a confrontation between a Conmunist state and an American backed non-
Comaunist country the differences in ideology affect the geography of the
state areas and notably in the region of the political boundary shared by the
two states* The well defined boundary between East arid West Germany has its
Asian counterpart in Harth and South Korea* The United States is the inspir¬
ation behind such world wide efforts to counteract the Communist aim of world
revolution* and organisations such as N*a.T*0* and S.B.A.T.O* represent
an attempt to block such expansionism.
Coiimmiam is a global movement, an ideology which is active in every
continent* Perhaps more emphasis than is desirable has been placed in this
chapter* upon European examples, but for the political geographer Europe and
Asia provide more tangible evidence regarding Connamiara than the other parts
of the -world* and so some lack of balance in any world view of the ideology-
is unavoidable* Nevertheless, although after this chapter the emphasis is
upon Asian CoiiE&mlsm, it must not be forgotten that it is an ideology which
is truly international in its aims* Chinese nationalism may colour Peking's
interpretation of the writings of Marx and Lenin* or territorial ambitions
dilute Hanoi's* but in one aim the whole Communist structure does provide the
appearance of a monolithic unity so dear to btalin'a heart, namely in its de¬
sire to convert the rest of the world to its ideology* 'Whether by peaceful
or warlike means this implies that all Communist states are at least latently
expansionist, and this affects the political boundary area, more especially
if it is shared with a non-Cojununist country. All Communist states are total¬
itarian in their form of government* and the central authorities strive to im¬
pose their authority throughout the state area quickly and effectively as wit¬
ness Chinese policy within Tibet*
CflvPEER TWO
Comrmmism in Aaia
Communism in Asia did not commence with the final success of the
Chinese Revolution in 1949* The Russian experience of 1917 profoundly
influenced those parts of the continent surrounding China* Korea had its
Communist Party by 1925, Japan in 1922, in the 1920*s Vietnam's Ho Chi-
minh was learning the rudiments of Marxism and Leninism in Paris and Mos¬
cow, the 1923 Kuomintang-Communist alliance within China led to the send¬
ing of Chinese Communist agents to Malaya, before China had a Communist
Party one flourished in Java* The 1930' s saw the establishment of Commun¬
ist Parties in Thailand (1930), the Philippines (1932), and India (19339*
However, Communism in Asia is increasingly dominated by the fact that
the Chinese mainland is in Communist hands* The Soviet Union still has im¬
mense power and prestige within the continent, but since Peking's role dur¬
ing the Korean War Moscow has tended to be eclipsed by China, although the
1953 purge within the North Korean administration was a belated effort to
curb the influenoe of the pro-Chinese element in North Korean politics.
1
One American scholar wrote of the Communist victory in China in 1949 'this
is probably the most important political and strategic change in the inter¬
national situation since World War II'* Certainly the space relationships
within Asia have been radically affected by the intrusion of an energeti¬
cally missionising Communist state in the middle of the continent*
Asia is a vast continent and it is easier to divide it into a number
of sections to view the space relationships between the various states*
This division is an arbitrary one* The Northeast area has the Communist
1* A-D.Baraett: 'Communist China & Asia'; Council on Foreign Relations,
published by Vintage Books, New York i960, p*I*
 










states of China, the U.S.S.R. and North Korea (Map l), the Western committed
states of Tainan (hound tightly to the United States e.g. American aid to
Taiwan totalled over 3*000 million dollars between 1949 and 1962), South Kor¬
ea (similarly dependent upon the United States;, the British Colony of Hong
2
Kong, Portugese Macau (Portugal is a member of N.A.T.O.) and, finally, the
uncommitted state of Japan. North Korea has been influenced initially by
its proximity to the Soviet Union, and since 1949 by its large neighbour to
the nortil. South Korea retains its independence as a result of American in¬
tervention, as does the Nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan, both of which
would hardly seem likely to survive China's aggressive expansionism in the
area but for the United States' naval power dominating the Pacific. Hong
Kong and Macau are useful to the Chinese as an outlet, but are remnants of a
former period. Japan is an uncommitted country which inclines towards the ^
United States in foreign policy and is greatly influenced by the latter in
culture and economy.
The Southeast region of Asia (Map 2) has the Communist state of China
sharing a boundary with that of sympathetic North Vietnam, and also the neu¬
tral countries of Laos (an unsteady neutrality) and Burma. In what was form¬
erly French Indochina Cambodia is uncommitted with regard to the Sino-Amerioan
conflict in Asia, as is Indonesia farther south. The Philippines and Thailand
.
are members of the American inspired South Bast Asia Collective Defence Treaty
and can therefore be counted amongst the Western Committed states. South Viet-
nam is dependent upon the United States for survival as an independent country
and is unlikely to follow any foreign policy which might offend the latter.
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1. As Macau is a Portugese territory comprising three islands off the coast
of China it has not been included in this study, not being a land j
boundary state with the People's Republic. J
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The recently established Malayasia (inaugurated on September 16th 1963)
is dominated by Malaya which was under a Btate of emergency from 1948 un¬
til i960 because the country's stability was threatened by a Communist re¬
bellion, and is therefore sympathetic to the Western cause and anti-Commun¬
ist. Portugese Timor can be included in the Western Committed areas. With¬
in the Southeastern area the coming to power of Communism in North Vietnam
was helped by proximity to Mao's China and the Communist successes in Laos
owe much to that state* s position bordering on China and North Vietnam.
3
North, South and West Asia (Map 3) is dominated by China and India.
The Communist state of China is bounded in the north by the Mongolian People's
Republic and the U.S.S.R. which in theory is the ideal situation for a Comm¬
unist regime (i.e. two fellow Communist states as neighbours), but which
proves to be more complex than an ideological map would suggest. India,
Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan are uncommitted in the "Cold War".
After the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 it might have been expected that India
would become part of the Western alliances, but such has not been the case.
The only Western committed state in the area is Pakistan which is a member of
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and the Central Treaty Organisation.
Despite its connections with the United States and Britain Pakistan has of
late had amicable relations with the People's Republic of China. With regard
to geographical position Mongolia was deeply influenced in its choice of
Communism by its closeness to the then young Soviet state and the challenge
from non-Communist China. The two great Asian powers of China and India
sharing a boundary also produces a political instability in the border areas,
as does Pakistan and India's dispute over Kashmir.
3« The Arab countries have not been included in Asia.
Aaia today is dominated by Comaunist China's incomparable geographi-
cal position in what is roughly the centre of the continent# China has a
traditional prestige throughout Asia which is not enjoyed to the same extent
by the Soviet Union or the United States# Much of Asia has grown used to
paying its respects to China as the centre of the civilized world. Added to
its excellent geographical location, and traditional prestige in Asia China
4
also has a missioniaing ideology. In 1957 Mao Tse-tung stated before the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 'in the end the socialist system will replace
the capitalist system. This is an objective law independent of human will.
Ho matter how hard the reactionaries try to prevent the advance of the wheel
of history, revolution will take place sooner or later and will surely triumph'.
The Chinese believe in W orId Revolution and take every opportunity to promote
it. Inevitably those states in Asia with non-Communist governments and closest
to China* s boundaries geographically are often deeply affected by the latter's
beliefs. Similarly, those states which have been most successful in promot¬
ing unity within the state area and have the most effective administrations
domestically are less affected by China's ideologies than those states where
the influence of the central authority is less than satisfactory throughout
the state area (e.g. South Vietnam). Where there has been an effective anti-
communist administration countering Chinese ideological expansion the common
political boundary had developed as a dividing feature in the landscape.
4. Mao Tse-tung: Speech quoted in 'Current Background*, Ho. 480,





CHAPTER TljREB : CHINA
1
The Historical Backgyyyxd ,
There are few states in the modern world which are more influenced in
their present outlock by past historical experience than China. The Chinese
of the mainland adhere to the Marxist ideology, but it has been modified and
adapted to Chinese conditions. Although it is possible to view an action
such as the Chinese conquest of Tibet after 1949 as Communist world revolut¬
ion being put into effect in fact the situation is far more complex than
that. Tibet was a tributary state of China under the last Ch'ing Dynasty
which collapsed in 1911, and this historical fact colours the present Peking
administration's attitudes towards Tibet as much as Mao's belief in world rev¬
olution by armed force. As history intrudes so much into present Chinese pol¬
itical attitudes and actions it was felt necessary to commence a discussion
of China's characteristics with a brief outline of the state's development.
2
It appears probable that there were two foci in the early development
of Chinese civilization, namely in the Middle Yellow River Valley and the
Middle Yangtze Valley (Map l). Of these two areas initially the northern one
was the more significant, but the impressive drive to the south by the Chinese
1. The following have been of importance in the writing of this part of
the thesis! D.Eoclde: 'China's Cultural Tradition'; Einehart, Hew
York 1956; W.T. de Bary: 'Sources of Chinese Tradition'; Columbia
U.P., New York i960; W.Eberhard: 'A History of China'; Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London 1950* C. P. Fitzgerald:' China, A Short Cultural
History'; PraegAr, New York 1950* L.C.Goodrich: 'A 3b,ort History of
the Chinese People'; Harper, New York 195°; O.Lattimore: 'Inner
Asian Frontiers of China*; Beacon Pfsss edition, Boston 1962; & Y.L.
Liang & N.Whymant! 'China'; Macdonald, London 1946.




























that transformed the Yangtze area from the original Southern China into Mid-
China did much to change their relative importance. The civilization was
based on irrigation, which helps to explain the difficulty the Chinese had to
expand beyond the Great Wall frontier where conditions did not favour such
agriculture.
Ignoring the early Hsia and Shang cultures of northern China, both
shrouded in myth and legend, it is perhaps best to commence this summary of
Chinese history with the Cfccu period (about 13DQ to 24-9 B.C.), the era which
is somewhat easier to decipher than the prior cultures. Initially the Chou
capital was in Shensi (Map 2) , but in the Eighth Century B.C. it was moved
into the Great Plain. Hie Chou Empire (Map 3) was a feudal state, with the
ruler distributing all fief'3 and favours personally. The nobility was above
punishment, although there was a cods of honour in which suicide played a prom¬
inent part. Ilie religion of the state was a form of ancestor worship in which
the ruler became a sacred symbol as the 'Son of Heaven'. Possibly the great-
eat weakness in the system was the reliance upon the ruling casta where there
was a need for men of worth in numbers it was increasingly difficult to satisfy.
By the time the Chou capital was transferred from Loyang in northwest
Honan the power of the Chou Dynasty was in decline. The age of the Eastern
Chou can be divided into two periods, from 772 to 432 B.C., and from about
434 to 221 B.C. The first period saw the absorption of the small feudal states
surrounding the now powerless monarchy by the more successful of their fellows,
and the next period is visually known as the 'Age of the Warring States' • What
is important for the political geographer regarding this early period of Ciiin-
ese history is that, except when internal strife sapped its strength, the Chou
Empire was expansionist, may well have begun to develop a rudimentary form of
nationalism amongst its elite due to a culture which was superior to that of
the surrounding areas, and had a not unimpressive political structure within
the state. The Chou was followed by the Ch'in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.).
Whilst other feudal states fought amongst theiaaelves the Ch'in in the
northwest remained aloof and concentrated on building up its own strength.
The outcome was an organisation not dissimilar from Sparta with every man
liable to military service throughout his life, and the military receiving
preferential treatment. The other feudal states fell easy victims to the
Ch'in armies. For the first time the title 'Emperor* was used, instead of
'King' • Although the Ch' in Empire never survived the second Emperor the
whole system of administration was overhauled with the abolishing of the feu¬
dal states and the division of territory into provinces. The armies were used
to drive the Huns from the great bend of the Yellow River and much of the
Great Wall was constructed. In 210 B.C. the Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang Ti died
to be succeeded by his inept son. The regime crashed, but it had managed to
unify the Empire, introduce a standard system of currency, weights and meas¬
ures, and start a line of dynasties which lasted until 1911 A.D. During
Ch'in times Chinese armies reached Worth Vietnam.
Although the Ch'in Empire was brief its importance to later Chinese
history was vast. For the first time trie Chinese acknowledged the imperial
outlook of their regime and, as if an omen for the modern world, began tak¬
ing an interest in alien lands as far away as north Vietnam. Feudalism was
abandoned and much of the administration throughout the state area stand¬
ardised.
'Die ensuing Han Dynasty (202 B.C. - 220 A.D.) has frequently been re¬
ferred to as the 'Golden Age of China'. The first Han Emperor Kao Ti start¬
ed life as a peasant called Liu Pang. Under the Emperor Wu Ti (140-87 B.C.)
the Western Han entered upon an era of territorial expansion. Korea was in¬
corporated into the Empire, the southern areas of China were brought firmly
under the Imperial rule and the threat of the Huns (llsiung-nu) actively
counteracted* Contact was made with the Soman ampire and India* Despite
the achievements of Wu Ti'a reign already signs of decay at Court showed
themselves (eunuch intrigue, royal parasites)* An early experiment in
'Coiimunism' was made under Wang Mang who had gained the throne by devious
means* He seized all estates and then divided them amongst the peasants*
Wang mang's reign lasted from 9 to 25 A.D. when he was defeated by Liu Hsin
who became the first of the Eastern Han Dynasty as Emperor Kuang Wu
('Eastern Han' signifies that the state capital was transferred from Ch'ang
An to the more easterly Loyang (Map I).
With some justification the Chinese like to point out that tiiey were
already experimenting with a form of Communism by the first century A*D*
under Wang sang. Perhaps more important with regard to the early Han Dyn¬
asty is that the tradition of territorial expansion during times of inter¬
nal strength was already well established* Tenuous contact was even made
with the Mediterranean, although it would be dangerous to overstress this
fact as it would be to claim that Africa was under British control at the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century because Landor had discovered the
source of the Higer. However, by the first century A.D. the Chinese had
firm control over the northern Hwang Ho area and the southern fangtse area,
and had nominal control of Korea*
The first Eastern Han Emperor was a Confucian scholar, but under Ming
Ti an embassy was sent to India in 0I-67 A.D* which officially introduced
Buddhism into China* Buddhism revived the Taoist beliefs and in later
years the two religions became rivals (it must be realised that the spread
of Buddhism in China was very slow, both because of the alien environment
and the primitive communications) • The Han Dynasty began its inevitable
decay and perished in bloody strife between the adherents of the then Emp-
press and the Court eunuchs. The Emperor survived only to fall auto the
hands of one of his three rivals. The Empire that stretched somewhat ten¬
uously to the Pamirs by 97 A.D. degenerated at its core. General Ts'ao Ts'
seized the Emperor and his son and set up a kingdom based on Loyang in the
north named Wei, whilst the south was divided between the dynasties of Wu
under Sun Ch'uan, and Han under Liu Pei. A general of the Wei managed to
unify the three states (the Chin Dynasty, 265-313 A.D.), but with only lim¬
ited success.
The Mongolian and Turkic tribes of the north pillaged the capitals of
Ch'ang-an and Loyang in 311 and 316 A.D. and the Chin Dynasty was forced
south, eventually setting up the capital at Hanking. Until the Sixth Cent¬
ury China was again divided into North and South. In the North the Toba
Tartars set up the Northern Wei Dynasty (386-535 A.D.), later using Loyang
as their capital. In 420 A.D. the Chin Dynasty was overthrown in the South
and in the Sixth Century the Northern Wei rule broke up.
By the 580's the Northern Chou had united North China. A general Yang
Ch'ien deposed the child emperor and began the short lived Sui Dynasty
(589-618 A.D.) which united the North and South once again. The Sui rule
was weak and fell before its rebellious subjects. This provided the opp¬
ortunity for an amazing man Li Shih-min to place his father Li Yuan on the
throne in Gh'ang-an as Emperor Kao Tsu. So began the T'ang Dynasty ^618-
907 A.D.j. Despite his being the younger son Li Shih-min became Emperor
in 627 A.D. Victories against the Tuiks under their leader Qadir who had
pestered the Chinese frontier areas for a nuiiiber of years led to the ac¬
quisition of Inner Mongolia in the second quarter of the Seventh Century.
After the initial successes of the T* ang Dynasty there followed s gradual
decline. The Examination System was fully established and the Islamic rel-
igion introduced, but too much power eventually came into the hands of the
military governors, more especially in the borderlands. General Chu Wen
murdered the last of the T'ang Emperors and founded the Liang Dynasty (907-
923 A.D.), but his son was overthrown by the Turkish general Li E' cr-yung
who became Emperor of the Later T'ang Dynasty (923-936 A.D.). With the aid
of the Kitan Tartars the Later Chin Dynasty ruled from 936 to 947 A.D. There
followed the Later Han (947-951)> and the Later Chou (951-960). Throughout
the troubled period which began with the decline of the T'ang Dynasty China's
limitations a3 a cohesive state are well demonstrated. Notable amongst these
'forces for disintegration' is the problem of an inadequate transport system,
more especially in the frontier areas which were thereby even harder to stab¬
ilise. With a dictatorial form of government it becomes especially important
that control is effective in those areas furthest from the centre of adminis¬
tration or those provincials with an abundance of local, power are tempted to
challenge the distant overlord. Similarly, the traditional division between
North and South China would have been at least partly counteracted by the
transport network if it had equalled the efficiency of the contemporary Soman
one. The threat from the frontier in the north which the nomadic tribesmen
presented to the Chinese state might also have been negated by a transport
network such as the Roman which permitted the rapid digrjstch of troops and
equipment to areas of danger. Having apparently noted the lesson of history
the present Chinese administration has put much effort into constructing an
adequate transport system to tie more closely border areas such as Tibet and
Sinkisng to the central authority.
The Sung Era began in 960 A.D. when General Chao S'uang-yin was pro¬
claimed Emperor by his fellow officers. The Dynasty lasted until 1280 A.D.
Despite an impressive cultural flowering the Sung period was something of a
failure, From the beginning it was dominated by ' barbarians' • The power
of the Kitans in the north wa3 never effectively curbed, and in the north¬
west the Tunguts carved out a kingdom for themselves. The Nuchen Tartars
set themselves up as the Kin Dynasty and ravaged the North in the Twelfth
Century, and once again China was divided with the Kin Tartars ruling the
region north of the Yangtze and the Sung maintaining itself to the south
with the capital at Hangchow. The harmony achieved between the two empires
was shattered by the arrival of the Mongols. The Kin were mauled by Jeng-
hiz Khan (1162-1227 A.D.), but whilst they were engaged in fighting the Mon¬
gols after the death of Jenghiz Khan (there are a number of spellings of
this name; the Sting armies reoccupied K'ai-feng and Loyang. Soon, however,
the armies of -the Sung Dynasty were reeling before the might of Ogotai's
Mongols. Ogotai died in 1241 and his grandson Mangu in SzechwaB in 1259*
but his other grandson Kublai completed the Mongol conquest of China.
Until the coming of European seapower, which was of dominant importance
to China from the Nineteenth Century onwards, the problems of the Sung Dyn¬
asty with regard to the frontier zones typify the situation which prevailed
when the state was in a period of comparative weakness. The challenge to
China's political unity came either from the northern frontier or from Sink-
iang. With the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations there may yet be a
reversal of the modern situation so that the greatest challenge to China is
once more from the north} at present the presence of American naval power in
the Bacific continues the situation which has prevailed since the Nineteenth
Century. During the Sung period the political administration was never eff¬
ective enough to produce unity throughout China, and there was not even firm
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control over the Eighteen Provinces (Map 2) which have been traditionally
regarded as Han China (the centre from which Chinese expansion moved out¬
wards) ♦ Until the advent of Communism China has represented a culture more
than a state, and it has only been during periods of exceptionally strong
government, often alien, that any form of unity has been imposed upon much
of the area now regarded as China, This problem of the basis for Chinese
unity is dealt with more fully later in this chapter when geographical dist¬
ributions are described.
Under the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1280-1368 A.D.) the Chines© Empire once
more expanded its boundaries. Korea and Burma beaano vassal states. In 1294
Kuhlai died to be succeeded by a series of weak rulers. A rebel leader named
Chu Yuan-chang placed himself at the head of some of the discontented factions
in China, and managed to gain the support of the pirate Pang Kao-chen. In
1367 Chu assumed the title of Emperor Hiuig Wu and marched on the capital to
claim the throne.
The Mongols were alien, but perhaps of greater significance they en¬
deavoured to rule without using the traditional governing classes of China.
Whilst there were men of outstanding ability the Mongols could dominate China,
but a weak ruler provided the Chinese elite with an opportunity to usurp the
throne and regain power. The Ming Dynasty made much of its claim to being
•Chinese*, but this meant more that it was 'Chinese* in culture than its rul¬
ers were Chinese in birth. The Mongol Yuan Dynasty had committed the uafor-
giveable sin of refusing to give up its alien ways, and had even counter¬
acted Chinese influences by using Turkic administrators throughout the
state area.
The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) initially maintained the territorial
expansion of the Mongols. In 1421 Peking once more became the capital, as
it had been under Kublai Khan# The choice of Peking, rather than some
more southerly centre such as Ranking (top I) has usually implied that
the a (Ministration is mare interested in the problems or advantages off¬
ered by an emphasis upon the northern frontier# Thus, with its close ties
with the Soviet Union following the Revolution of 1949 it was predictable
that the Coumuniat government should choose Peking as its capital, whilst
the previous Nationalist (Kuoraintang Party) government of Chiang Kai-shek
had favoured Ranking as the sea connections of the administration, notably
that with the United States, predominated# During the Fifteenth Century
most of Indochina (Hap 2) was under Ming rule, and contact was made with
Java, Sumatra, Cftylon and Aden, but these short lived adventures always
took second place to the northern frontier# The zenith of Ming power was
under the Araperor Ilaiao Tsung (1438-1506), after which a decline began. The
challenge came from the northern frontier area# 3y 1619 Hurhaabu had con¬
quered Manchuria with his Ru-chih 'Tartars, and had invaded the Liaotung Pen¬
insula. Rebellions within China and an appeal from the Imperial General u
Sair-kuei for aid gave the lanchus their opportunity# The new Dynasty was
proclaimed in the North in 1644, although the South was atill in the iianda
of the 3'iing Mmperor# By 1650 Canton had been captured. In a manner not
dissimilar to Chiang Kai-shek's exit to Taiwan one of the Ming leaders,
Cheng, fled to the island and there set up a rival 'China1J the Msuiehus
lacked the naval power needed to atom Formosa and Cheng liad not the milit¬
ary power to retake the mainland# Later generations acknowledged the Hanchu
power and Taiwan was united with the rest of China# Under K'ang ilai (l662-
1723) the Lmpire was once more extended to include Turkestan and Tibet#
Later Nepal and Burma had to pay tribute to Peking* It is possible to divide
the Ch'ing Dynasty into two parts marked by the abdication of Ch'ien Lung in
1796, after which the now notorious decline in Imperial China became quite
obvious to the European power's* In 181*2 there was the 'Opium War' with Brit¬
ain marking the beginning of European Imperialism in China, in 1851 China
was subject to the Taiping Rebellion, 1894 saw the war with Japan over Korea,
and 1900 the Boxer Rising. In 1911 the Republic of China was proclaimed.
The Manchus were culturally absorbed by China, but neither the Chinese
nor their ruling Dynasty were mentally prepared for the shock of a much
superior European technology. Despite an e arly expansion outwards the Chin¬
ese were fully convinced of the superiority of their way of life and contact
with Europeans meant nothing until the arrival of the latter in much larger
numbers during the Nineteenth Century. The Chinese were used to military
defeats as they had a history of such occurrences along their northern front¬
ier, but they had been always at the hands of nomadic tribesmen with an in¬
ferior culture. Similarly the challenge to the Chinese state, whatever its
territorial dimensions, had always been from the land frontiers, and never
by sea. The Chinese came out of the Opium War in 181*2 not only defeated mil¬
itarily, but also shaken culturally and strategically. Any Chinese adminis¬
trator knew that if the state was weak the answer was to permit the alien
dynasty to gain power and then absorb it culturally, in much the same manner
that the Chinese in their expansion southwards from the Hwang Ho had absorb¬
ed the tribes so that later generations became 'Chinese*. But the Europeans
not only hit upon the novel idea of attacking from the sea, but also were
culturally too sophisticated to be absorbed. For the first time in their
history the Chinese discovered that their own culture was in danger of being
modified by the 'barbarians'. This produced a revolutionary flavour to
Chinese society and it is surprising that the Manchu Dynasty did not fall
20 years before it actually did.
One of the dominant personalities in the downfall of the Dynasty was
Dr. Sun Yat-sen who had received a European education in Honolulu, Canton
and Hong Kong, and thereby appreciated more fully the need to accept West¬
ern innovations rather than resist them. In 1892 Dr. Sun started the Re¬
generate China Society in Macau, and in 1895# launched his first uprising
against the Manchu Dynasty in Canton. Throughout Sun's agitation it is
southern China which is the challenge to the reking administration. This
agitation re-emphasised the differences between north and south China which
had led to two Chinese states previously in history. To counteract the rev¬
olutionary mood of much of the country in 1898 the Emperor Kuang Hsu had
tried to inaugurate a number of reforms only to be frustrated by the Emp¬
ress Dowager, which probably sealed the fate of the Ch'ing Dynasty. In
1905 Sun's Brotherhood Society was founded in Tokyo, and this was later
the core of the Kuomintang Party ("the nationalists) which provided the supp¬
ort for Chiang Kai-shek. With the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty on January
1st, 1912, Dr. Sun became President of the Republic of China, but resigned
on February 23rd in favour of Yuan Shih-kai, eleven days after the formal
abdication of the Manchu Emperor-
Yuan was a reactionary with a desire to follow the traditional Chinese
pattern and set up himself as the first of a new dynasty. He led a series
of attacks against Sun's Kuomintang Party. In 1915 Yuan proclaimed himself
Emperor, but was frustrated in his attempt and died in 1916. Yuan's death
was followed by a scramble for power amongst the warlords, the most succ¬
essful being tiaose farthest from the influences of the central government,
notably those on the frontiers of China. During this period Dr. Sun, al-
ways much nor© aware of the happenings in the rest of the world than the trad¬
itional Chinese elite, began modelling the Kuomintang upon the Russian example.
In 1925 Dr. Sun died.
The new territorial challenge to China again came from the sea. The new
power in Asia during this period was Japan. China, weak with civil strife,
provided the ideal working ground for Japan's ambitions. Japan gave both fin¬
ancial and moral support to a number of the northern warlords fighting against
the Central Government. At the end of the First 'World war the Republican Gov¬
ernment had no control over those areas of the country to the north of the
Yangtze. (Map I). The Japanese use of both the northern warlords, and later
invasion from the sea, combined the traditional challenge to China's unity
with the newer phenomena of naval power.
It is during these troubled times that the Chinese Conmunist Party first
appears. In 1924 the Chinese Communist Party became a member of the Third
International, and had a brief alliance with the Kuomintang Party which was
emerging as the dominant force in Chinese politics. In 1927 the Kuomintang
leader Chiang Kai-shek began a persecution of the Communists at a time when
he was leading the Chinese armies on the Northern Expedition against the war¬
lords (1926-28)• In 1927 Nanking once more became the Capital. The success
of the Kuomintang led to a retreat of the Chinese Conrainists to northern
Shensi (Map 2;•
The Kuoraintang successes within China spurred Japan into action before
unity was achieved, and on September 18th 1931 Mukden, the capital of Liaonr
ing (Map 2) was occupied as a prelude to the conquest of Manchuria. In 1932
Japan attacked Shanghai, and in 1937 began a full invasion of China. With
the war against Japan (1937~45) came the failure of Chiang Kai-shek's regime
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to impose unity throughout China. The strife assisted the rise of the Comm¬
unist Party, and in 1949 the fugitives of the 1920*s became the new rulers
of China. Emulating the Ming refugees the Nationalist (Kuomintang) 'Dynasty*
retreated to Taiwan, its independence guaranteed by American naval power.
The history of China has a certain regularity. New administrations
come to power, achieve some sort of state unity (usually with reference only
to the Eighteen Provinces) which is used for territorial expansion into peri¬
pheral areas such as Mongolia or Sinkiang or even Vietnam, followed by a
period of stagnation and then decline. This decline is then challenged by
another 'Dynasty' which may be Chinese or alien, and the next government
then follows the same pattern. However, the Communist regime is different.
For the first time the Chinese have acknowledged fully a need to accept both
a Western ideology and technology. The Kuomintang was too heavily committed
to the conservative elements in Chinese society to be able to abandon the
traditional belief that the Chinese way of doing things was superior to any¬
thing the 'barbarians' had to offer. Armed with a belief in the importance
of accepting Western technology, and a determination to weld China into a
single political unit with its focus upon Peking, Coumunist China should de¬
feat the forces for disunity in the Chinese cultural area whilst at the same
time equipping the state with a modern enough economy to resist challenges
from the outside. The Chinese state is being centralised by the development
of a comprehensive transport and administrative network, the frontier areas
are being developed and formalised into political boundaries by treaty, and
the heir to the expansionist 'Celestial Empire' now has a missionizing ideol¬
ogy which provides a zeal for conversion amongst the bordering states. Look¬
ing at China in the past it is possible to suggest that political unity was





Eighteen Provinces or included frontier zones such as Manchuria, Mongolia,
Sinkiang and Tibet# When it had its strongest central government China was
little more than a federation of areas# And the farther away from the centre
of government an area was the less effective was the administration# The
frontier zones were never fully incorporated into the state area, even where
there was a formal boundary delimitation as between Tsarist Russia and Man-
chu China. Today Peking's administration in a frontier area such as Tibet
is increasingly well established, with all regional opposition crushed and,





Physical Characteristics of China
The extent to which the political administration at Peking can carry
out effective government throughout China's total area is influenced by the
physical geography of the 3tate. In an economically underdeveloped country
such as China the limitations of the transport network in particular makes
such factors as the rainy season, or desert and mountain terrain, of signi¬
ficance to the central government. Similarly a political boundary running
through an area of rain forest a thousand miles from Peking is more difficult
to reach than such a line running through grassland five hundred miles from
the centre of government. To administer an area up to the boundary means
that the government must have reasonable access to it from the rest of the
state territories, and such access is often dependent within contemporary
China upon the physical geography. As the nature of the physical geography
of China is considered a factor affecting notably the ability of Peking to
effectively administer the state area various aspects of phenomena such as
terrain, climate, vegetation and soils are dealt with in the following
pages in general terras.
Excluding islands China's boundaries cover about 16,250 miles (Map i) •
Extending from latitude 4 degrees N. to 53 degrees N. China has a north-south
maximum measurement of approximately 3,440 miles. West to east the state ex¬
tends from longitude 73 degrees E. to 135 degrees E. (3,125 miles). As will
readily be appreciated China is territorially a large state to administer, and
1. The following text3 have been of particular value in the writing of this
section! L.H.D.Buxton: 'China: The Land & the People*, Oxford U.P.
London 1929} Cressey (G.B.) : 'China's Geographical Foundations', McGraw-
Hill, few York 1934, & 'Land of the 500 Million', McGraw-Hill, New York
1955* Jen (Y) :'A Concise Geography of China', Foreign Languages Press,
Peking I964i Lee (S.t.): 'The Delimitation of the Geographic Regions of
China', Annals of Assoc. of Amer. Geographers, vol.37 for 19471 Naval
Intelligence Division: 'China Proper', Vol.1, 1944J & Shabad (t)j 'China's
Changing Map', Praeger, New York 1956.
this size factor magnifies the difficulties met "by a determined administration
such as that at present in Beking in its efforts to bring effective govern¬
ment to the whole state area.
China*s land boundaries are approximately 9*375 miles long (Map I). They
divide Chinese territory from that of the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's
Republic, Korea, North Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Hong Kong. The boundaries with North Vietnam, Laos,
Nepal, Sikkim and Hong Kong have been both delimited and demarcated; those with
Burma, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Korea, and the U.S.S.R. have been delim¬
ited, although recent Chinese statements suggest that the delimitation of the
Sino-Soviet boundaries may be unsatisfactory to Peking, and the Sino-Mongolian
boundary agreement has not been published so it is only assumed that it has
been delimited. The Sino-Bhutanese and the Sino-Indian boundaries have not
yet been satisfactorily delimited.
The boundary between Korea and China is mostly formed by the Yalu and
2
Tumen Rivers. That between the U.S.S.R., the Mongolian People's Republic
and China stretches from Kirin to western Sihkiang; in the northeast China
and the Soviet Union are divided by Hsingkai Lake, the Ussuri Paver and the
Amur River. The Sino-Mongolian boundary (agreement concluded on December
26th 1962, but details of the treaty still not available) is mainly across
steppe and desert, except in the west where the Altai Mountains dominate the
landscape. In Sinkiang the boundary with the Soviet Union is across mount¬
ains and rivers, whilst the Pamirs straddle the Sino-Afghanistan border. The
Himalayan mountain complex divides China from Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sikkim
and Bhutan. The boundary between China's Yunnan Province and Burma is a wild
area of rivers and mountains. Laos and North Vietnam share a boundary with
2. The geography of the boundary areas is dealt with more fully
later in the thesis.
 
China*s Yunnan and Kwangsi Provinces. Finally, China's maritime harder
is broken for a short distance by the Hong Kong-Kwangtung boundary which
is marked by a small river and its tributaries.
The eastern part of China (Map 2) is mainly composed of hills and plains
with few areas over 2,000 feet. The southwest has a vast complex of land over
15,000 feet. The bulk of the rest of China in the northwest is between 3,000
and 5,000 feet above sea level, but includes some notable exceptions in Sinki-
ang such as the Turfan Depression (500 feet below sea levelj and the Dzungar-
ian Basin.
Of China's total area only a tenth of it is composed of plains, although
this represents four times the size of the British Isles. The three main
plains are in the Northeast, the North China Plain, and that of the middle and
lower Yangtze. There are also smaller plains such as that of the Canton delta.
These plains are amongst the most important agricultural areas in the world.
Transport within tine plain areas is a3 good as anywhere within China, and better
developed than in most areas, but transport between the plains is far from sat¬
isfactory. As China's history shows the comparative isolation of southern China
from the north has on occasion led to it splitting away from the north to form
a separate state. Nationalist-held Taiwan limits the use that can be made of
sea communications between the north of China ana the south, but notably rail
and air transport between the two is being developed in the ©astern half of the
country.
A fifth of China's total area is coaposed of basins. In eastern China is
the agriculturally rich Szeehnan Basin (Map 2) , but the three other main basins
are located in the interior of the country. The Tsai&am Basin is part of the
I> .
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Chinghai-Tibet Plateau and lies between the Chilien Mountains and the Bayan
Kara Mountains which are themselves branches of the Kunlun Mountain range#
The Tarim Basin is between the Kunlun Mountains and the Tien Shan, whilst the
Bzungarian Basin lies between the Tien Shan and the Altai Mountains# The three
basins are isolated from the sea with a semi-arid climate and large areas of
desert. Snow fed rivers from the surrounding mountains have been used for irr¬
igating the basins# Again, transport within the basins is not particularly in¬
hibited by the physical geography, but contact between Peking and such an area
as the Tsaidam Basin (.Map 2) is still far from satisfactory if the central gov-
3
eminent's administration is to be effectively imposed upon the region.
The most important plateaus in China are the loess of the north, the inner
Mongolian plateau, the Tunnan-Kweichow plateau and the Chinghai-Tibet plateau.
The loess plateau lies between the Great Wall in the north and the Chinling
Mountains (Map 2) in the south, and the Taihang Mountains in the east and the
Tao Ho tributary of the Yellow River in the west. It includes all of Shansi
Province, most of Shensi, southeastern Kansu and northwestern Hopei Province.
The loess plateau has an average height of about 3*500 feet and is covered
with a thick layer of loess which is often over 350 feet deep. The plateau
surface has undulating loess ridge configurations and only in a few areas is
this gently rolling landscape broken by rocky mountains.
To the north the loess diminishes and the soil becomes sandy until the
Inner Mongolian Plateau north of the Great Wall is reached. The landscape
here is one of grassland and desert. The Inner Mongolian Plateau is bordered
in the east by the Khingan Mountains, in the west by the Chilien Mountains
and includes the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, plus northern Kansu. The
3* Throughout this study an effective administration is assumed to be
that which is at least approaching the central government's
influence around Peking.
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elevation of the Plateau ia about the same as that of the loess to the south.
The southern areas are agriculturally rich, using the water of the Yellow
River and that from the northern slopes of the Chilien Mountains (snow fed)
for irrigation. The rest of the Plateau is used for stock raising, although
efforts are being made to extent the area of cultivation.
The Yunnan-Kweichow Plateau includes Kweichow Province, plus the eastern
part of Yunnan Province. It is at a height of j5»5QO to 7,000 feet over most
of its area, the western being higher than the eastern part. It is a region
of limestone with a resulting karst topography. Plat land is used for padi,
whilst hill slopes are terraced. Much of Yunnan is only tenuously attached
to the Chinese administration due to isolation of settlements resulting from
the physical geography. To overcome some of this isolation the Chinese have
been building railways in the area, using Kunming as a centre for the network.
Peking's administration is becoming more effective in the area up to the bound¬
ary with Burma, but it cannot be claimed that it is as yet satisfactory] there
are many problems which the physical geography presents to the functioning of
the interests of the central government.
To the west of the YunnanrKweichow Plateau is the Chinghai-Tibet Plateau.
This includes Chinghai Province, Tibet, western Szeehuan and western Yunnan.
This ia the world' a most extensive plateau and is mainly at about 15,000 feet
(Map 2). Agriculture is practised in the lower areas of the river valleys.
This is one of the areas of China in which geological exploration is revealing
impressive mineral resources. More especially in the Tibetan part the first
attempts at bringing Chinese government to the region in the early 1950*s were
challenged by a people grown independent in the physical isolation of their
harsh environment. The Chinese Communists have had greater difficulty imposing
any form of administration upon the Tibetan region than anywhere else in the
People's Republic. Mountains and distance from Peking made Tibet largely
inaccessible to the Chinese for many centuries leading to the development
of a different culture based on Lamaism. The Chinese effort since 1950 to
firmly attach Tibet to the rest of the country has been greater than In any
other area, probably because of the physical and cultural obstacles. Of
overwhelming importance in the increasing success of the Chinese since i960
has been the building of a network of all-weather roads breaking down eff¬
ectxvely for the first time Tibet's physical isolation. Chinese adminis¬
tration is not fully effective within the Chinghai-Tibet Plateau, but it be¬
comes more so each year.
There are nine major mountain ranges within China, namely the Altai,
Tien Shan, Kunlun, Himalayas, Khingan, Yin Shan, Chinling and Nariling (Map
2) • Only the Hengtuan Mean tain3 run from north to south, thereby to a cert¬
ain extent hindering east to west coraauuications. It is communications with
the interior of the country which are at present the most pressing need to
advance China's political unity, and the main mountain ranges in their east
to west alignment do not provide as great a hindrance as might be expeeted.
China's coastline, which stretches from the Yalu River (Sine-Korean
boundary) in the north to the Peilun River (Sino-Vietnamese boundary) in the
soutli, can be divided into two sections. Prom Hangchow northwards it is
mainly a sandy coast with few islands, shallow coastal waters, poor in nat¬
ural harbours and backed by a plain; the exceptions are the rocky Penin¬
sulas of Liaotung and Shantung and Chinwangtao. South of Hangchow the coast¬
line is a rocky one with the exception of the Lsichow Peninsula and the
mouths of the rivers. This is the coast with the indentations which have
proven suitable for ports. The land above the coast is hilly. Islands are
off shore, and in fact most of China's islands (there are over 3>4CQ of them)
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lie off the coasts of the Provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien and Chekiang.
As Tibet demonstrates the building of a transport network between the
various parts of China can often be made a difficult and expensive under-
talcing due to the inhibitions of the topography. Until such time as China
has a more comprehensive transport system effective political administration
will not be realised. The isolation of the border areas hinders Peking's
authority up to the boundary, and this problem of distance from the capital
is often complicated by difficult terrain.
The complex topography and 3ise of China leads to a wide range of clirn-
4
ate. Map Ja. gives a general indication of January temperatures, ranging
from, the mild climate of the southern part of the country to the extreme win¬
ter cold of the north and much of the interior. Snowfalls in Tibet and north¬
ern China often dislocate transport facilities and add further difficulties
to the central administration. As can be seen on Map 3"b, July average temp¬
eratures are less pronounced in regional differences. The most extreme July
temperatures are found in the interior away from the moderating influence of
the sea, and often due to relief characteristics, for example the Turfan De¬
pression has a July average of over 90 degrees P.
With regard to rainfall the state can be divided into three regions which
are the outcome of China relying upon the Pacific Ocean as a source of moist¬
ure so the further west one progresses the less the rainfall becomes. South
of the Cliialing Mountains and in the southern part of the Ghinghai-Tibet
Plateau there is a Humid Zone with the annual rainfall in excess of 1*0 inches.
4* The maps, plus much of the climatological material, are frcsnj
Climatic Research Office of the Central Weather bureau, Peking*
•Climatic Atlas of China*, Geographic Press, Peking i960. Much
of the information for the interior of China is based on
incomplete data.
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In the southeast there is over 60 inches of rain per year. The precipi¬
tation is heavy in these areas as it is in the south that the summer mon¬
soon prevails and the region is bounded by mountains in the north and west
which intercept the wet winds (Map 4) • The region north and northwest of
the Yin Shan and Kunlun Mountains receives an annual rainfall which is less
than 10 inches. In Sinkiang to the north of Tien Shan there is a heavier
rainfall due to moisture being brought by winds from the Arctic Ocean. The
land between the Humid Zone and the Arid Zone is an area of transition and
is mainly semi-arid.
Not only is there an uneven distribution of annual rainfall throughout
China, but there is also a tendency to differences between years. Peking
illustrates well this point. Here the average annual precipitation over 69
years was about 25 inches, but the heaviest year had 43 inches and the
driest 12 inches. The Northwestern areas and the lower Yellow River have
the greatest fluctuations in rainfall and the Pearl River Basin the least.
Rainfall in China falls mainly in stammer and autuum and 8C$> or more
of the annual total falls between May and October. In summer a flow of hot
air comes from the interior of Asia to create a region of semi-permanent low
presstore in Siberia and Mongolia. Prom areas of high pressure over the Pac¬
ific Ocean arrive southeasterlies which are warm and moist and boring rein.
In winter there is a reversal of conditions with cold and dry northwester-
lies moving towards the low pressure area of the warmer Pacific. The winds
start from Mongolia in September and die out in March. The regime of the
winter and summer change of winds is further complicated by cyclonic storms.
July to October is the typhoon season and the Provinces of Kwangtung and
Pukien are estimated to receive 20-30/j of their annual rainfall in this way,
whilst the coastal area north of the Yangtse River gets about 1Cr/o of its
total from typhoons*
iviarked regional differences in China regarding such considerations
of physical geography as topography or climate work against Peking's eff¬
orts at effective political unity. The nomadic farmer of Sinkiang worry¬
ing endlessly about the limited rainfall is going to feel he has much mare
in comaon with the nomad of Soviet Central Asia or the Mongolian People's
Republic than with a Han Chinese administrator sent from the lush southern
area of Canton who has not had to contend with a water problem. Similarly,
the Kan used to the extremes in climate of northeastern China will probab¬
ly have more in consaon with the outlook of the fanner of the eastern U.S.S.R.
than with the rice cultivator of the Pearl River area. Although there are
many clangers in stressing the effects of physical geography it must be rec¬
ognised in a state as physically diverse as China such considerations can
emphasise that great force for disintegration within a country often known
as 'provincialism'•
With regard to Han China (i.e. the historic eighteen provinces mention¬
ed at the beginning of this section on China; many Sinologists favour a div¬
ision of the state into the two cultural zones of the north and the south.
5
Writing of thi3 division Willetts stated 'Marked physical differences, esp¬
ecially in climate, have brought into being two separate Chinas with distinct
racial, linguistic, and other traits.' This traditional division is a prob¬
lem which the Comounist administration has modified so that it is of less
significance now than at any time in the past. Climate was an element in
this division for that of the north encouraged the growing of wheat, millet,
kaoliang and legumes, whilst the 3outh was the zone of irrigated rice.
5* W.Willetts! 'Chinese Art'j George Braziller, New York 1958* p.16.
However, as with the noraads of the interior, political decisions are now
over-riding the cultural significance of the differences in climate between
north and south China. If these political decisions are supplemented by an
adequate communications network ranging from roads to radios a greater con¬
formity will result in the human geography, if not in the physical geog¬
raphy.
The fact that eastern China is of low elevation and has heavy rainfall
results in most of China's major rivers being in the eastern half of the coun¬
try. The rivers usually originate in the mountains and plateaus of the west,
but flow east. With the summer maximum in rainfall and the melting of the
snows China's rivers carry their greatest volume of water in this season.
Most of the rivers, such as the Amur, Yellow, Yangtse and Pearl Rivers,
empty into the Pacific. Those flowing into the Indian Ocean are located in
the south of the Ghinghai-Tibet Plateau and western Yunnan Province, notable
ones being the upper Brahmaputra (Yalutsangpo) and upper Salween (Nu Kiang)
Rivers (Map 2) • Only the Irtysh River in the northern part of Sinkiang empties
into the Arctic Ocean. Interior drainage basins are found mainly in the north¬
western portion of China and account for a third of the area of the state.
Of the northern rivers the Yellow is the most important. It is the sec¬
ond longest in China, stretching for about 3 >030 miles. Its source i3 at
the northern foot of the Bayan Kara Mountains in Chinghai Province, and from
here it flows through Kansu, Inner Mongolia, Shen3i, Shansi, Honan and Shant¬
ung.
South of the Chinling Mountains the two great rivers are the Yangtse
and Pearl Rivers. The Yangtse is the longest river in China (about 3>440
miles) and originates in the western part of Chinghai Province after which
it flows south through the Chamdo Area, Saechuan, Yunnan and then takes an
easterly direction. After Yunnan the Yangtse re-enters Szechuan Province
to flow through Hupeh, Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kiangsu to the Pacific. Steam¬
ships are able to use the Yangtse as far as Szechuan. More than a third of
China's total population is found in the basin of the Yangtse.
The Pearl River rises in Yunnan and flows through Kweichow, Kwangsi
and Rwantung to the South China Sea. It is navigable up to Kwangsi Chuang
Autonomous Region. Both the Yangtse and Pearl Rivers are ice free in winter
with only modest seasonal changes in level.
Due to the dearth of east to west flowing rivers as long ago as 50° B.C.
a canal was built to join the Huai and Yangtse Rivers* During the Mongol Yuan
Dynasty (1280-1368 A.D.) the Canal was lengthened to link Peking and Hangchow.
The resulting Grand Canal is still the longest in the world (Approximately
1,114 miles), stretching across the Provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Kiangsu and
Chekiang and linking the Yellow, Hai, Huai, Yangtse and Chientang River
systems. The Shantung and northern Kiangsu sections are now badly blocked.
For a political geographer perhaps of greatest significance with regard
to the rivers of China is that in the main they did not facilitate state un¬
ity by providing a better transport network, but hindered it by producing
separate regions based upon the rivers. It is reasonably easy to trace out
a region with its focus on the Pearl River, or one covering the Yellow
River's flood plain. The rivers assisted transport within their areas, but
did not encourage movement to other regions. Despite the ambitious achieve¬
ment of the Grand Canal a greater unity might have been achieved within the
important eastern half of China if a major river had flowed from, north to
south.
With regard to soils and vegetation distribution within China there
is a distinct correlation between the two. Most Chinese scholars tend to
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favour a division of the country into seven main soils and vegetation
regions* although the boundaries are not as precisely delimited as shown
in Map 5*
South of the Itenling Mountains there is the aone of tropioal vege¬
tation with a deep red soil* This includes the southern areas of the Prov¬
inces of Kwangtung, Pukien* Kwangsi and Yunnan, plus the Nationalist Chixr
ese stronghold of Taiwan* The landscape is green throughout fee year* and
the climate hot and wet* The typical vegetation is broad-leaved and includes
mangrove forest along the coast and tropical rain forest further inland* To
the north of this there is a region of warm temperate vegetation* The soils
are red or yellow in the southern part, but become light brown north of the
Yangtse* Very little of the natural vegetation is left, fee forest having
been replaced by agriculture* bamboo and mulberry* This is the farming heart¬
land of China*
Temperate vegetation extends over fee southeastern part of fee loess
plateau* the Worth China Plain and fee southern areas of the Northeast of
China* The soil is froson in winter, but a mom moderate rainfall means
there is less leaching than those areas south of the Yangtse River* The
natural vegetation is temperate deciduous with a sprinkling of conifers*
Human activities over a long historical period and a variety of natural
conditions have meant the development of a range of soils* The soil con¬
tains more calcium than that to the south and tends to be generally mom
fertile* The soil in Shantung and Liaoning Provinces is mainly brown for¬
est* In the North China Plain and the southeastern part of the loess plat¬
eau the soil is a dark brown one, fine in texture and rich in lime it has
become one of the principal farming areas of China. Only an the mountain
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areas of this region has forest survived for Man has "been active in cul¬
tivating the area since earliest times* The soils of the mountain areas
tend to he alkaline in character.
The Forest-Steppe area of vegetation includes central and northern
parts of the Northeast Plain, the forest zone of the Lesser Khingan and
Changpai Mountains and an area of steppe in the "west. The vegetation, there¬
for*©, ranges from forest to steppe, but there is greater conformity in the
soil type -which is mainly a very fertile black earth rich in humus.
North of the blade earth zone is what Wang terms the 'Region of frigid-
5
temperate vegetation* • This includes much of the Greater and Lesser Khingan
and Changpai Mountains. The higher latitudes have a grey podsolic soil,
whilst around the Changhai Mountains there is an infertile brown forest soil.
The natural vegetation is coniferous forest, but the destruction of the trees
has meant much of the region is now covered by grasses.
Northwest of the area of forest-steppe vegetation (black earth) a de¬
crease in rainfall means a decline in vegetation cover. This is the zone of
steppelands and desert. Eastern and southeastern Inner Mongolia is fortunate
in having a greater precipitation than that to the west of the Kolan Mountains
(Map 2) and so is covered with steppe whilst the more westerly area is semi-
desert and desert. The aridity of the climate means soils poor in humus, but
rich in lime. The predominant characteristic is chestnut and grey soils.
The vegetation consists of short grasses changing to thorny scrub further
west.
The Chinghai-Tibet Plateau is a law unto itself with regard to soils and
vegetation, due to the high elevation, cold and strong winds. Trees can only
5« Wang (Chun-Heng): 'A Simple Geography of China', Foreign
Languages Press, Peking 1958 p.51*
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rarely survive and so the most common vegetation cover is grass and shrubs.
Above 13,000 feet can be termed a desert. The Hengtuan Mountains in the
southeastern part of the Plateau demonstrate well the soil and vegetation
aones of the region. Where there are valleys the bottoms, with higher
temperatures and greater rainfall, support trees; the predominant soil here
is brown forest. Above the valley floors there is grassland utilising mount¬
ain meadow soil. Finally there is little or no vegetation and the scant
alpine desert soil.
With an increasingly effective technology it is becoming unfashionable
amongst Western geographers to suggest that physical environment can greatly
affect human attitudes. The day of the determinant has rightly passed.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to discuss such matters as the effectiveness
of a political administration within a state area without talking of the
traditions which produce disintegrative regions and which often have a rel¬
ation with the physical environment which first encouraged them. The steppe-
desert area of soils and vegetation in China has physical characteristics
which inhibited the introduction of the Han form of irrigated agriculture,
but which 'permitted' nomadic herding. There were other possibilities in
the steppe-desert region, but with the technological equipment available
when the development of the area began this was not apparent. Beeause of
the technological limitations of the early people the adaption to the en¬
vironment which developed was nomadic herding. The environment would not
'paunit' the use of the other alternative which was the Han Chinese irri¬
gated farming. A tradition of nomadic herding was established leading to
the development of a distinct culture easily recognisable from that of the
Han Chinese farmers of, for example, the Temperate Vegetation region (Map
5) • The physical environment is of far less significance today, but the
traditions partly engendered by it are still well established. The 'prov¬
incialism' of the steppe-desert nomads is partly due to the physical envir¬
onment; and this * provincialism' challenges the authority of the central
government*
China is a large and physically diverse state and for the various reas¬
ons stated within this study of the physical geography of the country this
has been the major cause of the development of a number of regions* Tibet
fought against integration into the People's Republic of China because of
its different traditions which were largely the outcome of physical isolat¬
ion* Tibet is a long way from Peking, is within an area difficult to trav¬
erse, has a climate very different from much of Han China, and other physical
characteristics such as soils have led to a different economy. To bring eff¬
ective Chinese rule to Tibet Peking Ijas first to break down the region's
physical isolation, notably by the development of communications with the
rest of the People's Republic. However, at this point it should be stated
that the challenge of regionalism to tire development of 3tate unity can always
be overcome by a determined political power backed by an adequate technology.
This point is well illustrated by Tibet where the buildiig of an ambitious
transport network has been supplemented by an influx of Han Chinese immigrant
farmers* Being unable to fully convert the Tibetans to their ideas the
Chinese administration has decided to displace them*




Political decisions taken by the central government in any state are
at least partly moulded in their characteristics by the population of the
country; even the most independently minded despot cannot regain in power
without taking into some consideration the traits and associated attitudes
of his subjects. Similarly, political decisions affect the population of
the state. Political decision and state population are interacting forces.
Therefore when dealing with such things as the effectiveness of the
central government's administration within the state area and whether the
state's boundaries are divisions within the landscape of singular imporv-
ance is both the characteristics of the state's population and the various
attitudes represented within it. in the following paragraphs China's pop¬
ulation is dealt with, both as a whole and as a number of 'nationalities.'
In 1644 A.D. the population of China was estimated to be about 100
1
million, by 1741 approximately 140 million and it had passed the 400 mill¬
ion mark by ISjjjC. According to the Census of 1953 China had a fifth of
the world's population with a total of 601,938,035* If it is assumed that
the natural increase in China1s population is about 12 million per year
(probably en underestimate) by 19&5 the population may have exceeded 745
million. The population is concentrated in the eastern provinces (Map la)
where Chinese civilisation has developed and flowered. Tea of the cities
here have a population of over a million, whilst in the western two-thirds
of the state the largest city is Lanchow with 600,000 inhabitants.
1. These historical figures are from Kuo (P.) '• 'China, New
Age & hew Outlook*; Penguin, Haimondsworth i960, pp.21-22.
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The 1953 Census brought horns to the world that, despite the vast
preponderance of Han Chinese in China's population, it was a state of many
nationalities. Minority groups accounted for 35,300,000 of China's total
population or about if/a on the mainland* Amongst the most important groups
were the Chuangs (6,611,455)* the Uighurs (3,640,125), Huis (3,559,350),
Yis (3,254,269), Tibetans (2,775,622), Miaos (2,511,339), Manchus
(2,418,931), Mongolians (1,462,295), Puyis (1,247,885) and Koreans
(1,120,405) • The Chuangs are located in the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous
Region (Map lb), the Uighurs in Sinkiang, the Huis in Kansu and CMughal
Provinces, the Yio, Miaos and Puyis in Kweichow, Yunnan and western Sech-
wan, the Tibetans in Tibet, Chinghai and western Sechwan, the Manchua and
Koreans in the Northeast and the Mongols in Inner Mongolia* The Miaos,
Yis and Fuyis retreated befoi^e the oncoming Han Chinese into the more diff¬
icult highland areas*
In Article 5 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(1954) it was recognised that China was a multinational state* The min¬
orities were given legal equality with the Ban Chinese with freedom to use
their separate languages and customs* Regional autonomy was given "to the
larger national groups (e.g. Siekiang-Uighur Autonomous Region)» But this
was merely an action recognising a situation already in existence, namely
that there were alien cultures within the Han domain. Assimilation is the
aim of the central government in China, with determined efforts being made
to defeat the isolation which encourages the retention of non-Han cult¬
ures* Efforts at more than nominal independence by the minority groups
lead to harsh repression such as that experienced, within Tibet.
In physical type there is usually only minor differences between the
Han Chinese and the other groups and the Han Chinese liave never been part¬
icularly worried by racial contrasts. From the earliest period of Chinese
history the Han have made a sharp distinction between themselves (Hue
Haia) and the barbarians (Yi Ti), but the emphasis was cultural and not
physical, 'when the Chinese adopted the ways of the barbarian they were
considered as barbarian} and when the barbarians absorbed the Chinese
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culture, they were considered as Chinese*• Shis is well demonstrated
by the situation during the Chou Dynasty (llDO to 249 B.C.) when those
who lived in Central China around the confluence of the Yellow River and
farmed were Chinese, but those to the north who did little agriculture
were termed barbarians despite belonging to the same physical stock. *
The Chinese, the Mongols, the Manohus, and the Tibetans, as we see them
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today, are not distinguishable except by some peculiarity of costuije* •
as Mop lb shows the bulk of the minority population is situated
along the boundaries of China and the significance of this with regard
to the effectiveness of the boundary line will be dealt with in later
chapters. It is useful here to take a brief look at the main minority
groups within the hoopla' a Republic. The Chuangs, along with their neigh¬
bours the Yao (Map 3b) , the Tungs and the Miao, are located in areas of
refuge unattractive to the advancing Han. Recognising the Chuangs (re¬
lated to the Thais) to be China's second largest nationality in March
of 1958 the former Province of Kwangsi was renamed the Kwangsi Chuang
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Autonomous Region. A Miao-Tuchia autonomous Chou has been set up in the
2. C.Chai & W.Chai: 'The Changing Society of China'} Mentor, New York,
1962, p.34* Also important in this section have been H.G-.Croel: 'Chin¬
ese Thought from Confucius to Mao Xse-tung'} Mentor, New York 1960}
C.P.Fitzgerald; 'China, a Short Cultural History*} Praeger, New York
1953i R.Grousset; 'Chinese Art & Culture'} Orion Press, New York 1959}
& C.HuJ 'China, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*} Mayflower
Press, London i960.
3* Chai & Chaii "The Changing Society of China'} p»35*
4* There is perhaps a need to clarify the official terminology of the Chin¬
ese administration with regard to terms such as 'Autonomous Region',
'Ch jiu' etc. A large minority area is established as an 'Autonomous Region'
and has a status similar to a province. It is administered by the central
govemaent. A small minority area is an 'Autonomous Hslen* and is govern¬
ed like a county. The minority area of intermediate siae is an 'Autonomous
Chou* within a province.
MLao areas giving a certain amount of self government. As with most of the
tribes of China's southern borderlands the Chuangs and Miaos were largely
primitive agriculturalists in the higher areas practising a form of shift¬
ing cultivation with an econony based on rice, wheat, soya beans, maize
and sweet potatoes. The continual problem amongst these tribes was one of
adequate food and the need to trade for salt. Although a little local aut¬
onomy is given to the minorities (e.g. Chous for the Thai, lisu, Chingpo,
Puyis and Bai in the south) as previously stated China is trying to assimi¬
late the tribes by bringing them within the economic, cultural and coiaraunl-
cations network of the Han Chinese. Population densities in the tribal
areas of the southern borderlands rarely exceed about 50 persons per square
mile and in the Tibetan and Yis areas may be much less.
The staple food of the Tibetana is highland barley which is drought and
cold resistant. Throughout the year the Tibetans wear fur lined clothing,
although in the warmer months they drop the coat to the waist. The economy
of the Tibetan areas is mainly based on animal husbandry, although since the
advent of Communist power in 1951 there has been a move to increase the land
under cultivation with an introduction of Han Chinese settlers. Population
densities are often as low as 1 person per square mile. Barley is now being
challenged by rice and wheat as a dominant crop. The Tibetans differ from
the minorities of China's south in that they are the possessors of an inr-
pressive culture of their own based on a modification of Buddhism, and
usually known as Lamaism. It was partly because of the importance of the Lam-
aist monasteries that compact communities are favoured by the Tibetan peoples.
The Tibetans also have a proud history, having at one period controlled an
empire which stretched across what is now western China and Nepal into India.
Resistance to Chinese attempts to crush Lamaism and transform the Tibetans
has been violent in contrast to the reaction of tribes of weaker culture
such as the Miaos. In 1959 the Dalai Lama, who may be considered the spir¬
itual leader of the Tibetans, escaped to India because of the Chinese eff¬
orts at assimilating the Tibetans* As in Inner Mongolia the distinctive¬
ness of the Tibetans culturally cannot be expected to survive an influx of
Han Chinese settlers and a determined administration*
Sinkiang has at present 13 nationalities within its boundaries, there
being Uighurs, Kazakhs, Han Chinese, Huis, KhaUthas, Mongols, Russians,
Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Tartars, Daurs, Sibos and Manchus* 74^ of the population
is Uighur in an area which accounts for a sixth of China's total. The
tribes of Sinkiang specialised in animal husbandry with herds of sheep,
cattle, horses and camels* Although animal husbandry still predominates the
Communists have endeavoured to replace this economy with irrigation pro¬
jects to settle the population which was largely nomadic. Between 1949 and
1958 Sinkiang's cultivated areas rose from 1,060,000 hectares to 1,730*000
hectares with wheat, maize, rice and cotton being of particular importance.
Traditionally the culture of the Turkic Uighurs and Kazakhs was a sim¬
ilar one, being often based upon nomadic tending. As the independence of
this form of life has always proven alien to Han Chinese concepts of civil¬
isation since the Nineteenth Century efforts have been made to change it*
The most popular method of undermining the nomadic way of life is to intro¬
duce farmers where possible; also proving effective is the reorganising
of animal husbandry itself so that it is no longer nonedie, but is similar
to ranching with the tent giving way to the house.
Both the Koreans and Huis have been granted the right to Chous* The
Koreans have an impressive culture which has always owed much to the influ¬
ence of China, and with the now close relationship between North Korea and
China there is an increasing similarity which makes the Korean minority
within China less distinctive than it was before 1949• The Huis were more
backward than the Koreans, but are being largely assimilated by the Han
Chinese. Both the Koreans and the Huis are farmers, although some of the
Huis are also stock raisers.
In the Northeast forestlands are the Olunchun hunters, a quickly dy¬
ing culture due to the development of their hunting grounds for forestry,
animal husbandry and cultivation. The Manehus were originally hunting
tribes, but are now associated more with stock raising.
What of the Han Chinese culture itself that it should prove so much
stronger than that of the minority groups? It is a secular tradition and,
except for sorae Chinese (Dungans) in the west who were converted to the Mos¬
lem faith and who periodically rebel against the administration, religious
wars are unknown in the history of China. 'Thanks to her secularism, the
history of China is marked by tolerance and an open-mindedness of spirit.
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It is a history of assimilation, not segregation.' The seculiar outlook
of China helps to explain why Communism should succeed within the state.
Also important in the strength of China's culture is its distinctiveness.
For example the language is so different as to encourage isolationism. It
is based on ideographs, is monosyllabic and has no alphabet. One sound has
to represent many words and different tones used to provide an adequate
vocabulary. Grammatical relations are shown by word order and context, not
conjugations or inflections. Bach ideograph represents an idea or an ob¬
ject. To read a fairly basic book knowledge of at least 3,000 ideographs
is needed. As might be expected after so many centuries of use the ideo¬
graphs are peculiarly suited to a certain way of thinking. With such a
language it is hardly surprising that it should be such a cohesive force.
5* Kuo (P) '• 'China'; Oxford University Press, London 19^3 » p»23»
Although within the Han Chinese world there are many dialects there is only
one written language.
The Chinese culture, unlike those of Europe, has grown up in isolation
which has produced a way of life which in itself is largely complete. The
Han always considered themselves the centre of a superior culture which rad¬
iated its "beneficent influence outwards to the alien world. Until the ad¬
vent of Europe* s superior organisational and technological abilities in the
Nineteenth Century it would not have crossed the Chinese mind that anyone
else had anything to offer. Therefore China's attitude was, and tends still
to he, that she had much to give to the minority groups and they had nothing
acceptable to her in way of cultural exchange. China resembled a missionary
going to a foreign place which did not accept her ideology or did not perhaps
know of it.
Basically China of the Han is culturally coherent, hut, as previously
mentioned, there is a division between the north and the south. This was well
demonstrated in the years following the death of the reactionary President of
the Republic of China Yuan Shi-kai; the followers of the dead President after
losing their leader in 1915 Held the north of China whilst the revolutionary
Sun Yat-sen found his support in the South and was based on Ranking and Canton.
Chinese civilisation had started in the northern areas along the alluvial tracts
of the Yellow River and its tributaries from where it spread eastwards into the
coastal plain and southwards, 'taking over other early neolithic settlements
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and absorbing the aboriginal tribes*' Differences between the Mongol char¬
acteristics of the northern Chinese and of the southern Chinese are of little
significance, the northern being taller, lighter skinned and having in many
6. C.Chai & W.Chai: 'The Changing Society of China',
Mentor, New York 1962, p. 30.
cases thinner lips and a less broad nose. The division has been a cultural
one based on economic factors, in a country of farmers what could be of more
importance than the north having an economy based on wheat and the south one
favouring rice? However, since 1949 the differences between north and south
China have been decreasing under determined Communist efforts to integrate
the whole state area.
At present China has far to go before she can claim to be a unit with
regard to population characteristics. The Chinese administration is deter¬
mined to negate as far as possible these forces for disintegration within the
state, the official policy being stated firmly in the 1954 Constitution
•National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People*s Republic of
China* • As yet China is in the process of modifying many of the characterist¬
ics of the state's human geography by her endeavours to impose political un¬
ity on the minority groups. 'Peking pursues a policy to integrate the non-
Han minorities ... with the centre of power in China proper. Although this
has been disguised by establishing 'Autonomous Regions', giving the local
population control of their own culture in return for accepting political
and economic control by Peking, the change is truly revolutionary in char¬
acter. Inner Mongolia was the first to come under tight control. Sinkiang
followed next. Tibet was the last to be integrated. Here the building of
strategic highways and other preparatory work took time, while the resist¬
ance led by the Dalai Lama held out until 1959, when the Tibetans' last
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proud stand was crushed by the superior forces of the Communists.' If the
distinctive economic character of a national group, for example the nomad¬
ism of the Mongols, is changed then also the culture is modified. 'Cultural
autonomy' will eventually mean a way of life which resembles exactly that of
the Han Chinese except for the wearing of distinctive dress on festive
occasions.
7. P.Chous 'China'; Oxford University Press, London 1963* p. 110.
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SconQHRC Characteristics
Political and economic matters in any state are inter-related.
When dealing with a question such as whether Peking's administration
is effective throughout China inevitably economic factors come to mind
such as the characteristics of the transport network which makes gov¬
ernment easier to a greater or lesser extent, or the distribution of
industries which back the administration's policy, or the dominant em¬
ployment for the population (i.e. usually an agricultural economy pro¬
duces a conservative peasantry, whilst an industrial economy a more rad¬
ical population;. In the following paragraphs the discussion concerns
the eoonony of China and its functioning under Mao's administration. Al¬
though this part of the thesis is mainly descriptive soras attempt will be
made to interpret the material dealt with in the light of the two quest¬
ions posed in the first chapter; in particular it is interesting to see
whether those economic decisions taken by the Peking administration are
modifying the geography of China, more especially in the border areas
such as Sinkiang and Tibet.
1. The following texts have been of particular importance in the
writing of this sections J.L.Bucks 'Land Utilisation in China';
University of Chicago Press 1937; Central Intelligence Agency:
'The Economy of China 1958-62'; Washington i960; O.E.Clubb:
•Twentieth Century China'; Columbia University Press, New lork
1964; M.ErCelcuk: 'The Iron & Steel Industry of China';
Economic Geography, 1956; V.C.Hoang: 'Collectivisation & Rice
Production'; China Quarterly No.9, 1962. Most of the statist¬
ical material is from the publications of the U.S. Consulate
General in Hong Kong or G»W.Hemys 'Production Statistics of
Communist China'; Joseph Crcsfield, London 1956.
Agriculture is still the mainstay of the Chinese economy despite
advances in industrialisation# It is related closely with the physical
geography in its characteristics, and notably with climateJ for example
in the more arid areas the concentration of alkali in the soil may pre¬
clude cultivation altogether or in the semitropical south the high rain¬
fall causes serious leaching and produces soils of low fertility. How¬
ever, 'in many parts of China human intervention has modified soil con-
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ditions more than in any other considerable zone of the earth's surface.5
About a quarter of China's total area is cultivated giving 0.4 acres per
head of population compared to 2 acres in the United States. A European
puts in 2 days of labour for one acre of wheat -whilst a Chinese lavishes
30 days.
Chinese agriculture has to be intensive. It is characterised by the
growing of crops for human consumption and the keeping of pigs and poul¬
try to use the waste which is edible and provide manure. Sheep and cattle
are only important in the drier areas of the northwest. Important centres
of agriculture include the North China Plain, the Yangtze lowlands and.
delta, the coastal basins of Chekiang and Fukien, the Canton Delta, the
Red Basin of Szechwan and the Wei Ho valley. Irrigation techniques are
used for the farming of the drier areas of the north and for flooding the
padi of the south. The great agricultural division between the rice area
of southern China and the wheat-millet economy of northern China is just
north of the Yangtse stretching from Szechwan to southern Kiangsu Province.
Y/heat dominates north China end is autumn sown except in the extreme north
2. W.G.East & O.K.H.Spate (editors): 'The Changing .'lap of Asia'j
Msthuen, London, 1953, p.272.
where spring wheat is grown. Millets are important in these areas where
drought inhibits wheat. There is an overlap of rice and wheat (winter
crop) in the areas north of the Yangtse where such provinces as Szech-
uan, Hupeh, southern Anhwei and southern Kiangsu have over a 9 month grow¬
ing season. Sweet potatoes, which were introduced from the Philippines
during the Sixteenth Century, are important in the sandy soils of the
southeast. The soya bean and peanuts are significant crops in the north¬
ern plains. Barley is grown in the Yangtse's central area, whilst maize
has found popularity in the northeast and southwest.
The pressure of population on the land has meant that food crops have
tended to prove too vital to rural stability to permit the development of
commercial crops. Similarly, despite the energetic efforts of the Coiamun-
ists since 1949, the rural areas remain conservative in their farming tech¬
niques even if they are more adventurous in their organisational set-up.
The silk of Kiangsu and Chekiang is still mainly reeled by hand. Tea is
of importance internally and is produced, in Kiangsi and Hunan, but the
peasant production for export has been replaced by the more efficient
plantation tea of Ceylon and India. In cotton China is largely self-
sufficient and it is her most important commercial crop, being grown along
the central and lower Yangtse, Kiangsu, north Chekiang, west Shantung,
Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi and Hupeh. The cotton is mainly of a short staple
type.
The successes achieved in industry under the Cororjunists have not been
reflected in agriculture. There are the environmental troubles of flood
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and drought such as those which plagued China between 1959-61. The con-
3» D.J.Dwyeri 'China's Katural Calamities & their Consequences';
Geography Vol.47, Ho.3, 1962.
servatism of the Chinese peasant with regard to new techniques, population
pressure upon the land and its attendant underemployment, poor transport¬
ation, and the use of forest and grass for fuel are all problems# The cult¬
ivation of steep slopes without terracing or contour ploughing leads to
soil erosion in the hill regions of south and central China and the loess
of the northwest. Despite the redistribution of land the average farm is
still under 4 acres. Finally, as long ago as 1933 J. L.Buck was stating
that yields could be increased in most areas by 2Sft or more.
The stagnation of Chinese agriculture reveals itself in the official
4
and estimated figures. In 1955 the total area under grain crops was 118.4
million hectares producing 174*3 million metric tons, in 1963 the area was
118.5 million hectares giving 179.1 million metric tons. Rice production
in 1955 was 78 million metric ton3 whilst in 1963 it was 78.4 million metric
tons, this is hardly a figure to be enthusiastic about considering that the
population in the same period will have increased by at least 96 million
people assuming 12 million new mouths to feed each year. Wheat production
in 1955 was 23 million metric tons whilst in 1963 it is estimated to have
been 21.8 million metric tons. Potatoes (included by the Chinese as a grain;
show the most encouraging picture with a 1955 production of 18.9 million
metric tons which increased in 1963 to 24*3 million metric tons. Other grains
(including peas) gave 55 million metric tons in 1955 which decreased a little
to 54*6 million metric tons in 1963. With regard to the harvests for 1963
it was a good year, but for the period July 1st 1963 to June 30th 1964 China
had to import a little under 6 million metric tons of grainstuffs, most of
it being wheat.
4. From the United States Consulate General's Office in
Hong Kong: 'Current Scene' 1964, p»27«
With such a sad picture in agriculture the 1958 'Great Leap Forward'
programme in industry has largely been abandoned and since i960 farming
has been given priority# Similarly there has been a renewal of the 1956
birth control propaganda and a campaign against early marriages. In 1962
the much publicised Commune system broke down; in 1958 between April and
October over 90>) of the fanning population (which constitutes about 75)<>
of the total population) had their co-operatives amalgamated into Communes.
Thus 750,000 producers co-operatives became 26,000 Communes. By i960 the
failure of the Communes was already beginning to show when 3)o of Commune
land was made over for private use, 'this has been reflected in the fact
that the most marked improvements in output during the last two years app-
5
ear to have been in vegetables, pigs and poultry.'
As early as December of 1955 Mao's Government was worried by the poor
yields in agriculture and shortly afterwards a Twelve Year Agricultural
Development Plan was published (1956-67)• The increase in yield per acre
for grain is still one of the prime objectives of the Administration. The
yield per acre in north China is to be raised from 1,000 lbs. to 2,700 lbs.,
that in central China from 1,400 lbs. to 3,250 lbs., and that of south
China from 2,700 lbs. to 5,400 lbs. In the agricultural programme emphasis
is being placed upon irrigation, flood control, better seed, more fertil¬
iser, closer planting, better administration, where possible tree protection,
more modern implements and the use of insecticides.
Although the Communist revolution in China was a popular uprising the
average Chinese peasant is as conservative in outlook as any man to be found
in the rest of the world. An experiment such as that of the Comnunes was
5* D.J.DwyerJ 'China's Reoent Harvests' '> Geographical Journal
Vol.130. June 1964, p.321.
doomed to failure before it was launched. Although the government in
Peking has nominal control of the areas of intensive agriculture in China
(notably the eastern half of the country) the effectiveness of the admin¬
istration is severely limited. For example it has been demonstrated that
excellent yields may be gained from rice grown as far north as Manchuria,
but government attempts to convert the wheat areas of northern China to
rice cropping have been singularly unsuccessful. In much the same way al¬
though this is the most effective government China has ever had the pol¬
itical influence of Peking cannot extend the area of wheat cultivation in
the south. Agricultural distributions within China are not being greatly
changed by Mao's rule in Peking except in one or two pioneer areas where a
sparse population has not hindered new developments (e.g. Tibet) to an un¬
manageable extent. The Chinese peasant is willing to try to increase his
production, but not to change his traditional crops or methods. With re¬
gard to the boundary areas of China in moat cases this agricultural tradr
itionalism is not involved as these are usually regions of modest populat¬
ion and development (e.g. Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria).
However, in an area of long established Chinese agriculture as in the bor¬
der zone of the Sino-Hong Kong boundary the advent of Communism in China
has not changed greatly the characteristics of agriculture on the Chinese
side of the international line.
The exploration for minerals within China is a relatively new occu¬
pation and is not so hindered by tradition as is farming. Prospecting under
the First Five Year Plan (1953"*57) revealed many new mineral deposits and
led to China claiming coal reserves of 1,000,000 million tons as against the
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reserves had risen to 1,200,000 million tons, for iron ore 11,000 million
tons, oil reserves were estimated at 100 million tons (this may have in¬
creased considerably after oil discoveries in 1964 at Chinchow 300 miles
east of Peking;, and there were considerable deposits of manganese, tung¬
sten, tin, antimony, magnesite and bauxite, plus moderate ones of copper,
lead, zone, silver and gold.
China is one of the great coal producers of the world, reputed to have
exceeded 400 million tons in I960 (in 1936 production was 35 million tons,
6
in 1949 32.4 million tons, and in 1957 150 million tons) • The distribution
of coal deposits in China is extensive as Map 1 demonstrates, but the most
important mining areas are in the Provinces of Liaoning (Kailan and Fushun
centres), Hopei (Fuhsin) and Shansi (Tatung;•
Iron ore is also widely distributed in China, but the important centres
are at Anshan in Liaoning Province, Tayeh in Hupeh, Bayin Obo in Inner Mon¬
golia, and Panchihhua in Szechuan. Where there is coking coal and iron ore
in close proximity it has been possible to develop a steel industry such as
the industrial complex of Liacning Province, Wuhan in Hupeh, Paotow in
Inner Mongolia, Peking and Tientsin in Hopei Province, and at Chungking in
Szechwan. Coal and iron mining are hindered in China by the limitations
of the transport system. Despite efforts to keep down the need for trans¬
porting such raw materials in I960 over of the total rail freight was
made up of coal.
China* s crude oil is located mainly in Sinkiang, the Tsaidam Basin of
Chinghai, Kansu, and Szechwan, whilst oil shales are found in Kirin and south
6. These figures are from D.J.Dwyer: 'The Coal Industry in Mainland
China Since 1949'* Geographical Journal Vol.129, Pt»3»
September 1963» p«337*
Kwangtung (Map l). The largest oil workings are at Yumen in Kansu, Fushun
in Liaoning and Wusu in Sinkiang. in 1957 production of crude oil was
about 3*760,000 metric tons, which increased to a little over 4 million
metric tons in I960.
About of the world* 3 tin production comas from Nochin in Yunnan
Province each year, but tin is also mined north of Wuchow in Kwangsi and
at Tayu in Kiangsi Province. China also produces 60/g of the world's ant¬
imony, notably from Hainhua in Hunan, Shaakuan in Kwar.gtung and in south¬
eastern Kweichow Province. Kiangsi, Hunan and Kwangtung between them pro¬
duce 45r> of the world's output of tungsten per year, and China is self
sufficient in bauxite from Shantung and Heilungiciang Provinces. From
Shihmienchung in Szechuan Province is produced asbestos. Lead and zinc
deposits are located at Kashga in Sinkiang, Changning in southern Hunan,
South of Anshan in Liaoning, and exploration continues hopefully in other
areas as China is not well endowed in these minerals. Violfram is found
at Kanchow in Kiangsi and north of Ining in Sihkiang. China produces en¬
ough gold for her industrial needs from mines near Khotan, Taehang and
Kashga in Sinkiang, Yushu and Sining in Chinghai, Chengtu and in northern
Szechwan, southern Shensi, central Hunan and in the Shantung Peninsula.
Salt is fairly widespread throughout China. Manganese comes from southern
Kwangtung, near Hsinhua in Hunan, north-east Kiangsi, east of luchow in
Kwangsi, north of Lanchow in Kansu and Anshan in Liaoning. China has a
reasonably good mineral base for the development of an industrial society.
At the end of the Eighteenth Century Lord Macartney returned from
China with a message from the Emperor Ch' ien Lung to George III which stated
that 'our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and
lacks no products within its own borders. There in, therefore, no need to
import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our products.'
Trade was later imposed by the European 'barbarians' upon the Chinese who
were brought face to face with the superiority of the former's technology.
Prom about 1928 onwards serious attempts were made by the Chinese Kuorain-
tang administration to speed industrialisation within China, but the
twelve years of warfare from 1937 to 1949 inhibited progress. In 1937 China
was producing cotton, silk and woollen manufactures, glass, chemicals, cement
and such traditional items as porcelain. The cotton industry was the biggest
and most modern development, with 5 million spindles. Manufacturing was lo¬
cated at Nanking, Shanghai and Hanchow in the lower Yangtse area, Hankow,
Hanyang and Vmchow higher up the Yangtse River, at Tientsin in eastern Hopei,
eastern Shantung Province and around Canton in Kwangtung Province. Shanghai
dominated China's industry. In 1932 a National Resources Commission had been
set up to encourage industry. The Japanese invasion robbed China of most of
her industrial development and the Chungking area of 'Free China' in Szechuan
was stimulated.
The Comnunists took over a war ravaged country in 1949* By 1953 China's
key industries had regained their peak production figures of the prewar per¬
iod. 1953 was the year of the First Five Year Plan which was elaborated in
its scope in 1955* The decision was taken to expand heavy industry before all
else. Industrial production increased in net value by 42/u between 1952 and
1956. During 1953 to 1956 industrial capital investment increased by 316* 7/S
with capital investment in heavy industry within this category averaging an
annual increase of 51* 5^* Capital goods production increased between 1952
and 1957 By a little over 200% whilst consumer goods increased during the same
period by only 85b and handicrafts by 69/0. The emphasis upon heavy industry
during the First Plan can beat be appreciated by the production figures.
Steel output was 1,340,000 tons in 1952 and 5*240,000 tons in 1957* In
1952 13*700 units of steel cutting tools were manufactured whilst 29,100
units were in 1957* Similarly cement production rose from 2,860,000 tons
to 6,700,000 tons, and coal production doubled. The comparative neglect
in light industry over the same period is shown by the increases in cotton
yarn (3,620,000 bales to 4*620,000 bales), and edible vegetable oils
(980,000 tons to 1,100,000 tons). At the end of the First Five Year Plan
China was supplying 88,0 of her own steel requirements and almost JO/o of ner
machinery needs. The cost of this achievement was sorely felt in agri¬
culture and the consumer industries.
The Second Five Year ELan was announced in 1956 and commenced in 1958.
It was intended to cover the years 1958 to 1962 and ambitiously the targets
were pushed upwards in 1957 and 1958. 'The Great Leap Forward' had been
launched. In 1959 the upward curve of increased production became erratic.
Agriculture was the weak spot with the Conanunes largely failing and floods
and drought over the next two years adding to the burden. (Crop damage
7
affected half the agricultural area;• The use of village furnaces for the
melting of pig iron increased the statistics, but the end product was
largely unusable. The fulfilment of the Second Five Year Plan lacked the
success of the First Five Year Plan and since 1961 Peking has not published
any production figures, bespite the shift of emphasis to agriculture it
seems likely that by 1963 steel production had passed the 20 million tons
per annum mark, and electric power had reached 42,000 million Kwh by 1962.
There has been a forcible movement of urban population back to the land, a
7. M.Freeberne: 'Natural Calamities in China'» Pacific Viewpoint
Vol»3» No.2», September 1962, pp.33~71»
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return of the ConEunes to collectives, although the Commune administrative
unit has been retained, and incentive pay has been introduced. Party work¬
ers are being more adequately trained to take charge of economic units, and
the possibilities of trade with the Western committed states being looked
into. In a country where the average income per head of population is £16
per year it has been acknowledged that it would be difficult to ask the
masses to tighten their belts further and so rapid industrial progress is
being sacrificed for greater efficiency in agriculture which, after all, is
the sector of the economy which provides the capital for any industrial
expansion.
It has often been felt that China's progress in industry has been built
upon Soviet aid. All aid from the U.S.S.R. to China has been in the form of
loans and credits and they totalled the comparatively small amount of £718
million which is about a third of what the United Kingdom spends on defence
in a year. Although Soviet help oame at the right psychological moment it
did not demonstrate particularly the much vaunted comradeship of the Commun¬
ist world. China has been paying her way since the beginning of the Coiamin-
ist regime and so can claim to have a much more self-sufficient economy than
her Asian rival of India. China is better able to afford the luxury of a
hostile relationship with the Soviet Union than India is with the United
States and Western Europe.
As Map 2 demonstrates the greatest preponderance of industry is still
within the eastern part of the state, despite Peking's efforts to develop
the west. The Peking, Shanghai, Canton and Chengtu areas have the greatest
concentration of industry within China. It is within the regions of indus¬
trial development that the effectiveness of the political organisation is
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the most impressive, The introduction of industry into an area such as
Ururachi leads to a breakdown of the traditional culture which has its basis
in the economy. If the herdsmen of Sirikiang are settled in new industrial
developments the control of the Peking government within these areas becomes
more effective. It is in those areas of mainly agricultural and pastoral
economy that Mao's control is the most tenuous, and this includes most of
the border areas. Peking's control of the northeastern industrial area up
to the boundary with the Soviet Union is more effective than along most of
the other border areas (cue of the notable exceptions being the boundary with
Hong Kong where again there is a concentration of industry). The development
of industry implies the introduction of many factors of integration such as
better transportation and a more concentrated population distribution, both
of which make the act of government much easier.
Efforts to develop industrially the interior of China have been frustrat¬
ed by the transport network. There is too great a dependence on the pre-
modem dirt roads, rivers and canals, fraught animals, wheel barrows or human
porterage has to be used too often to turn the state into an efficient indus¬
trial society or to produce the unity of culture and outlook typified by the
United Etatea. Very few people in China have been beyond a 100 miles of the
place where they were bom. 'Low mobility renders Chinese society sedentary;
each region tends to be a world in itself. This explains the amazing variety
of dialects, folkways, and provincial traits. For instance, the northerner,
accustomed to wheat or kaoliang, the mule-drawn cart, the desert wind from
the Gobi, and the elegant Mandarin speech, is ill at ease in Central or South
China, where everything seems strange to him: the all-rice diet, travel by
river boats, the Wu and Cantonese dialects, and even the humid, subtropical
8
air'. China's transportation system is improving and catting down these
8. P.Kuo: 'China'; Oxford University Press, London 1963, p. 16.
 
regional distinctions, but it is a slow process in such a large country where
change is often resented, if not actively opposed.
China has less than 3 miles of railway per 100,OCX) people compared to
250 miles in the United States. Her motor highways are even less well dev¬
eloped. The greatest deficiencies are in the central and western provinces
of the People's Republic (Map 3) • ha yet the transport system within China
is not adequate to challenge the regionalism of many areas of the state. For
example although the northeastern area is comparatively well served by rail¬
ways the provinces of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet and Chamdo account¬
ing for well over half the length of China's political boundaries have just
the beginnings of a transport system. For the first time Tibet has been tenu¬
ously attached to the core area of China by a road network, and a railway line
has been pushed through Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia (Map 3) • By Asian stand¬
ards eastern China has a not unimpressive transport network, but it is far
from the ideal a strong central administration must desire.
To overcome many of the inadequacies of the transport system the admin¬
istration lias made great use of aircraft so that it is possible to send an off¬
icial from Peking to Lhasa in a matter of hours where once it took months.
However, air transport is no substitute for an efficient land transport, more
especially where the bx^eaking down of local cultures and nationalisms is con¬
cerned. At present the poor transport network, notably in the western half
of the state, prevents Peking's political influence from becoming as effective
as it might expect to be. The strong policies made in Peking axe modifying
the geographical distributions in such border areas as Tibet and Sinkiang,
but only slowly in the face of regional isolationism helped by a totally
inadequate transport network. It is a relative matter! the boundaries provide
more of a division within the geography of the border areas than they did be¬
fore the coming to power of the Communist Party in China, but this division is
often hardly noticeable on the landscape. China is an economically back¬
ward country and this limits the administration's ability to impose its
will upon the landscape. An economically sophisticated state like the
United States can impose the will of the central government throughout
its whole state area with greater ease if it so desires, but the govern¬
ment is backed by an economy which makes China appear to be just progress¬
ing from the Iron Age. For example by 1969 the United States will have
41,000 miles of superhighway, every mile of which will be superior to any
road which China possesses, and the total a figure China could not dream
of matching.
China is beginning to breakdown regional isolationism by introducing
industry, more efficient agricultural techniques and a denser transport
network, but only a beginning ha3 been made on these. There still exists
the more highly developed eastern part of the state and the backward
western areas. The failure of agriculture to provide the sort of surplus
needed to finance a fast industrial growth means that China's regionalism
will take longer to counteract. Whilst Peking has such trouble finding
capital to provide more roads and railways the isolationism of the Uighur
in Sinkiang or the Tibetan challenges the administration's ©fforbs to weld
the state into an entity. There is still a lack of unity in the human
geography of the Chinese state which defies the political administration
from Peking and does not permit the political boundaries in most areas from
making an effective division within the border landscape. The achievement





Keeping in mind the limitations of any form of generalisation it is
possible to classify the states which share a common boundary with the
People's Republic of China into four main categories defined according to
the political sympathies of the governments concerned. The categories
chosen are Minor Neutralist, Major Neutralist, Western Committed and Comm¬
unist J the advantages of this simplification it is hoped will prove to
outweight the obvious disadvantages inherent in any attempt to classify
individually unique phenomena.
The Minor Neutralist boundaries include the Sincr-Afghanistan, Sincr-
Nepal, Sino-Bhutan, Sino-Sikkim, Sino-Burmese and the Sino-Laos. The crit¬
eria for membership within this division is a professed uncommitted stand
in the ideological conflict between the Communist states and the so-called
Western states, which largely follow the lead of the United States, plus
a smallness in size, population and power, which means that the states con¬
cerned are at the mercy of their large neighbour China and offer the latter
no serious challenge.
There is only one example of the Major Neutralist category and that
is the Sino-Indian boundary. This, however, has been divided into two
parts, the Sino-Northwest Indian boundary and the Sino-North East Frontier
Agency example. The latter has been chosen for fuller treatment in Section
Five. The difference between the Minor Neutralist and Major Neutralist
divisions is one of size and power. As the resources and power of India
are so much greater than those of the Minor Neutralist examples, China's
attitude towards this stalwart of the democratic system of government is
different. India is the only state sharing a land boundary with China which
challenges the latter's claim to supremacy in Asia. To a certain extent a
difference of attitude leads to a difference of political impact an the geog¬
raphy of the boundary area involved; notably, since the Sino^-Indian clash of
1962, both states have been active in the border areas with an energy which
contrasts with, for example, the mare casual attitude prevailing along the
Sino-Burmese boundary where China does not feel herself challenged.
In mny ways 'Western Committed' is an unsatisfactory description of
the third category. It refers to those boundary states which are either
directly ruled by a 'western* power (e.g. Hong-Kong) or are tied to the Unit¬
ed States' camp by such anti-Conmunist treaties as the South-hast Asia Coll¬
ective Defence Treaty and the Central Treaty Organisation (e.g. Pakistan).
The term 'Western* is inadequate for a geographer as it implies only a dir¬
ection and is the outcome of the provincial outlook of Nineteenth Century
Europeans. However, in this context it refers to the anti-Communist bloc of
North America and Western Europe under the leadership of the United States.
"Within the Western Committed category Hong Kong is given fuller treatment
in Section Six.
Theoretically the sharing of a boundary with a Communist state should
be for China the ideal situation as the ideology implies that no boundary
would then exist. But China and her Communist neighbours are all tinged
with the anti-ideological blight of nationalism which complicates their re¬
lationships. Within the Communist camp it is possible to subdivide the
1
states according to the rift between the Soviet Union and China. Kennan
1. G.P.Kennan: 'On dealing with the Communist World*; Council an
Foreign Relations & Harper & Row, New York 1964.
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considers that Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary,
the Mongolian People's Republic, Cuba and Yugoslavia amongst the Communist
states are sympathetic towards the U.S.S.R. in the Sino-Soviet disagree¬
ment, Albania and Worth Korea support China, whilst Rumania and North Viet¬
nam sit on the fence. It seems likely that North Vietnam would support
Peking rather than Moscow should pressure be brought to bear, if only be¬
cause of her position and the fact she shares a common boundary with China.
As yet, despite the verbal displays, the attitude of the Communist states
towards the rest of the world is not sufficiently divergent to make a Comm¬
unist category ineffective. The Sino-Soviet, Sino-Korean and Sino-Vietna¬
mese boundaries are dealt with in this section whilst the Sino-Mongolian
boundary area is looked at in greater detail in Section Seven.
To simplify the distributional picture of the four categories it is
useful to see the states involved on a map (Map i). All of China's north-
era and eastern boundaries dealt with in this study are shared with Comm¬
unist states, with the exception of tiny Hong Kong. The other three categ¬
ories' examples stretch in a lira from Laos to Afghanistan, mainly in the
southwestern area of China.
Although there are other ways of classifying the boundaries of China,
for example by the physical characteristics of the boundaries themselves,
it is felt that the simple one outlined here is useful and relevant. It




The Minor .Neutralist Borderlands
1
The S ino-Afehanistan Boundary
During historical times what is now modern Afghanistan has held a
strategic position as one of the crossroads within Asia. Before the sea
routes between Europe and China gained importance the main east to west
caravan road used the mountain passes of Afghanistan. It was also a high¬
way of conquest, both for those powers coming from the east and west, and
such later armies from the north as the Mongols and the Turks. It was here
that during the Nineteenth Century A.D. the Empires of Tsarist Russia and
British India met.
Landrlocked Afghanistan shares a common boundary with Iran in the west,
the Soviet Union in the north, Pakistan and Kashmir in the south and east,
and with the People's Republic of China for a modest distance in the north¬
east (Map i). The Sino-Afghanistan boundary is the outcome of Anglo-
Russian diplomacy during the latter half of the Nineteenth and early part
of the Twentieth Centuries. The British East India Company had approached
the King of Kabul during the early Nineteenth Century and had concluded a
treaty with the Afghans in 1809. During the next thirty years Afghanistan
was divided by domestic troubles, but then Dost Muhammad gained control of
the throne and in 1837 appealed to the British to assist him in expelling
the Persians from his territory. The British declined to help as the Amir
had previously tried to get Russian and Persian help to regain the Plain
1. Much of the historical and political material in this chapter is based
on Aitchison (C.U.): 'A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads
Relating to India & Neighbouring Countries', Calcutta 1933» and 'Papers
Regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan'; H.M.Stationery Office,
London 1919.
of Peshawar from the Sikh Ranjit Singh# Fran 1833-42 the First Afghan War
was waged by which the British replaced Dost Muhammad with iiis rival Shah
Shuja, Russia refused to help the Afghans which led to a mistrust only
rivalled by the dislike of the British following the occupation. It was
from this time that Afghanistan foreign policy began to be dominated by
Ruaso-British rivalry, and the related problem of saving the state from
being swallowed up#
The outbreak of the Crimean War led the British to view Afghanistan
more favourably and in 1855 a temporary treaty of alliance was concluded
with Dost Muhammad, which became a formal agreement concluded at Peshawar
in 1857» Both these treaties were a defensive measure against Beraia, which
in I856 had taken Herat and so started a war with Britain# The Peace Treaty
of Paris signed in March of 1857 recognised the independence of both Persia
and Afghanistan#
The I860*a saw the rapid advance of Russia southwards, reaching Sam¬
arkand in 1863 at a time when Afghanistan was again weak from internal
troubles following the death of Dost Muhammad# In 1869 Shir *Ali managed
to establish his throne on a firm basis, but Russian influence had already
reached the River Qxus# The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 was concluded
in which the Russians agreed to acknowledge the Oxus as the limit of their
southern expansion# Shir 'All's request for British guarantees of Afghan¬
istan territory was refused, a snub which led the Afghans to favour Russia
and the admittance of a Tsarist envoy to Kabul# Shir 'All would not allow a
British mission to enter his country which sparked off the Second Afghan
War of 1878-80 and led to a British occupation# But as in the First War a
bitterly hostile population made the British position untenable and a re-
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laxation of the Ruaso-rritish enmity led to the withdrawal of British troops
leaving -the state governed "by Shir 'Ali's nephew Abdur Rahman. Afghanistan
appears to have represented the difference between profitable and unprofit¬
able territorial acquisition for the British in India, and so occupation
was given up when it was felt sufficient control had been gained over Afghan¬
istan's foreign policy. The treaty of Gandaoak, signed on /.fay 26th, 1879»
was followed in June and July of the next year by further negotiations with
Abdur Rahman in which it was agreed that the Amir should be free to exercise
his control over domestic policy, but bound to follow British advice on for¬
eign policy. Afghanistan had become a British 'buffer state*.
The Russians were stimulated into action by these British moves in Af¬
ghanistan, annexing Khiva in 1881, Merv in 1884 and invading Afghanistan in
I885. The British mobilised twc array corps in India and war seemed imminent.
However, both the Great Powers resorted to diplomatic means of settling their
differences and an /uiglo-Eussian Agreement was signed in St. Petersburg in
July 1887• Further military operations along the Afghan boundary by the
Russians in 1889 led to a British warning. In 1891 the ftakhan region in
Northeastern Afghanistan became a focus of Anglo-Russian rivalry. Once again
diplomacy saved Russia and Britain from war and in the 1899 Agreement Wakhan
was recognised as part of Afghanistan.
Endeavouring to increase her influence within the country Russia pro¬
posed to Britain that she should have direct relations with Afghanistan, a
suggestion which was promptly turned down. In 1901 Abdur Rahman died, to be
succeeded by his son Habibullah who repudiated his obligations under the
Anglo- Afghan Agreement, whilst continuing to draw from Britain the annual
stipend of £1,800,000. With Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905
the Amir's attitude towards foreign powers became less favourable, whilst
 
predisposing both Russia and Britain to seek some sort of settlexaent in
Asia* Not only was there an effort to negate Anglo-Russian rivalry in
Afghanistan, but also in Tibet and Persia*
The resulting Russo-British Convention signed in St* Petersburg in
1907 saw the setting up of the Wakhan Corridor to prevent Russia or Brit¬
ish India sharing a common boundary, and thus also produced the somewhat
curious Sino-Afghan boundary of the present (Map 2)* Habibullah was not
consulted on these territorial changes, but in 1908 Russia stated emphat¬
ically that whether the Amir's agreement was given or not St. Petersburg
would honour the Convention. Much wood was added to the fire of growing
Afghan nationalism*
During the First World War Afghanistan was committed to neutrality,
but supported by the Afghan nationalist movement from 1916 the Amir began
to demand the representation of his country at the forthcoming peace talks*
In February of 1919 Habibullah wrote once again to the Viceroy of India
asking for the "'Absolute liberty, freedom of action, and perpetual indep-
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endence* of his country"* Before any answer came the Amir was assassin¬
ated. His third son Amanullah came to power and declared war on Britain
the same year (The Third Afghan War) • Britain was in no mood for such a
costly undertaking so, after bombing Kabul, when the Amir asked for an
armistice London agreed* A Peace Treaty was signed in Rawalpindi in Aug¬
ust 1919, followed in November of 1921 by a permanent Anglo-Afghan Treaty*
By this agreement Afghanistan once more gained control over her foreign
policy* A similar treaty was signed with the Soviet Union in February of
1921* Afghanistan's boundaries on achieving full independence remained
much the same as they had been before, despite empty promises by the Soviet
2* D»N*Wilber (ed*): 'Afghanistan* J Human Relations Area Piles,
New Haven 1956*, p*147»
Union to return the Panjdeh district taken by the fears in 1885* In July
of 1923 Afghanistan concluded a conmeroial treaty with China® a country much
neglected in the previous diplomatic moves despite her interest in Sihkiang.
Up to and including much of the Second World War Afghanistan became a
centre of international rivalry® more especially between the Axis powers of
Germany and Japan, and Britain® the Soviet Union and the United States* But
in 1944 China once more came back onto the scene and opened diplomatic re¬
lations with Kabul® signed a treaty of friendship and started conmsrcial neg¬
otiations* However® since 1949 the new Coammist regime in Peking lias not
shown the same interest in Afghanistan as it has in sorae of the states with
which it shares a longer border, such as Burma and Nepal.
Where once Afghan foreign policy rested upon playing off Britain and
Russia, it now continues in a similar vein but with the United States taking
the place of the United Kingdom* Share is a non-aggression pact with the
Soviet Union (19 51; and Afghanistan from 1955 has been enjoying a long term
loan, with low interest rates® granted by Moscow to the tune of about £35
million* Similar agreements with America have led to there being more United
States technicians in Afghanistan than any other foreign nationality* Prob¬
ably because of her limited resources China has not as yet participated to
any great extent in the influx of foreign aid and technicians* and whether
the cooling of relations between Peking and Moscow will change the Chinese
attitude remains to be seen*
Sinkiang is very much a pioneer area for the Chinese® and the Wfikhan
Corridor has the appearance of being an appendage to the main bulk of the
Afghanistan state area* The Russo~.british creation which is the boundary
between Chinese and Afghan territory has as yet been neither successfully
accepted "by the people of the region, nor its authority imposed effectively
by the Chinese and Afghan Governments# The main function of the wakhan
corridor is no longer applicable to the modern situation since the end of
British rule in India# The territorial rivalry between what was once the
Tsarist iitnpire and the British Raj is no more# The Yvakhan appendage to the
Afghan state is a left over from a former age and, by association, so also
is the Sino-Afghanistan boundary# As Map I demonstrates the Wakhan corridor
might have served well the function of keeping from direct territorial con¬
tact the British Raj and the Tsarist -.aspire, but today it has little valid¬
ity# Therefore, when trying to think in terras of ' functions* regarding the
B ino-A fghanistan boundary none come readily to mind as but for the former
Anglo-Russian rivalry during the 19 th and early 20th Centuries there would
now be no boundary between Afghanistan and China for probably the Wakhaa
Corridor would have been absorbed by either the Soviet Union or incorporated
into Pakistan or India#
Afghanistan itself is a land of 264,000 square miles, 770 milea from
east to west and 350 miles from north to south# The main orientation of
the state is from northeast to southwest following the thrust of the Hindu
Kush massif from the Pamirs to the Persian boundary. The great mountain¬
ous area of Afghanistan can be divided roughly into two, the Hindu Kush
proper, which descends from the Pamirs and ends near the Persian border,
and the Kuhri Baba Mountains which is a continuation of the Hindu Kush in
the heart of Afghanistan# In the north the mountains are bounded by the
Aim Darya Valley steppoland. South of the main massif there is a network




west (about ^),000 square miles) is desert at 2,000 feet in elevation.
The Sincr-Afghan boundary (Map 2) is in its northern section along
the crestline of the Little Pamir Mountains. Its central section is across
the upper .vakhjir River Valley, and in the south it again resorts to the
use of a mountain crestline (Murkushi) • In a region abounding in mountain
crestlinea and river valleys the choice of physical features for border
delineation is not of great geographical significance, notably as it does
not represent a cultural, or economic, or historical divide. The boundary
itself, as it favours the use of physical features in its delimitation (it
is not demarcated), can therefore be classified within Boggs® 'Physical®
category or hartshorns*a 'Subsequent*.
The mountainous areas shared by Afghanistan* s Wakhan Corridor, Che Bad-
akhshan region of the 0.S.3.B., China's western Binkiang and Jaimmr-Kaslvair
have much in common to make them separate from their respective state areas.
During historic times the areas have had a function as a refuge for those
peoples driven out of the plains which surround the mountains.
Being something of a backwater the Sino-Afghan border area has not been
as well researched as even certain other areas of Afghanistan. Nevertheless
it is possible to make some attempt at carrying out a cultural description
of the region. The v»akhan-Binkiang boundary area is mainly the domain of the
Tajiks (Map 3). There are two principal groups of Tajiks in Afghanistan,
and those who inhabit the boundary area are known as the Mountain Tajik. The
Mountain Tajiks apeak an archaic Iranian language and my well have been the
original Iranian inhabitants of Afghanistan. The Tajiks to the west were
gradually conquered, but those within the inaccessible mountain core re-saained
largely their own masters. Up until October of ly29 the Tajik chieftain,
Bacha Sjugqo, was able to dominate and terrorise the Wakhan-Binkiang region.
The Mountain Tajiks are of above average height and slim build. The
skin is light brown and the hair may range from straight to curly, and from
blaok to red or blond. The eyes are usually brown, but may be blue. The
head form is broad and the nose acquiline. The Tajiks to the west and most
of the surrounding peoples are Sunni Moslem in religion, but the Mountain
Tajiks are Shi'a Moslem. Whilst the Pamir Tajiks speak a language only re¬
lated to Persian, the plains Tajiks speak a tongue very similar to that used
in eastern Iran. Hie Mountain Tajiks are village dwelling cultivators noted
for their poverty. There are perhaps 75*000 people speaking the Pamir lang¬
uages (Shughni-Roshani, Wakhi, Munji-Yidgha and Ishkashmi) of which 45*000
are within Afghanistan.
Some of the Mountain Tajik areas have been modified in the border region
by an influx of Turkic speaking peoples who were Mongoloid in appearance. Not¬
able in the boundary area have been the nomadic Kirghiz who still 'move freely
in their seasonal migrations across the unpatrolled mountain borders of Afghan
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Wakhan, Soviet Kirghizia and Chinese Sinkiang'• In Afghanistan they number
perhaps 30*000 persons. Little information is available on the Kirghiz in
any of the states.
The Dardic speaking Kafirs are of greater importance in the Sino- Pakistan
and Afghan-Pakistan boundary areas, but are worth mentioning as there are some
scattered groups along the Sino-Afghan boundary. The Kafirs are new officially
called Nuris following their fo: ced conversion to Islam in 1896 when they were
defeated by Amir Abdur Rahman, and their region is named Nuristan, which means
4
•land of light*. The Kafirs are a little above average height, slim with black
3» D.N.W'ilber (editor): 'Afghanistan'* Human Relations Area Piles,
New Haven 1956; p.51*
4* Little has appeared in print on the Nuris since G.S.Robertson's 'The
Kafirs of Hindu-Kush', published by Lawrence & Bullen, London 1896,
and this text has been used here.
hair which may be straight or wavy* The skin colour is medium brown and the
nose slender and straight. Their economy is based on goats and cattle, al¬
though they cannot be termed nomadic* They live in wooden houses, often of
three storeys with a verandah arrangement on the top one. All the Kafir tribes
may number 60,000 persons, and speak a diversity of dialects of a language re¬
lated to ancient Sanskrit. Being still largely outside effective state juris¬
diction the Kafirs recognise only allegiance to the tribe.
The boundary has been of greater significance in the Tajik areas where
a settled farming economy makes it economically more acceptable; the Tajik
cultivator has no reason to move much from his village area, and the tribal
loyalties are not as strong as with the Kafirs. The main spread of the latter
is across the Afghan-Pakistan boundary (after Afghanistan the Chitral area
of Pakistan has the biggest number), and so it cannot be stated that there has
been any Kafir problem between China and Afghanistan. The group which totally
ignores the Sane-Afghan border is the Kirghiz, and for the simple reason that
a nomadic animal economy demands mobility without hindrance. Whether the
Government of the People* s Republic of China will change their present policy
of permitting the Kirghiz freedom of movement cannot be said, but the Sino-
Soviet controversy has led to the successful imposition of the political
boundary in those areas of nomadic tribes along the Sihkiang-Soviet Central
Asia border. Should a similar hostility arise between Afghanistan and China
Peking would probably not be above sacrificing economic considerations for
political.
In 1956 Afghanistan launched upon its first Five Year Plan. There are
no railways in Afghanistan, but since 1956 road building has figured promi-
5
nently in economic development. About 600 miles of roadway has been asphalted,
5* British Survey: 'Afghanistan'; No.201, May 1961, p.34*
Ill
and other forms of communication such as telephone, telegraph and postal
services extended* But, as is shown on Map 1, no attempt has been made in
the area of the Wakhan Corridor to attach it by means of communications to
the core area of the state. Political administration from Kabul within
Afghanistan is often ineffectual, but nowhere is it so tenuous as in the
area of the Sino-Afghanistan boundary. Here a separate existence is foll¬
owed by the tribesmen happily oblivious of their 3tate loyalties and giving
allegiance only to their cultural group. Avery aspect of daily life from
trade to marriage is concluded on a local basis with the various boundaries
and state administrations having little or nc influence. Afghanistan has
more pressing problems than the effective administration of the Wakhan Corr¬
idor, and China is apparently as yet unwilling to make the effort necessary
to impose her administration within Sinkiang up to the boundary line with
Afghanistan.
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The political geographer who first ventures into a study of the Hima¬
layan kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan (Map i) may well be surprised that these
two small states exist at all. In fact their survival is largely due to the
British policy in the Nineteenth Century of setting up a 'buffer' zone be¬
tween the rising power of the British Raj and the supposedly impressive power
of the Chinese Empire. In 1947 India followed the example of the British Raj
and left Bhutan and Sikkim to their nominal independence.
The small kingdom of Silckim is of little importance except for the sig¬
nificance of its geographical position. It lies between Tibet, Nepal, India
and Bhutan and commands a number of passes such as that of Nathu La which
lead into the core area of Lhasa. Sikkim's dominance of the Lhasa to Kalis-
pong trade route often led to foreign interest in its affairs, but neverthe¬
less the country has managed to retain a certain amount of independence. As
one of the centre pieces in the critical region between India and the People's
Republic of China Sikkim represents an interesting example of the importance
of geography in international politics.
During the Thirteenth Century A.D.Lepchas from the Assam hills began
immigrating into the Sikkim area, but it was in 1641 that the country was
first welded into the beginnings of a political unit when the Lama of Lhasa
and some colleagues converted the population to Buddhism and appointed Pbnchoo
Namgyal the first ruler. Until this time Sikkim had been a vassal area of
1. The following references have been important in writing the section
on Sikkim: P.P.Karan & W.M.Jenkins: 'The Himalayan Kingdoms',
Van Nostrand, Princeton 1963» D.Shellgrove: 'Himalayan Pilgrimage'*
Bruno Cassirer, Oxford 1961; D.Deig: 'Sikkim: Tiny Himalayan
Kingdom in the Clouds'; Nat. Geographic isag; Vol. 123; March 1963#
Gov. of Sikkim: 'Second Five Year Plan 1961-1966', Gangtok 1961;
J.C.White: 'Sikkim & Bhutan; 21 Years on the North-east Frontier
I887-1908'; Edward Arnold, London 1909.
Tibet. The early history of the state was bloody; during the reign of the
fourth ruler Ghogyel Gyurme (1717-1734) the Bhutanese plundered Sikkim and
carried off a large part of the population into slavery. Following the
Gurkha victories in Nepal they began a thrust into Sikkim. At this time
during the latter part of the Eighteenth Century Sikkim was much larger than
it is today, including eastern Nepal, Tibet's Chumbi Valley, part of Bhutan
and the Kalimpong and DarReeling districts of India. During 1788-89 the
Bhuianese invaded from the east and the Nepalese from the west and Sikkim's
territories were reduced.
The seventh ruler of Sikkim. was Tsugphu Earqgyal who came to the throne
in 1793* In 1814 a British force came to the aid of Sikkim and defeated the
Gurkhas. Following this the 1817 Aaglo-Nepalese peace treaty established the
boundary between Nepal and Sikkim. In 1835 in a gesture of friendship to¬
wards the East India Company the Sikkimese king gave the Darjeeling hills to
Britain. As compensation the British gave the king an allowance of 3»000
rupees a year which was doubled in 1846. The action of the ruler in granting
the British the land south of the Great Rangit River led to a strong Tibetan
reaction. Tibet still regarded Sikkim as a vassal state and considered Sikkim'a
gift to the East India Company as illegal. Tibet prohibited the Sikkimese
rulers from visiting Lhasa (of great religious significance to the Sikkimese)
more than once in eight years.
The ill treatment of a party of British officials in Sikkim in 1849 led
to the advance of British troops on Tumlung (Map 3) which was then the capit¬
al of the state. After this incident British power in Sikkim increased rap¬
idly and by the Treaty of 186l Sikkim was made a protectorate of Britain
with foreign policy in the hands of the latter. The 1886 incursion of the
Tibetans into Sikkim resulted in a British force marching on Lhasa in 1888.
At the end of the British expedition into Tibet the Indian Government sent
a politioal officer to rule Siidcim in co-operation with the local officials.
The power of the Maharajah was considerably curtailed by this action and
the kingdom was under the control of Britain, although in theory it was
independent.
A dispute between the ninth ruler and the British Resident led to the
fleeing of the Maharajah to Tibet in 1892. However, the disagreement was
settled and the four rulers who have been nominal rulers in Gangtok since
have allowed the real power to remain with the Residents. Due to its
strategic significance foreigners were only allowed into Sikkim by permiss¬
ion from the British, a policy which India has followed since gaining indep¬
endence in 194-7.
As with so much of her northern border India inherited the British
policies following 194-7* In 1950 the Indians signed a new treaty with the
Maharaja Tashi Hamgyal which makes Delhi responsible for all of Sikkim's
external affairs, strategic communications and defence. Continuing Brit¬
ish practice India also has a permanent resident in Gangtok.
Sikkim is politically dominated by India and a3 such has been thrust
into the front ranks of the latter's dispute with China. However, in con¬
trast to the rest of India's northern border commitments, Sikkim has the
advantage of having a boundary with China which has been both delimited and
demarcated (by posts) following a boundary treaty between Britain and China
in 1890. Although China might make claims to Sikkim on the basis of the
area having once been a vassal state of Tibet, the boundary can only be
challenged if Peking refuses to recognise the 1890 Sino-British agreement.
Sikkim is a gateway to India (Map 3) which has led to an increase of
Indian troops in Sikkim. Local opinion demands that Sikkim should have more
say in the defence of its boundary with Tibet and so in 1961 India agreed to
train and equip a Sikkim militia to guard some of the border roads, a move
which had very favourable reaction to India within the small state.
China's wooing of Sikkim has been marred by the arrival of 7,000 Tib¬
etan refugees since 1959 in northern Sikkira. However, China possesses two
useful weapons in that Peking has made much of the need to free Sikkim from
India's domination, and the ethnic similarities between much of Sikkim'a pop¬
ulation and that of Tibet.
The climate is harsh and the surface features restrictive. Basically
Sikkim is a basin of about 40 mi,lea wide enclosed between two dissected
ridges running north to south for about 80 miles each. In the west the Sing-
alila ridge is the division between Sikkim and Hepal and includes Mount Kan-
chenjunga at 28,168 feet in height. In the east the crest of the Donkhya
Range is used as a boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. In the north the cry¬
stalline Great Himalayan mountains form a dividing arc between Tibet and
Sikkim'a central basin. To the south the basin is blocked by the Barrel¬
ing ridge through which the Tiata River has carved a gorge near Kalimpong
(Map 2) • Sikkim is open to the full impact of the Southwest monsoon which
brings 200 inches of rain to the basin per year. The Tista and its tribut¬
aries have deeply dissected the Sikkimese highlands until it has formed the
central basin. The Kanchenjunga Range 12 miles south of the Great Himalaya
is a distinctive unit within Sikkim. The vegetation ranges in Sikkim from
the tropical luxuriance of the valley bottoms through subtropical and temp¬
erate a ones to the alpine varieties higher up the mountain slopes. Cut off
from Tibet by the Great Himalaya range, and from India by forest covered
hills Sikkim can claim a certain individuality with regard to its physical
geography.
The Sikkiraese are descended from Lopchas, Nepalese and Indians; as
with Bhutan both Mongoloid and Caucasian racial types are present. The Lep-
chas include such tribes as the Dupka. They comprise a little over 20% of
Sikkim's total population of about 170,000 persons. In the late Nineteenth
Century the British encouraged the immigration of Nepalese into Sikkim ao
that today these represent the largest element in the population and account
for 60/o of the people; they are Hindus in contrast to the Lepchas who favour
the Laraaist form of Buddhism from Tibet. It was not until 196l that the
Kepaleae were given Sikkimese citizenship, and they are forbidden to settle
in the northern valleys. The 1961 Sikkim Subjects* Regulation divides the
population into three racial categories of Lepcha, Bhutia and Tsong. Bhutia
was the term applied to inndgrants from Tibet and Tseng to the persons who
were not of Lepcha or Bhutia origin. The Indian community is small but
wields much economic power in the state. The bulk of the population is to
be found in the southern half of the state area.
The Lepchas used to cultivate small patches in the forest lands by means
of cutting down trees which were then burnt and corn, millet and buckwheat
planted. Game, fruits and tubers supplemented what the Lepchas grew. With
the influx of the Hepalese large areas of forest were cleared and rice grown
which inhibited the Lepchas1 living apace and led to the tribe becoming more
sedentary and relying less on hunting and gathering. The Lepchas are timid
and badly equipped to counteract the vigorous invaders from the north and
west* The Bhutlaa have pushed the Lepchas down from the higher lands to
the forests and lower valleys* This has led to a certain amount of animos¬
ity between the Lepchas and Bhutias and the Lepchaa and Hepalese*
The state religion of Sikkim is Tibetan Buddhism* but it is followed
by only 28^ of the population in contrast to 6q:,i> of the people being Hindus*
There is a certain amount of ill feeling between the two religious groups
which is further emphasised by cultural and ethnic contrasts* The official
language of Sikkim is Bngliah although only a small educated elite speak
it* The two main languages of the people are Sikkimese and Gurkhali which
again leads to a division within the population* However, Sikkim does have
an advantage over its neighbour Bhutan that the educational programme is
more advanced and illiteracy not such a tremendous problem to a government
endeavouring to bring about political unity within the state area*
Fran the appointment of a British political officer to Gengtok in 1868
the Sikkiraese economy has developed* In 19o6 Gangtok was linked with India
by the first road able to take wheeled traffic* The British introduced a
revenue system, extended the cultivated land area considerably and saw to
the building of various public works* Since the British withdrawal India
has been supplying the capital and technicians for Sikkim* Between 125k and
1261 Sikkim had a Seven Year Plan which was successful enough to encourage a
Five Year Plan to follow (1961-66) calling for about £& million of aid from
India* In both these Plans great emphasis was laid on the improvement of
communications, agriculture, mineral surveying and the development of for¬
estry (a third of Sikkim's 2,828 square miles is forested), plus electric¬
ity (mainly from hydro-electric stations;* But the crucial feature of the
Plans has been comnunicationaj half the expenditure of the First Plan was
 
on highways# In 1962 the 150 mile Korth Sikkim Road (Map 3} was opened
linking Gangtok with Oikkim's northern territories; an enthusiastic India
financed it and Indian Army engineers designed it*
The Sino-Sikkiraese border zone is a problem for both India and Sikkim*
Sikkim at the last Census (1961) had an average density of 59 persons per
square mile, but the northern seme contained only 65 towns and 7 villages
with over 500 persons as compared with the western zones 254- towns and 65
villages* The isolation of the small settlements in the mountain valleys
of the Great Himalaya chain defy government control from Gangtok. The ham¬
lets are self-contained and often cluster around a small monastery* The
50,000 people in the Gangtok area my be beginning to think of themselves
as Sikkioese, but such ideas do not reach many of the northern settlements.
The Maharajah is advised by an Indian Government representative as Premier
and Indians are in most of the chief civil service posts* There is resent¬
ment of India amongst many of the educated elite of Sikkim, so although
Indie completely dominates Sikkim at present her position is not unchalleng¬
eable* Afforts to move towards self-rule by a popular aasenhly have been
limited because of the ethnic divisions! the Sikkimese leaders either work
solely for themselves or else Just for the particular ethnic group from
which they come, but never for a united Sikkim* Similarly there is som
justification in believing that Indian administrators often serve their
country better than Sikkim's best interests*
The Sino-Sikkiraese boundary (Hap 4) itself runs along the Great Himalaya
crestline which separates 1 the waters flowing into the Sikkim fista and its
affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mocha and northward into
119.
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the other rivers of Tibet'• It can therefore be placed in Boggs'
•Physical' category or Hartshorns's 'Subsequent' division of boundary
type. Despite the boundary having been delimited it has not made much
impression upon the landscape, although there has been some change since
1951 with the advent of Chinese Communist power in Tibet, The population
in the border area on both sides of the boundary is Tibetan, but the
Chinese have put an end to the freedom of movement between Tibet and Sikkim
which prevailed before 1951* Since the 1962 Sino-lndian border clash there
has also been increasing political activity on the Sikkimese side of the
boundary, greatly assisted by the new road to the northern areas of Sikkim.
It would seem likely that in the future there will be greater cultural con¬
trasts between the populations on either side of the Sino-Sikkimese bound¬
ary.
Political unity is far from achieved within Sikkim due to the hostil¬
ities between the various national and tribal groups. There is the central
government area of effective administration around G-angtak which caters for
the majority of the population, but it cannot be claimed that the political
machine is as yet fully effective in the isolated northern territories.
Sikkira is a satellite state of India as yet lacking in effective pol¬
itical unity. It is a left over from the Nineteenth Century and probably
only survives at all because of a decision taken in 1861 whereby Sikkia be¬
came a British protectorate rather than an integral part of British India.
India had tended to leave much as she inherited it from the Raj in 1947»
and Sikkimese nominal independence is something which therefore survives.
The development of an internal road system will assist the govemiaant*s
efforts to weld the state area into a political unit, and the imposition of
2. P.P.Karan & W.M.Jenkins* 'The Himalayan Kingdoms'* Van
Nostrand, Princeton 1963, p.77*
the boundary upon the landscape will out SaJdcim* a Tibetan population' a
ties in the north* but Sikkim's survival as a state depends to a great
extent en the attitudes of her northern and southern neighbours*
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Bhutan covers an area of 18,000 square miles of strategic importance
between the plains of India and the Tibetan plateau region of China. The
core area of the state is around the Paro Valley in the Inner Himalaya zone
(Map 3) • The history of Bhutan, like its survival as an independent state,
tends to be obscure. However, there are strong connections with Tibet.
During the last 500 years lamas from Tibet have settled in Bhutan to found
monasteries such as that at Punakha (1527 A.D.). These Tibetan immigrants
found the country inhabited by a tribe called the Bhutia Tephoo who had
originally come from Cooch Behar in India. The Tibetan imi igration drove
many of the Bhutia Tephoo into the Duars Plain area of Bhutan (Map 2) •
About 300 years ago the Tibetan lama Sheptoon La-Pha established himself as
the King of Bhutan with the title Dharma Raja and began welding together
his dominions into an administrative unit. Later two rulers were establish¬
ed, one, the Dharma Raja, took care of spiritual affairs, whilst the other,
the Deb Raja, administered the temporal matters. The Dharma Raja's office
wa3 dependent upon a verifiable reincarnation of the former Dharma Raja
and the post ceased in the 1930*a when no reincarnation was found.
During the Nineteenth Century Bhutan was torn by civil strife. The
Den Raja's office was supposed to be filled by election by the governors
of the forts and territories, but went to the governor who was strongest.
Until the Twentieth Century Bhutan was a political unit without a central
1. The following references have been important in the writing of the
chapter on Bhutan; P.P.Karan & W.M. Jenkins - 'The Himalayan Kingdoms',
Van Nostrand, Princeton 1963; B.N. Datar •" 'Himalayan Pilgrimage';
Gov. of India Publications, Delhi 1961; D.Doig: 'Bhutan, the Mountain
Kingdom', National Geographic Magazine, Vol.117; I960; P.P.KaranJ
'Bhutan & Sikkim'; Canadian Geographical Journal, Vol.65, Dec. 1962.
authority as local power dominated. In 1907 the governor of Tongsa "became
the hereditary king or Gyalpo and the present monarch Jigrae Dorji Wang-
chuk is the third. His wife is the English educated cousin of the i.feharaja
of Sikkim.
Being a weak state Bhutan has "been since the Nineteenth Century the
scene of British, Chinese, Indian and Tibetan rivalry. Between 1841 and
I864 the British acquired most of the Duars Plain region. Up until 1904
political relations between Britain and Bhutan were through the Government
of Bengal, but after this date there was a transfer to the British Politi¬
cal Officer of Sikkim who was resident in Gangtck and who also looked after
relations with Tibet. This brought relations with Bhutan, Tibet and Sikkim
under the Government of India in Delhi. W ith the withdrawal of Britain from
India in 1947 two years later a new treaty was signed between India and
Bhutan to replace the earlier Anglo-Bhutanese one. By this Bhutan agreed
to be guided by India in her foreign affairs, and India acknowledged resp¬
onsibility for Bhutan's defence and communications. The British annual sub¬
sidy of 5^0*000 rupees was increased by India, and in fact all of Bhutan's
foreign aid (about £lf million per amum) comes from India. In 1961 Bhutan
launched a £12 million Five Year Plan based on aid from New Delhi. India
discourages all but commercial arrangements with other states for the Bhut-
anese. China has frequently offered assistance to Bhutan without success,
and the Bhutanese Government's request in 1961 to India for permission to
accept American aid under the Public Law 480 funds arrangement led to their
being told that anything Bhutan may need India can provide. In her efforts
to isolate Bhutan India had some initial problems from Chinese wooing as the
Bhutanese have very strong ethnic and cultural connections with Tibet, but
the Chinese action in Tibet following the 1959 revolt has done much to re-
establish Indian predominance and alienate any sympathy for the Peking
Government. As with Sikkim Bhutan is a satellite of India, and in much
the sane way survives largely due to the British Raj in the Nineteenth
Century using the country as a buffer between British and Chinese inter¬
ests in the Himalayan region. Britain never incorporated Bhutan within
her Indian territories, and this policy has been followed by India since
1947.
In contrast to Sikkim Britain did not conclude a Sino-Bhutanese bound¬
ary treaty during the period of the British Raj. The Sino-Bhutanese bound¬
ary is neither delimited nor demarcated and it is in dispute (Map 3). App¬
arently the British saw no urgency to conclude a Sino-Bhutanese boundary
agreement with China as they had done in Sikkim, probably because British
influence was somewhat later establishing itself in Bhutan and by that time
China did not appear the threat it appeared still in 1890 (Sino-Sikkimese
boundary agreement).
The boundary with India is not such a problem for the Bhutanese. In
1774 after the Bhutanese had invaded the British protectorate of Cooch Be-
har in India the British signed a peace treaty whereby each state recog¬
nised the boundary in the Bengal Duars as it was before the Bhutanese in¬
cursion. Following the Anglo-Burmese War of 1825-26 British rule wis ex¬
tended into Assam and the British confirmed the boundary between Bhutan
and their Assamese territories. According to this agreement the British
occupied the Durang Duars in Assam between July and November of each year,
and the Bhutanese for the odier months, paying an annual tribute for the
right in kind. The Bhutanese fell into arrears on these payments and inr
dulged in expeditions for plunder into British territory from 1828 to 1839.
In 1841 these events led to the British annexation of the Bhutan Duars and
the establishing of the present southern boundary of Bhutan in the Assam.
Similar problems over the Bengal Duars led to the I865 Treaty of Sinchula
Bass in -which Bhutan assented to the cessation of the Duars to the British
for an annual subsidy. The Duars Plain is an area of about 215 miles in
length and a little over 20 miles in width.
Bhutan's physical geography divides the state into the three struct¬
ures of the Great Himalaya, the Inner Himalaya and the Duars Plain. The
Great Himalaya offers heights of up to 24*000 feet in northern Bhutan and
the state has been strongly influenced by the five passes leading into
Tibet from this area. Here pastures are used in sunnier up to 14*000 feet
for cattle, or higher for yaks. Just north of the Great Himalaya are low¬
er mountains separating the former from the Tibetan Plateau and which form
the principal watershed for those rivers flowing southwards. Until the
Chinese invasion of Tibet the Bhutanese and Tibetans were little aware of
any political division, with Bhutanese bringing grain, spices and cloth
into Tibet and salt, wool and yak products from Tibet. Since then there
has been a rapid change of this state of isolation with the closing of the
boundary so that the Bhutanese economy of the border areas has been greatly
affected.
Spurs from the Great Himalaya thrust south to form the watersheds be¬
tween Bhutan's main rivers. The Black Mountains between the Manas and San-
kosh Rivers (Map 2) divide Bhutan into two ethnographic parts* to the east
the population originally came from title Assam hills whilst those of the
west are of Tibetan origin. The mountains affect climate with the windward
slopes having a heavy rainfall and those of the lee sides being dry. Simi¬
larly vegetation ranges from the dense forest of the damp lower slopes to
the alpine growths of the higher ground. The fertile valleys of central
Bhutan amongst the Inner Himalaya are at heights "between 5,000 and 3,000
feet, the best known being Paro at 8,000 feet and Punakha at 5,000 feet
(Map 5) • fhe river valley sides have been terraced for the growing of rice
and wheat. The more important settlements are dominated by a fortified
monastery (e.g. Pai-o).
The Duars Plain extends into Bhutan for about ten miles with the
mountains rising sharply in the north. The rainfall is heavy and the clim¬
ate unhealthy. The dense forest of the northern half gives way to bamboo
and savanna in the south. There are eighteen passes from the Duars into
the Himalayan foothills. The settlement is in small villages along the foot
of the mountains.
Bhutan's population is generally conceded to be less than a million,
or about 45 persons per square mile. The lowest density of population is
in the Great Himalaya region and the Duars Plain. The scattered nature of
the population distribution, plus the fact that it is completely rural
makes political unity a dream for the distant fixture. As mentioned prev¬
iously there is also the ethnic division between the western Tibetan stock
and the eastern tribes related to the peoples of the North East Frontier
Agency of India. The Tibetans are strict Buddhists, which cannot be claimed
for the eastern part of the state. Also there has been an immigration of
Hindus into the foothills of southern Bhutan which adds to the political
disunity of the state. The Tibetan version of Buddhism is the state relig¬
ion and a little over a quarter of the government's total revenue is spent
an the upkeep of the 4,000 lamas and 8 monasteries.
The Hindus of the south make up about 2%o of the total population and
are mainly from Nepal. They are banned from living in the central areas
of Bhutan and suffer from an acute shortage of lard suitable for agricult¬
ure. In government legislation they are discriminated against, which has
further emphasised their position as a discontented element within the
state. The disunity within Bhutan became of pressing importance to the
Government after the People's Republic came into being. The Bhutanese
were slow to appreciate the Chinese threat, but in I960 they decided to
launch an ambitious road building programme to be completed in 1966. Cen¬
tral Bhutan is being linked with India by three north-south roads which
are also being connected together by an east to west highway. The plan
calls for 800 miles of new roads assisted by a new law which makes work
on the highways compulsory, each family in a district has to provide one
labourer with the option of replacing him or her each month by another.
India is supplying capital and engineers and in 1962 the first highway
between Paro and the Indian boundary (120 miles) at Phuncholing was op¬
ened, reducing the travelling time from six days to ten hours (Map 3) .
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Of Bhutan Karan writes 'Differences in language, religion, and eth¬
nic origin have their effect on the political life of the tiny kingdom.
The people generally think of themselves in terms of their respective
tribes or ethnic origin.' This again is a similar situation to that
which prevails in other such Minor Neutralist states as Burma, but there
are differences with regard to Bhutan for the administration has taken
an active part in closing its own side of the boundary with China except
for refugees from Tibet. Traders returning from Tibet were found to be
carrying propaganda so that in 1959 Bhutan stopped all such movement across
the border and recalled the trade representative in Lhasa in i960. In May
of I960 the National Assembly heard complaints of the government's fail¬
ure to provide alternative markets for Bhutanese rice and of the poor qual-




ity of Indian salt, but since the opening of the first road to the south
criticism lias been less open. India has welcomed the reorientation of
Bhutanese trade southwards as the former connections with Tibet were held
to be strategically -weakening to the sub-continent's defence.
In the boundary dispute between Bhutan and China the Bhutanese claim
the so-called 'traditional line' which follows the crest of the Great Him¬
alayan Range (Map 1+) which is also the area's watershed along most of the
way. Peking lays claim to 300 square miles of north-eastern Bhutan, plus
much of the region north of Punakha, the basis of their demands being eth¬
nic similarity. Therefore the Bhutanese boundary version comes within
Boggs' Physical category or Hartshorae's 'Subsequent', the Chinese vers¬
ion into Boggs* *Anthropo-geographic' subdivision or, again, Hartshorns's
'Subsequent* category. In support of their case the Bhutanese quote the
3
Report of the 1395 Pamir Boundary Commission in that 'Geographically, pol¬
itically, and ethnographically, watersheds are ... the only true and stable
boundaries in these regions.'
Bhutan's central government, with the beginnings of a transport system,
is only at the first stage of making its administration effective through¬
out the state area. Bhutan is not a coherent political unit, being cultur-
ally diverse and beset with the problem of minority nationalisms. As with
both Bhutan and Sikkim the original reason for their existence as separate
states was due to Tibetan Lamaism. Each of the states was set up as a
vassal area of Lhasa, but both developed independently under ambitious, rel¬
igiously imbued dynasties. It was strong personalities which led to the
setting-up of Bhutan and Sikkim, for there is a general lack of reasons why
3. Government of India: 'Report on the Proceedings of the Pamir
Boundary Commission'# Calcutta 1897# P*7*
.1/7 .'.Mlt ■
the area should not have first been a frontier zone between China and India
later absorbed into these states# The survival of Bhutan and Sikkim during
the Nineteenth Century was due to a decision to use these countries as a
Sino-British buffer zone. Although both Bhutan and Sikkim are now Indian
satellites the^ still serve as buffer states between China and India. Sim¬
ilarly, except for the tradition of separate independence, there seems little
reason why tfce two states should not be combined.
The present extent of Bhutan and Sikkim is largely the outcome of how
far the surrounding states would permit the nominal administration of Gang-
tok and Punakha to spread. The Sino-Bhutariese boundary dispute is a contin¬
uation of this territorial battle. Perhaps the most logical move would be
the integration of Bhutan and Sikkim into the Indian state area, but this
might well be challenged by China and would appear morally difficult to just¬
ify in the light of present world opinion regarding nominally independent
small states.
The Sino-Bhutanese boundary (Bhutanese version; will become more eff¬
ective as a division within the landscape when the road building programme
permits easy travel from Punakha to the border zone. Already the inhibit¬
ion of movement of population across the boundary has begun to change the
attitudes prevailing amongst the people each side of the line. However, as
with all states the effectiveness of the political boundary as a division
in the landscape is related to the effectiveness of the political adminis¬
tration within the whole state area and as yet Bhutan is still striving
for the latter.
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On January 28th I960 the People1 a Republic of China and the Union
1
of Burma concluded a boundary agreement. Having been only familiar
with the more aggressive image of Communist China there was a certain
amount of surprise throughout the world at Peking's action, although as
it was later appreciated this was only the first of a number of similar
boundary treaties. As the Sino-Burmese boundary has now been at least
successfully delimited, if not demarcated, it is perhaps instructive to
2
view more closely the historical background of the treaty before deal¬
ing with the geography of the boundary area.
In December of 1954 Burma's Premier U Nu paid a visit to China. At
that time there were more pressing problems than the disputed areas of
Burma's northern border (Map I). At the end of the visit on December
12th a Joint Communique was issued stating that 'in view of the incom¬
plete delimitation of the boundary line between China and Burma the two
Premiers held it necessary to settle this question in a friendly spirit
at an appropriate time through normal diplomatic channels'. But a year
after the publication of this statement the matter was forcefully re¬
opened by a clash between Burmese and Chinese troops at Wakha in the Wa
state during November of 1955» According to the Sino-British agreement
of 1941 this was Burmese territory# but the Peking Regime did not recog¬
nise this treaty as they claimed China was weak from war with Japan at
the time and it had been imposed by the British. Also the Chinese stated
1. A copy of the boundary agreement is in the Appendix.
2. Much of the historical background in this section is based on D.
Woodman* 'The Making of Burma'j Cresset Press, London 1962.
H.Tinkers 'The Union of Burna* J Oxford, London 1957. British
Parliamentary Publications Nos. 5164 (1887) and 7547 (1894) and
Treaty Series N0.48 (1956)•






that a British Note dated April 10th 1911 acknowledged that Hpimaw, Kang-
fang and Gawlum were part of China. The Chinese refused to move until
the Union troops vacated these areas, plus much of the northern section of
the boundary.
The Burmese were not surprised by China's claims to Hpirnaw, Kangfang
and Gawlum, but were upset by the demand for much of what was Kachin State
(Map 2). A Joint Boundary Commission was set up to study the whole question,
the Burmese claiming that they governed 'all those territories which had been
administered by the British Government, that these territories included
Hpimaw, Kangfang, and Gawlu^i, and that they had at no time advanced into
any area which was not already administered by the British as part of Burma
3
at the time of the transfer of power.' U Nu had been replaced by U Ba Swe
as Prime Minister, but with the latter's approval he accepted an invitation
from Chou Krt-lai to visit Peking. Before he left it was decided that Burma
should sue for the recognition of the boundary as the British had left it.
Although China had certain just complaints against the 1941 Treaty
she was willing to accept it as part of a general agreement. Peking wanted
the abrogation of the Namwan Assigned Tract lease, although special consid¬
eration would be made of the Burmese highway through it, plus the return of
Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum. U Nu returned to Rangoon with his report and
after consultations went once more to Peking. It was hoped at this time
that if Burma gave up Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum she might retain the Nam¬
wan Tract. The possibility of Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum being administ¬
ered by the Chinese met opposition from the Kachins. The Chinese were aware
of the Kachin feelings in the matter and were prepared to make concessions.
3* Unless otherwise stated the quotations are from a speech delivered
by U Nu to the Burmese Chamber of Deputies on April 28th i960 and
reported in 'Burma', Vol.9*, No. 4*» for October i960, pp.11-27*
U Nu flew back to Rangoon with Peking's proposals that Hpimaw, Kangfang
and Gawlum should be returned to China, but that the boundary should run
along the watershed between the N'Mai Kha and the Salween Rivera which was
more generous than their previous claims.
China's claims on the Namwan Tract and Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum
were honourable ones. The Kamwan Tract had been recognised as Chinese
territory by the 1894 Anglo-Chinese Convention and the 1897 Anglo-Chinese
Agreement* under the latter the British had persuaded the Chinese to rent
them the area for a sum of one thousand rupees per annum. Although Burma's
only route between her Shan ana Kachin States ran through the Namwan Tract
she was well aware of China's right to the region and had planned another
highway to the west.
The 1894 Convention and 1897 Agreement related only to that part of the
Sino-Burmese boundary from the High Conical Peak (Latitude 25 degrees and
35 minutes N.) to the tripartite junction of the Burmese, Chinese and Laot¬
ian borders. The 1894 Convention stated in Article IV, 'It is agreed that
the settlement and delimitation of that portion of the frontier which lies
to the north of latitude 25 degrees and 35 minutes shall be reserved for
future understanding between the High Contracting Parties when the features
and condition of the country are more accurately known.' Britain felt that
the best boundary would be between the Salween and N'Mai Rivers, but China
claimed that the boundary should be farther west. After surveying of the
region and negotiation in 1905 the British Minister in Peking was instruct¬
ed to get the Chinese Government to agree to the 'watershed between the
Irrawaddy and Salween basins up to the confines of Txbet' as the boundary
with an annual payment of not more than 1,500 rupees as compensation. The
Peking Government refused and in 1906 the British Minister was instructed
to inform the Chinese that Britain would occupy and recognise this
boundary anyway.
In 1910 the Chinese chieftain of Tangkeng raided Hpiinaw and Peking
refused to take action as they did not recognise the area as British terr¬
itory. In 1911 a British expeditionary force occupied Hpirasw and negotia¬
tions were opened in Peking. A British Note (April 11th 191l) rejected all
Chinese claims to villages west of the N'Mai Kha-Salween watershed with the
exception of Hpiraaw, Kangfang and Gawlurn. The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma
(Sir Harvey Adamson) considered the Chinese claim to the latter three vill¬
ages as superior to that of his own Government. Nevertheless on February
1st 1913 Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum were annexed by Britain.
On February 4th 1957 Premier U Ba Swe in a note to Chou En-lai offered
China 56 square miles (Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum) and suggested that the
Namwan Tract be given to Burma on a permanent basis. When U Nu again became
Prime Minister in the same year he discussed U Ba Swe's proposals with Chou
En-lai who suggested that the Panghung and Panglao tribal areas might make
an acceptable exchange for the Nas&van Tract. In July of 1957 an official
Chinese note stated that Peking claimed 186 square miles of territory in the
Epimaw-Kangfang-Gawlum area and 86 square miles of the Bs nghung-Panglao
region in return for the Namsran Tract. Justice U Myint was dispatched to
Peking to say these terms were unacceptable. Chou En-lai suggested that
before the matter was discussed further a joint survey team should carry
out a study of the boundary.
In December of 1957 Deputy Premiers U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein arrived
for a goodwill visit to Peking where Premier Chou proposed that the Nairwan
Tract should only be given permanently to the Burmese in return for the
Panghung and Panglao tribal areas, although he did modify his views on the
northern boundary to the extent of agreeing that this section should follow,
with the exception of the Taron River region, the watershed. Chou 4n-lai
claimed that the Taron River area was important as a source of medicinal
herbs for the people to the north of the watershed. Again the Chinese sugg¬
ested a Boundary Commission to survey 'the Sino-Burmese boundary from Izur-
azi Pass to the Indian border, and also to settle, step by step, the question
of the Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang area to be ceded to China, ana also that
of exchanging the Hamwan Assigned Tract for the Panghung and Panglao tribal
areas falling to the west side of the 1941 line.'
There was something of a stagnation until a new administration cane to
power in Rangoon under General He Win who made fresh advances to Peking. He
stated that he felt the boundary should follow the watershed, that Hpimaw,
Kangfang and Gawlum should be returned to China and that the Namwan Tract
should be exchanged for the Panghung-Panglao areas west of the 1941 line.
He Win managed to persuade the Shan leaders to agree to the transfer of the
Panghung and Panglao tribal areas and proposed that of the 86 square miles
in this region demanded by Peking 62 square miles should be offered. He
Win's proposals were sent to the Chinese on June 4th 1959* He Win stressed
his unique position as a non-party leader in the negotiations which followed
which had enabled him to go farther in concessions to the Chinese than any
leader of a political party. On Deceniber 22nd 1959 He Win received a formal
invitation to visit Chou En-lai during the following month. On January 23rd
I960 the Burmese delegation arrived in Peking and on January 28th the Agree¬
ment was concluded. In the northern areas it was decided the boundary
should follow the watershed except where it crossed the Taron River basin.
Prom Izurazi to the High Conical Peak the boundary was also to follow the
watershed with the exception of the transfer area of Hpimaw-Kangfang-Gawlum.
The Hamwan Tract of 80 square miles was to become Burmese territory, although
m ap 3. econom ic divisions salween r.
how much of the Panghung-Panglao area was to be exchanged was not settled
(similarly with the HpimawKangfang-Gawlum region). A Joint committee was
to decide exactly how much Burma should give to China in these two areas.
China agreed to acknowledge the 1941 boundary and to surrender her right
under that agreement to participate in the mining enterprises in the Lu-
fang region. Thus, after many years of negotiation, the boundary between
China and Burma was reasonably well defined.
Although certain physical features such as watersheds were favoured
in most of the areas for delineating the Sino-Burmese boundary the polit¬
ical decision has net had any particular effect upon the region'3 geogra¬
phy as in the main it is a wild and inaccessible type of country which is
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involved. Burma itself is 'a land of longitudinal mountains and valleys.'
In the west there are the ifega-Chin-Arakon Yoma ranges rising in the
northern areas up to 20,000 feet. In the east is the Shan Plateau averag¬
ing about 3,000 feet in elevation and dropping to the Central Plain an a
scarp. The Salween River (Map 3) drains the Shan Plateau. The Central
Plain of the Irrawaddy and Sittang Rivers is broken by the Pegu Hills in
the south and the Kachin Hills to the north. In the southern part of Burma
are the hills of the Tenasserim. The physical geography of Burma has helped
to isolate her from China and India. Unlike Afghanistan Burma was never an
historical crossroads or transit area. Between the core areas of China and
Burma there is the mountainous country of lunnan. Within Burma itself the
hilly and jungle covered nature of the north, east and west lias emphasised
the cultural differences of the various areas of the state.
The 1956 Census listed 126 languages and dialects within the Union of
4» L.Carlson: 'Geography and World Polities'; Prentice-Hall,
Hew Jersey 1958; p.495*
Burma, which could "be classified into II principal language groups. Of
the 20 million people inhabiting Burma roughly 65/3 claimed Burmese as
their mother tongue. There are five dominant ethnic groups, plus the immi¬
grant Chinese and Indian communities. The Burmans are Mongolian in physi¬
cal characteristics and are culturally allied to the Thais. It is thought
that they entered the Indochinese Peninsula about 9C0 A.D. They are in the
main Buddhist. The Karens are the largest minority group and make up about
15/o of the total population. Until the coming of the British in the Nine¬
teenth Century they were an exploited minority and are hostile to the more
numerous Burraans. They are found in the south-eastern areas of the Union
and are peasant farmers. They differ in language from the Burraans and are
mainly Baptist Christians. Prom 1948 to 195^ the Karens waged a war of
independence against the Union until their manpower resources were exhausted.
It seems unlikely that the state will absorb the Karens successfully for
many years.
Other dissident minorities within the Union of Burma include the
Chins, Kachins, Shans, and the Nagas on the Indo-Burmese boundary. One of
the advantages the Burman majority has over these other cultural groups is
that of a higher general standard of education. Only the Karens come any¬
where near to challenging the Burman dominance in this field. The cultural
contrast between many of these ethnic areas (Map 2) is well brought out by
studying the economic divisions within the state. In the south is the
booming Padi Zone of Burma (Map 5) • Burma is one of the rareities of Asia,
namely a food exporting state. Most of the Padi Zone is within the Burman
ethnic area, although the Karens have developed part of it in the east.
The silts of the deltas and lower valleys of the Irrawaddy and Sittang
Rivers provide excellent soils which are watered by the summer monsoon. The
population density is high by Burmese standards, but not by Asian. This
is the main source of Burma's rice export. The Dryland Crop Zone further
north is still inhabited mainly by Burrnans. This was the early economic
centre of the Burma area where the middle Irrawaddy and the Chindwin Rivers
formed what was called the 'Mandalay Basin'. Irrigation was needed to supp¬
lement the limited rainfall. Millet, sesamum, cotton and peanuts replace
rice in importance and goats are herded on the brush. The main lumbering
zones of Burma are located just south and north of the main rice region.
At moderate heights above sea level these areas receive a rainfall inter¬
mediate between the wet monsoon of the Padi Zone and the limited fall of the
Dryland Zone. The trees are mainly tropical deciduous such as teak and have
the advantage of being accessible to those areas where the demand is highest,
and to the exporting port of Rangoon. Again, the two zones are mainly with¬
in the Burman ethnic belt. The Pishing and Farming Belt has rice growing
in the pockets of lowland and valley areas supplemented by fishing encouraged
by the numerous small harbours along the coast. There has been a large immi¬
gration of people from what is now East Pakistan and the region is densely
populated by Burmese standards. The Arakan Mountains isolate this part of the
coast from the core area of Burma to the east. What Deasy terms the Divers-
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ifled Panhandle is found in Burma* s Tenasserim area, 'Jhe snail coastal
plains support padi rice, but in the main the region is too hilly for this
type of farming. The better drained slopes are used for rubber plantations.
The hills of the interior are the domain of primitive negroid people who
practice shifting cultivation and food gathering. There is some fishing
and pearling, and the teak forests of the northern part have a limited inr
5. G.P.Deaay, P.R.Greisa, E.W.Miller & E.C.Casei 'The World's
Nations, An Economic and Regional Geography' j
Lippincott, Chicago 1958, p.737*
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portanee.
Of greater significance to the political geographer interested in
boundaries is the geography of the highland perimeter of Burma which en¬
circles the lowlands of the state core area. The terrain is difficult,
being mainly mountain and forest. Communications are almost non-existent
6
and the climate, with a heavy summer rainfall, unpleasant. The economy of
these outer lands is that of many similar areas of the world where primitive
tribal cultures combat with limited success the jungle environment. Forest
is cleared by burning, after which a field is farmed until its fertility is
exhausted when a new patch will be used. There is some raining and lumbering.
These shifting cultivation areas of the Shans, Kachins, Chins and lesser
tribes include the boundary zones. Although the Kachins might be consulted
before China was awarded Hpimw, Kangfang and Gawlum it seems unlikely that
the tribes in the region of the Sino-Burmese boundary are aware as to whether
they are under Chinese or Burmese jurisdiction. Individual loyalties are to
the tribe, not to the state, and the Kachins are found on both sides of the
boundary, as are the Bhans and numerous other tribal groups* The Mongol
peoples of the boundary may be represented in certain government bodies
within both China and Burma, but the majority of the families in these
sparsely inhabited areas are blissfully oblivious of being part of the Union
of Burma since 1948 or the People's Republic of China since 1949*
Burma is very much a Union of a number of nations. Opposition within
Burma to the state is strong amongst the minority groups. The Karens, being
in the main of more advanced culture than the Chans, Kachins ana Chins, have
6. Of particular interest with regard to the shifting cultivation
economy of Burma has been; G.E.Harvey: 'The Wa People of the Burma-
Chinese Border'; St. Antony College Papers No. 2; Chatto & Windua,
London 1957*
 
"been most effective in their protest against their nationality being sub¬
merged, but their defeat is only a beginning to Rangoon's efforts to weld
the Union into an entity* Burma lacks both the power and the unity to make
her boundary with China an effective geographical divide#
Yunnan is a province of China, but one which is as yet tied none too
securely to the Communist state# Peking is better equipped to make the
Sino-Burmese boundary function as a division, but does not appear to be part¬
icularly interested in wasting manpower and resources in doing so. There is
a limit to how much Chinese effort is going to be expended upon making bound¬
aries watertight and one suspects that Peking is satisfied to allow the
boundary with a friendly power like Burma to act as a frontier zone rather
than the strict line it is on paper# Until the more crucial border areas
with India or the Soviet Union are settled it would seem likely that the
tribes will be permitted to practice shifting cultivation on either side of
the boundary between the Union and the People's Republic#
In conclusion it is interesting to look at a short, but typical section
of the Sino-Burmese boundary as illustrated in Map 4# Throughout the entire
boundary the Chinese and Burmese have favoured what Boggs has termed a
'physical' delimitation, using physical features along which to run the bound¬
ary line. The two types of physical features favoured are watersheds and
rivers# In Map 4 it is the centre line of rivers which is used. There is
no particular advantage in determining a boundary line along such physical
features in the landacape. What is significant regarding the Sino-Burmese
boundary is not that the line can be categorised under Boggs' 'Physical' type
or Hartshorne's 'Subsequent', but that both Rangoon's and Peking's political
influence in these border areas is limited and that the line has not aff¬
ected in any way the geographical distributions of the zone. The border
areas are inhabited by primitive tribesmen of low culture who have never
heard of Peking or Rangoon, and would bo surprised to find that the
political boundary existed in their tribal homeland.
 
The Sino-Laoa Boundary
Laos is an isolated country performing something which is similar in
function to the late Nineteenth Century concept of a 'buffer state*. It has
hardly been touched by modernisation, 'even today there are less than 1,000
miles of motorable road (motorable, that is, during the dry season) in an
area nearly twice the size of England, no major industries, and a total
1
electric power production (all thermal; of only 8 million kWh a year', The
population may be anything from 1,500,000 to 4 million. Rice production is
2
about 600,000 tonsj per annum, and there is a rice import to supplement it.
Some tin is exported from the Nam Patene mines of the middle Mekong area of
Laos, and also there are exports of coffee, tobacco, timber, stick-lac and
benzoin. However, the Laotian economy is at present functioning on foreign
aid, mainly from the United States, but also from Prance. The state is both
politically and economically unstable, and to understand why one must have
some knowledge of its recent history which in itself has been greatly in¬
fluenced by its geographical position.
The Prench endeavoured to weld what is now the four states of Laos, Cam¬
bodia and the two Vietnams into the single unit of Indochina during their
period of ruling, despite there having been no tradition of unity before.
The Indochinese peninsula can be roughly divided into three physical regions,
namely the eastern coastal plains (including the Mekong Delta), the alluvial
lowlands of the western area and the central uplands which extent in a tongue¬
like fashion from the Yunnan plateau of China (Map I) . Dominated to a large
extent by the physical geography Cambodia and Laos tended to be under the
1. C.A.Fisher* 'South-east Asia'; Methuen, London 1964, p*570*
2. As with so much of the statistical material used in this Asian study
the source is primarily from such United Nations publications as the
Demographic Yearbook, Statistical Yearbook and the Yearbook of
International Trade Statistics.
cultural influence of India, whilst the Vietnains owed much to China.
France had sent Roman Catholic missionaries to Indochina as early as
the Seventeenth Century, hut it was after 1850 that French activity in
Southeast Asia became effective. France was interested in finding a route-
way into the heart of China for trading purposes, and in ensuring French
power in the Far Fast. Between 1893 and 1904 Laos was made a protectorate,
although this status appears to have meant exactly the sane as 'colony*. The
ruling house was not affected in Luang Frabang other than in the amount of
power it wielded. French colonies were considered as extensions of France
and policy rested on a belief in assimilation. France aimed at being a
modem Rome, a heady ambition in an area as remote from Paris as was Laos.
Governor-General Doumer in 1898 planned to connect Laos by rail with the
eastern coast of Indochina, but nothing ever came of the project and so the
landlocked 'protectorate' continued to rely upon the use of the Mekong for
most of its trading. Laos stagnated, although French protection from the
more vigorous Annamite3 was appreciated. In contrast to the Annamites the
peoples of Laos prior to World War II supported no nationalist movement
clamouring for freedom from French rule. The more accessible Vietnamese
resented the French idea of assimilation, whilst the more amenable Laotians
were inaccessible because of the physical geography of Indochina.
During the latter part of 1940 the Japanese arrived in Indochina
(Tonkin) and in 1941 instituted an 'occupation of a friendly territory'.
When the war turned against them the Japanese in March of 1945 created the
three states of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China), Cambodia and Laos.
This was the beginning of the collapse of France's Union of Indochina. The
Allied decision that Chinese troops should be responsible for Japanese
surrender north of the 16th parallel and British for that south of the l6th
pareUel further emphasised the rift, to become crucial later, between North
and South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh Coalition used the chances
provided to establish a government in Tonkin to which the Annamite Emperor
Bao Dai adhered. In the south French officials came with the British troops
in September 1945, therefore establishing more effectively French rule.
The French were willing to compromise and in March of 1946 signed an
agreement with Ho Chi Minh recognising the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
within the Federation of Indochina which was to be part of the French Union.
Misunderstandings such as the degree of independence involved led to war in
December of 1946. Once the regime of Mao Tse-tung was established in Peking
Ho Chi-Minh was able to cast off his non-Communist supporters and the French
to claim their struggle was not a colonialist one, but war against world
Communism. To give the old Indochinese Union a new flavour in the face of
the threat from the north the French in December of 1950 tried to weld the
three states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam into a Customs and Communications
Union. This seemed to antagonise popular opinion in Laos. By the beginning
of 1954 France was obviously losing the military conflict as well and neg¬
otiations were begun which led to the Geneva Agreements of 21st July 1954*
According to these agreements Vietnam was to be temporarily divided
along the 17th parallel for a year until elections were held throughout the
country. All four Indochinese states were barred from military alliances
or the having of foreign bases on their territory. All foreign troops
were to be withdrawn and in Laos the Pa thet La^ (Communist)' forces had to
regroup in the two northerly provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly (Map i).
The United States was unwilling to support the Geneva Agreements and set
about organising the South East Asia Treaty Organisation to stabilise the
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area. The Treaty was signed at Manila on September 8th 1354 by the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, .ranee, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines and Thailand.
In many ways Laos represents a revolutionist's ideal. As in Bursas
there was always a certain amount of contempt felt by the valley dwellers
for the hill tribes, but in contrast to Burma half or more of the populat¬
ion of Laos is made up of the hill people. The valley favouring Lao (Map 2)
are a branch of the Thai family. Before the arrival of the Trench in the
latter part of the Nineteenth Century the Laotian area was usually divided
up into a number of dimunitive kingdoms. Only the kingdom of Luang Pruhang
retained any similarity to its former self under the French, whilst its
rival ban Chang capital of Vientiane became the residence of the French
administration in Laos*
Although the Pathet Lao was some tiling of a successor to the former
independence party it was increasingly dominated by the Communist elements
and worked closely with the Vietminh. Many Vietnamese and hill tribesmen
were recruited by the Coaiaunists in Laos. The Communists have always ex¬
ploited most successfully minority or underdog resentment and the hill
tribes of Lac® were favourably disposed. However, in November of 1357 the
Pa thet Lao agreed to the return of their provinces of Bam Neua and Phong
Saly to Laos on condition that their party should be legalised within the
state. Calling themselves the New Lao ilakset party the Pathat Lao in the
elections of May 1338 gained between a third and a half of the seats in
the National Assembly. The Government split to be replaced by an anti-
Coranunist regime. But in 136o there was a neutralist coup led by Captain
Kong Lee. After much political intrigue a right-wing government under
Prince Boun Oum was established with the support of the United States and
Thailand# The neutralists were backed by the Pathet Lao and world Coramnism#
Hostilities broke out until in June of 1262 the two factions were brought
into coalition under the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma# In July of 1262
at Geneva fourteen states, including China and the United States, agreed to
respect Laotian neutrality# However this has not apparently halted Pathet
LacrVietn&nh penetration into Laos, as events since 1964 have shown.
The northern areas of Laos are largely in Communist hands and so the
Sino-Laotian boundary might have been placed in the Coirimmiat category rather
than the Jinor Neutralist# The ineffectiveness of the political boundary is
further emphasised by the diversity of cultures within Laos. The Lao or Thais
are spread over much of Southeast Asia and originally came from the Yunnan
Plateau, their migration covering centuries# The Pan Thai movement can ex¬
pect to find support from Thais in the Yunnan Province of China, the Shana
of Burma, the Thais of Thailand, besides the Lao of Laos# present the
boundary between the Thais of Yunnan and the Thais of Laos is weak as it is
not particularly in the Chinese interest to impose political divisions# The
Thais are Mongoloid, short, of yellow skin colour and almond eyes which makes
them indistinguishable from most of the other ethnic groups throughout South¬
east Asia. There is a certain amount of cultural division between the major¬
ity of the Thais who inhabit the valleys, and those poorer brethren who are
found in the hill areas#
The Kha hill peoples differ from the Thais who axe racially dominant-
ly Pareoeans (brachycephalic, flat faced, straight haired and yellow in skin
colour) in that they demonstrate certain Nesiot characteristics (dolicho¬
cephalic, with a Caucasoid element). As with all efforts at racial claaaifi-
cation the dangers tend to outweight the usefulness and the mixture of
types within Southeast Asia has been vigorous# 'Kha* is the Laotian name
for 1 savage'• The Kha culture is limited, based on the shifting culti¬
vation of dry rice and maize. They are aniiaists who live in communal long-
houses. Like so many primitive peoples (for distribution see Map 2) they
are unaware of the significance of political boundaries or the concept of
loyalty to the state. The only understandable loyalty is that given to the
tribe. There may be a million Khas in Southeast Asia.
The Miao hill tribes are perhaps a little more advanced in culture than
the Khas, but also rely heavily upon shifting cultivation for their crops of
rice, maize, roots, sugar-cam, beans and opium poppies. The hills they
farm are suffering from erosion in many areas. Again, the only loyalty is
to the tribe with the political boundary between China and Laos having no
significance.
The Lolo tribes live on the higher ground above 3,000 feet. Like the
Miao they are predominantly Mongoloid and practise shifting cultivation.
Their culture is dominated by the significance of the tribe in all activ¬
ities, as is the case with all the hill peoples of the Indochinese penin¬
sula. ...ven the Muong of the lower areas bordering the Annaiaite districts
have been unaffected by such modern ideas as that of the state.
Although the primary interest is in the Sino-Laos boundary it is per¬
haps worthwhile to mention briefly the Annamite population of the Laos-
Vietnam border and the Khraers of the LaosKSambodia boundary. The Annamites
are dealt with in greater detail later, but it is interesting to note that
due largely to their closeness to the Kwangtung province in China they were
strongly influenced by Chinese culture and that from III B.C. to 339 A*D*
many were part of the Chinese Lmpire* Like the Annamites the Khners are
Mongolian in their physical characteristics (lareoean), but in contrast owe
ranch of their cultural tradition to India* i'he Khraers had once dominated
ranch of Southeast Asia, most notably after the founding of the Angkor dyn¬
asty by Jayavarmn II in 802 A.D. By the beginning of the Tenth Century
A.D* the population of the Angkor region probably exceeded a million per¬
sons* ihe peak of Khtner power was under Suryavarraan IX (UI>-II50 A*B»)
when Sung China was too weak to challenge, for the Khmer and Chinese terr¬
itories met in Angkor* s northerly domains* Ihe movement of the Thais into
Indochina challenged Khmer supremacy, and their aggressiveness towards Cam¬
bodia was encouraged by the Mongols who had gained power in China in 1280 A*D*
In 2451 a Thai array captured Angkor and the ere of Khmer greatness ended.
The Khraers who survive today are, like the contemporary Mayas of central Amer¬
ica, a sad reflection of a former civilisation. The modern Khmers are peas¬
ant farmers, in some areas practising shifting cultivation, adhering to the
Iheravada Buddhist faith*
There is little cohesion in the Laos state* The hill peoples of the Laos
ELateau in the north or the Armariate Mountain Chain in the east look only to
the tribe and the problems presented by geographical isolation and a low level
of culture make the possibility of their adhering to a state-idea remote* The
more sophisticated Lao are more likely to support the central government,
although hare close relations with the Thai of China, Thailand, Burma and North
Vietnam inhibit loyalty to the state. In much the same way the Khmer minority
in the south feel greater sympathy for Cambodia than for the culturally alien
3* Groslier (B*) & Arthaud (J.): 'Angkor Art & Civilisation*#
London 19571 p»25»











Laos. The diversity of cultures, perhaps most emphasised by language diff¬
erences, has led to a hostile disunity which lias been effectively exploited
by the Communists so that by 1965 over two fifths of the state was under
Pathet Lao control. A Kha hill tribesman is not likely to have ranch sympathy
with the somewhat arrogant Thai of the Middle Mekong Valley. In much the
same way the boundary concept is not one which comes easily to people who
only recognise tribal and cultural differences and not state distinctions.
With regard to the boundary line itself which runs for a little undsr
264 miles there are three important agreements between the French and China.
At the Treaty of Tientsin signed between the two countries on June 9th 1885
commissioners were appointed by China and France to determine the boundary*
On June 26th 1887 a Convention was signed between China and France which
delimited, the Sino-Vietnamese boundary, but not the Sino-Laos line. This
latter boundary was delimited in an agreement signed cm June 20th 1895• The
Sino-Laos boundary has been demarcated after a fashion by fifteen stone
pillars over its total distance (i.e. one pillar every 17*6 roles).
In delimitation the Sino-Frencli team favoured what Boggs terms a
•Physical* line or Hartshorne refers to as a •Subsequent* type, * ... with
the single exception of the crossing of the Nan-jun Ho, the entire boundary
it-
is delimited by major and minor watersheds. * Map 3 demonstrates the feet
clearly. There is no boundary disagreement between Laos and China although
4* U.S.State Department International boundary Studies No. 34:
'The China-Laos Boundary* J Washington, June 1964, p.4.
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the border area is not in the hands of the central administration in Laos*
As with Afghanistan and Burma China does not appear at present to be
particularly interested in making the political boundary effective within
the border area. China's attitude to what are some of her weakest neigh¬
bours, and often with 3ome valid territorial claims, is surprisingly tol¬
erant. The tribal distributions along the Sino-Laos boundary might
equally be claimed by either China or Laos. The boundary line has no effect
whatsoever on the landscape despite the gesture of fifteen stone pillars.
The hill peoples have a loyalty only to the tribe and the central governr
meat of Laos' administration is ineffectual within the border area. As a
state Laos has no cohesion either culturally or politically.
5« This section owes much to the following texts- R.Dumont: 'Types of
Rural Economy*; London 1957* P.G-oroui 'L'Utilisation du Sol en
Xndochine francaise' , Hartmaim, Paris 194-0J Par Eastern Quarterly
Special Number on Prench Indochina, August 1957# P» la Bar &
A.Suddard (Editors)! 'Laos', Human Relations Area Piles,
Hew Haven i960; C.Eobequain; 'L'Indochine francaise', University
of Paris Press 1935i United Nations Dept. of Economic Affairs at
Bangkok, quarterly *Econoinic Bulletin for Asia and the Par East'.
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The Maior Neutralist Borderlands
^
The S ino-North-weat Indian Boundary
(Due to the Indo~Paki3tani conflict in Kashmir it should "be appreciated
that there is a close relationship between the following and the
Sino-Pakistani Boundary).
The region of Kashmir and the Western Himalaya is the centre of a
Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistaai conflict. In the area itself the plains
of India and Pakistan (Map I) at about 1,000 feet give way to the Siwalik
ridges (3,000 feet) which have alluvial valleys between them and adjacent
to them, north from the Siwaliks there is the outer complex of the Himal¬
ayas with heights up to 15,000 feet and in a belt of about 60 miles in
width. The one extensive area of level ground in this mountain chain is
the lacustrine basin of Kashmir between the Pir Pcnjal range of the outer
Himalayas and the Great Himalaya range to the north. The Vale is at about
5,000 feet in elevation. The Great Himalaya is 20 miles in width and lias
peaks up to 25,000 feet. About a hundred miles to the north of the Great
Himalayas is the Karakoram range with some peaks of 28,000 feet. Between
the Great Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains lie the lower Ladakh and
Zaakar ranges. All the ranges except the Karakoram are cut by river gorges,
the most notable being those of the Sutlej and Indus. Along the upper
1. The following have been important in writing this section* O.K. II.
Spate: 'India & Pakistan'; xlsthuen, London 1557; W.Kirk: 'The
Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute', Scot. Geographical l&gaaine Vol.76,
Ho. I, 1560; & 'The Inner Asian Frontier of India', I.B.G.
Transactions <4 Papers No. 31, 1962; the numerous Indian & Chinese
Gov. Publications listed in the bibliography; & Burrard, Hayden &
Heron: 'A Sketch of the Geography and Geology of the Himalaya
Mts. and Tibet', Gov. of India, Delhi 1933*
Indus and its tributaries between the Great Himalaya and Karakoram at
10,OCX) feet alluvial and lacustrine valley floors and terraces have local
agricultural significance.
As might be expected the climate is dominated by local contrasts in
relief. In -winter the average loss of temperature up to 12,000 feet is 3
degrees F. per 1,000 feet, and 2g- degrees in sunnier. The sequence ranges
from humid subtropical in the outer Himalayan ranges below 8,000 feet, to
humid microthermal between 8,000 and 12,000 feet, and from 12,000 feet to
the snow line (at about 16,000 feet in the Great Himalayas; tundra. The south
facing slopes have an annual rainfall between 40 and 80 inches, the main source
of precipitation being the summer monsoon which comes up the Gangetic Plains.
However, in the Vale of Kashmire over half the 26 inches Srinagar receives
comes between November and May from western cyclonic depressions, the maxi¬
mum being in March and April. Little rain comes to the sheltered valleys be¬
yond the Great Himalayas* Leh receives 3 inches per year.
The effect of altitude and the rain shadow is reflected in the vegetation
with the outer ranges having subtropical evergreens and deciduous forest up to
3*000 feet, followed by temperate forest between 3*000 and 8,000 feet (pine,
cedar and evergreen oak)• Between 5*000 and 11,000 feet there may be moist
temperate forests of spruce, fir and rhododendrons. Oaks, rhododendrons,
juniper and birch can extent up to the timber line, although in stunted forms.
Above the forest there are grasses. Above 16,000 feet temperatures tend to
remain below freezing throughout the year. Glaciers can descend as low as
13,000 feet. Beyond the Great Himalayas the valleys have xerophytic shrubs
and poor grasses due to the limited rainfall.
The Siwaliks and gravel fans of the outer Himalayan foothills are poorly
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mile. Within the moist subtropical belt the Vale of Kashmir is the major
population concentration with a density of 1,000 per square mile (it has
an area of 1,600 square miles); Srinagar has a population of almost a
quarter of a million. Between 6,000 and 12,000 feet there are numerous
farming villages and trading centres, but north of the Great Himalayas
settlement is sparse. The outer Himalayas at about 6,000 feet have some im¬
portance as a sunnier resort.
Communications within the region are often non-existent. 'At no point
is the Great Himalaya penetrated by a graded vehicular road. The highest
major highway traverses the Banihal Pass, 9,300 feet, into the Vale of Kash-
2
mir from Jammu' • Of course the advent of the Communist regime in Peking
has changed somewhat the transportation system within the region as witness
the now much publicised Aksai Chin road (Map 30 • This road was described to
Premier Nehru of India in a letter of the 17 th December 1959 sent to him by
3
China's Chou En-lai ' ... the motor road over 1,200 kilometres long from
Yencheng in Southwest Sihkiang to Gartok in Southwest Tibet was built by
Chinese frontier guards together with more than 3*000 civilian builders
working under extremely difficult conditions from March 1956 to October 1957*•
The isolation of much of the region is well demonstrated by the fact that
until September of 1958 India was unaware that the Aksai Chin road existed
although it passed through territory to which she laid claim.
With the outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities in November of 1962 the
tempo of new road building both from Sinkiang and the Indian side of the bord¬
er has increased considerably, although it is confined to the edges of the
2. N.Ginsburg (ed): 'The Pattern of Asia'; Prentice-Hall, New
Jersey 1958, p.582.
3» Indian Gov. Ministry of External Affairs: White Paper No. Ill,
P»53, New Delhi, i960.
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Arable land is mainly in the southerly valleys below J,000 feet and
its use is intensive. The alluvial valley bottoms are used for irrigated
rice, as are those terraces to which water can be brought in diversion can¬
als. Winter crops of wheat and barley are favoured after the rice has been
harvested. The higher terraced lands are used for millet and maize whilst
those slopes unsuited to cultivation are often used for pasturing the vill¬
age* s cows and work oxen. Manure from these animals plays an important part
in the cultivation of the arable lands. The burning of forest lands is en¬
couraged in order to produce more pasture. Timber is used for housing and
for export by river to the plains. Above 7*000 feet the growing season is
limited to the period from April to October with the staple crops being
spring wheat, barley and potatoes. The maximum height for cultivation is
about 12,000 feet where the yak is used for ploughing. Cattle can be past¬
ured in summer up to 10,000 feet, and sheep and goats up to 14,000 feet.
Transhumance is practised, but by September the southern Great Himalayas are
deserted. The people of Ladakh (Map 2f- have much in common with their neigh¬
bours in Tibet for they do not go to the lower valleys in winter. In the
dry area to the north of the Great Himalayas all agriculture depends on irri¬
gation.
During the season of transhumance there is trade between the Vale of
Kashmir and the settlements of Ladakh. Since 1950 the political situation
has not encouraged trade, but there is still some movement of wool, salt,
borax and yak's tails from Tibet and Ladakh to India and Indian manufactures
and grain in return. The inhibition of trade in 1950 with the Chinese
advance into Sinkiang and Tibet has been further emphasised with the deter¬
ioration of Sino-Indian international relations. The Karokoram Pass and the
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Baroghil Pass into o ink tang are now closed to all north-south traffic*
'The Bino-Horthwest Indian border area is an ethnic and cultural
mixture. Along the Indian version of the political boundary the popu¬
lation is composed of a sparsely distributed group of Tibetan immi¬
grants (Map 2^» These Tibetans and related Bhotiyas are Lamaist Mongol¬
oids living in the high areas and culturally and linguistically closely re¬
lated to the peoples on the Chinese side of the boundary. Until the deter¬
ioration in bino-Indian relations there was a freedom of movement in the les£
accessible areas of the border zone which both the Indians and the Chinese
since ly62 have been endeavouring to stop. As India recognised Tibet as
part of the Chinese People's Republic Peking has some cultural basis for
her claims to those areas inhabited by Tibetans and Bhotiyas along the boundr
ary.
Although most of Ladakh is inhabited by Mongoloids of Tibetan origin
there are some Pahari-speaking Caucasoids in the western part, and also the
Sans is tribe which apparently has some Dravidian characteristics amongst
their predominantly Indoraryan features. The Sans is, lagas and Kanjar
tribes are wanderers noted mainly far banditry; although occasionally they
do practise nomadism in the boundary area they tend to remain cm the Indian
side (Map 2^ and have been subject to efforts by the Indian government to
settle them.
Kashmir is dominated by Bardic speaking Caucasoids of the Moslem faith,
whilst the more southerly Jaramu is mainly inhabited by Caucasoids of the
Hindu Dogra faith and Fahari speaking Caucasoids who also favour Hinduism.
However, all these groups favour the lower more westerly areas and it is
only in the Chinese version of the boundary Just south of the Karakaram Bass
 
(Map 2; that they are affected by the possible imposition of the boundary-
line*
In the main the division between the Mongoloid peoples (speaking Tibet¬
an and Bhotian dialects; and the Caucasoid groups is located within the
southern areas of the Great Himalayas* Therefore either the Indian or the
Chinese version of the boundary tends to affect the people of Tibetan origin*
and not such more westerly Caucasoid groups as the Ranalta or Khasa*
It is difficult to deal with Sine-Indian relations in this area without
first touching on the Indo-Bakiatani dispute over Kashmir* Until recent
tiraes the name 'Kashmir* referred only to the Vale which surrounds the upper
Jhelum River* Prom the Seventh Century A*D* onwards the Vale has been in
alien hands with invasions of creeds (Hindu and Buddhist; and conquerors
(Afghan, Mogul and Sikh) • And yet the ethnic and cultural uniformty of the
inhabitants of the Vale has not been particularly affected. The state of
Kashmir came into being during the Nineteenth Century A*B* At the time the
ctiief of the Hindu Dogra tribes held Janrau, Ladakh and Baltistan (Map 3} and
purchased from the British the Vale and its adjacent hill country to add to
Jaamx and make into the State of Janaau and Kashmir* The Dogra administration
was never fully accepted by the Moslem Kashmiris*
Before the partition of British India in August 19A7 the Maharaja of
Kashmir negotiated an agreement with Pakistan whereby he promised to make no
treaties with other countries without prior notification to Pakistan. Pakis¬
tan was responsible for comnunicatian and supply arrangements with Kashmir,
and in an effort to speed up the Maharaja's accession to Pakistan there was
a blockade of grains, salt, sugar, and kerosene*
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In .august of 1947 rioting began in Pocnch (Map 3) against the Mah¬
araja's adiainistrationi this state had a population composed of over 9Qi
Moslems* The Maharaja's Bogra Hindu troops were used to harshly crush
the revolt in loonch which led to a Moslem uprising with an influx of
tribesman from Gilgit and Pakistan's Northwestern liwince to assist
their persecuted brethren. Without doubt these Pathan raids were also
the outcome of the loss of British tribute for there was considerable loot¬
ing of fellow Moslem as well as Hindus. The tribesmen were aided by Pak¬
istani officials and received much of their equipment from rich Pakistani
nationalists.
The Maharaja fled and appealed for Indian aid* India asked for his
accession as a price for their assistance and the Maharaja gave it* Indian
troops quickly expelled the tribesmen from the Vale, but were stopped by
regular Pakistani troops who claimed the Moslem population was being driven
from Kashmir* India appealed to the United Nations and the Security Coun¬
cil set-up a commission* A cease-fire line was established in August of
4
1948 and has since become the division between India and Pakistan (Map 3) *
United Nations' efforts to solve this stalemate have been fruitless,
mainly as India will not agree to demilitarising the region so that a free
plebiscite may be held* There are many reasons for this attitude, but per¬
haps the main one could be that only Jaraau has a Hindu majority and there¬
fore India feels she might not come out of a plebiscite with as ranch terr¬
itory as she now holds. To the Pakistanis the importance of much of the
region lies in its hydroelectric potential and the protection of the water
4* Much of the material on Kashmir came fi*ora the following; R.C.May-
field; *A G-aog* Study of the Kashmir Issue*, Geog* Review Vol* 45»
1955? V«.Bartons 'Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir', Foreign Affairs
Vol* 28, 1949# A.Thomer; 'The Issues in Kashs.iir', Far Eastern
Survey Vol*17, 1948*
sources of the Sind and Punjab irrigation network. To India probably
strategic considerations now outweigh all others.
The 8ino-Indian boundary dispute in the Northwestern areas of the
Indian subcontinent has been complicated by the strife between Pakistan and
India in the region, and the concluding of an Agreement between Pakistan
and China delimiting the boundary between the latter two countries on Parch
2nd 1963. Pakistan has delimited a boundary between China and the disputed
areas of the Kashmir region of which she has control (i»e. Gilgit and Balt-
istan).
When the British domination of India ended in 1947 the subcontinent's
northwestern border zona was not a boundary but a frontier. The British had
protected India by a northerly line of buffer states. The challenge during
the latter pari: of tin© Nineteenth Century and early 'Twentieth Century was
felt to come from Tsarist Russia which was expanding rapidly into Asia. China
was weak. The advent of Communism in China changed the political geography
of the area, along with the replacing of the still formidable British power
in India by the less impressive Indian might. China effectively occupied
the former buffer zone of Tibet and the Sinkiang region which brought milit¬
ary power right up to India's borders. There was a considerable difference
between sharing a boundary with a more powerful Asian neighbour and sharing
it with a small neutral country behind which stagnated a weak China. Also
as India had decided to favour democracy as a political way of life she
could not expect lasting sympathy from a China dedicated to Mao's form of
revolutionary iSarxiam.
Sino-lndian relations following the establishment of Communist power
in Peking were initially cordial. However, both India and China have
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attempted to streamline their boundaries from the prior somewhat vague arrange¬
ments of the British Ra,j and imperial and Nationalist China. The clash of int¬
erests did not come until after the mid-1;)50*s. Until then India acted in a
most sympathetic manner towards her large neighbour, supporting the Chinese
right for a seat in the United Nations. She culmination of this friendship
came in 195k when the 'Panshila* of peaceful co-existence was signed, along
with an agreement on Tibeto-Indian traffic. The latter led to India recognis¬
ing Tibet as part of the dominions of China, restricted Indian trade to certain
routes in Tibet, and a limited nustoer of merchants, and in return for Indian
representatives at Xatung, Gyantse ana Gartok the Chinese were to have trade
agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. Despite this much publicised
agreement in 195k a number of border incidents too): place. During Chou's 195&
visit to India no mention was made of difficulties over the Sino-Indian border
area which made Nehru think that the incidents at Bari Hoti were local mis¬
takes. But India decided to take a closer look at the more remote regions of
her frontier with China and there found Chinese troops in possession of territ¬
ory India claimed. The number of border incidents increased with some blood¬
shed. The 1959 ©scape of the Dalai Lama to India did not improve relations
along the border, but it was not until that year that the 195k correspondence
5
between India and China was mads public.
Ab the border area of the northwest of India was politically ill defined
when the subcontinent gained independence China has been able to back her
claims to territory which Delhi considered Indian with a certain amount of
evidence. According to China as she had no part in the 1842 Treaty between
5» Indian Government, ! inistiy of jcfcernal Affairs J *White Paper I. Notes,
Memoranda & Letters Exchanged & Agreements signed between the
Government of India andChina 1954-59*, New Delhi 1959*
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Kashmir and Tibet it is unacceptable, and in fact at this time there was
no delimitation of the boundary* The Chinese claim the line shown on John
Walker* a 'Map of the Punjab, W.Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet* which
was drawn for the hast India Company and published in Cunningham's book
•Ladakh* in 1854* Peking also stated that much of the Indian-favoured bound¬
ary was the outcome of British imperialism at the expense of China* To these
claims India replied that the ladakh boundary with Tibet (see Map 3 for dis¬
puted areas) had been marked by stone cairns in 1687 and that representatives
of both Tibet and China had signed the 1842 Treaty recognising this line*
Walker's nap was based on the work of Captain H*Strachey who had toured in
Ladakh in 1847~48, but never visited the disputed Aksai Chin area. The first
accurate map of Ladakh only became available in 1865* Similarly, although unr
deliiaited, there could be little doubt as to the eastern part of the North¬
western boundary as the 1954 Sino-indian Agreement had authorised the six
passes of Shipki La, Mana, Niti, Kingri bingri, Barma and Lipu Lekh and these
were boundary passes the southern end of which India had always controlled*
The Northwestern border area case was not so well documented on the Indian
side as was the Northeastern region (See Section Five)* In the Indian official
maps there was a variety in the line of the boundary* Similarly, the fact
that China could construct a road through Akaal Chin without India knowing of
it until a year after it had been completed did not say much for the effect¬
iveness of India's administration in the area she had claimed*
Both sides have tended to favour physical features in their boundary claims*
The Chinese claim a line along the Karakorara Range which is the watershed be¬
tween the Tarim River of Sinkiang and the Indus as far as the Karakoram lass
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when it runs east along the mountain ridge to 73 degrees S.» where it turns
south-east along the ciestline of the Karakoram ountains down to the Kongka
Pass* This cuts off all of Akaai Chin which the Indian delineation includes
by a boundary running northeast from the Karakoram Pass to the Kunlun Rang®
after which it goes southwards to the Lanak La Pass. South of the Komgko
PaaS^hina' s boundary claim cuts through the Ane Pass# runs through the west¬
ern part of Lake Pangong, around the wes tern side of Spanggur Lake to Mount
Bajum where It crosses the Indus River at 33 degrees 11. after which it favours
the watershed, oast of the Keyul lungpa River and south of the Hani© River.
From there it uses mount Shinowu before running west to the junction of India,
Ladakh and Tibet. India's boundary version goes across the centre of Lakes
Pangong and Spanggur, cuts the Indus valley between Lemehok and Tashigong,
thence following the watershed. between the HariLe River and the Sutlej tribut¬
aries via the Imis Pass, after which it crossed the River Pare 5 miles down¬
stream from Cliumar and on to Uya Peak at 73 degrees 2k- minutes L., 32 degrees
N. The following section from this point to the boundary with Nepal had more
minor differences. The Chinese version crosses the Sutlej River to the west
of Shipki Pass, follows the watershed south to traverse the Jadhganga River
West of Tsungsha where it turns east through liana Pass, to Mount Karaet after¬
wards to skirt the southern side of V.uje, Saagcha and Lapthal to again run
along the watershed to the junction of India, Chitw and Nepal. The main diff¬
erences between the Indian and Chinese alignment in this section come where
the Himalayan Hountains and main watershed arc broken by passes and rivers
and Lore the Chines© claims are into what the Indians consider their territory.
Both the boundary line favoured by India and that to which the Chinese
adhere are within Bogga' 'Physical* category or Hartshorne's 'Subsequent',
(e.g. Map k- where the boundary is along a watershed) • However, the boundary
areas are as yet frontier tracts between two hostile states, neither of which
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has integrated the peripheries of its territory in this area into the
political administration.
With regard to physical geography the region is part of a belt of
mountains running from Soviet Central Asia through Tibet to China's Sik-
ang. This arc of high land has often constituted a refuge area for peoples
driven from the surrounding plains, and also provided a base for aggression
into the lower areas (e.g. the Tibetans and G-orkhas) • The human geography
of the section dealt with here is diverse. Pakistan has some right to claim
those Moslem areas of the Northwestern frontier if religion and culture are
used as a basis for the settlement of the territorial dispute, although some
of the hill tribesmen should be included in Afghanistan on ethnic and cultur¬
al grounds even though they are nominally Moslems. Much of the area of the
Great Himalayas and further north is culturally and ethnically part of Tibet.
Although the Chinese acknowledge that the Tibetans are different from them¬
selves, despite both being Mongoloid, if Tibet has been integrated into the
People's Republic there is a case for also including those areas of the
Northwestern frontier with strong Tibetan ties under Peking's rule. Simi¬
larly Jammu oan rightly be claimed by India on ethnic and cultural grounds,
although at the time of Partition in 1947 both Jananu and Kashmir were econ¬
omically part of western Pakistan. Whether these considerations of human
geography are taken into account should any final settlement of the Sino-
Indian border dispute eventually take place remains to be seen, but what is
certain so far is that neither India nor China has managed to integrate
successfully within their state areas the frontier zone and that a satisfact¬
ory or effective boundary does not exist. The Sino-Northwest Indian bound¬






On iiarch 2nd 1963 a boundary agreement was concluded between Pakistan
and China delimiting the Sinlciang-Baltistan area. Negotiations had comm¬
enced on March 28th 1961 when Pakistan had sent a note to China. Peking
had replied on February 27 th 1962 suggesting a provisional agreement on
the boundary pending the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This favour¬
able repl„ by China to a state very much committed to the "Western camp
through military treaties was a little unexpected. Pakistan accepted the
Chinese suggestion on March 19th 1962 and cm May 3rd of the same year a Joint
communique was issued in which it was stated 'after the settlement of the
dispute over Kashmir, the sovereign authorities concerned shall reopen neg¬
otiations with the Chinese Government regarding the boundary of Kashmir,
so as to sign a formal Border Treaty to replace this provisional agreement'.
On October 12th 1962 the procedure leading to the agreement was accepted by
both sides and maps exchanged. Although the Sino-Indian border clash which
commenced in October 1962 may have led China to view more favourably the
concluding of a boundary agreement with Pakistan, it seems probable that
the latter had not started negotiations with the intention of causing India
discomfort.
1. The following have been of importance in the writing of this section:
O.K.H. Spate: 'India & Pakistan*, Methuen, London 1957i W.A.
Wilcox: 'Pakistan', Columbia U.Press, New York 1963* C.B.Birdwood:
'Two Nations & Kashmir', Hale, London 1956* Caroe (0.): 'The
Pathans', St. Martin's Press, New York 1958J K.B.Sayeed: 'Pakistan*,
Publishing House, Karachi i960. D.Davis: 'The Population of India &
Pakistan*, Princeton U.P. 1951* I^-Stephens:'Pakistan', Penguin,
Harmondsworth 1964.
2. Much of the detail of the Agreement is derived from 'The Pakistan
News', for March 15th, 1963. The Agreement is reproduced in the
Appendix.
MAPI.aiNO- AKIST NlBOUNDARY
The boundary has been largely delimited from the Sincr-Afghanistan-
Bakistan Junction to the Karakoram Pass. The line commences in the west
at 74 degrees 34 minutes E. and 37 degrees 3 minutes N. > and runs east¬
wards and then southea3twarda along the watershed between the tributaries
of the Tashkurgan River (part of the Tarim system) and the Hunza River
tributaries (Indus system. See Map I). After passing through the Khun-
Jerab Pass (Map i) the boundary runs southwards, still along the main
watershed, to a mountain peak south of the Pass where it leaves the water¬
shed to use the crest of a spur which is the watershed between the Akjilga
River and the Taghdumbash and Keliraan Su Rivers on the Pakistan side. There
is a certain amount of disagreement between Pakistan and China over the
following delimitation of the boundary for a short stretch. According to
the Chinese version after leaving the southeastern extremity of the 3pur
the boundary runs along part of the middle line of the bed of the Keliroan
Su to its confluence with the Kelechin River (Shown cm Map I), whilst
Pakistan favours a more northerly line running to the sharp bend of Shaka-
gam River. Following this the boundary, according to the Chinese version,
ascends the crest of a spur to follow it to where it Joins the main water¬
shed of the Karakoram Range at Shorbulak Mountain. The Pakistan version
from the confluence ascends a corresponding spur to Join the Karakoram 3
minutes further east, and 12 minutes further south, than the Chinese peak.
The boundary line then follows the main Karakoram watershed separating the
Tarim River drainage of Sinkiang from the Indus system. The line passes
through the Mustagh Pass to the peak of K2 (chogri) , to Broad Peak; G-ash-
erbrum Mountain to Teram Kangri Peak. It reaches its southeastern extrem¬
ity at the Karakoram Pass.
After this tentative first delimitation of the boundary it was decided
 
to set tip a Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission specifically to make
more adequate surveys of the border area and to follow this by the est¬
ablishing of boundary markers# Once this had been done maps would be
printed showing the boundary markers and a Protoool would be signed.
Article Six of the Boundary Treaty states that following the settlement
of the Indo-Bakistan dispute of Kashmir the sovereign authority concerned
would reopen negotiations with the People1s Republic of China; the bound¬
ary treaty of 1963 would then be replaced by a more permanent one, but if
Pakistan should be the 'sovereign authority' the previous agreement and
Protocol would be the treaty. As yet the boundary has not been demarcated
and has not been fully delimited.
In the delimitation of the Sino-Pakistani boundary physical features
have been favoured such as the watershed line shown in Map 2. Therefore
the boundary comes within Boggs' 'Physical' category or Bartshorne's
'Subsequent* division.
Despite Sino-Pakistani relations improving rapidly in recent months
(in February of 1964 Chinese support of Pakistan in Kashmir was pledged)
Pakistan is still much within the Western sphere of influence, notably
belonging to the American and British inspired S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.R.T.O.
Pakistan has often been offended by the sympathy shown towards India by
the Unite States and Britain during the periods of crisis faced by New
Delhi. The Karachi Government rightly considers itself a well proven
ally of the Western camp and therefore feels that India as Pakistan's
enemy and an aloof neutralist doe3 not warrant either aid or sympathy
from the United States and Britain.
Much of the geographical and historical material concerning the Kashr
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mir dispute has already been dealt with. Pakistan controls about 27,000
square miles of northern and western Jammu and Kashmir and disputes India* s
control of the rest of these two provinces. Pakistan's slice of territory
has a population of a little under a million. A surfaced highway runs from
Rawalpindi, which is an important railway depot in Pakistan, through the
Jhelum River valley to Srinagar» Jarmru and the Indian railhead at Pathan-
kot. Although this is still the main highway in the area there have been
efforts to improve comnunications, notably between Srinagar and Leh. A new
all-weather highway is due to be completed between Srinagar, Gilgit and
Huaaa in 1965. In general the roads in the area can only be described as
cart tracks.
Pakistan's main claim to the disputed areas of Kashmir-Jamnu are based
on the criteria of religious allegiance. As this was the reason for the
subdivision of India in 1947 Pakistan's case is not an unjust one. However,
as has been seen in the geographical description of the region (See Sino-
N.W.Indian Boundary section) there is a certain uniqueness in the cultural
and ethnic geography of the band of high ground which stretches between the
Indian subcontinent and the People's Republic of China. In 1951 the Pakistan
Foreign Minister Sir Muhanmad Khan stated before the United Nations Security
4
Council on Kashmir-Jammu 'It is well known that ... every factor on the basis
of which the question of accession should be determined - population, cultural
and religious bonds, the flow of trade, the economic situation, communications,
the geographical position, strategic consideration - points insistently in
the direction of the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan'• If cultural and
3» See the chapter on the Sino-Northwest Indian boundary in this section.
4» Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan: 'Verdict on Kashmir' J Gov. of Pakistan,
Karachi 1951* Quoted by R.C.Kayfield; 'A Geographic Study of the
Kashmir Issue', p.186.
ethnic characteristics were used to determine the annexing of the Sino-
pakistani border area not only would India, Pakistan and China be able
to make out a case for claims, but also Afghanistan# Pakistan can claim
a physical bond with those parts of the region which are drained by the
Indus and its tributaries, but China's Tarim Basin drainage system makes
an equally good basis on the other side of the Indus-Tarim watershed.
The harsh environment of the border area has limited economic devel¬
opment and population densities are very low. During the summer of 1964
the Eakistan-Sinkiang trade routes were re-opened ending China's attempt
to impose the boundary upon the landscape. China has not attempted to
integrate the land and peoples on her side of the boundary into the state
administration as the effort needed is apparently greater than the result
for Peking would warrant. Improving relations between Peking and Karachi,
and the stabilization of the border area by delimitation apparently makes
both states content to see a frontier situation continuing to exist where




North Korea is a satellite of the People's Republic of China. Of
those states with Communist governments only Albania and North Korea have
supported whole heartedly the Chinese in their ideological dispute with
the Soviet Union, and in the case of the latter, its position on the Chin¬
ese border would appear to have had a not inconsiderable influence upon
the decision. The Sino-Korean boundary fits very firmly into the categ¬
ory of * Communist' borderland, although within the range of Chinese Comm¬
unism and not the variety favoured by the Soviet Union.
The Korean peninsula is at present divided into the Communist state
of North Korea and the "western Committed country of South Korea. The bound¬
ary is the result of a military stalemate similar to that between North and
South Vietnam. Despite this political upheaval within Korea the Sino-
Korean boundary has not changed appreciably since about the Eleventh Cent¬
ury A.D.
Korean history starts with Tan Gun 4,000 years ago who was the myth¬
ical founder of the state. In 1122 B.C. the Chinese scholar K±~tze emi¬
grated to Korea with about 5,000 followers bringing Chinese civilisation
and establishing the Dynasty of Ki-tae, which ruled until the Fourth Century
B.C. Notable amongst these early cultural imports from China were those
1. Books & articles of importance in this study have been A.J.GraJdanzev:
'Modern Korea'; John Day, New York 1944; H.Ii.Iiess- 'Major Structural
Features of the Western Pacific Area, Korea to New Guinea*; Bulletin
of the Geological Soc. of America, Vol.59, 1948, G.M.McCuneJ 'Korea
Today'; Harvard, Cambridge 1950; & 'Geographic Regions in Korea*;
Geog. Beview Vol. 39, 1949; G.D.Taylor: 'Korea: A Geographical
Appreciation'; Geographical Branch of the Dept. of Mines & Technical
Surveys, Ottawa 1951; H.M.Vinacke: 'A History of the Far East in
Modern Times', Allen & Unwin, London I960.
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of agriculture, sericulture and building. Since 1000 B»C» Korea has been
very much a part of the Chinese culture area, although adding a distinct¬
ive flavour to her borrowings. Even India's contribution of Buddhism
introduced into Korea during the Fourth and Fifth Centuries A.D. came via
China.
Although highlands (Map I*) provide a transport hindrance for much of
the area between the Korean Peninsula and the Chinese mainland the river
lowlands at each end of the range have facilitated an easy routeway for
migrating peoples. It is thought that the Japanese used the Peninsula in
their movement into their islands, as did the Mongols in their attempt under
Kublai Khan to conquer Japan. Similarly the Manchua and Tartars roamed over
the area during their conquesting periods. As an area of transit Korea has
lacked the stability enjoyed by other more fortunate states.
The independence of Korea has been for only limited periods. The over¬
throw of the Mongols in China by the Ming Dynasty during the fourteenth
Century A.D. gave Korea one of its opportunities to throw off the domin¬
ation of the Chinese. In 1592 the Yi Dynasty was established in Korea which
led to 200 years of freedom until in 1592 the Japanese under Hideyoshi in¬
vaded. Hideyoshi died in 1598 and the Japanese exacted what they could be¬
fore retiring from Korea. From this time there grew up the hostility be¬
tween Korea and Japan. The victory of the Manchus over the Ming Dynasty
in China in 162+4 A.D. reaffirmed Chinese suzerainty over Korea. In order
to stop the Koreans aiding the Ming rulers the Manchus had invaded Korea
in 1627 and 163I. Tiring of foreign intervention from the time of the
establishing of the Manchua in China Korea decided to have no contact with
other foreign powers than China and sojae trading with Japan through Pusan
-.. 1 V. 1
(Map IB). Korea's fortunes were olosely tied to China although she was nom¬
inally independent under her own ruling house; when China was strong Korea
prospered, and when the Celestial mpire was weak Korea suffered. Korea's
isolationism during the years up until the latter part of the Nineteenth
Century earnt her the name of the 'Hermit Kingdom*.
The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 radically changed Korea's internation¬
al position and China had to recognise Korea's independence and put aside
any claim to suzerainty. Russian influence in Korea from this time bloss¬
omed until the ambitions of the Tsars were crushed by defeat at the hands
of the Japanese. The Treaty of Portsmouth signed in September of 1905 made
Korea a protectorate of Japan, and in 1910 Japan annexed the Peninsula.
Japanese rule was stringent, but provided Korea with a railway network
(Map IB) , an improved agriculture, heavy industry, hydro-electric power and
a mining industry. All the major posts throughout Korea were in the hands
of Japanese administrators so that the Koreans remained politically immature.
In 1943 the Cairo Conference adopted a policy aimed at producing a 'free
and independent* Korea 'in due course*. On August 10th 1945 Japan requested
an armistice when Soviet troops were almost at the Korean border. By August
14th the 38th parallel had been chosen as a division between the zones in
which the Japanese would surrender to the Russians and the Americans,
2
according to Grey a decision which was taken in Washington.
The occupying powers of the U.S.S.R. and the United States were supposed
to meet to arrange the peaceful unification of Korea. In November of 1947
the United Nations established a commission to hold elections throughout
Korea but the Soviet Union would not permit any entry into their northern
2. A.L.Greys 'The 38th Parallel', Foreign Affairs Vol.29» No.3*
for April 1951*
zone. In August of 1948 after elections the government of the Republic of
Korea was established in the south. The U.S.S.R. set up the Communist
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in December of 194-8 withdrew the
last of their troops from the northern zone. In June of 1949 the Americans
finished their occupation of the south. A year after the American with¬
drawal North Korean troops advanced into South Korea. The United Nations,
largely in the form of the United States, intervened on the side of South
Korea and China, feeling her own security challenged by United Nations'
successes, brought massive assistance to the side of the Democratic People's
Republic. Although the Soviet Union provided most of the equipment China
emerged from the Korean War in 1953 the dominant power of North Korea.
The Korean War of 1950-53 froze the division of the Peninsula roughly
along the 38th parallel, although it should be pointed out that in fact the
line is not the actual parallel, but a more ragged truce-line in the vicin¬
ity of the parallel. This internal boundary that started as a military con¬
venience in 194-5 cuts across transport, telephone and telegraph lines and
other distribution patterns developed during centuries of unity*
Korea has an area of 85,239 square miles and is a peninsula which ex¬
tends from the mass of Asia for about 600 miles in a southeasterly direction.
The southern half has a subtropical climate whilst the north is more greatly
affected by the continental influences of Asia. The main mountain spine of
the country runs from the Pai T'ou Shan (Map 3) southwards keeping close to
the eastern coastline and forming steep slopes down to the water. Korea is
basically a block inclined higher in the east than the west so that the
eastern side is made up of fault escarpments divided from the water by a
narrow coastal plain. To the west the plateau slopes gradually into plains
and lowlands. There is a similar sloping from north to south as well. The
west and south have most of the rich alluvial lands favoured for farming,
•whilst the northern mountains contain much of the Peninsula's mineral and
lumber wealth. The northern mountains are volcanic in origin and reach
over 9,000 feet in height. The rivers of Korea are short and most of them
rise at the eastern edge of the block. Few good harbours are to be found
along the eastern coast in contrast to the deeply embayed coasts of the
south and west.
The Koreans are Mongolian in race and closely related to the Chinese
and Japanese. Their most distinctive ethnic characteristic is in language
which is similar to the Central Asian Altaic group and related to Chinese.
Many Chinese words have been borrowed and the alphabet is a modified version
of the Chinese. It is thought that the Koreans migrated into the Peninsula
at an early date from Central Asia, with later immigrations from North China
and Manchuria to produce a certain amount of mixing. The present culture
is basically Chinese with a strong flavour of Japanese customs and the inev¬
itable icing of Viestern civilisation.
The population of Korea is about 30 million people, with two thirds of
this total concentrated in the southern zone. Except for the difficult
northern boundary area the Peninsula is densely populated and has a tyo in¬
crease per year. As with a number of Asian states both North and South
Korea, with high population densities (350 per square mile)^ have about 8Q%
of the population in agriculture. With much of Korea mountainous the amount
of good agricultural land is limited. Certain areas of the south and west
have population densities in the region of 1,000 persons par square mile.
The two Koreas were complementary to each other before partition. There
was a certain contrast in the physical geography of the two areas. Single
 
cropping was the rule in the north, whilst the milder south could double
crop. The south was better equipped for agriculture whilst the north had
most of the mineral, lumber and power resources. In the Pyongyang region
the coal and iron resources made it the centre of Korean heavy industry
(Map IB) , whilst the second concentration of heavy industry developed in
the northeast near the border where the reserves of iron ore are reputed
to total 1,000 million tons, along with abundant coal. Also in North Korea
are deposits of tungsten, copper, graphite and gold, whilst the hydro¬
electric potential of the People's Democratic Republic is good. In the South
there are good deposits of manganese, copper and tungsten, but there is little
else besides poor grade coal. Before partition in 1945 North Korea produced
85/£ of all minerals mined, and 90/o of all the textile manufactures.
Before the division of Korea in 1945 the state provided more of a unit
than does such a country as Burma or Laos today. Prom the latter part of
the Nineteenth Century Korea has acted as a buffer zone between spheres of
influence of more powerful states whilst retaining its own individuality.
During the late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Korea kept apart China,
Russia and Japan until it was absorbed by the latter in 1910. Following
the Second World War it was firstly a useful buffer between the power of
the Soviet Union and the United States, and after the Korean Y/ar the People's
Republic of China and the United States.
The Sino-Korean boundary (Map 2) is about 880 miles long. For all ex¬
cept 20 miles it follows the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and their tributaries
and can therefore be placed in Bpggs' 'Physical' or Hartshorne's 'Subsequent'
3
categories. The Geographer of the State Department writes of the boundary,
3. State Department? 'China-Korea Boundary'} Washington,
June 1962, p.l.
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'Under normal circumstances, boundaries following rivers are considered
to be demarcated. In this boundary, however, the lack of specific lang¬
uage in the various treaties concerning the location of the boundary with¬
in the rivers mitigates against such a classification. As a consequence,
the boundary in the rivers should be classified as delimited*. Also for
about the 20 miles between the headwaters of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers
the boundary can be considered to be in dispute between North Korea and
China (encircled portion on Map 2) •
The area between th© headwaters of the Yalu and lumen Rivers (Map 3)
is largely uninhabited. The first attempt to define the Sino-Korean
boundary in this portion was in 1713 A.D. when a boundary monument was
erected near the peak of the Pai-t'ou Shan on the watershed of the Tumen
and Yalu Rivers* On September 4th 1909 China and Japan signed an agree¬
ment whereby they recognised the River Tumen as the Sino-Korean boundary.
This agreement stipulated that the boundary should run from the 1713
marker to the headwaters of the Tumen River. This led to a controversy
as to which of the streams constitutes the true headwater stream. Dis¬
agreement in this area continues with the Chinese claiming a line along
the more southerly tributary (Map 3, second Chinese version) in such jour¬
nals as 'China Pictorial' (November 12£>l) , and the North Koreans adhering
to the line shown on Japanese maps drawn during the period when Korea was
a territory ruled from Tokio (e.g. Foreign Languages Publishing House:
'Facts about Korea •; Pyongyang, 1961, p.l.) • The dispute is of minor im¬
portance and does not apparently impair the good relations between the
two Communist states.
The Yalu River has been accepted as the Sino-Korean boundary since
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1875> but along with the use of the Tumert River the boundary is not well
defined. There has, for instance, been no formal allocation of islands
in the rivers. Although China has concluded a number of boundary treat¬
ies with her neighbours it is perhaps a sign of the friendship existing
between Peking and Pyongyang that there would seem no need for a more
closely defined Sino-Korean boundary. Although there is a difference of
600 square miles of territory in the Chinese and Korean border claims a
core generous attitude is taken by both sides than is the case along tlie
Sino-Indian boundary.
Until 1945 the whole of the Korean peninsula made a coherent economic
and political unit. The population was culturally and ethnically cohesive.
The division which has since developed along the Cease Fire Line is lead¬
ing to two distinct states. South Korea lacks the politically effective adr
ministration which governs North Korea, and the latter has progressed far
in the direction of providing a government whose actions are felt through¬
out the state area. However, although North Korea has endeavoured to make
sure that the boundary dividing the two Koreas functions as a division,
the excellent relations Pyongyang enjoys with Peking has meant that in the
north the Sino-Korean boundary has not been enforced to the same extent.
There is comparative freedom of movement across the Sino-Korean boundary,
and a large Korean minority on the Chinese side of the boundary. Korea
has always been open to Chinese influences and the present situation is
within the historical tradition. Although the political administration
of the two states on either side of the boundary is as effective as almost
any in Asia there is no urge to make the boundary into a division in the
landscape.
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North Vietnam is a state of 59*933 square railes with a population of
some 15 million people. Like North Korea it is largely sympathetic to the
People* s Republic of China and has been divided from South Vietnam by a
conflict of hostile ideologies, although it should be stated from the start
that Vietnam lacks the geographical coheaiveness of North and South Korea.
The core area of North Vietnam is the Red River Delta (Map I) which
was the centre of the Annamite Empire. She Delta accounts for about 5*300
square miles with an average population density of 1*250 persons per square
mile. Prom III B.C. to 939 A.D. North Vietnam was dominated by the Chinese,
2
so that according to Kolinsky it became little more than an extension of
south China. Chinese administrators and immigrants introduced their ideas
of politics, art, law, and religion, plus their advanced agricultural meth¬
ods. The severe flooding of the Red River in the Delta area was limited by
Chinese dyking techniques, the Annamitea were shown how to irrigate their
rice fields and the secrets of renewing fertility after cropping by the use
of green, animal and human manure taught them. North Vietnam has four months
1. Of particular use in the writing of this chapter have been the follow¬
ing: C.A.Pisher! 'South-east Asia* | Mathuen, London 1964* C.W.Bishop:
'Origin of the Far Eastern Civilisation*; Smithsonian Institute Publi¬
cation 3^81, Washington 1942* Canadian Dept. of Mines and Technical
Surveys, Foreign Geography Information Series No.6: 'Indo-China - A
Geographical Appreciation'; Ottawa 1953; W.Kaye: *A Bowl of Rice
Divided; the Econoixy of North Vietnam*, China Quarterly No.9, 1962;
S. 'cCune: 'The Diversity of Indochina's Physical Geography*, Far
Eastern Quarterly No. 6, 1947*
2. W.SelinskyJ 'The Indochineae Peninsula, A demographic Anomaly';
Far Eastern Quarterly No.9, 1950*
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when the winter temperature falls below 70 degrees P. and so the Chinese
imported their ideas for raising a second crop during this period when the
effectiveness of the rainfall was greater. A revolt against Chinese influ¬
ence came in 939 A.D. after which the Annamites began a steady advance into
the surrounding territories.
Despite the break with China the new kingdom of Annara was modelled upon
Chinese example. In expanding the Annamites could not move north because
of Chinese power, nor west due to the unhealthy uplands, so the south off¬
ered the most favourable routeway. Expansion was at the expense of the
Champa which was a major state of impressive Indian culture, but poor geog¬
raphical resources. In 1069 A.D. the Qiaos lost the land between Porte
d'Annam and Hue''to the Annamites (the Annamites called their kingdom Dai-co-
viet) • At this time the Khmers were challenging the Chams in the south so
that Champa was fighting for survival. The Champa struggle was a long one
but in 14C6 their capital of Vijaya fell to the Annamites (Map 2) • The Annam-
ites found difficulty in holding together the long strip of coastal plain they
had attached to the Red River Delta core area. The Nguyen family in the south,
aided by Portugese supplies of arris, challenged the Annamite efforts at cen¬
tralisation and built two walls across the country to divide north fran south.
The Emperor was still a member of the Le family in the North, but the Nguyen
family had established an independent monarchy in the South. The new south¬
ern kingdom continued the expansion down the coast and in 1692 conquered the
remaining Champa lands. The southern monarchy was known in the 'west as
Cochinchina, whilst the North Vietnamese territories were called Tonkin by the
Europeans. In the latter part of the Eighteenth Century Cochinchina acquired
most of the Mekong Delta area (Map l) • At about the same time a dynastic con¬
flict took place in which the Le Emperor retreated to China and many of the
I • I* >1 *
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Nguyen family were killed. She Nguyen heir Nguyen Anh survived to enlist
French support through the Catholic priest Pigneau de Behaine and take Hue''
in 1801 and Hanoi in 1802. As the new Emperor Gia Long he requested the off¬
icial recognition of the Chinese which was granted with the proviso that Viet¬
nam should send tribute to Baking every two years. The territories of Vietnam
were divided into three parts for administrative jxirposes based on Saigon,
Hanoi and Hue, a convenience that the French adhered to when they ruled the
areas (i.e. the colony of Cochinchina, and the protectorates of Annam and
Tanking •
French interest in Indochina was dormant for much of the first part of
the Nineteenth Century, but using the Emperor of Annara's hostility towards Cath¬
olic missions in his territories as a pretext France in 1858 bombarded Tourane
and the following year captured Saigon. The Annamites ceded eastern Cochin-
china to France in 1862, and in 1867 the rest was annexed. When the irench
discovered that the Mekong did not provide a routeway into China they moved their
main sphere of activity northwards, n . ranccr-Annamite Treaty in 1874 opened the
y
Red River to French navigation. A French expedition farced the Emperor at Hue
to recognise a French protectorate over Tonkin and Annam. As the Chinese con¬
sidered the Annamite lands as tributary to Peking they protested, but the Con¬
vention at Tientsin in 15c4 and the Treaty of 188£ gained Chinese recognition
of the I* ranoo-Annaaite treaties signed at Hue. In 1887 caws the Union of Indo¬
china. The main foci of French economic activity were the Mekong and Red
River deltas. Throughout the Union all except the most minor positions were
in the hands of Europeans* There was a tradition of resistance to alien cul¬




p.h-jna and by the beginning of the Twentieth Century nationalism began to
develop# The leadership of Annamite nationalism -went to the discontented
and frustrated elite #10 were often educated in Prance. In the late 1920's
a most remarkable man entered upon the political scene of North Vietnam,
namely Ho Chi Minh. In the 1930's his Vietnamese Revolutionary Association
was banned by the French. By the time France fell to Germany in 1940 and
Japan entered Tonkin those areas inhabited by the Annamite3 were centres of
anti-French nationalism. Ho Chi Minh was in China during much of the Second
World war organising the Vietminh which established a government in Tcaikin
at the ond of the War. As has previously been mentioned with regard to Laos
war broke out between the Vietminh and France in 1946. The supposedly temp¬
orary division of Vietnam in Hie region of the 17th parallel (which was a
truce line) at Geneva in 1954 has become permanent largely due to South Viet¬
nam's unwillingness to agree to elections to reunite the two states.
The war with France left North Vietnam in a sorry economic state. It
had relied previously upon South Vietnam to supplement its deficiencies in
rice, and now its own production from the land was dwindling due to damage
to the irrigation network. The mining and manufacturing industries were in no
condition to earn the foreign exchange needed for a food import. A period of
agricultural and industrial rehabilitation followed. Yields per acre of rice
were increased from 28 to 3^ bushels and the agricultural acreage by 15?j.
Rice was rationed which gave the Hanoi regime a surplus by 195&* Conaaunicat-
ions witnin North Vietnam and from North Vietnam to China were repaired and
extended. Aid has been mainly from China, although in the critical year of










• rm\ * : ■ ' ■ 1 t ■
178.
(£35 million) • Up until 1961 the Chinese had granted North Vietnam £180
million in aid, the Soviet Union £130 million and Eastern Europe about £32
million. In their 1961-65 Plan the North Vietnamese appeared to change to
the U.S.S.R.'s economic model, but in 1963 China once again gained ascend¬
ency and since then despite Soviet diplomacy her neighbour seems to be
firmly within the Chinese sphere of influence. There is, however, the trad¬
itional antipathy of the Annamite population towards China and the million
strong Catholic community which is of great importance within the economic
network of North Vietnam.
The oldest area of Indochina is the pre-Cambrian folding which consti¬
tutes a large part of Cambodia and the southern areas of Vietnam and which
is of a similar age to the massif of southern China. Subsequently a con¬
centric circle of folds was built up around this nucleus. Primary folding
is found in the mountains of the Yunnan-Burma boundary area, northern Viet¬
nam and the Shan Plateau, but it is the more impressive mountain building
of the Mesoaoic which dominates northern Vietnam and eastern Laos. The
Indochinese Peninsula has a 'ridge and furrow' relief pattern with such
rivers as the Irrawaddy, Mekong and Red occupying structural depressions which
they have widened. As might be expected such 'ridges' as the Annamite chain
hinders movement and settlement. The Annamite mountains often exceed 6,000
feet and their malarial character has meant a lack of contact between the
Vietnam Coastal Plain and the Mekong Valley (Map I). The Coastal Plain it¬
self is interrupted by branching spurs from the mountains, these often contain
short streams that have brought down rich alluvium. The Laos Plateau is an
extension of the Yunnan Plateau which also thrusts a finger to divide the Red
River and Sikiang-Yukiang systems J this Tonkin-China Hill area is inhabited




■Die Red and Mekong Rivers have the advantage of coming down from con¬
siderable altitude and being fed by heavy monsoonal rains so that they carry
much silt. 'Early Chinese records show that when Hanoi was first made cap¬
ital of Ran Yueh over 2,000 years ago, the town which is now 60 miles inland
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was then on the coast.' Haiphong on the banks of 'the Red River suffers
from severe sedimentation as a port. The Red River is not as long as the
Mekong and its plains of more modest extent. At Hanoi the March to May dry
season gives the Red River a flow of 25,000 cubic feet per second whilst be¬
tween June and October this may be greater than 800,000 cubic feet per sec¬
ond. The Red River Delta region remains of prime importance to North Vietnam.
The ethnic and cultural make-up of Vietnam is in many ways a complex one.
The two Vietnams total 125*889 square miles in area with a population of about
28 million people. The Annamite distribution is much as one might expect it
to be with a concentration in the Red River and Mekong Deltas joined by a band
along the Coastal Plain (Map 3) * thus bearing a direct relationship to the
historical development of the Annamite Empire. There are about 13 million
Annamites in North Vietnam and 10 million in South Vietnam, with a further
300,000 in Cambodia and 50*000 in Laos. The Ann mites are Pareoean in rac¬
ial characteristics. Before the Chinese dominated the region in the Second
Century B.C. the Annamites were of a limited culture and practised shifting
cultivation. Basically the Annamite culture remains Chinese, although with
a distinct Vietnamese flavour and some European innovations such as the Roman
Catholic minority.
The Thais in North Vietnam number 800,000 which is about equal to those
in Laos, and there are 25,000 in South Vietnam and 30,000 in Cambodia.
3« C.A.Fisher: 'Southeast Asia'J Methuen, London 1964, p»4dA»
They occupy many of the higher areas which make up the Sino-Vietnam border
zone. The Khas along the Laos-Vietnam and Cairibodia-Vietnam boundaries are
of more primitive culture than the Thais.
A little of the Khmer and Champa days of ascendency in South Vietnam
remains. There are 40*000 Ghana in South Vietnam and 80,000 in Cambodia.
They were an earlier Pareoean people in the Indochina area with a tendency
to have more pronounced Mongolian features than the later arrivals and a
somewhat lighter skin. Despite assimilation by the more numerous Annainites
the Chams still retain a culture which owes more to India than China.
The Mongoloid Lolo, Miao and Muong tend to favour the higher ground and
practise shifting cultivation. Their tribes are found in minority pockets
and where, as is the case in the Lolo and Miao groups, they straddle a bound¬
ary such as that between North Vietnam and China it is as yet of limited
significance to them. The North Vietnamese relationship with China has meant
a certain laxity with regard to the question of the boundary between the two
Communist states. For example in the north-east of North Vietnam the bound¬
ary cuts across the Chinese population distribution, but as yet the Peking
regime has made no claim to the territory inhabited by this Chinese minority
within North Vietnam. There are about 100,000 Chinese in North Vietnam.
The Mans are hill peoples of Mongolian physical characteristics. They
are scattered over much of North Vietnam and are also found in China. Their
culture is based on shifting agriculture and their allegiance is to the tribe.
The Mans migrated into Indochina in about the Thirteenth Century A.D. and be¬
came established in the zone between 1,000 and 3*000 "feet.
In the main the Sino-Vietnamese boundary favours a number of minor crest-
lines in the Tonkin-China Hill area, with the use of some river alignment in
MAP4.SiNO-V!ETNASBOU D RY £3POLITICALOOUND AFTER'INDOCHIE* 1:400,000SERIES -
its eastern section. Until the Franco-Chinese Convention at Tientsin in
1884 and the Treaty of 1885 the area between North Vietnam and China was
a frontier composed mainly of difficult terrain inhabited by backward hill
tribes. The establishing of French power in Tonkin demanded a well defined
borderline with the Celestial Empire and so the presented boundary was de¬
limited. Having re-established the traditional Chinese zuzerainty over
North Vietnam the Peking regime appears to be satisfied to leave the bound¬
ary as it is, although as yet it has been only partly demarcated.
Hie Sino-Vietnamese boundary can be classified under Boggs' 'Physical1
type or Hartshome's 'Subsequent' category. With the exception of river
crossings such as in the area of the Red Eiver the boundary is delimited along
minor crestlines. To demonstrate a typical section of the boundary Map 4 is
included. The boundary cuts across cultural groupings and provides only the
beginnings of a division within the landscape. Relations between Hanoi and
Peking are excellent and there is a free movement of trade across the border
assisted by two railway lines which run from Hanoi to Kunming in the west
and Hanoi and Nanning in the east. North Vietnam makes an uneasy political
unit with rivalry between such groups as the Annamites and Thais, and this
is one of the reasons that the Hanoi Government is officially a coalition
which includes nationalist non-Coramunista. However, North Vietnamese eff¬
orts at welding together the various cultural groups into a whole have been
more successful by far than those of South Vietnam or Laos. Although North
Vietnam lacks the unity of culture and race enjoyed by North Korea a beginn¬
ing has been made in successfully imposing the influence of the central gov¬
ernment throughout the state area. The friendly relations between China
and North Vietnam and their interrelationship economically will prevent the





Although the Sino-Soviet boundary (Map i) has been placed in the
Communist category of borderland along with such Chinese satellites as
North Korea there is a distinct difference in the political situation
which is beginning to be reflected in the geography of the boundary areas.
The U.S.S.R. is the most powerful of the Consnunist states, and as such its
relationship with China is one of equality. Differences between the Sino-
Soviet relationship and the Sino-Korean or Sino-Vietnamese positions have
been further emphasised since the growth of hostility between the U.S.S.R.
and China.
In 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress the first seeds of disagreement
were sown between the Soviet Union and China when it became plain that Krus-
chev was in the process of modifying the revolutionary concepts of Lenin
and Stalin as was inevitable for the leader of an increasingly prosperous
state. But even by the Moscow Conference in November of 1957 any breach be¬
tween Peking and the U.S.S.R. was not apparent; having had much to do in
the helping of the latter re-establish her influence over a rebellious Last
Europe China had at last achieved recognition throughout the Communist
world as second only to the Soviet Union as a leader within the bloc. But
there was an insurmountable difference between Peking and Moscow for China
was a revolutionary •have-not' and the U.S.S.R. a once revolutionary 'have'
state. The differences in attitude became strikingly apparent during the
Middle Eastern crisis in 1958 when China urged the Soviet Union to use her
1. The following have been of importance in the writing of this
section: E.Crankshaw: 'The New Cold War, Moscow versus Peking';
Penguin, Harmondsworth 1963* W.A.D.Jackson: 'The Russo-Chinese
Borderlands'; Van Nostrand, Princeton 1962; W.Kolarz: 'Russia
& Her Colonies'; Phillips, London 1952, and 'The Peoples of the
Soviet Far East*, Praeger, New York 195k# T.Shabad: 'Geography
of the U.S.S.R.'; Columbia, N.Y. 1951# A.S.Whiting & S.Sheng:
'Sinkiang'; Michigan State U, East Lansing 1958.
reputed ballistic missile superiority to crush American landings in the
Lebanon and British in Jordan. Prom the sunnier of 1958 when China at
lest appreciated that Krushchev was serious when he stated war must be
avoided at all costs the Sino-Soviet division became emphatic. The breach
became known publicly to the Communist movement at the Third Congress of
the Rumanian Communist Party in June of I960, and the Communist parties of
the world took sides at the Moscow Conference which followed in November
of the same year. The replacement of Kruschev by Kosygin and Bresknev in
the Soviet Union in I964 has led to little improvement in Sino-Soviet re¬
lations, and the difference between the two Communist states my prove in¬
surmountable. It would seem unlikely that China and the Soviet Union will
ever achieve the Communist ideal in inter-state relations.
Such power politics would not be of particular importance to a geog¬
rapher except for the fact that the Sino-Soviet border region has been
affected, perhaps most dramatically by the imposition of the boundary line
in the nomadic lands of Central Asia where raigration across the line has
been stopped. A tradition of Sino-Russian rivalry has been revived.
The Urals have often been quoted as the boundary between Asia and
Europe. But these mountains provide no barrier to east-west movement.
During the latter part of the Sixteenth Century A.D. Russian adventurers
first began exploring the areas east of the Urals in search of furs ar.d
minerals. They encountered only weak resistance from the indigenous tribes
of the Vasyugan Plain where they built their first forts. The Russian
Tsar annexed during the first decades of the Seventeenth Century these free¬
booter posts, which led to a further movement east into Siberia with new
forts at Kuznetsk (1618), Yeniseisk (1619;, Krasnoyarsk (1628), Iliinsk (1630)
 
and Bratsk (1631)• The Russian advance was along the steppe of the north
away from the challenge of the more warlike tribes of Central Asia. It
was not until Lake Baikal was reached that the Russians met any opposition
when the hostility of the Buriat Mongols forced them further north into the
Lena Valley, where they founded Yakutsk in 1632. In 1639 the Sea of Okhotsk
(Map 2) was reached. Poyarkov entered the basin of the Amur River in 1643
and explored the waterway to its mouth. In 1655 Nerchinsk (Map 2) was
founded at the nesting of the Nercha and Shilka. The Russian expansion
through Siberia had been fast and deceptive for they had met no real
opposition.
At the time when the Russians were moving eastwards Manchu power was
establishing itself in China culminating with the setting up of the Ch* ing
Dynasty in 1644* The defeat of the Buriat Mongols by the Russians and the
establishing of Irkutsk in l66l led the Manchus to encourage the Chinese
to migrate northwards, but then to change this policy again between 1668
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and 1673 'in the hope of preserving their patrimony intact.' Chinese
power under the vigorous new dynasty was impressive arid the Russian ad¬
vance was stopped. In 1689 the Treaty of Nerchinsk forbade the Russians
to use the Amur and established the SinoHRuasian boundary well to the north
of the River along the Argun River and the Stanovoy Mountains (Map 2) • The
Manchus acknowledged Russian interests in northeast Siberia, but brought
the Amur Basin firmly under Chinese control. From 1662 to 1722 perhaps the
greatest of the Ch'ing Bmperors, K'ang Hsl, ruled during which time the
tribes of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet were forced to acknowledge
Chinese overlordahipj 'under such circumstances the Russian expansionism
was inhibited.
2. W.A.D.Jackson* 'The Russo-Chinese Borderlands'; Van Nostrand,
Princeton 1962, p.31.
 
The Mongolian Plateau had great significance to the Russians as it
provided a direct route to Peking and in 1727 the Sino-Russian Treaty of
Kiakhta permitted Russian traders to cross Mongolia. The Tsar had to ac¬
knowledge Outer Mongolia as part of the Chinese Empire. Russian expansion
found itself barred by the Chinese in Manchuria and Mongolia.
By 1757 the Chinese had completely broken the resistance of the West¬
ern Mongols so Dzhungaria and the Tarim Basin (Map 3) were united into the
province of Sinkiang, which means 'the new dominion'. Sinkiang was not
popular amongst the Chinese who wished to emigrate, despite favourable taxes,
free land and seed. The local chieftains were vassals of the Emperor, but
their tribesmen resented the Chinese immigrants. Frustrated in the Far East
Russia sought further lands in western Siberia where Chinese power was weak¬
est. In 1716 Omsk was established, followed by Semipalatinsk in 1718 (Map
3) • By the end of the Eighteenth Century Russia had gained control of the
Turkic tribes of the Altai Mountains and the northwest boundary of Outer
Mongolia was delimited. By this time the Ch'ing Dynasty had passed its high
water mark and had begun to decline in power.
The weakness of the Ch'ing Dynasty was demonstrated to the world for the
first time following the Opium War of 1840-42. In 184^ a Russian expedition
was sent to explore the Amur and in 1850 the Treaty of Nerchinsk was violated
when a fort was built at Nikolayevsk at the mouth of the River. Nicholas
Muraviev, the Governor General of Eastern Siberia, organised an expansion at
Chinese expense moving east from Lake Baikal and south along the coast from
Okhotsk. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun established a new Sino-Russian boundary
along the Amur from the mouth of the Argun to the Pacific (Map 2). The terr¬
itory south of the Amur and east of the Ussuri was jointly occupied and
Khabarovsk founded (Map 2). At the I860 Treaty of Peking Russia took complete
control of what is now known as Maritime Krai (Map I) and further land taken
from Manchuria. In 1872 Vladivostock was established as a Russian port as
the problem of winter ice was less severe than at Nikolayevsk.
The Tsarist drive also got under way in the nomadic Kazakh lands of
the west where allegiance was to the Ch'ing Emperor. The Russians had great¬
er accessibility to Central Asia than the Chinese based on Peking. By 1854
the Russians were southeast of Lake Balkash and Alma-Ata was founded (Map 3) •
The Treaty of Peking in I860 also began the delimitation of the Inner Asian
boundary between China and Russia. In 1864 the Treaty of Tarbagatai de¬
limited the boundary south of Lake Issyk-Kul (Map 3) • The Russian ambitions
were assisted by a series of revolts against Chinese authority in Sinkiang,
although the Chinese managed to crush the rebellious Moslems (Dungans) and
made Sinkiang a regular province of the Empire in I884.
All the Manchus could do to counteract Russian expansion was to encour¬
age Chinese settlers along the borderlands. In I878 the Ch'ing Dynasty gave
its official permission to the emigration of the Chinese into Manchuria.
The Chinese needed to act for in 1891 the Russians started constructing the
Vladivostock to Khabarovsk section of the Trans-Siberia Railway, and during
1892-95 construction started in the opposite direction from the Urals to Lake
Baikal.
Russia felt her position in the Far East challenged by the rising power
of Japan who had defeated China in 1895. Shortly afterwards Russia gained
Chinese permission to build a railway from Lake Baikal across Manchuria to
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Vladivostock and in 1897 obtained mining rights in southern Manchuria, per¬
mission to extend the railway from Harbin to Dairen and leases to Port Arthur
3» Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 'Treaties & Agreements with
& Concerning China', Washington 1921; also for 1919-29, Washington 1929.
and Lair-en. Hie Boxer Rebellion of 1900 demonstrated Chinese frustration
at European intervention.
In 1905 Russia was defeated "by Japan, but by the detente of 1907 agreed
on separate spheres of influence in.China. Russia's sphere was northern
Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. In 1908 all legal bans on immi¬
gration into Manchuria were completely lifted and settlers moved north¬
wards, helped by the railways. In 1911 the Ch'ing Dynasty was overthrown.
Russian penetration of Sinkiang during this period was economic. Dur¬
ing World War I there were serious revolts against the Russians by the nat¬
ive populations who resented the loss of some of their richest lands. The
situation was changed in 1917 with the advent of the Russian Revolution,
for the Soviet leaders initially tended to disassociate themselves from Im¬
perial policies. By 1923 Soviet authority had become established through¬
out Siberia, but the revolutionary state was weak. However, an agreement
with the local Chinese governor of Sinkiang permitted the U.S.S.R. to set¬
up consulates at Sharashune, Chuguchak, Kuldja, Kashgar and Urumchi, and
by the end of the 1920's all of Sinkiang's foreign trade was in Soviet hands.
In 1930 the Semipalatinsk to Alma-Ata (Map 3) part of the Turkestan-Siberian
Railway was completed to assist the economic assault on Sirikiang. But in
1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, thousands of immigrants entered Sinkiang and
the Chinese Moslems (Dungans) rebelled. The Chinese Governor had to call
on Soviet assistance which gave Moscow free movement in the Province.
Further revolts of the Turkic Moslems of the Tarim Basin also required
Soviet troops to quell them in 1934* From 1932 to 1943 Sinkiang was a Sov¬
iet satellite.
From 1933 to 1945 Manchuria was in the hands of the Japanese. In June
of 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union. By 1943 the U.S.S.R. could no
longer afford to keep its garrisons in Sinkiang and withdrew them which
gave Chiang Kai-shek the opportunity to replace them with his Rationalist
forces. But the Kuomintang lacked the forces to effectively attach Sirik-
iang to China.
By the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill
promised Chiang Kai-shek the return of all territories that China had lost
to Japan (i.e. Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores), but at Yalta in
February 1945 the United States, and Britain agreed to the Soviet Union
being granted a lease on Port Arthur, a recognition of the U.S.S.R.'s pre¬
eminent position in Dairen, and the operating of the uhinese Eastern and
South Manehurian railways by a Joint Sino-Soviet Company; this was all de¬
pendent upon a Sino-Soviet treaty however. The latter was signed on the
day the Japanese surrendered (August 14th 1945) • By this treaty the
U.S.S.R. recognised China's sovereignty over Sinkiang and Manchuria and
Port Arthur became a joint naval base, Dairen a free port and China agreed
to recognise the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic if the
Mongols expressed such a desire in a plebiscite.
The coming to power of the Chinese Communists in 1949 changed radi¬
cally the position along the Sino-Soviet borderlands. In 1950 Mao visit¬
ed Moscow and the old treaties were abrogated and new agreements signed.
The Chinese were determined to integrate Aianchuria and Sinkiang into the
People's Republic. By 1955 all Soviet troops and interests in Manchuria
had been withdrawn and culminated. In that year the transfer of Soviet
shares in Sinkiang joint companies began so that the latter province came
fully under the control of China. Since they established control of Sink¬
iang the Chinese Communists have been encouraging large scale immigration
into their far western province. For the first time in a number of decades
Sinkiang and J/tanehuria are firmly under the administration of Peking.
In this study the Mongolian People's Republic (Map i) and its boundary
area with China is dealt with later in Section Seven* Therefore the Sino-
Soviet boundary is to be found on either side of the Sino-Mongolian bound¬
ary. For the sake of convenience the Sino-Soviet boundary is here dealt
with in two parts, namely that to the east of the Mongolian People's Repub¬
lic (Map 2) and that to the west (Map 3) • The eastern, or Manchurian,
boundary was the outcome of the Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) , Aigun (I85S) ,
Peking (i860) and that of 1911 which fixed precisely the line from Tarbaga
Dagh to the confluence of the Argun with the Arair River. The western, or
Sinkiang, boundary owes much to the Treaties of Peking (i860) , Tarbagatai
(I864) , St. Petersburg (1881) and that between Russia and Great Britain in
1 95 on the Pamir region. From a study of Soviet and Chinese Communist maps
there appear to be some boundary discrepancies, notably in the Pamir area
of Sinkiang and in the region of the Argun River in Manchuria.
The Far Aastern boundary (Map 2) between the Soviet Union and China is
mainly delimited along physical features, notably the Amur River and its
tributaries the Ussuri and Argun. The line stretches for 2,000 miles from
the Pacific coast south of Vladivostock to the hills of Trans-Baikalia. Be¬
ginning in the western portion of the boundary the Argun River divides the
Chita Oblast of the U.S.S.R. from China's Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
(Map l) for 600 miles or so. where the Argun joins the Shilka the Amur
corrjes into being (Map 2) and forms the boundary for the next 1,000 miles.
From the middle Argun to the Amur the border area is made up of an upland
plateau sparsely populated and which finishes to the east in the Great
Khingan Mountains. The Amur flows across the Great Khingan in an easterly
and south-easterly direction after which the uplands decrease in height.
The increasing influence of the Pacific leads to a slow change from the
dry, higher steppelands to the greener areas to the east where summer rain¬
fall is heavier.
The Chinese side of the Amur is higher than that of the Soviet "bank.
The 3,000 foot peaks of the Little Khingan extend towards the Pacific as
far as the Sungari River. On the Soviet side near the Zeya River the up¬
lands disappear in a northerly direction to leave the Zeya-Bureya Plain which
is an important granary in an otherwise predominantly highland border region.
The administrative centre of the Amur Ohlast (the political divisions are
given in Map i), is Blagoveshchensk and is located on the Plain. The Plain
narrows towards the southeast, confining the Amur. Here the Little Khingan
Mountains of the Chinese side meet the Bureya Range which reach heights of
over 6,000 feet. Beyond this narrow area the waters of the Amsur are in¬
creased by the Sungari and later the Ussuri Rivers. The Amur flows across
a wide plain which is poorly drained and farmed only on the higher areas.
To the east of the Bureya Range there is the Khabarovsk Krai of the Soviet
Union, and between the mountains and the mouth of the Ussuri Birobidzhan,
which is the Jewish Autonomous Oblast set up in the 1930*s, and which has
a present population of about 165,000 people, most of whom are not Jewish.
Within the Chinese Province of Heilungkiang the area from the Little
Khingan to the Ussuri is poorly drained and sparsely settled, notably along
the Sungari River. It is a region of improvement planned by the Peking
regime. Further south the Manchurian Plain often has densities of over 4-00
persons per square mile.
At the meeting of the Ussuri and Amur Rivers the boundary changes dir¬
ection with the latter flowing northeastwards past Khabarovsk (population
of about 350*000) which is the chief city of the Soviet Far East. Some
twenty or so miles north of Khabarovsk the Amur River is joined by a branch
of the Ussuri named the Kazakevicheva. Chinese cartographers include the
flat and uninhabited lands between the Kazakevicheva and the main course of
the Ussuri as within China, whilst Soviet maps claim them as within the
Union. The boundary follows the Ussuri River to Lake Khanka after which it
crosses the northern portion of the Lake to turn in a southwesterly direction
through a number of low ranges to terminate inland a little way from the
coast. From this point the Soviet Union shares a short boundary with the Kor¬
ean People's Republic to the Pacific.
Within the U.S.S.R.'s Maritime Krai to the east of the Ussuri there are
the low and heavily wooded hills of Sikhote Alin which runs parellel to the
coast from the mouth of the Amur to Vladivostook. The main centre of settle¬
ment for Maritime Krai is on the Lake Khanka Plains. There are small fishing
villages along the coast and a number of military establishments. On the
other side of the Ussuri the Nadan Khada Alin Range of Manchuria separates
the Sungari valley from the Ussuri and the Lake Khanka Plains. The Range
is a continuation of the highlands of eastern Manchuria which dominate the
Chinese-Soviet-Korean harder region.
Up until the Nineteenth Century the lands on either side of the Amur
were inhabited by primitive tribes which included Paleao-Asiatics like the
Gilyaks and various groups belonging to the Manchurian-Tungus family such
as the Manchus. Their economy was based on hunting, fishing and trapping,
whilst to the west of them starting in the Great Khingan Mountains there were
Mongolian ethnic groups surviving by pastoral nomadism. This has changed,
much since the last Century; as has been stated the Russian advance stimu¬
lated Chinese counter-measures based on mass immigration into these lands
at the end of the Nineteenth Century and during the first years of the
Twentieth Century. The 2 million Manchus on the Chinese side of the "bound¬
ary have been culturally assimilated by the Han and have no, or little,
cultural or ethnic difference from the majority of the population of the
People* s Republic, even speaking the Chinese language. The Mongols of the
Great Khingan region are still culturally distinct, but of modest numbers
(about 350*000) and notably since the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute great¬
er efforts have been made to impose the boundary upon their lands and turn
them into settled communities.
In the Par Pastern border region the Chinese have a distinct advant¬
age over the Soviet Union in their efforts to absorb the lands up to the
boundary. The Chinese border areas of Inner Mongolia, Heilungkiang and Kirin
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had a population in 1957 of 36,610,000 persons whilst it seems unlikely that
the U.S.S.R.'s borderland total is more than about 4"^ million people. The
water—logged soils, short growing season and permafrost of the Soviet Par
East inhibit farming development. Water and forest resources are impressive,
but the iron ores used at Komsomolsk for steel are low grade and the coal not
particularly good for coking purposes. Soviet efforts to introduce industry
have been poorly rewarded and the million acres of virgin land brought into
agricultural use in the mid-1950*s did not respond well and proved unsuited
to farming in many areas. Soviet settlement in the Par East is dominated
by the Trans-Siberian Railway network.
The Chinese have successfully brought their borderlands with the Soviet
Union in the Par East within the political administration of the state, the
method employed being large scale Chinese immigration into the region so
that the minority groups have been culturally absorbed. Similarly, since the
4» Encyclopaedia Britannica World Atlas; University of Chicago
Press 1961, p.133*
deterioration in relations between China and the Soviet Union the boundary
line has been functioning as a strict political division with no free move¬
ment across it* Chinese immigration into* and development of, the border
region continues with a vigour which contrasts with the lack of the success
of the U.S.S.R.'s attempts on the other sida*
The Soviet Union has not successfully integrated the Far Eastern poss¬
essions into the state unit, notably since the Sino-Suviet dispute Uoscow
has been aware of the Chinese territorial challenge, but can claim little
success in the attempts to fill a few of the empty spaces* At least half
the population of the Soviet Far eastern borderlands is urban which makes
the emptiness of the countryside even more apparent* The boundary provides
a geographical division in the landscape, but between the populated Chinese
lands and the unpopulated Soviet territories*
The Inner Asian Section of the Sino-Soviet boundary stretches from the
Pamir thuntains of the south to the ^ltai ranges of the northern section
(Map • On the western side are the Soviet Republics of the Tadzhika,
Kirgiz and Kazakhs, plus a little of the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast, whilst
the Chinese section consists of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region*
The Pamir plateau according to Chines© maps has yet to be deliiaited be¬
tween the Soviet Union and the People1 s Republic* The Pamirs themselves
reach heights of the order of 18,000 feet* The Soviet section lies within the
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast which is a subdivision of the ladzhik Sov¬
iet Socialist Republic* The Tadzhiks are ethnically related to tribes found
in both Afghanistan and Iran* The Tadzhik Republic has a population of 2
million, but this is concentrated to the west and the Pamir Plateau is sparse¬
ly populated* On the Chinese side of the boundary there is the Tash Kurgban
Tadzhik Autonomous Hsiea which is an ethnic subdivision of Siakiang* The in-
habitants are Sarikola Tadzhiks following the Israaeli Moslem faith which is
led by the Aga Khan, and representing a dissident minority within China.
North from the Pamirs the 3ino-Soviet boundary crosses the Trans Alay
Mountains, beyond which there is an upland valley which is the land of the
Kirgiz nomads divided between the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic and
China's Kirgiz Autonomous Chou. Where once the Nomads were permitted to range
freely across the boundary since the Sino-Soviet dispute efforts have been
made to settle the Kirgiz on each side of the line.
After the upland valley the boundary moves eastwards into the Tien Shan
(Map 3) where it follows mainly the Kokahaal Tau crestline. Unlike the Sino-
Soviet Far Eastern boundary the Inner Asian borderline does not favour so
frequently physical features in its delineation, often it is an arbitrary
line which had been drawn on a map. The Tien Shan runs from east to west
for over 1,900 miles and is composed of a collection of geologically diverse
ranges containing small valleys. The highest peak is found in the Khan Ten-
gri Mountains and is at 23*000 feet and is in the Sino-Soviet boundary area.
On the Soviet side the Tien Shan is mainly within the Kirgiz Republic, whilst
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in China Owen Lattimore felt that the Mountains constituted the key to
Sinkiang. The Tien Shan divides Sinkiang into two parts with Dzhungaria
in the north and the Tarim basin in the south (Map 3j •
The Tarim Basin is a region of drought due to the mountain barriers of
the Pamirs in the west, the Tien Shan in the north and the Kun Lun in the
south. However, at the base of the mountains there are oases fed from mount¬
ain streams such as those settlements of Khotan and Yarkend near the Kun Lun
and Aksu at the base of the Tien Shan. The water problem limits nomadism to
5« O.battimore: 'Inner Asian Frontiers of China', Beacon Press edition,
Boston 1962, p.151*
the uplands, but includes such important cattle breeding groups as the
Tadzhiks and Kirgia» Within the oases the main ethnic group is the Uighurs
who aire a Turkic people* The Chinese in the Tarim Basin are of limited
number and mainly military or administrative personnel* Baking has an am¬
bitious road and rail building plan for Sirikiang in order to both exploit
the economic resources of the Province and to establish more effectively the
rather tenuous authority of the central government*
The Hi River (Map 5) marks the corridor zone of Inner Asia* To the
north of the Tien Shan a greater rainfall has clothed, the slopes of the
mountains with good posture which provided an easy routeway for nomadic in¬
vaders such as the Mongols in the Thirteenth Century* Y.here the boundary
crosses the Ili River Valley is perhaps the militarily most vulnerable sect¬
ion of the oino-Soviet borderlands* The Ili Valley is limited by mountains
in the east, but widens in the west. Alma Ata to the south of the Hi is
the capital of the Kazakh Republic and has a population of about half a
million people, most of them Russians* The Chinese Ili area has been org¬
anised into the Sibo Autonomous liaien; the Sibo are a Tungus-i&mchurian
tribe numbering about 20,000, but associated with the Uighura and sharing
their Turkic culture*
Worth from the Ili River the boundary follows the ©ast-weat line of
the Ala Tau Range which has heights up1 to 15,000 feet, using the crestline
as a political boundary, after which the boundary censes down into the de¬
pression known as the Bzhungaidan Gate* This routeway was selected for the
first Inner Asian line linking Moscow to Peking before the deterioration
in Sino-Soviet relations. The boundary crosses steppe beyond the Barlik
Maili Mountains to the north of the Dzhungarian Gate* At the Tarbagatai
Mountains the boundary turns eastwards to follow the crestline of the
eastern half of the Range at about 9,500 feet, after which it crosses the
valley of the Black Irtysh River which rises in the Mongolian Altai. The
Black Irtysh was an important routeway for transporting minerals from
Sinkiang to the U.S.S.R.
The Basin of Dzhungaria occupies 270,000 square miles and is bounded
in the northeast by the Mongolian Altai and in the south by the Tien Shan.
Rainfall is about 8 inches in the lowlands and a little more on the higher
ground. It is a region of pastoralisxn. 'Most of the 475,000 nomadic Kaz¬
akhs of Sinkiang live in the western uplands of Dzhungaria. In past times
of crisis, the Kazakhs freely migrated back and forth from Russian to Chin¬
ese territory. Thus, the Sinkiang Kazakhs share a coraaon history, as well
6
as a common Turkic language with the Russian Kazakhs*• The freedom of
movement once enjoyed by the Kazakhs is no more and so a modification of
the Kazakh culture on each side of the boundary can be expected. At pres¬
ent the Kazakhs are Moslem. There are also Mongol nomads throughout
Dzhungaria, although mainly in the Tien Shan and near the border with the
Mongolian People's Republic. The Mongols are Lama Buddhists. The Kazakhs
and Mongols have been given minority status by the Chinese. Also Dzhung¬
aria has about a quarter of a million Dungans (Chinese Moslems) • Chinese
immigration into the area has been encouraged so that perhaps a million
have arrived from the east during the last few years. Uruiachi is now an
industrial city of 200,000 people.
There is a striking contrast between the Fax- kastern Sino-Soviet
boundary and the Inner Asian one for the Chinese and Soviet positions are
reversed in the two. Soviet Central Asia has had forty years of Communist
6. to• A. 1).Jackson^ 'The Russo-Chinese Borderlands'J Van Rostrand,
Princeton 1962, p.11.
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government and has been carefully integrated into the political unit. Chin¬
ese development in Sinkiang has only just begun. There are 12 million
Turkic peoples and 7 million Slavs in Soviet Central Asia as against 4 million
Turkic peoples and Ik million Chinese in Sinkiang. During their forty years
of rule the Communists in Soviet Central Asia have wiped out any separatist
feelings amongst the minorities and neutralised the one® challenging hold
of Islam. Agriculture has been collociiviaed and even before the sino*boviet
dispute much headway had been made in eliminating noraadaia. Soviet Central
Asia lias been a centre for putting into effect the plans for ploughing virgin
lands so that the immigration of Russian and Ukrainian farmers continues at
the expense of the Kasakh nomads who are thereby forced to conform. The bino-
Sovist boundary in Inner Asia makes an effective divide in the human geography
of the region, but whereas the U.S.S.R. has integrated her areas into the Sov¬
iet political unit China can males no such claims for Sinkiang where the- state
lias experienced great difficulty with many of the minorities ranging from
tlie religious animosity of the Dungaas to the raoini feeling of the Turkic
Uighurs. Soviet Central Asia is as racially diverse as Sinkiang, but in the
former the distinctive cultures have been neutralised whilst in the latter
they are still a dominant factor.
The Far Eastern Sino-Sovict boundary area shows the Chinese dominant
with the Soviet lands sparsely settled and undex-develoxed in oampjarison.
On the Chinese side of the border the minority groups such as the Banohus
have been culturally absorbed by the Ban peox>lea and the political adminis¬
tration of Peking successfully imposed right up to the boundary. The Mon¬
gols, tenacious of their way of life, arc perhaps the last to survive the
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ary at present malcea an effective divide within the human geography of
the border area, but only as long as China respects itj it is doubtful if
the Soviet Union could stop a spill over of Chinese into her empty o£ lands
of eastern Siberia unless she contemplated a drastic retaliation. In the
region of the Par eastern boundary China dominates the situation through
the far greater numbers of Han then Russians, and her control of the territ-
org within har Jurisdiction.
In conclusion a contrast in boundary delimitation between the eastern
and western Sino-Soviet lines can be seen, The eastern boundary is delimr
i
ited mainly along rivers with the exception of the area of the bino-Soviat¬
icorean meeting (Map 4) where a water-shed-crestline boundary cornea into being. »
Phe eastern Sino-Soviet boundary is therefore within Boggs' •Physical* cat¬
egory or Hartshorne*s * Subsequent* • The western section is partly Boggs'
•Physical* type of boundary (hartshorns*a 'Subsequent category' Map 5)# but
also much of it consists of an arbitrarily drawn line which hartshorns would
have classified as a 'Pioneer Antecedent* boundary (Map 6), or Boggs'
•Geometric*. As two sorts of boundary lino have been used in delimiting the










CHAPTER ONE? Historical Development.
Pre-Nineteenth Century
Nepal is a landlocked state (Map i) dominated "by the Himalayas and
surrounded by the two ancient cultures of India and China. Nepal is faced
by a number of the problems which perplex those states within the Minor
Neutralist category of border country so that, despite other characterist¬
ics of a more unique quality, it makes a useful example for studying in
greater detail. In many ways Nepal resembles closely Tibet, Sikkim and
Bhutan; the area has been a refuge zone for peoples from China and India,
and each have accepted and modified the cultural offerings of the surround¬
ing civilisations*
The early history of Nepal is shrouded in mystery, but it seems prob¬
able that at the birth of the Gautama Buddha in 563 B.C. at least the Valley
of Katmandu was well populated. Before the birth of Christ Buddhist culture
flourished in much of the area now known as 'Nepal*. But the history of
Nepal has been dominated by the Valley of Katmandu which was first developed
by a people known as the Newars. They organised the agriculture of the area
and later adopted the Buddhist faith which they modified and elaborated. The
early history of Nepal is dominated by cultural borrowings from the south.
1. The following texts have been particularly useful ir this chapters
G.S.BaJpai: 'Nepal & Indo-Nepalese Relations'; Indian Yearbook of
International Affairs for 195U-i J.H.Elliott: 'Guide to Nepal',
Newman, Calcutta 1959; A.Gupta: 'Politics & Elections in Nepal';
The Political Quarterly Vol.30» 1959; G.Jain: 'India Meets China in
Nepal'; Asia Publishing House, London 1959; P.P.Karan & ft.M.Jenkins:
'The Himalayan Kingdoms', Van Nostrand, Princeton 1963; & H.M.Vin-
ackeJ 'A History of the Par East in Modern Times', Allen & Unwin,
London I960.
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According to Bana's 'Charita Harsha' the Indian ruler Sri Harsha in¬
vaded the Valley of Katmandu in 607 A.D., hut his governor was later de¬
feated by a Nepalesa army under Prince Amsuvarman. Amsuvarman came to power
in the first quarter of the Seventh Century A.D.> and later took the title
of 'King of Kings'. The new Dynasty was established at the time when Tib¬
etan power was dominating the Himalayas and Nepal was made a vassal state.
Historical facts are again uncertain at this period but it would seem that
Nepal remained a vassal of Tibet until the Eighth Century A.D. There were
internal power struggles and political intrigue and although the Valley of
Katmandu remained the cultural core of Nepal what is now the present area
of the state disintegrated into a number of small kingdoms. The Tibetan
claim to vassalage ceased in 703 A.D. (except for some of the northern
principalities which were paying tribute to the Ch'ing Emperor as late as
the Eighteenth Century^ and the tiny states of Nepal entered upon a long
period of stagnation.
The arrival of the Moslem religion in Northern India in the Thirteenth
Century led to the fleeing of many of the Hindus to Nepal. A number of small
Hindu kingdoms were established in southern and western Nepal. Some refugees
of Rajput origin settled around Gurka (Map I). During the Eighteenth Century
the Rajputs consolidated their power around the centre of Gurkha. At this
time the all-important Valley of Katmandu was divided into the three prince¬
doms of Katmandu, Bhadgaon, and Fatan (Map l) . In 17 '9 the Gurkha leader
Prithwi Narayan managed to bring the Valley of Katmandu under his rule and
inaugurated a period of Gurkha empire building which was to challenge the
Sikh power to the west, the British East India Company to the south, and
2. Quoted by P.P.Karans 'Nepal*; University of Kentucky Press,
Lexington I960, p.4.
China and Tibet to the north.
Having consolidated their position in Nepal the Rajputs broke off the
northern territories* tribute payments to China and Tibet and in 1789 made
their first attack into the latter. In 1791 the Lhasa administration re¬
fused to provide the balance of an indemnity promised the Nepalese by the
Tibetan authorities at Tashilhumpo. The reason for the refusal on the part
of Lhasa is thought to have involved Tibet's domestic politics in that
Tashilhumpo was a centre of rising Lamaist influence and the denial of aid
by Lhasa led to the expected reaction of the Nepalese with renewed invasion
and the plundering of the rival Tashi Lama's monastery. Having watched the
power of Tashilhumpo crushed by the Gurkhas Lhasa requested aid of the Chin¬
ese Emperor.
China's alien Ch'ing (Manchu) Itynasty gained much from the support given
to it by the adherents of the Lamaist religion in Tibet and Mongolia, and so
an appeal from Lhasa was not to be taken lightly. Following a role as pro¬
tectors of the Lamaist interests in Tibet the Manchus dispatched an army
which decisively defeated the withdrawing Nepalese in 1792. In the Sino-
Nepalese treaty which followed the Gurkhas had to return their plunder and
agree to a tributary mission to Peking every five years, whilst the Chin¬
ese did not bother to extend their control in Nepal as they had done in Tibet
there is little doubt that the Gurkha Government was considered a vassal of
the Celestial Empire.
If Peking considered Katmandu part of the Ch'ing dominions what was the
attitude of Nepal towards China at this time? At the beginning of the Nine-
3
teenth Century Mir Izzut Ullah informed William Moorcroft, a Bengal Govern-
3« A.LanL 'Britain & Chinese Central Asia'; Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London i960, pp.38-40.
ment veterinary surgeon, that the Rajah of Nepal had appealed to the Chinese
Emperor for protection should the British East India Company attack his terr¬
itory. This suggests that the attitude prevailing in Katmandu was the same
as that in Lhasa. As Befitted their role the Manchus are reputed to have
answered favourably to the Nepalese request and enquired what resources the
Rajah might need.
Nineteenth Century
With a certain inevitability the expansion of Gurkha power to the south
after its frustration in the north led to conflict with the British Bast India
Company. Hostilities began in 1814, and during the war the British captured
a draft of a letter from Katmandu to the Chinese Emperor requesting the Manchus
to send an army into Bengal to create a diversion and so provide military
pressure to relieve the onslaught on the Nepalese armies. A Treaty between
the East India Company and Nepal was signed on November 28th 1815 at Sugauli
by which the Gurkhas lost their position in Sikkim and territory around Kurnr
aon, and Garwhal, and all land gained west of the Kali River (which today
marks the western side of the Nepalese oblong). Katmandu was to have a Brit¬
ish Resident. What is of particular interest is that Nepal was not added to
British India as it was considered a Chinese sphere of influence, and a
counter—offensive from Peking was feared.
Botji Nepal and the British East India Company waited with apprehension
for the Chinese reaction to the Celestial Empire's exclusion from the negot¬
iations which preceded the Segauli Treaty. Would the Ch'ing Emperor repeat
PauljLondon 196cypp. 38»W| 0.
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the Chinese action of 1792 when an army of 70*000 men had "been led by Gen¬
eral Pu Kang'an against the Gurl&as? But the power of the Manchus had al¬
ready begun to lose its effectiveness and the only Chinese move was a pol¬
ite request to abandon the Katmandu Residency* The Chinese still thought
of Nepal as a vassal state, but lacked the power to operate against the
British threat at such a great distance from Peking*
Prom 1804 to 1837 Nepal was guided by a Prime Minister of impressive
ability, namely 3him Sen. His policy rested on the belief that the Nepalese
military ambitions should be directed against the British, and that any
territorial expansion should be at the expense of India. China was considered
of far greater power and significance than the British, and the wily Premier
concluded that the Manchu overlord must not be upset by Nepalese invasions
into Tibet, near- by too friendly Anglo-Gurkha relations. Hardly had the Seg-
auli Treaty been signed than Bhim Sen was conspiring with the Chinese to ex¬
pel the British Resident from Katmandu. Bhim Sen was only too aware of the
threat of peaceful British penetration, ana so the British Resident was re¬
stricted an his movements to the Repalese capital. In 1837 Bhim Sen was dis¬
graced and retired into private life; the machinations of the mentally un¬
stable monarch led to the suicide of the ex-Prime minister in 1839*
The fall of Bhim Sen left Repalese foreign policy full of indecision.
After 1837 the Gurkhas could not decide whether to follow a hostile line against
the British, or adopt a pose of strict neutrality. But the attitude towards
China did not change as the Nepalese still considered themselves .Manchu feud¬
atories to the extent of offering their services to the Ch'ing Emperor during
the Sino-British conflict of 1840-42 (the Opium War;J Nepalese assistance
was declined by the ever proud Chinese.
In 18^5 Jang Bahadur became Prime Minister of Nepal and the adminis¬
tration tock on a distinctly pro-British appearance. The defeat of the Chin¬
ese at the hands of the British in the Opium War had a considerable effect
on the outlook of the Nepalese, and from this period British prestige and
influence increased at the expense of the Chinese. In 1850 Jang Bahadur
visited Britain.
Despite a decline in the respect accorded the Chinese the Nepalese
continued to send their Tidbute Missions to Peking every five years, main¬
ly because they proved to be profitable, but also due to the Gurkha belief
that even if China -was no longer the dominant power in the Himalaya region
she was not to be taken lightly. The 1852-54 Mission was badly treated in
both China and Tibet. Taking advantage of Chinese preoccupation with the
Taiping Rebellion the Nepalese used the excuse that their nations ef the
Tribute Mission had been badly treated in Lhasa to attack Tibet. In March
of I856 the Tibetans agreed to pay the Nepalese an annual tribute of 10,000
rupees (a practice which was finally ended by the Chinese Conmimists in 1953),
abolished customs' duty on Nepalese goods, and acknowledged the right of Kat¬
mandu to have a representative in Lhasa to look after the interests of the
Nepalese traders. On April 1st I856 the Nepalese commenced their withdrawal
from Tibet. The situation with regard to Chinese power in the area of the
Himalayas had changed radically from what it had been sixty years before.
In 1856 Jang Bahadur resigned and in recognition of his services King
Surendra Vikram Sahi bestowed upon him the title of Maharaja and made the
Nepalese Premiership hereditary to his family (the Ranas). But Jang Bahadur's
retirement was brief and he was recalled to office ir 1857 where he -implement-
ed a policy of assisting the British to crush the Indian Mutiny with the
aid of 12,OCX) Nepalese troops* For this action he was made a Grand Command¬
er of the Order of the Bath and some of the territory ceded to India in 1815
along what is now Uttar Pradesh and Bihar was returned to Nepal.
But China had not faded completely into the Background. Even if the
Nepalese no longer shared the Chinese opinion of the lowly vassal status
of the Katmandu Government profit demanded that they send another Tribute
Mission to Peking in 1866. This journey was locked upon as a trading vent¬
ure as it carried opium for sale in China. The Mission did not return to
Katmandu until 1869 after it had been made to feel fully its tributary
position by the Chinese.
In order to try and counteract the effect of the honours conferred upon
Jang Bahadur by Queen Victoria the Emperor of China in 1872 granted the Nep¬
alese Premier the Celestial Empire*s most distinguished award of the 'Double-
eyed Peacock Feather* and the 'Sable Coat*. In 1877 the first hereditary
Prime Minister of Nepal died, having dedicated much of his service to creat¬
ing an outlook sympathetic to British interests along the northern borders
of India. Prom this time until 1951 the power of the Kings of Nepal was sec¬
ondary to that of the Premiers, none of whom were particularly admirable,
working in the interests of the nobility and against the bulk of the pojwlat-
ion. Efforts were often made to depose the Rana family from its dominant
position within Nepal, Premier Ranaudip Singh being assassinated in 1885
and Prime Minister Bir Shamsher Jang Bahadur having two attempts made on
his life before be died somewhat more peacefully in 1901.
In 1890 China acknowledged Britain's interests in Sikkim by treaty,
an action which was followed in 1895 by an agreement regulating trade be¬
tween India and Tibet. The 1895 throwing off of Chinese suzerainty by the
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Tibetans and the latter's refusal to recognise the Sino-british treaties
was followed in 1302 by Tibetan raids into Sikkim. Nepal endeavoured to
act as mediator between Tibet, Britain and China in these matters. The
1904 Tounghusband expedition to Lhasa had a yak supply column provided by
Nepal. With the conclusion of hostilities Nepal had earned the gratitude
of Britain, and the Prime Minister was decorated by the Chinese.
Twentieth Century
It took the British a long time to grasp the full significance of the
Nepalese Tribute Missions to Peking. It was not until 1895 when the Brit¬
ish examined the whole system that the Missions were condemned as a sign of
vassalage. British slowness can be partly blamed on the fact that until
1895 China's actual power was a mystery, but in that year the Japanese dem¬
onstrated fully the decay of the Ch'ing Brapire and the British no longer
felt a need to conciliate the Chinese. By the end of the Nineteenth Century
Nepal considered herself an independent and sovereign state, but this view
was not shared by China. In 1908 the Nepalese Premier Chandra Shamsher
visited Britain and confirmed the independent status of his country, but a
similar visit to Peking would have been worthless. In the same year the
last Tribute Mission left for China. 'Chinese Olympian pride and arrogance
had always maintained that these friendly coninunications represented the
tribute paid by a vassal to its lord ... It has of late years been brought
home to the world at large that Chinese arrogance has not lessened and that
her claims to suzerainty over lands that never were hers or never had more
4
than an exchange of courtesies with her, are still being pressed.' Both
4. F.Tuker; 'Gorkha'; Constable, London 1957» pp.190-191.
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China and Nepal tended to misinterpret the lesions; whilst China continued
to view them for what they had been in the 1790'a, namely the representations
of a state conquered by her armies, Nepal looked upon them as business vent¬
ures.
In 1909 P*u Yi, a child of two years, was proclaimed Chinese emperor
with the name Iisuan T'ung. Under the Regency the ^.Sanchus had an inglorious
last fling occupying Rima in Tibet and advancing into the Miahrai country of
the North hast Frontier Agency of India. In 1910 Nepal was officially pro¬
claimed a vassal of the Chines© Empire. By the following year the opposit¬
ion to the Manchus in China was irresistable and in 1912 the emperor abdi¬
cated.
The fall of the Ch'ing dynasty did not bring about the sort of reform¬
ation the more enlightened elements in China had worked for. lire situation
quickly took on the appearance of being just another example of the roughly
three hundred year cycles of rising and declining dynasties. China degener¬
ated at the hands of corrupt and greedy men, both native and foreign. At
the end of the First V»orld War the foreign powers decided to replace the
idea of territorial partition with regard to China by a more sophisticated
form of exploitation based on international finance. The hopes of such
idealists as Sun Yat-sen were frustrated, with China split exnee more into
North and South. In this age of the petty warlord China's foreign policy
' V & : ' ' /;
revolved around the demands of such states as Japan, Britain and France.
There was little opportunity for a weal; China to present her opinion an such
matters as the status of Nepal.
Whilst Ghina ceased to be an effective force in international affairs
Nepal concentrated upon gaining firm support for her proclaimed 3tatua as an
 
independent state. In 1923 Britain recognised Nepal's sovereignty by
treaty. The Katmandu Government had to wait many years for similar recog¬
nition from the rest of the world, but in 1947 the United States documen¬
ts ted such recognition, followed by France in 1949 and Nepal's large
southern neighbour India in 1950. In December of 1955 Nepal took her place
as a member of the United Nations, thus backing by world opinion her claim
as an independent state.
The fall of Chiang's regime in 1949 heralded the leadership of Mao Tse-
tung in China. A Chinese Communist delegation visited Katmandu in 1955 where
the two countries recognised each other and agreed to exchange ambassadors.
In 1956 a Sino-Nepalese Treaty put an end to Nepal's rights in Tibet, but pro¬
vided for Nepalese trading posts in Tibet in exchange for similar rights in
Nepal for the Chinese. Consulates were opened in Lhasa and Katmandu. The
Nepalese Premier visited Peking in 1956 and Chou En-lai returned the court¬
esy in 1957 by coming to Katmandu.
Whilst China had been undergoing a revolution Nepal had been in a sim¬
ilar domestic turmoil. In February of 1951 under the late King Tribhuvana
Bir Vikram Shah Deva the power of the Rana family was crushed and an end put
to the tradition of hereditary prime ministers. In 1956 King Mahendra Bir
Vikram Shah Deva came to the throne. On February 12th 1959 a new consti¬
tution was proclaimed which had been drafted by a commission under the guid¬
ance of the British lawyer Sir Ivor Jennings, and which gave the right to
vote to every person over 21 years of age. In May of 1959 the state's first
democratically elected government took office. On December 15th i960 King
Mahendra jailed Premier Koirala and dissolved I&rliament. In July of 1961
the King proclaimed a policy of 'Guided Democracy'. It is not certain
exactly why the King disbanded Nepal's effort at democracy, but there is
reason to suspect that he felt his own position challenged.
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With regard to her neighbours Nepal was equally sensitive to the influ¬
ence of both China and India, but nevertheless concluded treaties of friend¬
ship and trade with the latter in 1950* In the same year the late Premier
Nehru of India made a verbal guarantee of Nepal's boundaries to which the
Nepalese Prime Minister replied, 'V/e have had for centuries excellent relat-
5
ions with China'• But a number of maps published by China in 1951 showed
Nepal as part of the People's Republic, and the 1953 1Atlas of the Chinese
People's Republic' published in Peking showed large areas of Nepal as Comm¬
unist territory.
However, the Peking Government's attitude towards Nepal has been one
of friendship despite the latter's strict neutrality. The Chinese approach
to the undelimited frontier shared with Nepal was constructive. 'Ihe subject
of Nepal's northern border was first broached by China in 1959* Further dis¬
cussions eventually led to an agreement delimiting the Sino-Nepalese bound¬
ary on October 5th 1961. The boundary has since been demarcated by stone
posts (the fill text of the 1961 agreement is given in the Appendix).
6
The Sino-Nepalese boundary starts from the point where the watershed be¬
tween the Kali River and the Tinkar River meets that between the tributaries
of the Karnali River and the Tinkar River. It then runs southeast along the
watershed between the tributaries of the Karnali River and the Tinkar ana
the Seti Rivers, passing through the Lipudhura mountain ridge and Lipudhura
5* Reported in the 'Manchester Guardian' for March 31st, 1955*
6. Details of the Agreement are given in the Peking Review for October
20th. 1961. Map 2 has been constructed from information provided by
the Nepalese Embassy in London. It appears to be practioally impossible
to procure the exact location of the majority of Hie place names given
in the Treaty text, and those on Map 2 have been supplied by the
Nepalese Embassy.
Pass to Pehlin or Ural Pass (Map 2) • After the Urai Pass mountain crestlines
are favoured as the boundary travels northwards to the Lapche Pass, with
the exception of the use of the Yadangre River and Karnali River briefly in
the more southerly part of this section, and the watershed between the
streams flowing into the I&nasarowar Lake and the tributaries of the Humla
Karnali River near the Lapche Pass* After this the line taken is the south¬
easterly watershed between the tributaries flowing into the Manasarowar Lake
and the tributaries of the Machuan River on the one hand and the tributaries of
the Hum! a Karnali River, the Iviugu Karnali River and the PanJang Khola on the
other. Watersheds and spurs are favoured for delimitation as far as Tingli
Bhodo, then mountain ridges take the boundary to Fhumphula, and Chaklo. After
Chaklo the boundary runs south along the watershed between the Yalu Tsangpo
River and the tributaries of the Kali (See Map 2 in Chapter 2 of this Section)
as far as Lagula Pass when it turns eastwards and follows the watershed be¬
tween the Tsangpo River and the tributaries of the Marshiyangdi River. The
rest of the boundary (Map 2) favours mainly watersheds, mountain ridges and
spurs and more occasionally rivers. In an area where the physical geography
offered numerous similar lines for delimiting the boundary along, and where
the human geography appears to be happily oblivious of the boundary the only
problem met was the prestige of Mount Averest. Here it was decided that
China should have the northern slopes within her territories whilst Nepal
had the southern slopes.
The delimitation and the demarcation of the boundary left Nepal with
more territory than she in fact had considered claiming, notably in the north¬
west. Prom the viewpoint of the smaller state it has been the most favourable
boundary agreement concluded between China and a non-Communist state. The
■boundary had never been delimited before, and it is perhaps surprising
that a Chinese Communist administration should be willing to conclude a
boundary treaty with a state which a Ch'iug Emperor would have consider¬
ed a vassal. The Chinese attitude throughout recent years has been most
sympathetic towards Katmandu, suggesting even a minor neutralist state
with a monarchy is preferable to the Chinese along their border than a
more major power. As will be shown in the economic chapter (Chapter Pour)
of this section China has been most generous in aid given to Nepal. Nepal's
geographical position of being a small state wedged in between the two vast
countries of India and China is reminiscent of that of the Mongolian
People* s Republic between China and the Soviet Union. In both cases what
is politically an unenviable geographical location has proven a useful
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CHAPTER TWO • Physical Characteristics*
Until probably about the middle Tertiary epoch all of Nepal and most
of Tibet was under the geosynclinal Tethys Sea. Following sedimentary de¬
position in this Sea the floor of the Tethys area began to slowly rise and
develop a series of folds in parallel lines. The crests of these rising
folds were subject to wind and rain erosion which decimated their syraaetry.
A transverse river system developed, along with attendant drainage basins.
The erosion and elevation processes at work produced the mountain systems
of Nepal and Tibet. Earth movements complicated the structure of the region
by distortion.
Of greater importance to the political geographer than these forces of
the past is the present physical characteristics of Nepal. The state can
be divided into the Himalayas of the north and the Terai Plains in the south.
First to be dealt with will be the physiography of the region of the Himal¬
ayas which can be further subdivided into the three zones of the southern
sub-Himalayas, the Middle ranges and Inner Himalayas, and finally the north¬
ern Tibetan zone (Map i).
The sub-Himalayas are characterised by overthrust faults. The foot¬
hills of the Himalayas rise gently from the Terai to about 2,000 feet, after
which there are a series of steep escarpments. A number of parallel ridges
run roughly from northwest to southeast, and are separated from each other
by broad valleys called 'duns'. These outer hills are rarely over 4,000
feet in height, and are composed of younger Tertiary rocks. The outer sub-
Himalayas are made up of anticlines and synclines dissected into escarp¬
ments* Where the younger Tertiary strata is in contact with the older rocks
1. This section is based mainly on D.N.Wadia: •Geology of India'; MacMillan,
London 1953# P.P.Karan: 'Nepal'; University of Kentucky Press,
Lexington i960 & T.Hagen: Communications I. & 4* of the Nepal Bureau
of Mines, Katmandu 1951 & 1954*
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a reverse fault is found (The 'Main Boundary Fault' shown in Generalised
Section)• The outermost Himalayas consist of detrital material.
The Middle Himalayas are within the range 5,000 - 15,000 feet. One
of the differences between the Middle and Outer Himalayas is that the former
consist of ridges of irregular direction. Much work has yet to be done on
the structure of the region, but it appears to be characterised by recumb¬
ent overfolds, sliced by reverse faults passing into thrust planes along
which much of the structure has moved southwards.
The Valley of Katmandu is enclosed by the Middle Himalayas to the south,
and the Inner Himalayas to the north. Beyond the Inner Himalayas there is
the high desert area of the Tibetan Plateau. The Inner Himalayas is a little
known region, but what work has been done so far favours the hypothesis that
it is built of piles of nappes.
North of the Inner Himalayas the rocks dip gently to the north at
heights of over 15,000 feet. Thi3 Tibetan zone is overlain by fossiliferous
marine sediments, in general these marine sediments occur only to the north
of the Inner Himalayan axis.
On Map I the Middle Himalayas and part of the Inner Himalayas have been
marked as the 'Nappe Zone of Nepal'. Compression in this large region has
produced thrust faulting of great geological complexity. These thrust sheets
2
are usually associated with recumbent and inverted folds. Hagen divides the
zone into a lower Nawakot nappe system and an overlying Katmandu one. The
roots of the Katmandu nappes form the main range of the Himalayas.
In the main the geology of the Himalayas has controlled the relief.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that a number of the more important Himalayan
2. T.Hagen! 'Uber Gebirgsbildung und Talsysteme Im Nepal Himalaya';
Geographies Helvetica Vol.9i 1954*, & T.Hagen: 'Nepal'; Kuanierly












rivers (e.g. the Ivosi) are older than the mountains they pass through. Dur¬
ing the mountain building period apparently these rivers kept their original
beds, but eroded their channels at an accelerated rate. This led to the
emergence of a fully developed valley system (with transverse gorges) with
the rise of the Himalayas. Today the watersheds of the Himalayan rivers
lie not along the peaks of the mountain system, but usually to the north in
Tibet. Whilst the uplift of the Himalayas was compensated by downcutting
in the main river valleys the tributaries did not react accordingly and raoat
of them are discordant with the main rivers, entering them as waterfalls or
cascades.
In Nepal the Terai usually varies from about 15 to 20 miles in width.
It is the result of filling up by lengthy alluviation of a tectonic basin
brought into being when the structure of the Tethys Sea was folded to form
the Himalayas. It has a foundation of ancient crystalline rocks traversed
by faults indicating that it sank after a series of block faults.
The Terrai is cut by numerous rivers which present no problem in their
hillier upper courses, but which tend to flood in the low lying areas. The
rivers reaching the plains find their velocity checked and so deposit much
of the sediment they carry] when the monsoon arrives the extra volume of
water lacks the space it needs in these constricted channels and floods.
The most dangerous river in Nepal from the point of flooding is the
Kosi in Southeastern Nepal (hap 2). After the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. and the
Indus Rivers the Ecsi is the third largest Himalayan river with a catchment
area of almost 23,0CO square miles. About 8Qj of the rainfall of its catch¬
ment area fall3 in the monsoon season so that from June to September the




in a tropical river.' The fluctuations of the Kosi have been known to
lay waste up to 500 square mile s of good arable land in Nepal. Although
there are differences within the Nepalese drainage system the Kosi does ex¬
hibit the main characteristics of most of the other rivers within the
country. (Map 2).
With regard to the climate of Nepal the most pleasant environment is
at about 5*000 feet in the mountain valleys. The heat of the Terai decreases
northwards into the extreme cold of the Himalayas. Elevation has much to do
with the changes of climate within Nepal, whether it is with regard to in¬
solation or rainfall. Local climates dominate much of the country, more
especially in the north, nevertheless it is possible to divide Nepal into
certain broad climatic belts.
The Terai is climatically part of Northern India, having a tropical mon¬
soon regime. The southwesterly monsoon brings surauer rainfall which extends
into many of the mountain valleys. The Inner Himalayas protect the more
southerly areas of Nepal from the cold winter air masses of Central Asia.
Although the Terai shares the same sort of climate as much of India, Nepal
is a country with a certain claim to climatic uniqueness with regard to the
surrounding region, if only because of the effect of the Himalayas.
The pattern of temperature within Nepal is of overwhelming complexity.
Teisperatures decrease with increasing altitude, and averages of less than
50 degrees P. for the coldest month begin at about 4,500 feet. Even the
Terai has a distinct winter season with a January average of approximately
60 degrees, P. in the eastern districts decreasing to perhaps 50 degrees P.
in the western areas. Within the Terai the June average is about 80 degrees
3. P.P.Karan: 'Nepal*; University of Kentucky Press,
Lexington i960., p.24*
F. in the oast and 90 degrees F. in the west. The mountains or© affected
by the degree of exposure and the elevation. In winter the nocturnal cold
air often influences the climate down to 4,000 feet. Frosts and fogs are
frequent* In the Valley of Katmandu the January average temperature is 50
degrees F. and the July 78 degi oi F., but winter teiapera tuxes do go below
freezing on occasion.
Host of Nepal* s rainfall comes from the southwest monsoon which breaks
in about raid-June. The monsoon lasts until September and accounts for over
three-quarters of the annual precipitation in the majority of areas. There
is a steady decrease in rainfall from east to west (from about 75 inches to
30 inches in the Terai; • As might be expected total rainfall is higher on
the Himalayan slopes than in the Terai plains. Within the Inner Himalayas
exposure to the monsoon winds is the criteria for animal rainfall, within
the rain shadow of the mountains the climate is very dry. In the Valley of
Katmandu the average annual rainfall is 53 inches, three quarters of which
falls in the period from June to September. V, inter' a northwesterly wand
brings some rain, perhaps 10 indies in the western Terai and 20 inches in
the western mountains* astern Nepal is not much affected by these north-
westerlies which are believed to be depressions originating over the Medit¬
erranean oea.
With a number of reservations the climate of Nepal can be divided into
three regions, the hot subtropical area of the Terai, the cooler microther-
mal zone of the Nepal Nappes and inner Himalayas (Map l), and the tundra reg¬
ion of the Tibetan 2kane whioh fringes the great heights of much of Nepal's
frontier with China. The subtropical area is an extension of Northern India.
North of this elevation tends to dominate climate with winters moderately
cold to very chill and sup ers wet and warm in the main* At about 10,000 feet
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above eea level winters are cold and summers short and cool restricting
the growing of cereals. Above 10,000 feet winters are severe. Potatoes
and barley can be grown successfully up to 14,000 feet. The fiopalese
tribes such as the Sherpas and Bhotiaa (or 'Bhotiyas1) have retreated into
these higher agricultural acmes with an economy based on yak and sheep, and
potatoes and barley. Temperatures remain in the region of 35-45 degrees P.
throughout the year, but rainfall varies from valley to valley. At elevat¬
ions over 15,000 feet the climate is that of the alpine tunclra.
Nepal has an immense variety of soil, rock, drainage, slope and alti¬
tude which often leads to abrupt changes in the natural vegetation, of the
country. It is, however, passible to divide Nepal into a number of vege-
4
tation zones (Map 3).
Within the lowland Terai new riverine deciduous vegetation is found
along the zcain river beds, taking advantage of the material brought down
by the streams (sand and gravel), and usually associated with tall grasses.
Away from, the rivers there is a much larger area of old riverine forest
consisting of sem&l, siris, karma, latikarraa and other species. North of
the riverine forests there are stands of sal, less numerous in the east
than the drier west. Sal is of great economic importance, being used for
housebuilding and railway ties. Sal usually grows up to about 4,000 feet.
Along the Himalayan slopes between 3,000 and 7,000 feet there is a
belt of pine (Map 3) • as this is an area of intensive agriculture little
of the natural vegetation remains. From about 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet
there is a mixture of forest species. In the eastern part of this latter
vegetation zone the use of shifting cultivation lias denuded most of the
4* Much of this section is based on E.Robbei *Report to the Government
of Nepal on Forestry1 j H.N.Food & Agrlc. Organ. Report 209.,
Rome 1954*
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forest, but the smaller population of the western areas has meant a number
of virgin stands have survived.
The more northerly temperate coniferous forest ©an be further sub-
5
divided. In the area from 11,000 to 12,000 feet the forest is a mixture
of fir and birch and is a subalpine zone. From 7»0G0 feet to 11,000 feet
there is oak, bamboo and larch. There is a difference in vegetation between
the northern and southern slopes of the Himalayas with fir doing poorly on
the latter* Where rainfall is less abundant, as in the northern slopes of
parts of the Inner Himalayas, moist temperate coniferous gives way to such
dry temperate vegetation as junipers, or even thorn bushes.
The higher areas of the Himalayas have an alpine vegetation. The plants
are suited to the extreme cold, small rainfall and short growing season. Trees
are rare, occurring only in sheltered places. Southern slopes may have short
woody plants, whilst north facing areas will have little other than lichens
and mosses.
Soils are dominated by climate and relief in their formation. In the
main Nepal* s soils reflect the tropical, temperate and alpine vegetation
zones and the mesothermal, microthermal and tundra climatic regimes* Azonal
lithosols are found on the higher, steep Himalayan slopes, but the gentler
mountain sides where the vegetation cover is adequate have shallow zonal
soils. Tropical deciduous and humid subtropical forest gives red and yellow
soils on the lower slopes, giving way to brown or gray podzolic forest soils
on higher ground. Under temperate coniferous and subalpine vegetation mount¬
ain meadow soils are formed. In the southern areas of Nepal there is a belt
of alluvial soil covering about 9,000 square miles. Although these Terai areas
5* II.Kihara, editors 'Fauna & Flora of Nepal Himalaya*} Fauna & Flora
Research Society, Kyoto 1955* p«287*
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have local variations in the soil the alluvium is all derived from the
river system's deposition* After the alluvium of the Terai there comes a
slope of shingle and gravel along the foot of the Himalayas* Coarse grav¬
els are here mixed with sand and clay. The Himalayan foothills are of im¬
mature sandy and shallow soils* Above geology is very much the subordinate
of climate* Hers the red and yellow soils of the pine forests give way to
brawn and gray podzolic forest soils which are succeeded by mountain meadow
soils at a higher level* It is thought that the Middle Himalayan soils are
soant with much of the southern slopes bare rock, and the northern faces
clothed by glacial, fluvioglaclal and rainwash soils* The valleys of the
region are floored with drift gravels and morainic material brought down
from above the snow-line. On terraces some alluvium may accumulate. The
Inner Himalayas suffer much erosion by glacier, there being some 3,500 square
miles of glaciers amongst the higher peaks of Nepal.
fhysioally Nepal is part of Northern India along its southern boundary
(the Terai) and can be included in Tibet in the extreme north of the country*
Between these two zones is what might be termed a distinctly Nepalese region
which has served throughout the ages as a refuge area for peoples and ideas*
Nepal is not dissimilar from Tibet in its possession of a core area around
which there is a peripheral zone more available to outside influences* where¬
as Tibet was more open to the culture of the north, and notably China, Nepal
has tended to receive more from the Indian subcontinent due to it being
physically more available to the south* Nevertheless coiusunication between
Tibet and northern Nepal until the 1951 Chinese take-over in Lhasa was read*
ily available and profitably used. It is interesting to note that the Gurkha
military expansion of the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries was
both to the south and the north, suggesting that to a determined ruler with
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an army used to the environment the physical disadvantages to movement
towards the north were not particularly greater than those through the
Terai.
The diversity of physical geography within the state of Nepal has
had its effect upon the considerations of political geography. The hind¬
rances of such factors as relief, vegetation and climate (e.g. the rainy
season) to movement has encouraged the development of distinct regions
largely caused by isolation. The difficulties in administering such a
group as the Sherpas in the north from Katmandu makes the central author¬
ity ineffectual within the area. Nepal is not an effective political unit
largely because the hindrances of physical geography have not been tackled;
if it was possible to get by good road from Katmandu to the Sherpa area
Nepalese nationalism might now have replaced Sherpa tribalism. Similarly,
the political boundary between China and Nepal will not become an effect¬
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According to the June 1961 Census of Nepal the country has a popu-
.
lation of 9f337#66lf which represents a density of 174 persons per square \
i'
I
uiile, and an annual rate of increase of 1*6, .>« The Valley of Katmandu
(Katmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon) has a population of 456,804., and a density
of 2,095 persons per square mile* M
2
Of Nepal Hagen states 'Pew countries exhibit such racial, ethnical,
linguistic and cultural diversity ••• the country may rightly be called the
'ethnic turn-table of Asia"* The population can be divided into two raain
physical types, namely the Tibeto-Nepalese, with Mongoloid, and almondrshaped
eyes (the former has the upper lid falling low to cross the lower lid and cat
off the inner corner of the eye, whilst the latter has the upper eyelid fall¬
ing partly over the edge of the lower eyelid), and the Indo-Nepalese with
open eyes* This physical division tends also to be followed linguistically
with the Tibeto-Nepalese belonging to the Tibeto-Burman language farally,
and the Indo-Nepalese speaking languages derived from an Indo-Aryan source*
The Tibeto-Nepalese tribe^ (Map l) can be divided into Ancient Nepalese and
Tibetan groups which are furthai- subdivided, and the indo-Nepalese into
Nepalese and Indian groups, which are also further subdivided*
Certain groups appear to favour certain types of environinent* The
Ancient Nepaleae settled in the heart of Nepal at an early date, and it was
only much later that there was an infiltration of the Indo-Nepalese and
Tibetan tribes* The original Ancient Nepalese in the Middle Himalayas were
little bothered with settling the fever-ridden plains to the south, or the
1* H*B*Gurung in the 'Geographical Journal', Vol. 128, Dec* 1962, p.574*
2« T.iiagen: ' Nepal5} Kummerly & Prey, Berne 19bl. Much of this chapter
is based on this bode (quotation from pp*59-60), & C.Von urer-
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high mountains to the north. But the coining of the Moslem religion to
India gravely disturbed many of the Indian states bordering Nepal and
there was an influx of refugee Hindu Brahmans (priests) and Kshatriyas
(warriors) to take advantage of the valleys of the more remote Himalayas*
as they came from the plains the Indians rarely settled above 6,000 feet.
These refugees were all of high caste. Under this pressure .from the low¬
lands the Ancient Nepalese races had to retreat also. Today where the K'?is
and Thamangs once followed the Bon Po doctrine there are Hindu worshippers
amongst deserted chortens and prayer-walls.
The Tibetans, suffering from a harsh climate, looked with, a certain
amount of envy towards the Nepalese midlands. By the time Europe was fac¬
ing the Middle Ages the Sherpas had settled in .astern Nepal and the Thak-
als further west. These invaders did not conflict with the Ancient Nepalese
inhabitants as they settled in the valleys above 7500 feet. Right up into
this Century Bhotiyas have continued to come from Tibet and settle in
northern Nepal.
The Ancient Nepalese races did not settle in western Nepal. Here much
of the land between 6,000 and 10,500 feet is uninhabited and represents a
boundary between the lowland IndoHBepalese races and the highland Tibetan
peoples.
To summarise, the Indo-Nepalese groups cover most of the Midlands and
Terei of Nepal (for- further clarification see Pig. 1.), the Ancient Nepalese
races are found on the higher areas of the Midlands and the southern flanks
of the Himalayas, whilst the Tibetan groups are in northern Nepal.
The main settlement of the beware is the Valley of Nepal (Map l) with
a scattering in other parts of the country. They have almond-shaped eyes
(BalaecrMongoloid) and are slim in build and small in stature* Indo-
Kepaleae traits can be found amongst many of the Newars due to inter¬
marriage* They are very much a Bepaleae minority, and always have been,
yet the culture of the Midlands region is theirs. Their culture is one
of the outstanding ones of Asia, rich in mythology, outstanding in agri¬
cultural science (their irrigation laws would make an interesting study in
themselves) , and throughout their history excellent craftsmen* It is
\
thought that the pagoda style of architecture was introduced into the rest
of Asia by Newar builders brought to Peking by the Mongol conquerors. They
were great traders and many towns outside the Valley of Nepal owe their or¬
igins to having been Itewar trading posts in former times* Such Indian
towns as Calcutta and Patna still have their large Newar depots, and until
1959 there was an extensive colony of hewars at Lhasa. The Newara are ad¬
herents of the Hindu Siva or Gautama Buddha.
Also of the Ancient isiepalese race are the Thamsngs who today cover a
much greater area than the ftewars* The Thamangs were originally located on
the southern flank of Ganesh-Himal, and their southern expansion is recent.
They have pronounced Mongoloid features and are of thickset build except
in the southern areas where they have mixed extensively with other racial
groups* In their source area between elevations of 4,500 feet and 8,000
feet they have rice an the valley floors, maize, millet, and barley at the
middle levels and potatoes up to the tree line* They raise water buffal¬
oes, sheep, cattle and goats* There is a tradition that the Thamangs orig¬
inally cam® from Tibet* In the more remote areas the Thamangs have kept
a form of Shamanism which is pre-Buddhist and found also in Tibet* The
majority of the Thamangs now follow a form of Buddhism very similar to that
practised in Tibet (Lamaisny • In the lower areas of Thamang settlement
the Hindu religion has made some progress*
The Gurungs came from the southern slope of the Aimapurna Massif
and so adjoined that of the Thamangs in the west. The Gurungs have spread
west, south and east* The villages of the Gurungs are the largest type in
Kepal and are situated on high slopes surrounded by fields of maize and
millet. As with the Thamangs the Gurungs cultivate rice in the valley
floors* In sunnier they practise transhunance with their cattle, bringing
them up onto the higher pastures unavailable in winter* They are mongol¬
oid or almond eyed and short in stature. Although they were originally
Shamaniats and later Lamaista the Gurungs are now mainly liindus. They have
provided an exceptionally large number of mercenary soldiers*
The most westerly of the Ancient hepaleae are the .Mangars, although a
subdivision (the Eukhas and Euraa) of the group is found in eastern Ifepal.
As neighbours of the Gurungs the Mangars are found mainly on the western
and southern slopes of the hhaulagiri Massif# Although this is the chief
area the . angara are also in scattered colonies to the south and east* Their
architecture is borrowed from the Tibetans in their northern areas, and from
the Gurungs farther south* Traditionally the Angara are the blacksmiths
and bridge constructors of the Hepalese, and have been responsible for the
early attempts at mining* The Mangars can be divided into two culturally
between the northern areas where the ways of Tibet are favoured (religion,
trade etc*) and the southern Hindu regions* Like the Kewars the Mangars are
almond-eyed, slim and snail. They have also provided both the British and
Indian armies with many thousands of mercenaries* It is interesting to note
that practically all the mercenaries have been recruited from the ancient
Hepaleae races, and so the areas where they have been found enjoy a higher
standard of living than other parts of Nepal.
The Rais and Limbus are often classified together as the Kirantis. They
are Mongoloid and traditionally noted for their military prowess. The Rais
and Limbua appear to have a common origin, but at present inhabit different
parts of Nepal. The Rais live in the catchment area of the Sun Kosi River
at heights between 4,000 and 7*500 feet. The Liixibus ore found between the
Arun River and the border with Sikkira. Apart from the Sherpas the Limbus
have the highest standard of living in Nepal. The religion of the Raia and
Limbua is a mixture of local myth, Lamaism and Hinduism. It seems possible
that the Kirantis my have provided the ruling caste in Nepal from about 700
B*C. to 100 A.D. According to their own traditions it was not the Newars who
were the first to settle in the Valley of Katmandu, but themselves. Again,
these tribes have been a source of ixercenaries.
The only Ancient Nepalese living in the Terai are the Tharus who display
many of the racial characteristics of the negroid type. Nevertheless blood
group tests have shown that the Tharus are related to the other Ancient
Nepalese racial groups. Although the open eye is the most common there are
almond-eyed Tharus as well. They are hunters, fishermen and cultivators.
There are numerous small Ancient Nepalese groups such as the Sunwars of
the Sun Kosi River area who are noted throughout Nepal as smiths and gold
workers* Although there are also the Auras and Rukhas in western Nepal so
little is known about them that it is not possible to elaborate on their
characteristics.
The Indo-Nepalese peoples who fled into Nepal from the strife of north-
em India did not always enter the country peacefully. The first invaders
were the Thakurs who are at present located in western Nepal (Map I). Although
the immigrants have been partly assimilated by the native populations of Nepal
they have also conquered the inhabitants in many areaa and become the ruling
classes* The Brehaans who came with the victorious warrior tribes from the
south managed to retain their religico-social pre-eminence within Nepal and
imposed their caste system where possible* In order to gain support amongst
the local population (Newar etc*) they created the highest classes amongst
the natives Kahatriyas, but this was unacceptable to the pure-bred Kshatriyas
from the Indian subcontinent who named the Nepalese warrior caste 'Khas'* The
name Ghetri is probably from Kshatriyas. Children of Jnarriage between Brah-
mana or Indian Kshatriyas anc^Ancient Nepalese were automatically Khas* Many
clans came into being amongst the Khas caste* When the Shahs gained power in
Gorkha their main support came from the Khas* The Gorkha Khas had their own
language derived from the Hindi of the Rajputs which was later the official
national tongue called 'Nepali*.
Unlike the Indo-Nepalese the Tibetan immigration was peaceful, the tribes
settling in the uninhabited areas above 9>000 feet in the main* As can be
seen from Map 1 their settlement has remained very much a northern ore. The
mountainous nature of their new environment often raeant that the valley
settlements had re contact between each other and so developed along independ¬
ent lines* An example of this is the Thakals and Sherpas who entered Nepal as
a single tribe* 'ihey are racially similar, Laraaist, each settled along trade
routes between Tibet and India, and share a language related to that of Tibet.
The Xhakala are on the most important routeway between India and Tibet} they
are lively, fairly prosperous and primarily merchants and traders* Due to
their trade they have been influenced by the cultures of the Ancient Nepalese
and India* The Sherpas are famous as mountain porters* The Khurribu Valley
Sherpas depended upon the caravan routeway to Tibet for their livelihood and
so their culture has tended to be that of Tibet* It is a stronghold of
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Lamaism. At 11,500 feet above sea level the soil here is frozen for four
months in every year. In suianer the upper pastures help to supplement the
potato diet (utilised for transhumance as in Switzerland). The Khuiabu
Valley is the heart of Sherpa country and yet has a population of under
2,250 persons. The Sherpas prefer to raise cattle than till the soil. Des¬
pite a thriving agriculture based on the potato and cattle Sherpa prosper¬
ity owes much to trade. Along with the Thakals the Sherpas are the only
tribe with an organised trade with Tibet; unfortunately Chinese policy has
done much to hinder this trade since 1951* The Thakals and Sherpas were
middlemen exporting their own cattle and butter, plus Indian and Nepalese
rice, paper, dyes, sugar and kerosene, and importing Tibetan salt and wool*
In the Khurabu Valley many of the Sherpa houses contain Chinese porcelain,
brocade, silk and Jewellery. The Thakals have abandoned agriculture in their
arid environment, but the reliance on cultivation and pasturing in the Sherpa
areas has led to a kind of democracy where such positions as that of the man
regulating the distribution of pastures are elected ones. The extended fam¬
ily system of the Hindu influenced areas does not exist amongst the Sherpas
where each man and wife set up their own household away from their parents.
Due to the demands of transhumanoe and trade polyandry is common. The Sherpa
lamas differ from those of Tibet in that they have to support themselves. As
can be seen the Sheipas are still greatly influenced by Tibet, whilst the
Thakals have been much affected in their culture by their contacts with the
Ancient Kepalese and India.
As with much of the physical geography of Nepal the cultural geography
1
can be subdivided into three areas. In the north such tribal groups as the
Sherpas derive their culture from Tibet. Until the arrival of Chinese
Coiununist power in Tibet the Tibeto-Nepalese boundary was of little signifi¬
cance to the northern tribes. The allegiance was always to the tribe and the
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family with the concept of the Btate so;nothing of which the people were
unaware. The bhotiyas were free in their movement across the Tibeto-
Nepaleae boundary and were oblivious to the fact that they were straddling
such a line, as their present distribution demonstrates. The boundary had
little influence on geographical distributions. In northern Nepal the first
thought is still of the tribe, but the Chinese, despite friendly relations
between Katmandu and Peking, have been much more active in the border area
than any previous Chinese or Tibetan regime. There is no longer such a free
movement across the boundary. A Sherpa minority is now included within the
People's Republic of China, and with Peking's strong assimilation policies
this will probably lead to a growing dissimilarity between the Sherpaa of
Nepal and those of China. This may also prove the case with the Bhotiyas.
Although with less effectiveness and vigour Katmandu is also trying to bring
its administration into the northern areas, nevertheless it can be expected
that the independence at present demonstrated by the northern tribes will
become less in later years. At present the central authority within Nepal
is only fully effective in the region of the Valley of Katmandu, but the
programme of economic development, more especially in transportation, will
eventually break down the isolation of the tribes of the north and the south.
In the third cultural region of the south India has no wish to close the
boundary with Nepal, but here the latter is very sensitive to the great
influence of her neighbour, and is anxious to counteract it with more eff¬
ective government of these areas. Nepal is making an effort to impose more





Economically Nepal is an underdeveloped country. Of the state's
working population over 90'Jo are farmers and agricultural labourers. Over
90% of the population ia illiterate, that most problematic of ailments
for a country determined upon a path of economic development, there are
only 1,000 hospital beds in the whole state area, and the average expect¬
ancy of life is 30 years, 1%> of the population have never seen a doctor.
The average income of a Nepalese is £50 per annum.
Most of the land suited to arable faming in Nepal is already being
2
used. A little more than 10/j of the total area in under cultivation. Most
of this land is located in the Terai areas (65/ j) , and in the southeastern
Terai 70,9 of the land is cultivated, in the eastern Nepal many tracts of
land now used for arable are better suited to forest development or past¬
ure and are being challenged by soil erosion. Other areas of western Nepal
could be used for cultivation if the rainfall v»3 less uncertain. There is
a lack of irrigation development with only 2C^> of the cultivated land being
irrigated at present.
1. 'The following have been important in writing this chapters
G-.V.Bowers: 'Agricultural Development in Nepal*, U.S.Poreign
Agricultural Service Publications, Washington 1955* S.Carasarm*
•Trade Through the Himalayas', Princeton University Press,
1951* C.i-'urer-IiaimenaorfJ 'The Sherpas of Nepal', John
Murray, London 1964* T.IIagen: 'Nepal', Kummerly& Frey, Berne
1962; & Y.P.Pant: 'Nepal* 3 Economic Development on an International
Basis', Nepal Cultural Association, Katmandu 1956.
2. P.P.Karan: 'A Land Use Reconnaissance in Nepal by Aerofield
Techniques 3c Thotography', Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society, Vol. 104, April 196q«PP* 172-187.
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A difference in physical envirorunent leads to a variety of crops
being grown. About 55/ ' of the land cultivated is under rice, a further
2G)/a in maize and millet and 10^ in wheat. Potatoes, 3Ugar cane, Jute,
tobacco, buckwheat and vegetables occupy the rest of the arable land.
The eastern part of the humid Terai is the main cultivated area of
Nepal. An extended monsoon period gives a rainfall which encourages up
to three crops a year. Two crops of rice are normal with a third crop of
Jute or sugar cane. This is the great agricultural export region of Nepal
and is economically the most important in the state.
The Inner Himalaya has a number of fertile valleys, mainly at a
height of between 4»0Q0 and 5»000 feet. Deep soils favour an intensive
agriculture and the complex physical geography has led to the development
of core areas of dense population widely scattered. The Valleys of Kat¬
mandu and Pokhara provide excellent examples of these, and they have con¬
siderable importance as centres of political power within Nepal. In the
sparsely populated and more lofty valleys of the Great Himalaya agriculture
is practised as high as 14,000 feet, but it is based on an economy of herd¬
ing and potatoes. These higher valleys are economically backward and remote
and until the Chinese Conasunist take-over in Tibet were orientated towards
the latter rather than towards the south.
There is a need to increase the food production of Nepal to cope with
a population increasing at the rate of 150,000 per year. Despite political
stability within the state being intertwined with economic stability the
administration's efforts to improve agricultural production have not been
impressive. There is not much opportunity to increase the actual area of
3
cultivation in a country which is so mountainous, but there are exciting
3» This point of limited possibilities for further expansion of culti¬
vated area was proven in P.P.Karen <fe W. 14 Jenkins* 'Population, land
Utilization, & Possible Expansion of Cultivated Area in Nepal',
Pacific Viewpoint, Vol.2, No.l, larch 1961,pp.41-58•
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possibilities with regard to developing much better crop yields* Such im¬
provements are hindered by the non-acceptance of crop rotation, the limited
irrigation facilities and the shortage of fertilizers. In the feral*s
drier areas the fields lie fallow for the 8 months of the dry season. The
rice stubble is used to graze cattle, although it is poor forage and the
attitude towards herding in the Terai is complicated by the bulk of the
population being Hindu.
Although efforts are being made to modernise the system of land taxes
in Nepal land tenure is complex and inhibits efficiency in agricultural
production still. It has only been recently that in land taxes and rents
any consideration was given at all to the size or productivity of the hold¬
ing. Certain lands still have a very privileged status and reflect the feu¬
dal trappings of a society which has bean too long out of the Twentieth
Century. The tax burden is borne by the smallholder and the tenant farmer,
although the rent free holdings of the Rana family were abolished by 1961.
Other members of the nobility still enjoy privileges of various kinds in re¬
lation to their land holdings and progress is slow at adjustroent with so many
interested parties in positions of power around the throne.
Further hindrance is felt in agricultural development by the prevalence
of rural indebtedness. In the western areas during the yearn of poor rain¬
fall, or in the eastern lands when the crops do not match up to expectation,
tenant fai-maro are forced into debt in order to pay the rent. The rate of
interest demanded on such loans is too high to permit the farmer to be able
to repay it. A Royal Land Reforms Commission was set-up in 1961 to make
recommendations to the adiainistration for the improvement of agriculture.
Its report was presented in 1962, but it seems improbable that the question
,ii 11
of rural indebtedness will be overcome for many years yet. 'Working under
a burden of debt, the Nepalese farmer can make little improvement on the
land, and progressively poorer yields involve him in a vicious circle
4
which has its effect on the total productivity of Nepalese agriculture.1
American and Indian aid is being directed at the increasing of the
irrigated area within Nepal. There is a iiopal-United. States Irrigation
Fund which has been financing irrigation projects in the Terai. It is in
India's interests to encourage the improvement of Nepal's agriculture as
she takes all of her surplus except for a certain amount in the north which
is smuggled across the boundary into Tibet.
The Nepalese farmer is an arch conservative in his methods. An Amer¬
ican economic mission demonstrated to some Nepalese fanners amongst whom
they lived that by changing their strain of seed the Nepalese could double
the yield from rice and maize without any extra effort, and that by plant¬
ing the maize seed closer to the surface it grew faster and had larger
cobs. Despite the evidence before their eyes the Hepalese farmers would
not change their traditional seed or technique of planting.
The agricultural economy of Nepal seems to be typified by the ifepal-
ese farmer's liking for the keeping of the 'tsaurl' which is a cross
between the yak and the cow and does not appear to have any advantages
over either, but is distinguished by having the added disadvantage of
being sterile.
The Nepalese launched their first Five Year Plan in 1956 which was
described as a 'pilot scherae' and proved something of a failure. A Three
4» P.P.Karan & W.M.Jenkinsi 'The Himalayan Kingdoms*, Van
Noatxend, Irinceton 1963, p.103*
ny,r(\
233.
Year Plan followed in 1962 and a second Five Year Plan is due to run from
1965 to 1970. These later Plans are aizaed at abolishing caste discrimin¬
ation, gaining equality for women, introducing much needed agrarian reform
to deal with tenure, taxation and indebtedness, and the establishing of
rural credit banks# More fertiliser production, better seed and improved
techniques of fanning are also included in these ambitious Plans# whether
Nepal succeeds by 1970 in achieving those targets would seem doubtful in
face of the competition from the conservative farmers, the problem of cap¬
ital, and tho vested interests "being challenged.
jflfflMMflflaa*
Just as in the ICurope of Francis I and Charles V mercenary service pro¬
vides Nepal with a very important source of income# The first Nepelese mer¬
cenaries were levied by the British in 1814 A.D., and by 1908 when the lost
so-called 'Gurkha* regiment was raised the Brigade comprised of two regi¬
ments recruited from the Ha is and Lizabus, one from the Khas, and seven from
the . angars, Thaxaangs and Gurunga, in all twenty battalions. In the First
World War the British Army recruited 200,000 Gurkhas, and at the end of the
Second World War had forty five Mepalese battalions within its ranks. Be¬
tween 1915 and 1945 the Gurkhas were awarded 12 Victoria Crosses which is
still the greatest prestige symbol amongst the hill tribes such as the Gur-
ungs. In 1947 the partition of India led to the Republic of India (as it
now is) taking over six of the regiments of Gurklias and Britain retaining
four of the regiments. At present there are 14*000 Gurkhas serving with the
British arsay, and perhaps 20,000 with the Indian army.
Bthieally this mercenary service of the Nepalesa is frowned upon by
the nationalists -within Kepal, and attempta have been made to decrease
the numbers involved. However, the economy of the country could not at
present withstand the abolition of this fruitful source of revenue. The
standard of living is higher amongst the northerly tribes than the Hindus
of the Terai because of the revenue from mercenary service. Service is for
15 years and is well paid by the standards of Kepal. The Gurkhas of the
British army afford Kepal a million pounds a year in sterling, which is
about 1+Q,v of the state's foreign earnings. After their fifteen years of
service in the British army the Gurkhas get a pension of 240 rupees a year
which is roughly five times the average annual earnings of a cultivator
from their home area. The Gurkha on active service earns about twenty
five times the amount a cultivator can get in a year. What is surprising
about the large number of ex-servicemen amongst the Nepalese is not that
there should be an outcry against the indignity of mercenary service, but
that the Government has not put the training of these men to practical
ends. Hxcept for the starting of schools in their villages the returning
servicemen resort once more to their peasant farming.
To provide alternatives to mercenary service and develop the economy
one of the crucial problems is education. During the first Five Year mlan
6,550 people received technical training, of which 550 graduated abroad.
The first modern secondary school was established by American Jesuits
without any religious strings attached and has been producing very high
calibre students and has special links with Cambridge University. Under
the Three Year Flan it was expected that a further 7»0G0 people would be
given some sort of technical training. In 1959 the University of Trim
hawan was opened in Katmandu and now has about 500 undergraduates. Also
established in Katmandu is an American run teacher training college. The
Government have plans for a teacher for primary education in every village
in the distant future, Nepal is in a desperate way educationally, but it
is one of the problems being faced more realistically than many others.
There is little urge to establish the expensive prestige symbols of Nepal-
oae universities as yet which would be understaffed and undercapitalised.
Nepal is willing to send her students anywhere as long as they get an edu¬
cation. This perhaps demonstrates -sepal' 3 adherence to neutrality in her
foreign affairs as well as anything.
- -e^pv^cea ...enc
tor a number of years the United Nations have been engaged upon the
production of a geological survey of Nepal. This survey is as yet incom¬
plete, but it is already reasonably certain that Nepal has few of the min¬
eral resources necessary for industrialisation. Goal, iron, micah, copper
and cobalt have been found in various parts of the country, but reserves
are small and usually of poor quality. The minerals are unsuited to large
scale mining development. Also the deposits are mainly in areas where
5
access is such as to make transport coats prohibitive. Similarly, the
geological structure of much of Nepal is highly faulted and folded which
makes continuous deposits of minerals less likely.
The Swiss Government first helped Nepal with the job of geological
survey, anu later the United Nations started a general mapping of the
geology. Using its International Co-operation administration the United
States lias helped Nepal to establish a bureau of Ainea in Katmandu with
a staff of Indian and American trainee geologists and engineers. The Geol¬
ogical Survey of India is also helping with other mapping projects.
despite her general lack of mineral resources Nepal does have great
5. G.b.Aearson; 'Nepal's Mining frospects'i Far eastern economic
Review, Vol. 34» October 19 th. 196l.PP«170-171 •
potentialities with regard to hydro-electricity. There are few countries
in the world with such hydro-electric development possibilities in a sim¬
ilarly sized area. At present the total installed hydro-electric capacity
is only 1350 kilowatts* and that is mainly in the Valley of Katmandu. There
are small thermal and hydro-electric plants at Biratnagar in the southeast of
Nepal. Hydro-electric projects are restricted by lack of capital, equipment
6
and trained manpower. The geologist Ilagen worked out a scheme using the
Karaali River in western Nepal to demonstrate the possibilities. The Karn-
ali 'forms a huge S-shaped meander where it breaches the mountains (Mahab-
harat Mountains; • Two tunnels, one 2.6 kilometres long and the other 5*3
kilometres, could each cut off one of the two loops of the river, and in the
first case a fall of 180 metres, in the second case one of 110 metres, would
result. The Karnali, however, is one of the largest rivers in Nepal, with a
mean flow of about 300 cubic metres per second at the low-water period. With¬
out constructing a dam, therefore, by means of only a simple water-inlet with
a short tunnel, approximately 1.3 million kilowatts of electrical energy could
thus be won at these two places together. This would surely be the cheapest
electrical energy in the whole world.* Such a development would mean that
there would be a far better supply of nitrogenous fertilizers for Nepal's
agriculture and industry would partly compensate itself for a lack of mineral
resources by the cheapness of its power. The United Nations has made the
Karnali part of its future programme. At present there are four new hydro¬
electric stations under construction which will give an additional 22,000
kilowatts of power by the end of 1965* This is only scratching at the poss¬
ibilities, but will more than cater for Nepal's eleotricity needs in 1965, and
6. T.Hagens 'Nepal*, Kuramerly & Frey, Berne 1961, p. 105.
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an export of power to Lucknow is expected* If greater effort was made to
develop Nepal's hydro-electric resources India would be willing to take
any surplus of power as she is short of electricity, and Nepal would have
a profitable export which could cater more and zaore for her own needs
later*
There are excellent marble quarries south of Katmandu at Godavari, but
the very promising export trade is retarded by poor transport* Oil pros¬
pecting continues without success* The import of petroleum products costs
the country about £100,000 per annum in precious foreign exchange* Simi¬
larly, Nepal has no salt and is dependent upon India now that the Tibetan
source of supply has been largely cut off by less freedom of movement across
the Sino-Nepaleae boundary following the CoiMiunist revolution* As the re¬
tailing and wholesaling merchants of the Valley of Katmandu find the trade
in the northern areas especially unprofitable where salt is concerned each
family every year sends one member with a load of their agricultural surplus
to barter for salt* According to the position of the village in relation
to the source of salt this journey may take up to two months* It is quite
common for a Nepalese family to receive only about £2 for their wares once
their representative reaches the border with India due to the poor quality
of the agricultural products after the journey* The £2 earned this way may
represent the total cash income of the family concerned for the year, al¬
though it should be remembered that the farmers will have fed their famil¬
ies and also probably paid off part of a debt to the local moneylender with
some of their crop (interest rates are usually 35/ji • To supplement this
agricultural income many thousands of Nepalese migrate temporarily to India
for seasonal employment of road construction and tea plantations* There are
about two million Nepalese now living in Assam, and perhaps another quarter
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of a million work seasonally in .bengal, Sikkirn and Assam.
The Sherpa, Thakal and Bhotiya salt traders felt the take-over of the
Chinese Communists in Tibet more severely than most of the population of
Nepal. The economy of the northern tribes such as the bherpes and Bhotiyas
was wedded to that of the Tibetans. Since the mid-1950'a there has been a
distinct mellowing in the Chinese attitude towards the Nepalese and with the
increasing success in integrating Tibet into China so trade across the diner-
Aepalese boundary has shown signs of once again increasing.
The problem of capital for development is a difficult one which per¬
vades all economic considerations with regard to Nepal. The low earnings
of the people and the lack of exports make capital a scarce commodity. As
with many other similarly situated states Nepal has to rely on foreign aid
to finance her development projects. Switzerland was the first country
to send a technical aid mission and that was in 1950* In 1951 the United
States began to assist Nepal, and even although Nepal was not a member at
the time in 1952 the United Nations extended assistance to Katmandu. I960
provides a good year as an example of the foreign aid Nepal has been re¬
ceiving, although it should be pointed out that these figures do not take
into consideration such factors as the education and health work carried
out by the Christian missions. In I960 the United States gave Nepal
£3,180,000 in aid, India £2,010,000, China £1,500,000, the Soviet Union
£275»000 (Panaoti electricity station and a sugar refinery,; United
Nations £55»600, Switzerland £19,000 and the Colombo Plan countries £16,150.
With the ford foundation also giving a grant of £56,750 this made a total of
£7,112,500. The aid of the United States, Uiina, India and the Soviet Union
appears to be partly forthcoming due to the geographical position of Nepal
between Communist China and the Major Neutralist state of India. In 1963-64
the aid givers changed positions a little with the United States giving
AO/i of all foreign aid, India 23^, the U.S.S.R. 15> and China $5, but
the latter can expect to .jump to at least second place during 1965 or
1966 as Peking is reputed to have been lavish in her promises of aid to
Katmandu over the next few years, one of the notable projects being a Lhasa
to Katmandu railway construction beginning in 1966*
Most of Nepal's manufacturing is of the type visually described as
'Cottage industry'* 'There are few factories in Nepal and the total number
of workers employed in them is only 20,000* The subscribed capital invest¬
ed in industry is less than £2 million* The largest industry in terms of
capital investment is jute, with cotton manufacturing next and food pro¬
cessing third* These three industries account for over 75/' of the capital
investment#
As in so many Asian states Nepal regards industrialization as a way
of increasing the standard of living for the bulk of the population. As
has been stated already there is only a poor mineral base from which to
build up industry, to which can be added the fact that Nepal is not really
an agricultural surplus area, and has a population with small purchasing
power and few technical skills* Political instability deters foreign and
domestic investment, although in 1961 the Indian company of JBirlas agreed
to construct a textile mill costing about £1% million in the Valley of
Katmandu; this is now the largest industrial enterprise in Nepal and pro¬
duces 20 million yards of cloth per year*
Despite these problem Nepal is going ahead with plans for indus¬
trialisation* Under the first Five Year Plan a start was made on plants
for paper, cement, cigarette and sugar processing on a modest scale. In
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1963 Britain gave Nepal a medium term loan to increase further her plans
for electricity production(£800,000)• In 1962 the United Nations Special
Fund agreed to assist with a three year survey of the hydroelectric pot¬
ential of the Karnali River "basin at a cost of £340*000* Nepal has an In¬
vestment Guarantee Agreement with the United States, although as yet no
American firms have set up factories in the country. The United States has
given about half a million pounds in aid to Nepal for specifically indus¬
trial projects and the export-import j_ank is lending a further £33D,000 to
the Nepal Industrial development Corporation* However, at present only two
significant industrial projects are scheduled to be built and they are a
cement factory and paper plant relying on aid from, the People's Republic
of China*
Administrative measures have been taken to encourage industry* In 1961
arbitration by tribunal in the case of industrial disputes was introduced
(Factories and Factory Workers Amendment Act) • Large and s ail industries
are exempt from the business profits tax, 25/» for the large and 5Qd for the
small* Hopefully industrial estates are being built in the suburbs of Kat¬
mandu, by Indian aid at Eatan and by the Nepal Industrial development Cor¬
poration at Balaju*
Industry in Nepal is hindered by numerous factors ranging from a lack
of minerals to a lack of markets* India takes 94% of Nepal's exports and
supplies 99% of her imports and is unlikely to be able to absorb the sort
of industrial products which would come from Nepal's factories and which
would be in direct competition with her own manufactures (e.g. Textiles)*




'It would be difficult to conceive of a pattern of Internal transport
that would more seriously hinder the achievement of political unity and
1
coherence than does that of Nepal'. Of the states bordering upon the
People's Republic of China Nepal possesses one of the worst transport net¬
works. If Katmandu wishes to send material to the eastern or western parts
of Nepal the usual practice is to first go south into India and then along
the Indian transport system to re-enter Nepal at a suitable point further
east or west to proceed north to the destination. Thus from the viewpoint
of governmental control those areas of Nepal outside the Valley of Katmandu
are not within the territory effectively administered. Over the outlying
areas of Nepal Katmandu can only claim to a 'da jure' political control.
As yet the only railway in Nepal is 29 miles of line from Raxaul on
the Indian border to the foothills settlement of Amlekhganj. The Chinese
have agreed to build a railway from Lhasa to Katmandu, and it is hoped that
construction will begin in 1966. 'There are no other plans for railway con¬
struction which is expensive and difficult in the terrain of Nepal.
A government operated electrically powered aerial eableway runs from
the railway station at Amlekhganj to Katmandu, transporting cargo in baskets.
This was originally built in 1924 with a capacity of 8 tons per hour, but
it has now been reduced through wear to 5s tons per hour. It operates 12
hours a day to deliver 60 tons. United States aid is being used in an
attempt to improve the capacity of this cablenay.
1. P.P.Karen & w.M.Jenkins; 'The Himalayan Kingdoms'; Van
Noatrand, Princeton 1965, p.108.
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It was not until 1956 that Katmandu was linked by modern road with
the outside world. In that year the i'ribhuvana aJ Path was opened be¬
tween Katmandu and Raxaul on the Indian border. A nunfeer of unpaved, fair
weather roads serve the Terai, but half the bridges on these are in a state
of disrepair. Further north the tracks in the interior of Nepal are either
so steep or bo narrow that only human porterage is possible, even the mule
being unable to use such pathways. A lade of bridges often causes the
porter to have to make a considerable diversion, forcing him to carry more
food. Often the crossing of rivers and streams is by 'dug-out' canoe. These
'dug-outs' are particularly primitive as the saw is unknown in most rural
districts and only an axe i3 used to construction.
In 1950 a daily Patna to Katmandu air service was inaugurated, using a
fairweather strip constructed at Gaucher in the Valley of Katmandu. This
first tentative development using lXJ-3'a has been expanded to other parts
of Nepal with the help of United States' aid. The United States has supp¬
lied aircraft and navigational aids. The use of air transport is helping
to counteract the isolationism of the areas outside the Valley of Katmandu
and permit a freer flow of people and ideas* Inaccessibility fosters reg¬
ionalism which is the great dividing factor to Nepal.
As might be expected the Plans have been much concerned to the develop¬
ment of better transportation. A start was made on road building to the
first Five Yesr Plan, although it was a very modest attempt at improving
existing routes. As part of the Three Year Plan and the second Five Year
Plan to the autumn of 1961 China and Nepal concluded an agreement for the
construction of a highway linking Lhasa and Katmandu. Under this agree¬
ment Peking is granting Nepal a little under million up until 1966 when
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the road will be opened* There are no conditions attached to this aid and
China is supplying technicians, irachinery, iraterials and training Nepal-
ese workers* India has been apprehensive about the construction of the
Mahendra Raj Path road between Lhasa and Katmandu as she views it as a
threat to her security following the aggression of China in 1962* The
effect of the road when it has been completed is likely to counteract the
dominance of Indian influence within Nepal.
A much more ambitious east to west road has been planned which would
be 900 miles in length and do much to counteract the isolationism of those
areas of Nepal outside the Valley of Katmandu* The Soviet Union promised
to build this road, but no sign lias yet been forthcoming that a start is
being made upon it in the near future* It would therefore seem unlikely
that there are to be any impressive improvements in Nepal*s transport
system in the foraeeable future other than the Lhasa-Katmandu highway.
2
In I960 Tibet tod: l*Q5a of Nepal's exports and supplied 0*6g,j of
her imports* The opaning of the Lhasa to Katmandu road should produce a
rapid increase in dino-Kepalese trade, and more especially if China's fav¬
ourable attitude towards Katmandu continues* Similarly, when the Lhasa
to Peking Railway has been completed and extended to Katmandu further boost
should be given to Nepal's connections with China* There is a feeling
within Katmandu official circles that a curb on India's predominant pos¬
ition in Nepal's external relations is to be welcomed* Practically all
of Nepal's imports (metal goods, petroleum products and cement) come from
India («C18 million p*a.) so why, Katmandu feels, should not this economic
2* Par Las tern economic Review, Vol* 35 for March l6th, 1962, p. 619*
predominance be challenged a little from the north.
Of crucial importance to any state striving for internal cohesion
is an adequate transport network, preferably supplemented by other forms
of conraunication 3uch as radios, telephone services and telegraph lima.
In this field Nepal is primitive even by Asian standards, hven given an
efficient administration in Katmandu it would not be possible for the
central authority to assert political control throughout the rest of the
state until such time as one can move with ease about the country. There
is no bigger problem facing Nepal's efforts to become a cohesive state
than the physical isolation of the bulk of the country into various regions.
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smzm W& 1 -Jhe Political Geography of the blno-Nepalese Boundary
After outlining the geography of the state of Nepal it "becomes necess¬
ary to attempt to answer more fully the two questions posed in this thesis
study. Is the state's central authority affective enough to modify the geog¬
raphy of the country, and do the political "boundaries, notably the Sine-
Nepalese line, provide a division within the landscape? Before launching
upon a more comprehensive analysis based on the geographical description
which has come before it i3 possible to give a negative answer to both quest¬
ions.
'All Nepalese tribes have a sense of tribal identification which miti-
1
gates against the development of Nepalese nationalism.* Nepal is not an
entity, nor does it appear likely to develop a sufficient feeling of like¬
ness amongst its tribes during this Century to be able to make such a claim.
Tribal allegiance always comes first and in many areas there is a total ignor¬
ance of the existence of any other sort of commitment; only in the Valley of
Katmandu is the concept of loyalty to Nepal present. Practically everything
about the geography of Nepal works against the welding of the state into a
unit, whether it be such factors as the geauorphology, geographical position
of the country, economic resources, tribal distributions or climate. Many
Gurkha soldiers returning from India find that a journey such 03 that from
Bombay to Dhanghari on the Indo-Nepalese border takes early half the time that
is necessary to get to his village in Nepal although the latter part of the
trip is only one twentieth the length of that through India. From Bombay to
Nepal the Gurkha can travel by railway, but in Nepal he has to go by foot,
1. P.P.Karan & W.M.Jenkins5 'The Himalayan Kingdoms'; Van
Nostrand, Princeton 1963# p«99«
carrying all his luggage and relying on the local population's hospitality
for accommodation.
The forces woiking within the Nepalesa state are mainly of a 'centri¬
fugal* nature. Perhaps of dominant importance in these forces is tribal
nationalism, aided by the difficult terrain and a poor transport network.
Although there is a monarchy allegiance to the crown is not strong enough
to be seriously counted a 'centripetal* force. Of greater importance is
the growing educated elite which is wedded to the idea of 'Nepal* rather
than to the tribal groups from which its members might be recruited. Sim¬
ilarly the determination of certain states such as India, Britain and the
United States to ensure the continuing independence of Nepal is a strong
force against the country's political disintegration. The viability of
Nepal (i.e. the measure of effectiveness with which the state can be ad¬
ministered to fulfil the purposes for which it was created) is limited, but
it has not reached the crucial stage of South Vietnam or Laos where the
administration is on the verge of collapse.
The bulk of the population of Nepal has not been alienated as in South
Vietnam, but is largely indifferent or ignorant concerning the state. The
situation appear? to depend in South Vietnam on economic considerations, the
peasant finding the material promises of the Viet Cong 'fifth column' more
attractive than the economic failures of the various American-backed admin¬
istrations. Within Nepal it would seem probable that the various aspects of
economic development will be crucial in the effort to achieve an effective
central authority based on Katmandu. There is an interaction of political
and economic stability in any state, but Nepal's lack of economic develop-
• i nji ' i-
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msnt makes this tie-up of utmost importance. Can Nepal build enough roads*
educate enough of her population, counteract rural indebtedness, put an end
to mercenary service, diversify the economy, intensify agricultural product¬
ion, overcome the inhibitions of a limited mineral potential, attract foreign
capital, restrict the birth rate, and defeat a hundred other pressing econ¬
omic problems?
The government of Nepal has tended to try and place the cart before the
horse by ignoring many of the economic factors and endeavouring to tackle
the political problems alone. In i960 the Panchayat system of delegated
authority was established in the hope of extending effective governmental
control to each village. About 3,400 village councils are elected by the
villagers throughout Nepal. The village councils in turn elect members
for 74 district councils who nominate members to attend 14 zonal councils.
From the latter 109 delegates are sent to the National Panchayat of whose
membership one third retire each year to be replaced from below. So far
this system has not proven greatly effective in bringing the influence of
the government to the more remote areas. It is no substitute for an ade¬
quate communications network.
Even by Asian standards Nepal is a poor country. Uespite the corr¬
uption of many members of the government and the despotism of the monarchy
the Nepalese administration has accepted graciously aid from more prosper¬
ous states, and most of it has found its way into economic development.
Such projects as the Chinese financed Lhasa to Katmandu road will help to
overcome the problem of isolation in Nepal's northern territories, even
if it does risk an excessive increase in Peking's Influence within Nepal.
It is unfortunate that the Soviet proposal of an east to west highway has
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aa yet not ma terialised* The breaking down of isolationism, the increasing
effectiveness of the central authority within the state area, and economic
development are all connected to the improvement of coraaunications, and not¬
ably the traiisport network. If the trip from Katmandu to the dherpa areas#
for example, only took hours instead of days tlx© Sherpas would not only be
loss insular in their outlook, but would also be more of an economic asset
to the state whilst themselves benefiting more economically. as Britain
has been finding in the modem world thero is a heavy payment for a triuia-
port system which is not as good as it should be.
Particularly along the 3ino-Nepalese boundary is Katmandu's adminia-
tra tion tenuous. The physical geography of this area hinders easy movement
to a greater extent than perhaps anywhere els© in Nepal. Despite the sign¬
ing of a boundary agreement with China Nepal's control of the border area is
only nominal. The boundary itself has been demarcated by a number of
pillars. In the main the line fallows mountain creetlines (Pfep l) ana water¬
sheds ('.tap 2} and can be classified under Boggs' 'Physical' category or
Hartshorns's 'Subsequent'. During the first part of the 1950'a when she was
endeavQfsiring to establish more effective control within Tibet China did en¬
deavour to close the Sino-Nepaleoe boundary, but there was reputed to have
been e great deal of sraaggl ing between northern Nepal and Tibet. With in¬
creasingly good relations between Katmandu and Peking there has been a re¬
laxation by tho Chinese of their surveillance of their side of the boundary.
The Sharpaa and Bhotiyas are astride the boundary which limits its effect¬
iveness as a division within the landscape, but with the building of better
roads to the area and the increasing determination within Katmandu to bring
the other areas of Nepal within the area of effective administration it
would be expected that there will develop a certain amount of divergence
"between the Sherpas and Bhotiyas on each side of the boundary. It will be a
long process of assimilation for the Nepalese administration will continue
to be weak in this area for many years, and the Chinese apparently no longer
feel a need to exert their authority right up to the boundary.
Neither the Tibetans nor the Nepalese tribesmen who live in the bound¬
ary area are adherents to the concepts of the People's Republic of China and
Nepal. The effectiveness of a boundary as a division depends upon the atti¬
tudes prevailing amongst the people each side of it. Tibetan hostility to
the Han administration is well known. The Sherpas and Bhotiyas are of Tib¬
etan origin, further, the concept of the Nepalese state has not been advert¬
ised enough within the Nepalese tribes to even begin to challenge allegiance
to the tribe. The Sherpa or the G-urung might be willing to fight for his
tribe or for a higher standard of living, but it is doubtful if he would be
willing to risk his life for the state of Nepal as many millions of Britons
were for the United Kingdom during the first two 'volunteer' years of World
War I. 'Nationalism* is an idea which is taught; if it is already there
amongst the older generations as within a tribe then the task is much easier
and more certain. Nevertheless, an efficient propaganda machine with ready
access to the people concerned can 'sell' the idea of nationalism. If Kat¬
mandu was in easy contact with the northern boundary areas, and w&s willing
to make the effort in perhaps a generation the idea of 'Nepal' could be
firmly established amongst the tribesmen.
But the state of Nepal is underdeveloped both economically and. politic¬
ally and tribal allegiances go practically unchallenged except in the immedi¬
ate vicinity of the central government. Similarly, Peking's control of her
Tibetan borders is not as effective as that with Hong Kong or in the
2so.
Manchurian area* Also liking is apparently willing to administer the
zone with Nepal more casually than her border with India* Under these
circumstances it can be restated that the central authority within Nepal
is having little effect upon the geography of the state area, and the
boundary does not provide a division within the landscape*
CH!NA
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SECTION FIVE : The North East Frontier Agency of I^Ha
Major Neutralist Borderland
1
CHAPTER ONE : Historioal Development
Pre-19th Century A.D.
The North East Frontier Agency territories are the least known in the
Republic of India. As such writing about them presents many problems, the
most notable being often a lack of basic information. The historioal back¬
ground prior to the arrival of British administration in the Nineteenth Cent¬
ury illustrates well this difficulty; it is shrouded in mythology and is full
of as yet unanswered questions.
A number of ruins in the foothills of the North East Frontier Agency
suggest that the influence of the ancient rulers of Assam must have encom¬
passed the tribesmen living closer to the plains. Local remains in Lohit
(Map I) are traditionally assumed to mark King Bishmak's capital of Bishmak-
nagar whose daughter in Hindu mythology is reputed to have been carried away
by Lord Krishna on the eve of her wedding. The Bhalukpang castle ruins in
Kameng are claimed by the Akas as the home of their ancestor Bhaluka who was
a grandson of the Raja Bana, a figure who was, according to myth, defeated
by Lord Kirshna at a place called Tezpur. The Kalita King Ramachandra was
reputed to have fled to the Dafla area of Subansiri from the plains and
there re-established his kingdom. Lohit is also full of legend including a
passage through the hills on the lower reaches of the Lohit River where Para-
1. The following references have been of importance in this chapter:
J.R.Aitchisan: 'A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, & Sanads Re¬
lating to India & Neighbouring Countries* J Superintendent of Gov¬
ernment Printing, Calcutta 1933; O.Caroe: 'Review of Report of
Officials of the Governments of India & the People'o Republic of
China on the Boundary Question'; Geographical Journal Vol. 127, Sept.
1961; W.Kiik: 'The Inner Asian Frontier of India'; I.B.G.Transactions
& Papers No. 31, 1962; V.Elwin: 'A Philosophy for the North East
Frontier Agency'; North East Frontier Agency Administration, Shillong 1959.
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surama struck a single blow of his axe, this is a place of Hindu pilgrim¬
age. What all this local legend does imply is that from earliest times
the hill tribes had a certain amount of contact with the plains, and that
the area of the North Mast Frontier Agency acted as a refuge for the de¬
feated and the fugitive from the zone of higher culture to the south.
It would be expected that the Miahmis worked on the temples and forts
of Lohit and the Akas and the Daflaa on those of Kameng. One of the earn¬
est references to the hill tribes is in the chronicles of Shihabuddin who
accompanied Mir Jumla cm his invasion of Assam in 1662* A.D. Apparently
at this time such tribes as the Mafia did not acknowledge the authority of
the Ahom Raja of Assam, but were aggressive enough to invade his dominions.
Under these circumstances the Ahom kings adopted a policy of conciliation
tempered with displays of force towards the hill tribes. The object of the
Ahom Raja was to contain the tribes in their hill country and thus protect
from their ravages the gentler plains people. Only when there were partic¬
ularly aggressive raids into their territories did the Ahom kings embark on
military expeditions against the tribes. These expeditions were often
costly and fruitless. 'When the Raja Udayaditya Singha proposed to punish
the Daflas of Subanairi for carrying off a number of Assamese men, women and
children, his Prime Minister declared that 'the Mafia miscreants can be cap¬
tured only if an elephant can enter a rat-hole.* The Raja ignored the warnr
2
ing and his expedition was defeated with heavy losses of men and provisions. *
2. V.Alwin: * A Philosophy for the North Mast Frontier Agency* J




The Indian administration of the bordering plains prior to the arrival
of the British had therefore tried to quarantine the more warlike tribes
of the North Bast Brantier Agency# But by 1858 when Britain's interests
gained control of Assam from Purander Singh the authority of the Ahem
kings had broken down and the plains* government was weak# Therefore the
policy of containment at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century was not
functioning and the tribal raids were much more frequent# The first tent¬
ative exploration and survey by the British Bast India Company had been made
in 1826, and from 1844- onwards attempts were made to reach agreements with
the local tribal chiefs from the plains of Assam to the crestline of the Him¬
alayas# British outposts were established in the foothills and used as bases
for punitive expeditions into the interior# Visitors were resented by the
tribesmen and despite explorations by Britons little impact was made upon the
northeastern areas#
It was not until 1882 that the British abandoned the idiom kings* trad¬
itional policy of containment of the tribes within their foothill territor¬
ies# In that year the first tentative steps were taken towards setting up
some sort of administration with the appointment of J.F.Needham as an Ass¬
istant Political Officer# Needham held this post until 1905 during which
time he embarked upon a number of extensive trips into areas until then
unexplored and thereby brought knowledge of British administration to
3# In dealing with the North Bast Frontier Agency during the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries the following have been of
particular use: '"The diner-Indian Boundary Question*, Foreign
Languages Press, Peking 1962} Indian Ministry of External Affairs,
White Papers I, II, III, IV, V & VI, Notes & Memoranda &
Letters Exchanged & Agreements Signed Between the (rovernment of
India & China} and * Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India',
New Delhi I960.
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tribesmen who until this time had been totally unaware of the existence
of British power in India*
Another method employed during the Nineteenth Century by a Britain
loathed to commit herself to an expensive extension of her power into the
North Bast Frontier Agency was the use of trade fairs to create a feeling
of friendliness amongst the tribesmen* These fairs were held at various
centres and might attract as many as 3#500 tribesmen, although the Adis
refused to attend*
During the Nineteenth Century the British administration had not con¬
solidated adequately enough its position in the newly acquired lands of Assam
to gain effective control of the difficult country and hostile peoples of
the North Bast Frontier Agency. In fact it could never be claimed that Brit¬
ish administration within the hill tribes was other than of a nominal kind.
Twenty?tfa Offlto
Efforts at creating better relations between the rest of India and the
hill tribes were marred by the Adis* murder of Williamson and Gregoraon in
1911 when they were in, Slang* In 1912 the Topographical Survey was very
active in the tribal areas and managed to map much of the interior* By
1912 political administration could claim to have some sort of foothold in
the whole of what is now the North Bast Frontier Agency* In 1919 the ad¬
ministration was divided down the middle into the Balipara Frontier Tract
and the Sadiya Frontier Tract* In 1942 the Tirap Frontier Tract (Map I)
was detached from the Sadiya Frontier Tract, and in 1946 the Balipara Front¬
ier Tract was divided into the Se-La Sub-Agency and the Subansiri Area. In
1948 the remaining part of the Sadiya Frontier Tract became the Abor Hills
and the Mishzni Hills* The Naga Tribal Area was at first administered as
part of the Naga Hills, hut it became a separate territory of Tuensang
in 1951* It was not until 1954- that the frontier Divisions were given
their present names of Kamang, Bubansiri, Slang, Lohit, Tirap and Tuen¬
sang# However, in 1957 Tuensang was united once more with the Naga Hills
to become the new Naga Hills and Tuensang Area.
At present the North hast Frontier Agency is constitutionally part
of Assam and is administered by the Ministry of external Affairs with the
Governor of Assam acting as Presidential agent# bach of the Divisions is
under a Political Officer with control co-ordinated in Shillong# The Sub¬
divisions are tinder Assistant Political Officers who have under them Base
and Area Superintendents#
Perhaps the two most significant dates with regard to the North nast
Frontier Agency during this Century have been 1947 and 194-9# Until 1947
India w»3 under British administration and up to 194-9 China was a weak
state# In 194-7 Britain granted India independence and in 194-9 China came
under the control of a vigorous Communist administration? a weaker power
ruled in Delhi and a stronger one in Peking# There was a reversal of the
positions which had prevailed since the Nineteenth Century A#D#, namely
India became the less strong state#
The North Bast Frontier Agency under British rule in India was a broad
frontier zone between the British territories and China# This was not a
particularly new role for the tribal areas to play as for centuries neither
China nor India could claim to have had any control over the Agency# It
had been a zone of independent tribal territories which had provided a use¬
ful barrier during periods of Chinese or India strength, but had an independ¬
ent will of its own which demanded its containment during times of weakness
in the plains# Sino-Indian relations in this frontier zone have been
complicated "by a change in attitude on the part of the two states; 'since
ft arid War II, however, both India and China have sought to increase the
measure of direct control over their respective spheres of influence in the
4
frontier zoru.' India has attempted to directly control the land up to
her version of the boundary which stretches for 710 miles from Bhutan to
the Talu Baas at the Sdao-Indian-Burmese boundary Junction#
The Siao-Indian boundary was delimited in the North Bast Frontier
Agency which makes India's case for the adherence to this line a better
one than her claims in the Northwest. In 1913 a conference was convened
at Simla in India at which Britain was represented by Sir Henry MciJahon,
China by Ivan Chen and Tibet by Lonchen Shatra. The resulting delimitation
was Jcnown as the McMahon Lino and followed the Himalayan crest from the
northeastern corner of Bhutan to the Isu Razi lass in northern Burma. At
the time of the agreement there were no objections raised by the Chinese
and the map showing the delimitation was signed by all three representat¬
ives# The Chinese objections of May 1st. and June 13th. 1914 were direct¬
ed at the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet only, as was that of May
30th. 1919. No objection was raised concerning the Lino-Indian boundary.
Similarly, since I960 the Chinese have recognised the 120 mile stretch of
the McMahon Line between China and Burraa as the Sino-Burraese boundary.
What of the boundary of the North East Frontier Agency as claimed by
India and China? 'The Indian side demonstrated that the boundary shown
by India was the natural dividing line between the two countries (i.e.
India and China) ... if mountains form natural barriers, it was even more
logical that the dividing line should be identified with the crest of that
4# W.Kirk J 'The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute'| Scottish Geographical
Magazine, Vol. 76, No.l, I960, p.4.
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range which forms the watershed in that area. Normally where mountains
exist, the highest range is also the watershed; but in the few cases where
5
they diverge, the boundary tends to be the watershed range.' The Chinese
claim was not a modest on© 'but involved a vast stretch of territory of about
6
32,000 square miles, the alignment being right down at the foothills',
(Maps 2 and 3)» As Kirk so aptly pointed out India did not follow the water¬
shed principle of boundary delimitation at all times* ... The Indian alignment
lays no claim to ... the great longitudinal valley of the upper Brahmaputra
or Tsangpo, or to those sections of the valleys of the Bangui©, Subanairi, and
Luhit rivers which lie to the north of the Mci&hoa line. To include all the
territory draining to the Indian Ocean as part of India would seriously imping©
on the traditional Tibetan sovereignty, and yet would be the logical outcome
of the absolute application of the watershed principle' •
The Indian alignment follows the crest of the Great Himalayas, crossing
the Tsari River and the Mhang River (Map 2) to continue along the watershed
of the Dihang and its tributaries before crossing the Lohit River to reach the
junction of the Burrasse-Chinese-In&ian boundaries. The Chinese version (Map
3) starts at the southeastern tip of Bhutan and follows the line where the
southern edge of the Himalayan foothills meets the plains of the northern
bark of the Brahmaputra River. The boundary crosses the Subansiri and Brah¬
maputra Rivers and continues in a southeasterly direction to a more south¬
erly trijunction of the Burmese-Chinese-Indian boundaries.
8
Rao has put forward with enthusiasm India* a legal arguments "Cor her version
5. Report of the Officials of the Governments of India & the Bsople's Repub¬
lic of China on the Boundary .Question; Ministry of External Affairs,
Delhi, February 1961» pp.235-36•
6. Ibid, p.237*
7. W«Kixk: 'The Inner Asian. Frontier of India*} I.B.G.Transactions &
Papers No. 31* 1962, p. 155*
8. K.K.Rao: "The Sinor-Indian Boundary Question & International Law* J The
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, April 1962 pp.375-415*
The five points are from p.411.
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of the boundary delimitation, fie gives five criteria:
1) Historic rights derived from close association with, and possession of,
these areas dating long before the Christian era.
2) Conformity of India's northern frontier with the principles of inter¬
national law and the international practice concerning natural
boundaries.
5> Treaty and Custom, which clearly demonstrate that both India and China
accepted these frontiers; India has openly exercised sovereign powers
in the frontier area at the time when China started making claims and
intrusions.
4) In particular, the Simla Convention of 1514 which is binding on India,
Tibet and China.
5) Recognition by China of the Sdno-Indian frontier as asserted by India.
As it is hoped it has been shown India's association with the tribes
of the North Nast Frontier Agency can hardly be described other than as ten¬
uous, although it has been a more effective one than that of China with re¬
gard to the area. Similarly, the use of the term 'natural boundaries' in
one which it is difficult to accept as there is no such phenomena, it is
assumed in this case that the author means the use of certain features in
the landscape as lines along which to delimit a boundary. As has been seen
in the strictest sense the boundary in the North ^ast Frontier Agency does
not adhere to the 'natural boundary*, and there is perhaps some .justification
in stating that the Chinese use of the line between the foothills and the
plains is also an acceptable 'natural boundary'. Without a doubt the trump
card in the Indian hand, and the one reason why the Indian case is so much
stronger than the Chinese in this section of the Sino-Indian border, is the
Simla Convention of 1913-1914* Other than the use of force as in 1962
there is no effective Chinese reply to this as even claims of Imperialist
exploitation do not stand up due to the lack of Chinese protest following
the McMahon delimitation# All other claims by India and China as to cult¬
ural affinities or physical resemblances of the tribesmen to either the
Indians or the Chinese will, it is hoped, be proven to have little basis
later in this Section*
From the geographer's viewpoint one of the interesting developments
in the Sino-Indian border dispute was the use of maps to back up territor¬
ial claims* China used maps published by the Survey of India in 191? and
later, and a map in the 1929 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The
Indians quoted the maps of the ficMahon conference at Simla. For the total
length of the Sino-Indian boundary the Indians quoted 36 official Indian
maps and 8 Chinese, and the Chinese 23 Indian. The use of maps in such
disagreements can be deceptive, for example such privately published maps
as the one in the 1929 Encyclopaedia Britannica are not of much value.
'The value of cartographic evidence in international boundary disputes
rests ultimately on the degree of accuracy of topographic survey obtaining
at the date of its compilation, the extent to which it represents the off¬
icial point-of-view of the state concerned, and the measure of its con¬
formity with the principles of delimitation laid down in the definitive
9
treaties'. The Indians had an advantage over the Chinese with regard to
their cartographic evidence in relation to the Ilorth East Frontier Agency
as they were able to use their past mapping as proof of their greater claim
9. W.fC.iik: 'The Si.no-Indian Frontier Pispute' j Scottish Geographical
Magazine, Vol. ?6, No.l, I960, p.11.
to having had more adiuinistrative control in the Agency.
In the autumn of 1962 the Chinese resorted to the use of force in an
attempt to resolve the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Their armies advanced
within range of the Brahmaputra River before stopping. Indian opposition
to the Chinese was ineffectual, as might be expected of a state dedicated to
peace, and ill-prepared. A cease fire followed at which it was suggested by
the Chinese that there ahould be a withdrawal of troops 20 kilometres behind
the line held by India and China on November 7th. 1959* This affects the
Northwestern boundary of India far more than the North East Frontier Agency
as it was not until the spring of 1962 that India made her administration in
Ladakh anything like effective. India wanted a withdrawal 20 kilometres be¬
hind the line held on September 8th, 1962 which would make her position fur¬
ther north. Despite India's unwillingness to comply with China's suggestion
Chinese troops did fall back to the 20 kilometres area behind the line held
in 1959* This has once more left much of the North East Frontier Agency in
the control of India, and a stalemate at present prevails. In fact China
appears to be less interested in the North East Frontier Agency than in those
areas of Aksai Chin in the Northwestern boundary which hold the vital Tibet-
Sihkiang highway.
India has a better claim to the North East Frontier Agency than China
due to the Simla Convention and her longer period of administrative activity
in the area. But the elite being educated at Indian universities and who are
returning to their tribal areas may find incorporation in either the Republic
of India or the People's Republic of China unacceptable. They have the mut¬
inous example of the Nagas to suggest the possibility of self-deterraination
10
for the peoples of the North East Frontier Agency. India's 'watershed'
10. A watershed is a line separating two contiguous drainage areas.
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boundary may have no more relevance than China's foothills delimitation.
The North East Frontier Agency is something of a distinctive entity
owing little to Tibet (The Tibetans call the tribesmen 'Lopes' or
'Southern Barbarians') or India. The tribes of the North East Frontier
Agency may prove, like the Nagas, unwilling to be subservient to Indian
nationalism. After her defeat by China in 1962 India is no laager con¬
sidered able to protect the peoples of the Himalayan area and so even an
offer of a federal arrangement may be unacceptable to the educated amongst
the tribesmen. Already the Nag&s have suggested the possibilities of in¬
dependence from both India and China. India's policy in the area has
lacked coherence, and China may yet prove to be uninterested in the Agency




The North Sect Frontier Agency ia bordered in the north by Tibet, in
the east by Burma, in the south by India and in the west by Bhutan. From
Bhutan across the Agency to Burma is about 355 miles, whilst its widest
north-south part is 110 miles* For the purpose of this study the Indian
administrative divisions of Karaeng, Subansiri, Siang, Lbhit and Tirap rep¬
resent the area dealt with although it should be appreciated that the bound-
ary claimed by China excludes Tirap, and the southern parts of Lofait and
Siang (Maps 1 and 3 in the previous chapter)*
It is difficult to deal with the physical geography of the North Bast
Frontier Agency area as so much of it is imperfectly known. Similarly,
there is a need to view the Agency in the larger context of the Himalayas
as a whole and this inevitably involves a certain amount of repetition, nob-
ably of material dealt with in the previous section on Nepal.
It is generally agreed that during esozoic times the area which is
now the Himalayas was then occupied by the geosynclinal Tethys Sea. There
is a contrast in the Tibetan area which is covered with sediments laid down
under the Tethys sea, and the rocks of the Himalayan core which contain anc¬
ient and more recent crystalline intruaivea and sedimentaries similar to
those of India. There were three phases in the transformation of the Tethys
geosyncline, first the upthrust of the central axis of ancient crystalline
and sedimentary rocks in Oligocens times, then in Miocene times a movement
1. Of importance in this chapter have been the following texts5 J.ii.Auden-
•Traverses in the Himalaya* j Records of the Geological Survey of India
Vol.69, Pt.2, Calcutta 1935i N.Ginsburg (sditor); 'The Pattern of Asia* j
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey I960* S.D»Miara: 'The Sino-Indian Dispute: A
Geographical Analysis' J Indian Geographical Journal Vol.34, Pt*3/4 1959J
K.H.Pascoe: 'A Manual of the Geology of India & Burma'I Government of
India, Delhi 1950J & O.K.H.Spate: 'India & Pakistan', Methuan, London 1957*
■which led to folding, and lastly the post-Pliocene phase which is still
in progress and which has affected notably the Siwalik sediments*
The Great Himalayas extend in a south facing arc from tine Indus to
the Brahmaputra* Most of the peaks over 25,000 feet are of granites and
gneisses, but much of the area, including that of the North hast Frontier
agency, is made up of old raetaiaorphies* The Great Himalayas have a com¬
paratively gentle and rounded slope into the Yalu Tsangpo furrow, but
fretted southern face* The Dihang (Brahmaputra-Tsangpo) has cut an im¬
pressive gorge through the Himalaya range* There appears to be a pushing
back of the watershed due to the greater rainfall on the southern slopes
of the Himalayas* The eastern culmination of the Great Himalayas is the
25,000 feet high Mancha liarwa overlooking the Dihang (Map 2 in previous
chapter;, but it seems probable that it continues eastwards at a lower
elevation to be cut later by the upper dalween River, upper Mekong River
and upper Yangtse River* The Indian delimitation of the North hast Front¬
ier Agency is therefore along the Great Himalayas and the continuation of
this range following the interruption of the Dihang gorge (Brataaputra-
Taangpo),
Although this eastern section of the Himalayas 'is very little known
2
geologically and even geographically,* it appears to be similar to the
Northwestern area* 'The post-Archaean rocks of the Assam Plateau are un¬
folded and horizontal, •*• the Tertiary rocks are complicated, overturned,
and overthrust, both in the Himalayan foothills and their strike continu-
. 3
ations, the Batkai and Naga ranges (further south)' « This suggests that
2* O.K.H.Spate: 'India & Pakistan'J ISethuen, London 1957, p*20*
3* R.D*Oldham: 'The Making of Indian Geography* j Geographical
Journal, Vol*3, 1394, p*l39«
2!&4*
the Brahmaputra Valley has been forced down between the Shillcng Plateau
to the south and the Himalaya folding to the north*
4
Writing of the eastern section of the Himalayas Wager concluded that
it had been produced by two different processes in two stages# 'The first
stage was the production by horizontal compression of an elevated plateau
in approximate isostatic equilibrium* Phis plateau is essentially the
present plateau of Tibet, but when formed it extended further south over
the region which is now the Himalaya. The second stage, which is presum¬
ably still going on, is one of vertical upwarping of the edge of the plat¬
eau to maintain approximate isostatic balance as the rivers cut deeper and
deeper into its edges* The second stage is the one which has produced the
extra height of the Himalaya mountains above the plateau of Tibet*'
With regard to physical geography what the Indian boundary can claim
to do is follow a line which roughly divides the sub-montane area of ths
tribal foothills from the high plateau of Tibet* The Chinese delimit¬
ation more or less coincides with a line marking where the foothills end
and the plains of the Brahmaputra begin* Having used the Himalayas India
has perhaps the advantage of greater visual impact in her boundary delim¬
itation*
The climate of the North >aat Frontier Agency is mainly affected by
influences from the south as the Himalayas have shut off the area from
the air masses to the north except in ths upper air* The seasonal rhythm
is that of the Indian subcontinent with two seasons based on rainfall over
most of the agency; there is the rainy season from March to September and
winter from October to February* The rainfall is mainly governed by the
4* L.RAVager; 'The Arun River -Drainage Pattern A the Rise of the
Himalayas'# Geographical Journal, Vol* 89, 1937# pp*249-50*
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alternation of the monsoon*
The colder weather starts at the end of October and persists until the
beginning of February. At this time of the year the general movement of
air in northern India is down the Indus and Ganges valleys to the low press¬
ure area south of the equator. As Map 1 demonstrates temperatures are com¬
paratively low throughout the North East Frontier Agency, but depend on
altitude moire than anything else for the differences within the area in
January. There is a large diurnal range as the skies are clear and bright
during the day with a temperature that rises considerably between about
11 a.m. and 2 p.m., but which drops rapidly during the evening to produce
cold nights with the temperature below freezing. The morning insolation
amongst the hills is often delayed in its effects by a thick blanket of fog
during this season.
At the beginning of March temperatures start rising and pressure de¬
creases. There are showers in late March, but heavy rains start in and
last to the end of August and are associated latterly with the Southwest
Monsoon. Temperatures in the Agency in July are again affected mainly by
altitude with over 80 degrees, F. in the plain areas decreasing to below 70
degrees F. in the higher Himalaya areas and the Tibetan plateau further
north.
September has less rain and prolonged dry breaks. Except for the Tirap
area of the southern part of the North East Frontier Agency and part of the
Agency bordering upon Bhutan the annual rainfall is over 80 inches and in
most areas is between 100 and 200 inches. The Himalayas tend to block the
movement of the monaoonal rains northwards so that Tibet is much drier than
most of the North East Frontier Agency. (Map 3). The highest rainfall is
recorded in the months of June and July when the Southwest Monsoon is at its
height. There is an east to west decrease in rainfall along the Himalayas.
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The Upper Assam Valley acts as a funnel with moist air driven up the Brahma¬
putra.
The rainfall of April and May is the outcome of Northwesterly winds
and is cyclonic. This may bring over 10 inches of rain, but does not com¬
pare with the Southwest Monsoon when it breaks with regard to intensity of
precipitation. However, this phenomena of the early rain brought by the
Northwesters does make the climatic regime of Northeastern India a little
different to that of the rest of the Subcontinent.
The soils of the North hast Frontier Agency have not been mapped so
that Map 4 (previous chapter) is a highly generalised picture of the situ¬
ation prevailing. Most of the area is covered by red and yellow soils with
a tendency towards leaching and becoming more gritty with a rise in elevat¬
ion. These soils extend over into China and Burma, although they are modi¬
fied in the higher areas where they may eventually become little more than
gravel. The red soils of the higher areas of the Himalayan foothills found
between about 6,000 and 8,000 feet are slightly podsolised and increasingly
gritty. The Alpine soils of the Himalayan slopes range from a gravelly
meadow soil at the lowest level to ice and snow above. There are numerous
variations of this basic classification according to local differences in
relief, parent rock and climate.
The original vegetation over most of the area of the North East Front¬
ier Agency was forest of one type or another. The exception is the north¬
ern boundary with China (Indian delimitation) where the Himalayas and
Tibetan Plateau have an Alpine vegetation. At about 9,500 feet the vege¬
tation becomes a shrubby forest of rhododendrons, birches, and junipers
grading into low evergreen scrub on the Indian side and into open xero-
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phytic hush on the drier Tibetan side of the Himalayas. Above 12,000 feet
there is grass followed by bare rock. Below the Alpine vegetation there is
a band of temperate forest with scattered oak and ash and a predominance of
Junipers and deodars. At 3,000 to perhaps 7,000 feet occurs subtropical
wet hill vegetation in which there is a predominance of evergeen oaks and
chestnuts. Bamboo and creepers are common and in some of the areas over
5,000 feet there are pine trees. Below this there is tropical evergreen (wet)
forest and semi-evergreen (i.e. predominantly evergreen) forest (See Map 5
the previoufe • chapter). This is typical rainforest and is found up to 3,500
feet. It is best developed in those areas with over 120 inches of rain per
annum and a short dry season. In the wetter areas the rainforest is dense
and reaches heights of 150 feet with an undergrowth of bamboo in those places
where there is a break in the overhead cover. 'Due to heavy and continuous
rains for the greater part of the year, luxuriant evergreen vegetation is the
most characteristic of this region. Thick Jungles, with tall, stout trees
5
with long creepers around them, are found everywhere.'
The physical geography of the North East Frontier Agency has been such
as to encourage the isolationism of the tribes living within the area. Comm¬
unication with the plains of India is perhaps a little easier than with China.
Neither of the boundary alignments favoured by the two conflicting states in
this region have any outstanding merits with regard to the physical character¬
istics of the Agency. The problems of physical geography as they relate to
the efforts of either India or China to integrate the Agency within the state
administration have not been tackled adequately from Delhi or Peking. The
5» L.R.N.Srivastavai 'The Gallongs'; Research Department,
Adviser's Secretariat, Shillong 1962, p.2.
difficult terrain, the restrictions imposed upon movement through rain¬
forest, the length of the rainy season and other consideration of physical
geography make the Agency a more difficult area to integrate within the
state than the North China Plain for Peking or the Ganges plain for Delhi*
Also, if it was possible to fly directly from Delhi to the North East
Frontier Agency a distance of over a thousand miles would be covered, or
from Peking to the Agency over fifteen hundred miles. The land routes
are much longer. Factors of physical geography have encouraged, independ¬
ence amongst the various tribes of the North East Frontier Agency, and
present trends suggest that it will be a long time before such factors have
been negated to the extent that it is possible to say that either India or
China has successfully integrated the Agency within their state area, or
that the influence of the two countries in the Agency is such as to make





CHAPTER THESE : Physical and Cultural Characteristics of the People
It is somewhat easier to deal with the various tribes of the North
East frontier Agency by using the five administrative divisions of Kameng,
Subansiri, Siang, Lohit and Tirap. Map 1 shows the general distribution
of the main tribal groups within the five administrative divisions, but
it should be emphasised that in most areas along the boundaries with Tibet
and Burma the tribes straddle the border. With the present stage of an¬
thropological research in the North East Frontier Agency only a general
picture of the delimitation of the tribal areas can be given.
Within the Kameng Frontier Division in the corner of the boundary with
Tibet and Bhutan surrounding the great Lamaist centre of Tawang are the
Monpas. The Monpas spill over into Tibet and Bhutan and are Lamaist Budd¬
hists. There has been an important lamasery at Tawang for over 350 years.
The Monpa culture is a more sophisticated one than most of the other tribes
of the North East Frontier Agency. It is based on terrace agriculture and
the herding of sheep, horses and yaks. The main centre of the Monpas is
Tawang which stand on a plateau amongst the mountains at about 10,000 feet.
Their villages are visually at heights from 5,000 to 12,000 feet, and the
administrative centre of Kameng at Bomdila is at 9,000 feet. The Monpas
live in two storied houses constructed of stone and wood with plank floors
1. The following books have been of great use in the writing of thi3
chapter: T.K.M.Baruah: 'The IduMiahmis', Gov. of India, Shillong
1359; F.C.Dutta: 'The Tangsaa', Gov. of India, Shillong 1963;
V.Elwin: 'A Philosophy for the North East Frontier Agency', Gov.
of India, Shillong 1959; G.Furer-Haimendorf: 'Himalayan Barbary',
John Murray, London 1959; S.Roy: 'Aspects of Adi Culture' & 'Aspects
of Padam Minyong Culture*; both published by the Gov. of India,
Shillong, 1964; R.P.Sharma: 'The Sherdukpens', Gov. of India,
Shillong 1959; B.K.Shulka: 'The Daflas', Gov. of India, Shillong
1959; L.R.N.Srivastava: 'The Gallongs', Gov. of India, Shillong
1962.
and heavily carved doors and window fraaes» Due to the cool climate their
dress is substantial, with a liking for coloured sashes, highly decorated
hats and silver swords# The Monpas are famed for their carpets, but the dom¬
inant influence in everything from religion to architecture and textiles is
that of Tibet#
Further south is the small Lamaiat tribe of the Shurdukpen which migrates
for several months each year to the plains to avoid the cold and to trade. To
the east of the Monpas are the Alias and Bunguns and to the north extending
into Tibet the Mijis who are all influenced by their Lanadst neighbours, but
cannot be termed adherents of that faith. The Bunguns are very few in nuuiber
and have a history of being oppressed by their stronger neighbours. The Akas
are familiar to students of Indian history a3 in the first part of the Sine-
teenth Century their leader Tagi brought them on numerous raids against the
plains to the south# The dress of these tribes is a combination of silk gar¬
ments traded from India, and Tibetan dress. Their houses are large and
slavery is common.
In the eastern part of the Kaaeng Division are the Baflas (Daphlas)
who present a marked contrast to those tribes of the west. Only recently
has any sort of administration been imposed upon them. They number about
80,000 and extend far into Subansiri in the east, with a few along the Indo-
Tibetan boundary (Indian delimitation,. They live in long houses which
hold a nuniber of related families, plus their slaves and servants and although
there may be many such houses in an area there is rarely a feeling of comm¬
unity spirit. There was at one time wars between the various houses. The
culture of the Baflas is a poor one with some work in bark fibre and the
best products made in cane. The Daflas are warlike with blood fSdus taking
their toll of life still.
Living amongst the Daflas are snail groups of Sulungs who are prob¬
ably the aboriginal inhabitants of the area. They are hunters and food
gatherers, but they have also acquired ability to work in iron and brass.
The Sulung culture is even more primitive than that of the Daflas and they
are completely dominated by the latter tribe.
The first known European contact with the Apa Tani tribe (or Apa
Tanangs) was the tea planter H.M. Crowe who travelled there at the latter
part of 1890. The Apa Tani society was an impressive one based on irrigat¬
ed fields worked with a hoe. They were completely isolated, but their two
crops a year made them prosperous. The Apa Tani area has today been brought
effectively under the administration of India (with the exception of the
period of the Chinese invasion in 1962;. The Apa Tani are energetic, soph¬
isticated in their culture by Dafla standards and have adapted quickly to
the modern innovations introduced into their tribal area.
Bordering the Apa Tani tribe is a group of tribes known as the Hill
Miris. It was not until 1911 that anything wa3 known of this group and as
late as 1953 a party of the Assam Rifles were slaughtered by them. The Hill
Miris, and the related Gallongs to the north, lead a harsh existence, 'here
you realise what the struggle for existence means. The climate is abomin¬
able; the people are under-nourished and tormented by diseases of the skin.
There is no art here, little weaving, little of the song and dance that de¬
lights tribal society elsewhere; there is simply the long losing battle
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against hunger and disease. * The Gallong3 do extend into Tibet, but in
small numbers. As with all the northern tribes of the North East Frontier
Agency in the difficult terrain of the area there is a total ignorance with
2. V.Elwin! 'A Philosophy for the North i^ast Frontier Agency';
Gov. of India, Shillong 1959, pp.15"16.
regard to the boundaries. The Daflas, Hill Miris and Gallongs are similar
in culture. They tie their hair in a knot above the forehead, wear a hat
which has a peak and decorated with kite or porcupine quills. The Hill
Miri women wear a short petticoat held up by a leather belt. Over this is
worn a cane skirt fastened tightly over the loins and permitting only short
steps. Across the upper part of the body a cane and fibre brassier© is
worn. Beads are very popular. The more northerly tribes wear long, dark
red wool coats imported fron Tibet. The Hill Miris are a less warlike
people than the tribes to the north* The Apa Tani are distinguished in
their dress by the men wearing a cano belt and the women having wooden nose
plugs and large ear rings. The Api Tanis, Hill Miris, Daflas and Gallongs
are all onimlats in their religious beliefs and not even the more northerly
members of the tribes have been converted to Tibetan Laraaisn. The Hill Miris,
Gallongs and Daflas are shifting cultivators with some herding.
From the period of earliest contact the tribes of the Siang Frontier
Division have been known collectively as Abora which is a word of plains'
contempt meaning 'unruly'. They showed an independent spirit towards out¬
side intrusions and fought vigorously the punitive expeditions launched
against them. Of recent years they have proven themselves amongst the most
co-operative of the hill peoples and the Indian Government has dropped the
detrimental term of 'Abor' and called them Adds. There are a number of
tribes which are united by language and culture; these include the Minyongs,
Panggis (Pangis), Shimongs and the already mentioned Gallongs with their
•o-|
associated groups which extend into Tibet of the Ramos, BoVars, and Pailibos.
The Abor villages are notable for their dormitory club for men and
boys which is of great importance in the tribal organisation and is iisad by
the tribal council. Some of the tribes have also a club for girls, but
the Gallongs and the northern affiliated tribes do not. The Gallongs have
a form of polyandry which is unknown elsewhere. Throughout the tribes
women are enthusiastic weavers. Dancing is the main recreational occupation.
Slavery is common with the three social divisions of freemen, freed slaves
and slaves. The Abors are famed orators. Some of the tribes of the north
are influenced by Tibet and are Lama-ist in their beliefs, whilst those of
the south are animist. The northern areas are less prosperous than the
more southerly. Again, the economy is mainly one of shifting agriculture
and some herding.
Despite the difficult terrain of the Lohit Frontier Division thi3 was
the part of the North East Frontier Agency in which the early explorers were
most active. In 1827 the surveyor Wilcox visited the area, as did the bot¬
anist Griffith in I836 and Rowlatt in 1845« In 1912 the Dibang Valley was
explored and in 1914 the Lohit Valley was followed almost to the Sino-
Indian boundary. Of the tribes in the area all the early explorers appear
to have had a low opinion, mentioning specifically their filthiness, de¬
ceit and small regard for human life. However, these early judgments were
perhaps harsh as they are talented weavers and the women are famed for
their exotic coiffure. The tribes are known collectively as the Mishmis,
but the most important are the Digarus and the Mejus. The tribes appear
to have migrated from Burns and have language affinities with the Kachins
on the border area with Burma. The most obvious feature of Mishmi life
is the ffeet that, like the Daflao, the village community is unimportant.
Again the real social unit is the house, and a rich man's abode may be
over a hundred feet long and fifteen feet wide. There is a passage down
one side of the house -with rooms leading off from it and up to sixty people
may "be so accommodated# The more northerly tribes again extend over the
border and import wool coats from Tibet which are decorated with crosses
and have a multitude of colours. Weaving is done in wool, or cotton or
nettle fibre. Finely woven shawls are popular, and the usual dress for
women is a long skirt and an embroidered bodice. Both sexes are fond of
Tibetan charms and are devoted to tobacco. Amongst some of the Mishmi
tribes opium is popular. The Mishmi tribes are maiiily animists in religion
and rely on shifting cultivation for their livelihood.
To the south of the iiiahmis are the Buddliiat tribes of the Khamptis
and Singphos. The Khamptis immigrated from the Shan States of Burma at the
end of the -Eighteenth Century A.B. and shortly afterwards came the Singphos
who are a branch of the Kachins of Upper Burma. Both tribes were noted for
their aggressive characteristics, combining to attack the Sadiya outpost of
British administration in 1839* At present the two tribes are peaceful,
working as cultivators and traders. The Buddhism of the Khamptis is of a
purer sort than that of the Siagphos which has been modified by borrowings
from animism. Both tribes are famed for their wood carving and their vill¬
ages are distinctive because of the presence of Buddhist temples. Contact
with the plains over many years has made the Khaaiptis and Bingphos more soph¬
isticated than the other hill tribes. The culture of eastern Lohit is basic¬
ally that of northern Burma, but it has been modified in the more southerly
areas by contact with the plains people of Assam.
The Tirap Frontier Division is a narrow strip of difficult mountain
terrain which divides liargherita and the Brahmaputra Valley from Burma mainly
along the Paktoi Range* The Noctes tribe has been in closest contact with
the plains and is nominally Hindu in religion. The Tangsas wear their hair
in a topknot, favour a sarong and have close cultural links with Burma from
where they migrated some centuries ago* . The Wanchos are perhaps the most
energetic of the tribes, having little competition in this claim from the
Tangsas who have been notorious for their opium inspired indolence.
The Wanchos and Noctes are divided into three classes ranging from the
families of the Great Chiefs, those members of the families of the Great
Chiefs who have married commoners, and the commoners the;:iselves. There are
separate dormitories for the boys and young men, and also for young women
in some villages. The Wanchos wear a minimum of clothing, but a great deal
of ornament made from bone, shells and feathers. Both the Wanchos and
Noctes were formerly headhunters.
The physical features of the peoples of the North East Frontier Agency
are basically of Mongoloid stock and related to the type found in the neigh¬
bouring areas of Tibet and Burma. The hair is black and scant on the body
and face. Men are of medium height and women short. The presence of the
epicanthi fold is common, becoming more pronounced the further north and
east one goes. The nose is broad and the figure stocky, lien and women are
equally strong as they share the n©nual work. Thick lips and prognathous
faces are rare.
Although physical type is a dangerous criteria for estimating relation¬
ships there does appear to be a stronger affinity between Tibet and Burma
with the bulk of the population of the North East Frontier Agency than be¬
tween India and the latter. Culturally many of the tribes have Lama ist
connections with Tibet or Buddhist beliefs from Burma and only one tribe
has accepted Hinduism. However, most of the tribes adhere to a form of
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animism.
With regard to distribution and outlook the tribes in the boundary
areas are completely oblivious as to whether they are in India, China or
Burma. The boundaries are divides only as far as the physical features
of the landscape by which they are delimited are divides in the human
geography. Similarly, the m Idness of most of the country has dissuaded
■the bordering states from imposing effective administration up to the
boundaries. There is much to support the view that the North East Front¬
ier Agency is a separate entity with regard to its human geography, a
separatism which has been greatly assisted by the physical geography.
277.
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CHAPTER FOUR ? The Economy
Agriculture. Forestry &
Land ownership in the North East Frontier Agency varies from tribe to
tribe, but can usually be divided into that which is owned by the individ¬
ual, that which is owned by the tribe and used for tribal purposes (e.g.
graves) and common land which any member of the tribe is permitted to work.
This is modified according to whether shifting cultivation is the technique
favoured in agriculture or the more sophisticated types of cultivation like
the irrigated rice areas of the Apa Tani plateau. In the Apa Tani lands
there is a strong sense of private possession as land is the source of
wealth and the less permanent possessions are vised to acquire more land. The
ownership pattern in the Apa Tani area is as follows; firstly there is the
privately owned land which more or less includes all cultivated land such
as irrigated rice fields, dry crop fields, garden plots for maize, vege¬
tables, millet and fruit trees, groves of trees and bamboo which are useful,
and building sites. Tribal land is pasture near the villages used for graz¬
ing and burial purposes, plus forest land which is too far from the villages
for exploitation other than for hunting. Finally, common land is usually
confined to a small amount of pasture. Land can be bought and sold amongst
the Apa Tanis, although it was traditionally bartered for livestock. An
outsider can buy other things for money, but not land.
In those areas where the tribes favour shifting cultivation the village
boundaries with other villages are most important and are established by
1» The references used in the last chapter have been of equal usefulness
in this, plus the following texts; V.AnsteyJ •Economic Development
of India1; Longman, London 1952; G. N.Patterson J 'Peking Versus
Delhi*; Faber, London 196,5; and L.D.Stamp; 'Asia', Methuen,
London I960.
tradition and agreement. All the village dwellers are greatly concerned
in preserving these "boundaries# Of the villages most were settled in each
case by a single clan which cleared the forest and now owns the land. Those
who arrived later are tenants of the descendants of the original settlers#
Uncleared land is the property of the village which will give permission
often to an immigrant to use it and he can transfer his holding to his chil¬
dren if he i3 granted 3uch land to clear or reclaim. Tenants cannot give
their holding to their children in this way as it returns to the owner fam¬
ily should they cease to use it. Therefore each of the descendants of the
original clcarers have a number of family tracts within the village area.
Each year the area for shifting cultivation is selected by the village coun¬
cil and the village priests. 'All the various agricultural operations, in
fact, such as clearing the forest, burning the ' jhum' (growth cut down when
use of the area is renewed;, sowing or dibbling the seed, weeding, fencing
and reaping are done by everybody at the same time with the appropriate rel-
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igious ceremonies.'
Although nothing is paid to the village by those families wishing to
extend their agriculture into the common lands it is an expensive undertak¬
ing for not only is there the problem of clearing the forest but many and
elaborate sacrifices have to be made to the spirits of forest and hill whose
territory they are invading. It should be appreciated that although the
most usual form of agriculture in the North East Frontier Agency is a shift¬
ing cultivation type unlike other parts of the world where the population
also is mobile the tribes here retain a permanent settlementi only their
2. V.Elwin: 'A fhilosophy for the North East Frontier Agency';
Gov. of India, Shillong, 1959, p.65.
cultivated plots are abandoned to fallow#
The Jhum Land Regulations of 1947-48 formalised tribal ownership of
land in the North East Frontier Agency of India. Outsiders are not per¬
mitted to settle in the tribal areas under the Inner Line Regulation of
1873# this stated that a licence was needed for any person other than a
member of one of the tribes to enter the tribal areas.
Efforts to improve the agriculture of the tribes have had to take
into account the dietary tastes of the areas concerned. The basic diet of
cereals, millets, vegetables and meat is more or less the same throughout
the tribes. Where wet rice cultivation has been successfully introduced,
as in the Apa Tani lands, it has become the staple food, but millet is the
more common crop on the shifting cultivator's plots. Also grown is maize,
which may be used for a pig food, onions, chillies, sweet potatoes, must¬
ard leaf, and the recently introduced and highly successful common potato.
Also cultivated are pumpkins, ginger, mushrooms and the plantain flowers.
This diet is supplemented by numerous wild plants such as bamboo shoots.
The Abors cultivate sugar cane, but there appears to be a lack of sweet
things in the diet, other than the collecting of wild honey, amongst the
other tribes.
Milk and butter are popular amongst the Buddhist tribes, but are not
favoured by the others. The flesh of deer, squirrels, wild boar, birds
and rats is eaten by most tribes, whilst some consider monkey, dog or ele¬
phant flesh as a delicacy. The domestic animals such as pigs, cattle,
goats and poultry are usually saved for feasting or sacrificial occasions,
but again in contrast to the Hindu beliefs further south there is no app¬
rehension about killing cattle. Snakes, frogs and certain insects are
eaten and fish is procured when the opportunity avails itself. Both meat
and fish are often dried on racks. In most tribes hunting and fishing
has ritualistic significance and the whole village takes part. There are
certain 'taboos' which dominate the eating habits of the various tribes,
as, for example, the Wanchos' avoidance of one type of fish which they con¬
sider a reincarnation of one of their dead forbearers.
Dietary research by the Indian Government has proven that on average
the food of the tribesmen is richer than that of the Indian farmers. The
tribesmen's diet contained l6/o more calories, 17% more protein, IQyo more
calcium and 33/<> more Vitamin A. But it has to be remembered that the hill
climate is more rigorous and that for several months of the year there is
a lack of cereals.
Over 90/3 of the tribesmen practise shifting cultivation and here the
inevitable problem has arisen. All is well if the land is allowed a suff¬
iciently long fallow period in which to recover its fertility, but in many
areas an increasing population pressure means that the cycle is being short¬
ened. In numerous places soil erosion is a very real threat to the tribal
economy, even although it has been estimated that perhaps only 1$ of the
North Bast Frontier Agency is under cultivation at one time today.
The problems of shifting agriculture in the North East frontier
Agency have been viewed carefully by the Indian Government and three meth¬
ods of solving them have been suggested. Firstly there is the possibility
of introducing wet rice cultivation in all areas where it is possible to
grow it; this is a limited answer as the areas suitable for this form of
agriculture are few. Since 1947 about 20,000 acres of tribal land have
been turned over to wet rice cultivation. A second project developed in
the more mountainous areas is terracing on the gentler slopes, and this has
been done most successfully by the Monpas. It has not been possible in the
parts of the North East Frontier Agency where the tribes do not have the
same level of culture as the Monpas to persuade the very conservative cult¬
ivators to try terracing. The final possibility was to make shifting cult¬
ivation itself a more scientific proposition by limiting its disadvantages.
The main proposals so far made have been related to the use of crops to en¬
rich the soil such as nitrogen fixing legumes.
The introduction of wet rice production in particular lias produced fur¬
ther problems such as the breaking down of the communal work system, with more
permanent land holdings, the attraction of wild elephants in such areas as
the Lohit Valley to devastate the fields, and the tendency to sell the rice
crop which leads to a decline in diet. Terracing also encourages a frag¬
mentation of land holdings. The agricultural practices of the tribes are
closely linked with their culture and changing the farming techniques can
often lead to a social disruption. V.hat is lacking in the North East Front¬
ier Agency is an educational system which would prepare the tribes to face
the problem of change when it comas. Efforts are being made to produce
textbooks in the Tibeto-Burman languages of the tribes and to recruit suit¬
able teachers. Of course -the Lama ist tribes have a system of education,
although it has many limitations. Education in the tribal areas is at a
rudimentary first stage of development.
With regard to forest resources there has always been a similar problem
throughout the world when dealing with land inhabited by aboriginal tribes.
The tribesmen of the North East Frontier Agency consider the hills and for¬
ests as their property and any attempts by the Government to alter and im¬
prove the forest areas leads to quick resentment on the part of the inhabi¬
tants. Ofben amongst the tribes the forest areas not only have material
importance, but also religious significance to further complicate the
picture.
Under these circumstances, with the added problem of India's ten¬
uous control over the Agency, it has been decided to permit the utmost
liberality in the administration's approach to the question of forests.
Where there are well defined village boundaries efforts are being made
to record them on naps to ensure the position of the villagers with re¬
gard to the use of forest in their traditional area. Commercial inter¬
ests in the forest resources are being subordinated to the attitude of
the tribesmen.
However, over much of the North East Frontier Agency the population
density is so modest that there are large areas of forest belonging to
nobody. The Forest Department of the Indian Government has attempted to
declare these forests reserves so that the timber may be conserved. So
far there are three categories of forest land in the Agency; the Forest
Reserves are as yet small in number and limited in area, secondly there
are the forests which can be made into Reserves, but such have not yet
been established, finally there are the traditional forest areas of the
tribes. Tribesmen living near the Forest Reserves have the right to
collect timber and other forest products from these areas as long as it
is only for their personal use, and not for sale or barter. Similarly,
they may fish, hunt and graze cattle freely in these Reserves.
In the lower villages of Slang, the Dibang Valley, Lohit and Tirap
where the Indian administration is the most effective the village forest
areas have been placed under the control of the village councils, and the
revenue from the forests is being used for the development of the villages.
Whether India -will be able to extend this arrangement to the less accessible
areas of the Agency ■will depend upon the efficiency of her administrative
machine and the settlement of the boundary dispute with the People's Repub¬
lic of China. Similarly, one wonders whether Indian policy towards the
rich forests of the North East Frontier Agency would have been so much in
the interests of the tribesmen if the tribal areas were more accessible and
Indian control within them more complete. The aboriginal lands elsewhere in
India have tended to fare less well than have those of the tribesmen in the
North East Frontier Agency once they have been brought fully within the Gov¬
ernment's field of action.
'Freedom to hunt and fish is of first importancei the loss of this free-
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dorn has been a major cause of tribal decline in other parts of India.' Fish¬
ing and hunting is of great importance in the supplementing of the diet of the
tribesmen, but in many of the more populated areas there is a danger that much
of the wild life is being exterminated. Therefore there is a need to protect
the wild life in certain areas in order to let it re-establish itself in
strength.
The whole of the tribal areas have zones for hunting and fishing which
are exclusive to certain villages and clans, for example the Shimongs along
the border with Tibet will not permit the Lamaist Khambas to visit the sac¬
red mountain of Riutalaj this is not because they feel they are under Indian
administration and the Khambas are under Chinese with an international
boundary of sorbs between them, but because the Shimongs fear the Khambas'
pilgrimage would disturb the game of the area.
3» V.Elwini 'A Philosophy for the North East Frontier Agency';
Gov. of India, Shillong 1959*
As has been stated before hunting and fishing is also surrounded with
religious significance and the bones of a particularly big fish or the
antlers of an animal will be hung in the hunter's house and it is a form
of sacrilege to desecrate them. The success of a ceremonial hunt or vill¬
age fishing may be connected in the minds of the tribesmen with the success
of the harvest; a good fishing expedition will mean the gods are favourable
and a good harvest will follow* Any outside intrusion upon these hunting
and fishing rights meets with vigorous tribal opposition* The issue of lic¬
ences by the Political Officers is therefore kept to a minimum. Those that
do hunt or fish are usually advised to hand over at least half of their
successes to the people on whose tribal land they have indulged their sport.
In agriculture, forestry and fishing the tribesmen of the North East
Frontier Agency are more primitive than, and thus distinct from, the bulk of
the population of India or China. Their limited techniques in these economic
fields emphasises further that the Agency is in many ways a distinct entity.
With the conflict between China and India over the Agency it also appears
improbable that, other than for the fringing areas, a change in the character
of the Agency is likely to take place in the near future. The tribesmen will
not be moulded into the image of their Indian or Chinese neighbours for many
years yet.
Mineral Kegpiyqea and Industry
Knowledge of the mineral resources of the North East Frontier Agency is
non-existent, as might be expected in an area which has been under the most
tenuous of Indian administrations and which is a sons of vigorous rival claims
between the People's Republic of China and India. Any possibility of a com-
prehensive geological survey of the Agency, or even tentative exploration
for mineral resources, is new complicated by it being an area between two
hostile armies foilwing the Chinese invasion of 1962. It is only possible
to judge the sort of minerals within the Agency by the vise made of them by
the tribesmen.
In 1872 Dalton mentioned that the Kharaptis were excellent carvers of
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ivory, wood and bone and worked, in gold, silver and iron. The frequency
of local blacksmiths mentioned using iron, gold and silver suggests that
these metals are common and found near the surface. Many of the tribes have
blacksmiths, but it is a skill confined to certain families. The blacksmiths
travel from village to village plying their trade. The Monpas' blacksmiths
are located along the Irsdo-Tibetan boundary (Indian delimitation) and travel
throughout the southern areas of the Monpa tribal distribution. The Abors
and Daphl&s are faired for their brass casting which is made from local
supplies of copper and sine. The Tirap tribes were once well known for
their work in silver gained from their territories.
It would be difficult under present circumstances with such a lack of
knowledge of local resources and with such an inadequate administrative
machine for the Indian Government to promote industry in the North East
Frontier Agency other than on the basis of a 'cottage' type. Before the
disruption of the Chinese invasion some effort was being made by the
Indians to stimulate local crafts.
Painting is only found in the Monpa areas of the Agency where the
Lamaist traditions are strongest. There is also some paper making here
from local materials, again stimulated by the needs and influences of the
1. T.Elwin (Editor)* 'India's Northeast Frontier in the Nineteenth
Century'> Oxford University Press, Bombay 1959.
Lama1st religion. The painting is mainly done on the walls and roofs of
the Monpas* relxgious buildings, but also pottery and wood carving is
brightened by paint. The paper is of reasonable quality and used for
religious books and the ccorrespondence of Monpa lamas.
Pottery is rare as the clay of the North East Frontier Agency is
unsuited for such use. Bamboo is ouch more popular for fulfilling the
needs of the tribes such as cooking, drawing water or storage. The Apa
Tanis asake clay animals as toys, although there is no knowledge of the
potter1 s wheel. In northern Slang the Lairaist tribes make clay models
of lord Buddha. Clay implements are otherwise imported from the plains
of India, although these are few in number.
'The Lamaist and Buddhist tribes practise carpentry with a certain
amount of skill in the construction of their houses, but such tribes as
the Abors use only bamboo. Many of the tribes have a tradition of wood
carving which usually has been stimulated by religious beliefs of one
sort or another. In Kameng wooden bowls, dishes, cups, religious masks
and effigies of Lord Buddha are made, mainly amongst the Lama1st tribes
such as the tfonpas -who are influenced strongly by Tibetan culture. Wood¬
en masts are also popular amongst the tribes of northern Siang who are
influenced by Tibet. The Khamptis of Lohit have a fame as wood carvers
of figures. The chief centre of wood carving is the Wancho area of
Tirap. Toys, pipes, drinking mugs and numerous other objects are carved
with a skill unequalled in the rest of the Agency.
To encourage the silver work of the Mishmis or the poker work of
the Wanchos the Indian administration had started a number of Cottage
Industries Training and. Production Centres# This was aimed at adding new
techniques to those the tribesmen already had and to give them subsidiary
occupations to make the standard of living a little higher. The crafts
were intended to supplement the main one of agriculture. Boys trained as
carpenters are able to produce furniture and improve house construction,
tribal blacksmiths are improved in their techniques, but both these trades¬
men work also in the fields.
The cane work of the tribes of Subansiri, Siang, Loh.it and Tirap was
originally thought of as a bad investment of India's money in encouraging
it as the tribesmen were beat known for their cane hats# But later it was
appreciated that the traditional skill in cane could be used to produce the
much needed furniture for the tribesmen. The tribes of Tirap especially
are now well known for their cane chairs.
Bfforts to improve the abilities of the blacksmith families have been
much slower as there was a need to have ceremonies performed at intervals
by the tribal priests to ward off the spiritual dangers challenging the
blacksmiths# The first efforts of the Indian Government to influence the
blacksmiths have been largely stopped by the Sino-Indian crisis.
illthough the attempts of the Cottage Industries Centres in northern
Kameng had little success in popularising paper making as a trade before
the Chinese invasion progress was encouraging in the art of painting. The
Centres had been established at Tawang and Bomdila. At Bomdila pottery
had been introduced to the tribesmen with a certain amount of success, mak¬
ing the administration think in terms of trying it in othei Centres as well.
But the most important of the new crafts has been carpentry. This attracted
the most enthusiastic response from the boys of the tribes and the course
was made a two year one.
Soap making has been established in Bomdila, but has failed elsewhere.
Bee keeping has also had only limited success for 'to the tribal mind the
extraction of honey is an adventure rather than a craft, for the people
show courage and enterprise storming the citadels of bees high up the face
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of cliffs or at the tops of trees'• Tailoring has also been introduced and
is important in those areas where stitched clothing is in demand. In the
making of garments an Assamese silk has been very popular, but the plains
people have charged the tribesmen exorbitant prices. A Sericulture farm
has been established in southern Siang and another in Tirap to teach the
tribesmen to produce the silk cloth, and over 200 families have taken up
sericulture in these areas.
The efforts of the Cottage Industries Training and Production Centres
have been hampered by numerous problems. The population is small and agri¬
culture always had to come first in tribal priorities. Boys and girls have
been attracted to the Centres by the 35 rupee stipend offered to trainees
rather than an urge to gain a skill. Having acquired their trade many of
the tribesmen fail to practise it once they have returned to their villages.
These problems have led to more careful recruitment, a three to six month
probationary period, and at the end of their training the tribesmen are
presented with a set of tools. The Centres are made as like the tribal
villages as possible so that the tribesmen do not feel at a psychological
disadvantage. As much use as possible is made of fellow tribesmen as in¬
structors as this acts as an inspiration to the apprentices to a greater
extent than the use of tradesmen from the plains.
2. V.Elwin: 'A Philosophy for the North .^ast Frontier Agency' j
Government of India, Shillong 1959, p.105*
A Skilled Workers' Scheme has been set up whereby the better artists
and craftsmen are supplied with raw naterials and have assistance in mark¬
eting their goods, some of which are exported. The greatest influences
of such schemes are to be found in those areas where Indian administration
has been most effective and least inhibited by the Chinese hostility. In
1955» for example, the first Co-operative Society was established in south¬
ern Siang aimed at building roads and houses, and later taking in the trade
in consumer goods. These Co-operatives are aimed at stimulating local
production by taking advantage of the tradition in many of the tribal areas
of the people working together. The Co-operative stores handle the proaucts
of the local craftsmen. These Co-operatives have proven successful in the
southern tribal areas and efforts were being made to spread further north,
but the unstable political position of the Agency has inhibited this.
The tribes of the North East Frontier Agency are in most cases only just
beginning to come into any sort of contact with what is generally known as
'modem civilisation'. Local culture and traditions are still the most im¬
portant factor in the life of the tribesman who feels no obligation in out¬
look to either India or Tibet but only to his tribe or family. In industry
the Agency has nothing which would qualify for the label of 'commercial
manufacturing'• Industry is geared to local needs and the policy of the
Indian Government has been one of trying to broaden the abilities of exist¬
ing tradesmen and training the young people in supplementary skills rather
than encouraging production for export outside of the North East Frontier
Agency. Of the traditional skills it can be said that the more northerly
tribes owe much to the influence of Tibet and Lamaism, but that the bulk of









The transport network of the North East Frontier Agency is primitive
1
in the extreme. Srivaatava*a description of Slang gives a good picture
of the sort of problems facing any administration with regard to access to
the tribal areas, 'The current difficulties in transport and the supply of
essential commodities are at present being eased by recourse to airlift ...
Rivers, though big, are full of rocks and rapids, and have very strong
currents and cross-currents, which render navigation impossible. Snail
boots and bamboo rafts can and do ply for a little distance in the Siyom,
but these are only for crossing from one bank to another. The plying of
such boats and bamboo rafts does not help in the way of regular transport¬
ation of passengers and goods. It is far from an easy task to make motorable
roads in the area due to the formidable nature of the country and lack of
such equipment aa may be required to construct such roads. And to import
everything by plane is a still harder Job. Mole tracks are under construct¬
ion, but these tracks will cover only a limited area - the central portion of
the country. Porter tracks, though spread throughout the country, do not yet
connect every village with each other and with the outposts and the adminis¬
trative centres'.
At Hie time of the Chinese invasion during the autumn of 1962 the trans¬
port network of the North East Frontier agency was as shown on Map 1. On
the plains there was a railway line from Dibrugarh to Lucknow, but no conn¬
ection by rail with the hill areas and none planned. There were seven air¬
fields connecting the administrative centres and more important settlements
of the Agency with the rest of India, plus three landing strips only suited
1. L.R.N.Srivastava: 'The Gallongs'i
Gov. of India, Shillong, 1962, pp.11-12.
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to light aircraft. The Amy Engineers had constructed a road fran the
plains to Bomdila in Kameng which had proven difficult and expensive,
iioradila, which is at 9,000 feet, had gained much from this highway, but
it had hardly been completed when the Chinese invasion took place. Using
mainly tribal labour Ziro in Cubansiri had been connected with the plains,
as had Paaighat in Siang (Map 1; • In Tirap tribal enterprise had led to
the building of a road between Khonsa and Margherita. These roads and
airfields represent the total amount of 'modem' transport arteries within
the North East Frontier Agency. Since the Chinese invasion it would seem
likely that greater efforts are being made by both the Indians and the
Chinese in the bordering areas to improve the transport network, but in
the 'no man's land* between the Chinese and Indians in the interior of the
North East Frontier Agency there can have been no improvement since 1962.
Before 1962 the Indian Gcverwnent was making some progress in the more
accessible areas of the Agency by promoting the construction of new roads
and bridges through the tribal councils. The tribal council allotted
individual tasks on the village's stretch of road to be built. ..hero roads
had been improved it was not a complete blessing as there followed the
money-lender, the exploiting trader and the purveyor of cheap alcohol. The
hand-loom industry suffered by the import of cheap textiles, as did a number
of other local products. New diseases arrived with the increased exploitat¬
ion from the plains.
In the Indian Five Year Plana first priority in expenditure upon the
North East Frontier Agenoy was given to transport, with food production next,
and thirdly the improvement of health facilities. However, only modest pro-
2'J2.
grass was made in toe construction of roads due to the difficulties of
the terrain and the limited capital and equipment available to the Indian
Government* The Chinese invasion of the North East Frontier Agency in 1962
has emphasised the importance to India of this border, but the core area is
now only partly available to the administration* Until the North East
Frontier Agency has a comprehensive network of communications with either
India or China it will remain a separate entity containing tribes acknow¬
ledging only the authority of the tribal council*
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CiiHirTBR FIVE i The Political Geograihy of the Sino-North East
Frontier Agency Boundary
The advent of Caanunist power in China and the aggression of the
Chinese against India in 1962 has node the North Aast Frontier Agency of
great strategic importance to India. The control of the Brahmaputra
Valley, and ultimately that of the Ganges, could he quickly lost by an
inability to defend the Agency as the events of 1962 suggested. It is
possible for an efficient military force to defend successfully the bound¬
ary line favoured by the Indians, but the boundary which the Chinese are
claiming is largely indefensible. It is always possible for a determined
military force to overcoms the physical hindrances of a landscape, unless
such advantages of physical geography are used by a determined opposition.
A boundary along the foothills would give a defending Indian army no ad¬
vantage of physical geography, whilst control of the North East Frontier
Agency would. Therefore militarily the once unimportant Agency has since
1962 become of outstanding strategic importance.
In answer to the two questions posed in this study neither India nor
China's control within the Agency is effective enough to modify geographi¬
cal distributions* Similarly neither version of the boundary has had the
least effect upon the landscape. It is perhaps constructive to deal with
some of the reasons why such is the case.
As with Nepal the forces working within the Agency are of a centrifug¬
al type in relation to both India and China. Indian and Chinese adminis¬
tration in the Agency might even be considered leas effective than that
of Katmandu in Nepal. Not only do tribal loyalties prevail everywhere, but
where an elite has been educated by India they are emulating the Nagas and
talking in terms of separate statehood# At least in Nepal when educated
the tribesman usually accepts the idea of a Nepaleae nationalism# Since
1~i62 the viability of the North East Frontier Agency with regard to India
has been in a state of collapse# Chinese administration within the Agency
has rarely existed at all, and when it has it has been limited to the
northern areas#
The North East Frontier Agency is typified by the position with regard
to language# Host of the tribesmen speak languages belonging to the Tibeto-
Burman branch of the Sino-Tibetan family# Including differences of dialect
■there are over fifty tribal languages# Abor-Daphla is spoken in one form or
another from eastern Siang to western Lohit and might later provide the basis
for a predominant language throughout the Agency# The Monpas and other
northern tribes speak a dialect of Tibetan# The Khamptis and Singphos have
connections linguistically with the tribes of Burma and the Thais, whilst
the Wanchos and related tribes have a language similar to that of the Nagas#
The Indian administrators have found the language barrier between them and
the tribesmen immense as not only are the Tibeto-Burman languages difficult
to translate or learn to apeak, but have led to a different tradition of
thought than that of the plains' Indians#
The Indian Union has many dissident minorities within it, but these
are located in areas more accessible to Delhi than the North East Frontier
Agency# Concessions have had to be made to the Nagas, and it would appear
that more yet will have to be made, despite Nagaland being much more eff¬
ectively within the Indian orbit of administration# Only in the southern
areas of the North East Frontier Agency is Indian control other than of a
nominal kind. At present the northern areas are more readily available to
Chinese Influences, and tinder the present Sino-Indian stalemate it would
seem likely that this situation will continue to prevail.
Considerations of physical geography have emphasised the tribal iso¬
lationism of the Agency and made it much more difficult for either India
or China to bring effective administration to the area. Topography, vege¬
tation and climate hinder easy movement within the Agency and make the con¬
stmiction of such vehicles of political administration as roads prohibit¬
ive in cost. Even if the military situation permitted India to launch upon
a programme to provide a coa^rehensive transport network within tho Agency
it is questionable if her economy would be equal to the task.
•Few, if any, land frontiers in the world can claim as strong a sanct-
1
ion of long and unbroken tradition* • Although on a basis of past admin¬
istrative record India may have a better case with regard to the North East
Frontier Agency, this claim of the Historical Branch of the Indian Ministry
of External Affairs is an absurdity. Within the Agency of over-riding im¬
portance is the attitude of the people living there, and almost without ex¬
ception the allegiance is to the family and tribe. The tribes in the north
may have cultural ties with Tibet and those in the south with India, but this
does not provide any feeling of Chinese or Indian nationalism amongst these
groups. It is as if the British should all be ardent American nationalists
because they share the same language and basically the same culture, and to
a greater extent than the tribesman do that of India or Tibet.
To break down the tribalism of the population a programme of develop¬
ment Is needed with roads and education high on the list of priorities. The
1. Ministry of External Affairs! White Paper No.2j 'Notes, Memoranda, &
Letters .Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China,
September to November 1959*} Gov. of India, New Delhi 1959 » p«132.
conflict between Chine and India does not permit the development of
such a prograrana. what would be the outcome of such a programme if it
was possible? Easier oojnrramication with, say, the south and an increas¬
ingly large educated elite would probably produce the opposite effect to
that desired by Delhi# So far the tendency has been amongst the educated
tribesmen to find most attraction in the possibilities of an independent
Agency, or at least a nominally independent state in loose federation
with India. India's defeat by China in 1962, and her poorly directed
policy in the Himalayan area, has not added to her popularity amongst
the peoples of Nepal, Bhutan and the North East Frontier Agency. Nepal
has welcomed the building of the Katmandu to Lhasa road to counteract
Indian influence in the state, and Bhutan is negotiating for some aimi- ^
la arraage.nent with China at present. Although to European and Ameri¬
can eyes the democratic administration of India is far more attractive
than the totalitarian government of China the tribesmen of the Agency
may find the greater administrative efficiency of Peking more attract¬
ive than the somewhat haphazard Delhi model. The Sino-Indian position
along the Himalayan area leaves the North East Frontier Agency with
greater independence at present and the small educated elite amongst the
tribesmen may prefer an alliance with China than risking even federation
with a proven loser such as India. One of the surprising aspects of
the present situation in the Agency is that there has been no suggestion
of ascertaining the opinions of the population regarding the future,
there has been no U.N.Miohelmore Report can the feelings of the tribesmen
towards inclusion in India, or in China, or possible independence, as
was carried out in Sabah and Sarawak before Nalayasia came into being.
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As the Indian and the Chinese version of the boundary both favour
the use of physical features in delimitation they come within Boggs*
'irhysioal* category or Hartshorns*s 'Subsequent'. Under present political
circumstances neither line has the least effect upon the landscape as the
Chinese are so situated that they may not implement their version of the
boundary, and as the Chinese control the northern areas the Indians are
in the same position with regard to their version of the boundary. Within
their tribal areas the tribesmen enjoy a freedom of movement unhampered by
any knowledge of state allegiances or political boundaries, ihether the
Sino-Indian boundary follows the watershed delimitation of the Indian
version (Maps 1 and 2) or the foothills delimitation of the Chinese line
(Map 2) has at present no relevance to the tribesmen.
With regard to the future the North East Frontier agency is culturally
distinctive enough to suggest the possibility of political independence. She
sort of arrangement prevailing along most of the rest of the Himalayan area
(e.g. Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan) would be more acceptable to the educated
elite appearing amongst the tribes, and would provide a passible solution
to the Sino-Indian dispute in the area. Whether such a buffer state would
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CHAPTER QNa ' Historical Develoiaaieat
Ppe-Nfcieteentfr €<j?ntqyy
The work of archaeologists has shown that Hong Kong was inhabited from
earliest times, but was never of any importance as a population centre until
the Nineteenth Century A.D. Hamlets supported themselves by fishing, farm¬
ing and piracy. From the period of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in China such
fishing centres as Aberdeen (Map i) , which was then called Shak Pai wan,
were notorious as pirate bases.
Hong Kong is physically a part of the Kwangtung Province of China (Map
I) over which Chinese suzerainty was established in the years 221 to 214 B.C.,
but even the vigorous attempts of the Han Emperor Wu Ti who conquered the
area in 111 B.C. failed to convert it from a frontier district. It was not
until the T'ang Dynasty £618-907 A.D.) that Chinese penetration of Kwangtung
began with any seriousness and only during the Sung period (960-1280 A.D.)
did Chinese immigration become numerically significant. 'The oldest vill¬
ages in the New Territories, those belonging to the Tang Clan, have a con¬
tinuous history dating back to the eleventh century, and other villages
date from the Yuan Dynasty (1280-1368 A.D.).Hakka and Cantonese, the two main
2
Chinese groups, probably settled in the area over the same period'.
1. Although other sources have been used of prime importance in this
chapter have been the following; G.B.Bndacott; 'A History of Hong
Kong', Oxford, London 1953} G.B.Endacott & A.Hinton; 'Fragrant
Harbour; A Short History of Hong Kong', Oxford, Hong Kong 1962}
G.B.BndacottJ '.an eastern Bntrepot*} H.M.S.Q. London l9o4l
S.D.Ho: 'A Hundred Years of Hong Kong', U. of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
1952} & I.Ingramsi 'Kong Kong'} H.M.S.O., London 1952.
2. Bong Kong} Report for the Year 1962, p.335i Hong Kong Gov. Press 1963.
 
The Sung Emperor Ti Ping# retreating before the Eongola# died at
Kowloon in 1278 A*D» (Map l) • Hia brother# the last Sung Sniperor, was de¬
feated in the New Territories and fled south# although many of his foll¬
owers remained in Lantau (Map l) where their descendants are still found.
Europe's first maritime contacts with China were through Arab and
East Mediterranean traders# many of whom settled in Canton from the eighth
century A.M. onwards. The Portugese were the first European merchants to
exploit the possibilities of sending their own ships to China# Jorge Al¬
varez reaching there in 1513* In 1557 the Portugese established them¬
selves at Macau# the Chinese administration feeling grateful to them for
having helped to suppress piracy in the area. For over two hundred and
fifty years Macau remained the most reliable place of contact between China
and Europe, despite Chinese hostility to it throughout this period.
In 1637 the Englishman John Weddell endeavoured to force his way
through to Canton (Map 2) but was blocked by Portugese interests and failed.
It was not until 1699 that the East India Company ship 'Macclesfield* was
able to trade without hindrance with the Chinese. Following this success
the East India Company sent ships each year and in 1715 set up a factory
outside Canton. Efforts to extend the Company's trade failed and in 1757
European trade in China was limited to Canton by an Imperial Edict and
placed under the control of an official of the wmperor called the Hoppo. Two
years before this Edict a Chinese guild of merchants (Ccr-hong) was given a
monopoly of European trade. Britain's growing control of the Indian subcon¬
tinent during the Eighteenth Century led to her having a greater ability
than her other European rivals to exploit the possibilities of trade with
China and she began to dominate the European contingent in Canton.
At the close of the eighteenth Century trade with China was lucrative
for the European merchants, but limited by the Imperial restrictions* Liv¬
ing in Canton was restricted to the trading season and the Europeans were
not allowed to enter the city. In 1793 Lord Macartney was sent as ambass¬
ador to Peking to try to gain commercial concessions, but had no success
despite being well received. In the main the Europeans were trusted, but
were considered barbaric.
Nineteenth Century:
In the latter part of the Eighteenth Century the East India Company's
monopoly of British trade with China was beginning to crumble Licenced
private traders used India as a base for coiiraerce with China. This enlarged
the British community in Canton and led to the abolition of the East India
ompany's nominal monopoly by Parliament in 1833• However, this did not
overcome the reluctance of the Chinese to extend the commercial privileges
of the Europeans. In 1816 a second embassy led by Lord .tunherat met with
far less success than that of Lord Macartney and was ordered to leave Peking
without an audience with the Emperor. In 1334- Lord Napier was sent out to
Canton as Chief Superintendent of Trade. His instructions were to be con¬
ciliatory towards the Chinese. He lacked power to negotiate with the Chin¬
ese or to control the British merchants. Napier failed to obey his orders
and went to Canton without the necessary permit and tried to ignore the Co-
hong in his communications with Imperial officials. Napier's efforts were
crude and ineffectual. Napier was a sick nan and was forced to ire tire to
Macau where he died shortly afterwards.
Within China opium smoking was increasing rapidly in popularity. The
Imperial administration was alarmed by this development. The import of
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opium was banned by the Chinese, but despite this it was the staple of
trade between India and China. Lin Tse-hsu was appointed Special Conia-
is3ioner by the Emperor with orders to crush the opium trade. In March
of 1839 Lin arrived at Canton and surrounded the foreign factories with
troops. No Europeans were allowed to leave and they were denied food and
water supplies until all opium had been surrendered. Opium traders and
ships1 captains arriving at Canton had to sign an agreement that they would
not import opium with the death penalty for disobeying this iapoxt re¬
striction. Captain Charles Elliot, who was appointed Superintendent of Trade
in 1836, told all British merchants to surrender their opium, but refused to
let them sign the agreement against the import of opium* The British comm¬
unity at Canton was under siege for six weeks, after which they were allowed
to leave for Macau# The Portugese Governor of Macau could not guarantee the
safety of the British so Eliot and his countryman retired to Hong Kong. A
number of incidents led to the breaking down of all relations between Lin and
Eliot.
The British Porelgn Secretary Lord Palraerston decided that Sino-British
relations needed settling and demanded a commercial treaty from the Chinas©
or a small island where the British community could live free from the sort
of pressure Lin had exerted. In June of 1840 a British expeditionary force
arrived to back up Palmerston's demands. Lin had been replaced by a Manohu
commissioner called Keshan who negotiated with Eliot. On January 20th, 1841
agreement was reached over the preliminaries of the Convention of Chuenpi in
which Hong Kong was ceded to Britain. The island was occupied by a naval
detachment on January 26th, 1341 and shortly afterwards proclaimed a British
Colony.
The Convention of Chuenpi was not fully acceptable to either side. It
angered the Chinese and Balmerston referred to Hong Kong as a "barren
island with hardly a house upon it" and found it a poor substitute to a
coraaercial treaty# In August of 1841 Eliot1 s successor arrived at Maoau*
Sir Henry Pottlnger renewed hostilities* The war came to a close in
August of 1842 when British troops were poised for an assault on Ranking*
Under the Treaty of Nanking Hong Kong was ceded to the British Crown and
four other ports opened to trade* In June of 1843» the Treaty having been
ratified by both ritain and China, Hong Kong was formally declared a
British Colony and the name "Victoria" given to the settlement (Map I). Hon*
Kong was made a free port and by the Treaty of the Bogus in October of 1843
the Chinese were given free access to it* An early estimate of the Colony's
Chinese population gave it as about 4-,000 with a further 2,000 afloat. The
first official population report in June of 184-5 showed a total population
of 23>817 (595 Europeans and Indians).
Initially Hong Kong did not prosper as had been hoped due to the att¬
ractions of the Treaty Ports such as shanghai* The 184-7 Barliainentary Cotmr-
Ittee of Enquiry into trade with China recommended economies in the admin¬
istration of Hong Kong as it was felt that it would never develop as an im¬
portant commercial centre. However, shortly afterwards there was a vast
emigration of Chinese, in 184-9 to California and in 1851 to Australia as part
of the gold fever which gripped the world, and also to such places as Central
and South America as labour for the sugar plantations, or Southeast Asia and
the Pacific lands as traders* Hong Kong boomed as a centre for the passen¬
ger trade of the coolies* The Taiping revolt which began in 1850 led to
unsettled conditions on the neinland of China and to the Colony becoming a










having 119,321 inhabitants of whom 116,335 were Chinese.
The Tientsin Treaties (Second Anglo-Chinese War of 1856-58) Save
Britain and France the right to diplomatic representstion in Peking. The
first British Envoy Sir Frederick Bruce was stopped at Taku Bar an his way
to Peking. Once more hostilities broke out between Britain and China and
British troops occupied the Kowloon peninsula. Sir Harry Parkes secured
from the Chinese Viceroy in Canton a perpetual lease on the Kowloon penin¬
sula including Stonecutter*' s Island (Map I) • The I860 Convention of Peking
made this lease into an outright cession of territory to x ritain. Laval and
military claims on Kowloon restricted its development until the Twentieth
Century.
The 1898 Convention of Peking was stimulated by mistrust of French
and Fussian intentions in eastern Asia and followed the 1893 alliance of
Britain and China. Britain was given a 99 year lease on the mainland north
of Kowloon together with 235 islands in the area. This extension was named
the "Hew Territories". The British take-over in April of 1899 had some
opposition but under the enlightened guidance of Sir Henry Blake, who re¬
spected Chinese customs, the Hew Territories were successfully absorbed with
3
the population increasing from 100,000 to about half a million by 1961
(Census).
At the 1898 Convention of Peking it was decided that the Sincr-Hong
Kong boundary should be delimited along the Sham Chun Fiver as shown in Map
3» The delimitation is along the river except in the western and where the
British had the advantage and a mare northerly tributary was used in the
area of Beep Bay (Map 3) • Since 1899 the boundary has been demarcated along
3# The statistical material is taken from the Hong Kong Annual
Reports, plus other Hong Long Government publication such
as the Census.
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Its total length, a process which has been completed since the advent of
Cormmism in China; today there is fencing along the boundary in an attempt
to control illegal immigration into Hong Kong from Kwangtung.
Twentieth Century:
During the Twentieth Century Hong Kong continued to increase in popu¬
lation and trade importance. The Chinese community was given more say in the
governing of the Colony with the first Chinese joining the Legislative Council
in 1880 and the first Chinese member of the .executive Council taking his seat
in 1926. There was equality of race under the law (I865 Governor's Instruct¬
ions made sure that no ordinance was passed 'whereby persons of African or Asia¬
tic birth may be subjected to any disabilities or restrictions to which persons
of European birth or descent are not also subjected*) •
In the same year as the University of Hong Kong was founded (1911) the
»
Ch' ing Dynasty in China collapsed. During the ensuing period of troubles on
the mainland further refugees immigrated into Hong Kong. Chinese participa¬
tion in the First florid War led to a wave of anti-foreign feeling with a boycott
of foreign goods. This Chinese nationalism stimulated a seamen's strike in
Hong Kong in 1922 and a General strike in 1925 and 1926. Although Britain bore
the brunt of the Chinese feeling against foreigners immediately following
the First World War Japan soon replaced her. The Chinese remembered with
bitterness Japan's Twenty one Deuiands of 1915* la 1931 Japan occupied Sfen-
churia and her machinations in China's northern provinces led to open war in
1937. la 1938 Canton was taken by the Japanese forces. In 1937 100,000
refugees entered Hong Kong, about half a million in 1938 with the fall of
Canton, and another 150,000 in 1939• by 1939 Hong Kong's population was
therefore about 1,600,000.
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The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 helped Japanese
ambitions in Asia. On December 8th, 1941 Japan attacked from the mainland
of China, forcing the British to retreat from the New Territories and Kow-
loon to Hong Kong Island. The Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong Island on
the night of December 18th - 19th, and the Colony surrendered on Christmas
Bay. The Japanese occupation was to last three years and seven months and
left Hong Kong in a sorry state economically. Civilian government under
the British was restored on the 1st of May 1946. Sir Mark Young resumed
his Governorship and the population rose from about 600,000 at the time of
the Japanese defeat to 1,800,000 by the beginning of 1948.
The defeat of the Chinese Nationalists on the mainland during 1948-49
led to the greatest immigration in Hong Kong's history. Over 700,000 ref¬
ugees entered the Colony during 1949 and the first months of 1950. They
were mainly from the province of Kwangtung, but also from Shanghai and other
industrial and commercial centres. By December of 1950 the population of
Hong Kong was over 2,350,000.
Since 1949 Hong Kong has survived under the shadow of the aggressive
reputation of the People's Republic of China. The Colony has, however,
prospered as China's outlet to much of the rest of the world and the People's
Republic is Hong Kong's principal supplier of imports (16b of the Colony's
total in 1963). China is also the third largest market for Hong Kong's re¬
exports, although she does not figure prominently in the Colony's domestic
exports. Iianigration from China continues with frightening vigour, for ex¬
ample an May 23rd 1962 5>820 immigrants were arrested trying to cross the
Sino-Hong Kong boundary of whom 5,112 were returned to China, and yet despite
this careful check upon the border it was estimated that 60,000 managed to
immigrate illegally into Hong Kong during May* With this immigration, plus
a high "birth rate of 32*8 per mille (death rate of 5*9 per mille), it was
hardly surprising that the total population of the Colony in the 1961 Census
was found to have reached 3*129,648* Since the 1949 Communist victory in
China both Chinese and British officials have been endeavouring to impose
the boundary upon the landscape in such matters as population movement, but
often only with limited success.
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mgffll ass qf the Land
Hong Kong is located on the southeast coast of China adjoining the
Kwangtung Province of the People's Republic# It is within the tropics,
"being about 100 miles south of the Tropic of Cancer. It £ies between
latitudes 22 degrees 9 minutes and 22 degrees and 37 minutes, and longi¬
tudes 113 degrees and 52 minutes and 114 degrees and JO minutes East.
Kowloon is about 90 miles southeast of Canton and 40 miles east of Macau
(Map 2)• This diiaunitive Colony has a total land area of a little over
398 square miles of which Hong Kong Island (top l) and the small islets
account for 29 square miles, Kowloon and Stonecutter's Island just under
4 square miles and the Hew Territories 3^51 square miles.
As with much of the rest of southeast China Hong Kong is covered "by
a series of granitic domes. Associated with these intrusions are minerals
of economic value such as galena, magnetite, silver, gold, graphite, fel¬
spar and quartz. The structure of the Hong Kong area is a sloping mono¬
cline which strikes parallel to the Chines© coast (i.e. northeast to southr
west). The axis of the monocline runs through the centre of Hong Kong. The
appearance of the landscape, which is one of rugged islands with deeply
dissected peninsulas, signifies an upland terrain which has been invaded by
the sea. weathering is chiefly through chemical action helped by the al¬
ternation of dry and wet seasons. This results in a laterised rock mantle
with depths of more than 100 feet in some places.
The more prominent hills are made up of either volcanics or porphyries
and form a contrast to the lower granite hills. The plains are recent
1. The following have been of importance in this chapter; S.G.Davis: 'The
Geology of Hong Kong'} Government of Hong Kong} S.G.Davis* 'Hong Kong
in Its Geographical Setting*} Collins, London 1949* I*IngramsS 'Hong
Kong*} His Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1952. J.L.Peacock;
'Hong Kong toteorological Records & Climat©logical Notes,
Government of Hong Kong 1952.
depositions of alluvium# Erosion benches are cor-taon up to 400 ffeet and
above suggesting the fluctuation of the whole area during geologically
recent times and harbour borings have brought to light weathered rock sur¬
faces overlain by peat# The highest peaks are at about 3*000 feet and are
made of fine grained crystalline rocks# The coarse grained granitic hills
range in height from 800 to 1,200 feet and are of the Upper Jurassic per¬
iod#
Only the Yuen Long area near Deep Bay (Map l) has a soil of any depth#
Everywhere else in the Colony the soil is thin, often averaging only two
inches# The residual soils are acidic and infertile and need potash, line
and superphosphates to make them productive# Another problem is that the
crystalline nature of the rock formations does not favour aquifers so there
is little underground storage of water and most water for agriculture must
be from surface sources# The rainfall is erratic leading to shortages such
as in 1938 when the rainfall was only 55 inches, or 30 inches leas than the
normal average# To pertly overcome this problem Hong Kong is constructing
a network of reservoirs#
Monsoons dominate the climate of Hong Kong which gives a variety some¬
what unusual in the tropics# The winter monsoon is from the northeast and
commences in September and lasts usually until the middle of March, although
it has been known to continue into May# Early winter is the pleasantest
period of the year with warm and dry days and a temperature of between 70
and 75 degrees F# At the beginning of January rainfall is slight, but the
sky is overcast and a chill wind often blows# In early spring there are
usually periods when the cool norttieasterlies are replaced by warm south¬
easterly winds leading to coastal fog.
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In summer the monsoon blows mainly from the southwest and occurs from
about midriipril to September* It is less persistent than the winter mon¬
soon# Summer is the rainy season and the weather is hot and humid with
cloud cover, showers and occasional thunderstorms# According to the read¬
ings of the Royal Observatory (established in 1883) the annual rainfall has
varied from 46 inches to 120 inches, but averages 85 inches# On average
the five dry months from November to March have only 9 inches of rain, whilst
the rest of the year has 76 inches# The rainfall varies also over the Col¬
ony according to relief with the higher areas having a greater fall and the
smaller islands having about half the rainfall of the mountain regions#
The daily temperature mean ranges from 58 degrees P in February to over
82 degrees P in July# The yearly average is 72 degrees P. February is the
coldest month with a mean minimum of 55*6 degrees F, but usually the temp¬
erature will at this time go below 45 degrees, F# Afternoon temperatures
are usually about 9 degrees P higher than the coldest temperature at night#
The mean relative humidity exceeds dO% from roughly the middle of February
until the first week in September# November on average is the least humid
month with 6%l> relative humidity, although the lowest recorded reading of
1C^ was for January.
Prom May to November tropioal cyclones cause galea, the most likely
months for their occurrence being July, August and September# The passage
of these cyclones bring strong winds and torrential rains# There is an
average of one gale a year and leas frequently the centre of a mature
typhoon will bombard Hong Kong with winds of hurricane force, for example
in September of 1962 the typhoon 'Wanda* led to 138 dead, 34 missing and
130 persons injured, plus 72,000 people registering themselves homeless
with the Social Welfare Department#
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With regard to vegetation Hong Kong is within the frost-free double
2
cropping rice zone of southern China. As might be expected all available
land is used for agricultural purposes. Bice is the main crop of the Hew
Territories, but it is surpassed in importance by market gardening. Vhere
water permits there are two rice crops a year, tire first being sown in the
nurseries in March, transplanted in April and harvested in June; the sec¬
ond crop is placed in the nurseries in June, transplanted at the end of
July and harvested in early November. Market gardening, including flowers
for the urban areas, increases each year in importance. Vegetables are
grown throughout the year, but have their greatest significance in the
coolest months. Some areas manage eight crop® of vegetables each year.
The upland areas suffer from highly leached and acidic soils and are there¬
fore mainly grass covered and it is here that since 1945 an intensive pro¬
gramme of afforestation has taken place.
Physically the Colony of Hong Kong is part of China. However, the
fact that Hong Kong is under a different political administration is having
a modifying effect on certain aspects of the Colony's physical geography.
Since British administration there has grown up a vast industrial and cor,war
ercial city which lias had a certain superficial impact on the terrain. More
dramatic have been the changes in vegetation with the ever growing importance
of market gardening to supply the urban areas, and the governmental pro¬
gramme of afforestation. 'Hie development of mineral resources also produces
a somewhat different landscape. Hong Kong under the British administration
is developing economically much more quickly than is the bordering Chinese
2. T.B.Tregeari 'Land Utilisation in Hong Kong, with Maps of Hong
Kong and the New Territories* J University of Hang Kong Press 1955*
province of Kwangtung, even allowing for the city of Cantcn* This is
producing a certain amount of physical contrast each aide of the Sino-
Hong Kong boundary, although it should be stressed that the effect of
political factors is always much less regarding the physical geography
of an area than it is upon aspects of the human geography* The impact
of the Sino-Hong Kong boundary today upon the Canton to Hong Kong rail¬




At the end of 1962 the population of Hong Kong was estimated to nustoer
3#526,500* Using language and place of origin as a criteria 9Q, j of this
total were Chinese# At the last Census of January and February 1961 the
population had been given as 3,129,643 of which 1,607,779 were male and
1,521,869 were female# The previous official Census had been taken in
1931 whan the population had been found to number 84-9,751* The Department
of Statistics estimate of population in Septerber of 194-9 put the total at
approximately 1,857,000# Estimates of population are difficult ' since the
number passing both ways across the frontier in any one year can be equal
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to or greater than the total of the population* • Illegal immigration in
particular complicates the population increase estimates, but of the est¬
imated increase in 1962 of about 300,100 91,581 was the outcome of the ex¬
cess of registered births over registered deaths and 208,500 the net bal¬
ance of migration#
In the 1961 Census 33,140 came from British Camaonssealth countries
outside Hong Kong, of which 27,936 lived in the urban area# Those from
nonrCourmonwealth countries (except China) numbered l6,6i)7» of which 13,467
lived in the urban area (Map I) • The Aliens* agistratien Office for
non-Chinese alien residents (excluding children under 16 years old) at the
end of 1962 gay© tlie following figures, total registered 8,159 of which
Aaerican citizens provided the largest group with 2,103, followed by
Portugese (1,863), Japanese (652), Filipino (422), Dutch (386), Indones¬
ian (329), ranch (323), Italian (302) and German (300)•
]<• Hong Kong: The Report for 1962J Hong Kong Government
Press 1963, P»36#
Of the urban population of Kcwrloon and Hong Kong about half is of
Hong Kong birth, the vast majority having descended from immigrants from
Kivangtung Province in China* The Kwangtung districts -which have supplied
the largest elements of Hong Kong's urban population are those bordering
the Colony, notably Po On, Tung Kwun, Wai Yeung, Mui Yuen, Chiuchow, 5ze
Yap, Mam Hoi, Pun Yua, Shun Tak and Chung Shan* Also in the urban war
unity is found a Puleion group and Overseas Chinese whose families origin¬
ated in either the Kwangtung or Fukien Provinces* (As Map 2 in Chapter
Three of Section Two demonstrates the two Provinces have both a coastal
position and a proximity to Hong Kong which make them logical migration
areas for the Colony)*
006 out of every 1,000 inhabitants of the urban area of Hang Kong,
Kawloon and New Kowloon have Cantonese as their mother tongue* As the name
implies it is the dialect of Canton, plus others which resemble it* Another
137 in every 1,000 inhabitants of the urban area speak other dialects of
Kwangtung, Hcklo being the most important, followed by Sze Yap and then
Hakka* 28 speak Shanghai, 13 English, 10 the Kuoyu dialect and 6 some other
tongue. Of the families coming from North China there is a tendency to
adopt Cantonese* English is increasing in use, but Kucyu is dying out except
in the intellectual circles* Amongst the speakers of minority languages or
dialects there are one or two concentrations within the area of the Colony,
notably Chiuchow in the western district of Hong Kong Island, Fukien and
Shanghai speakers at North Point (Map I) and Sze Yap speakers at San Chai.
In Kowloon there is a Chiuchow concentration at Wang Tax Sin, Sze Yap speak¬
ers in long Kok and Cheung Sha wan and the Shanghai dialect is concentrated
in Hung Horn. The most notable grouping of Kvuyu speakers is in the district
of the University of Hong Kong*
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Within the New Territories there are four main dialect groups, the
traditional Imd dwelling Cantonese and Hakka, and the boat dwelling
Tanka and Hoklo# These groups shew differences in physical appearance and
customs# The Tanka and Hoklo are thought to be of non-Chinese origin, al¬
though they consider themselves Chinese# The usual village consists of
just one clan, although multiclan settlements do occur# Custom demands that
the men merry outside of their respective clan. There is no record of marr¬
iages between land and sea dwellers#
The Cantonese are found occupying the best areas of the two main plains
of the northwestern part of the New Territories and own a great deal of the
mora fertile land in the other parts# The Cantonese are also the majority
group in the principal islands# Their oldest villages are those of the
Tang clan in the Yuen Long district (Map i) and have been settled since the
late Eleventh Century A#D# A similar age has been proven for the Cantonese
villages at Shek Pik and Mui Wo on Lantau Island (Map l) • On the same Island
some of the Cantonese villages in the Tung Chung Valley date back to the
Thirteenth Century A.D.
The Cantonese and the Hakka entered the Hong Kong area at about the
same time, but the former met with greater success# The Hakka are today
found upstream of the Cantonese in the Hew Territories cm the poorer soils#
They were historically subservient to the powerful Cantonese, but recent
immigration has restored the balance. The Hakka now dominate in such areas
as the Sha Tau Kok Peninsula near the eastern end of the Slno-Hong Kong
boundary, on the islands of Tsing Yi and Ma Wan and in the foothills of Tai
Mo Shan (Map I). The former hostilities between the Cantonese and Hakka
are breaking down and intermarriage is now common with some villages shared
between the two dialect groups#
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The Tanka are the sain seafarers of South China and make up most of
tii© boat dwellers of the Colony* They own substantial sea-going Junks
and en^ge in deep sea fishing. In the main the ffcraily lives afloat, al¬
though some live ashore* The Tanka have bean in the Hong Kong area sinoe
time immemorial, as have the Hoklo* The Hoklo are less numerous than the
Tanka and are mainly found in the eastern waters of the Hong Kong area.
The Hoklo have in some oases settled ashore for a number of generations.
Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911-12 the immigration influx into
the Hew Territories has been such that the indigenous population has tended
to be swamped* Most of the iroaigrants have been Cantonese, Hakka, Tanka
or Hoklo and have either been integrated into the Colony or are in the pro¬
cess of being absorbed* It is the more northerly Chinese newcomers who are
assimilated less quickly, although the only group which has completely re¬
sisted integration is a community of miners from North China found at the
base of Ma On Shan (ilap I) •
As a result of the expansion of industry, commerce and public utilities
into the Hew Territories from the urban areas there has also been an emi¬
gration from the overcrowded city zones into the New Territories* This
trend is beginning to show itself in the 1961 Census figures for language
groups in the Hew Territories where 66k out of every 1,000 inhabitants
gave Cantonese as their dialect (but this included Tanka and Sze Yap
speakers) , 254 Hakka, 46 Hoklo, 26 Shanghai, 13 English, 9 Kuuyu and 9
all other languages* According to the 1961 Census the total population
of the Hew Territories was 456,404 of which 46,459 ware boat people*
It would be difficult to produce an accurate language map of the
Colony because of the comparative mobility of the population due to such
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factors as immigration from the People's Republic of China and the booming
industry and commerce of Hong Kong. There are# however, strong cultural
ties for 9Q/o of the population with China and yet the boundary has already
begun to represent a notable division in the geography of the region. Since
the advent of the Communist Revolution in China in 1949 that state has been
vigorously endeavouring to change the ways of the population with a success
unparalleled in its history. The Chinese culture to which the inhabitants
of Hong Kong adhere is already largely a remnant of a former period within
China, to take but one example the cult of ancestor worship which still pre¬
vails in most Hang Kong aonrounities is officially no more within China. Sim¬
ilarly those who have immigrated into Hong Kong since 1949 are largely people
who are unwilling to accept the charges which the Peking (kwerniaent has im¬
posed.
And yet the Chinese culture within Hong Kong is changing as rapidly,
if less painfully, as that in China. The divergence between the Chinese
of Hong Kong arid those of China is well illustrated by religion. Within
the People's Republic of China, as befits a Communist country, religion
is actively discouraged. Hong Kong presents a quite different picture.
There is, for instance, a Christian community of about 400,000 people which
is growing at the rate of 12*<> per annum in the hew Territories and Kowloon
and 7/o in Hong Kong Island. 9fyo of the total Protestant strength in the
Colony is Chinese (mainly Anglican, Lutheran, Baptist and Mathodist;. The
Rcisan Catholic Churoh claims a community of 190,000 and run 174 schools with
111,748 pupils in them. Christianity within Hang Kong is vigorous and im¬
possible for the Chinese population to ignore. A Chinese educated in a
Roman Catholic school will have an attitude which is quite distinct froan the
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product of the Chinese Communist way of life to Kwangtung.
Buddhism to Hang Kong is undergoing a revival amongst the Chinese
population, largely stimulated by the immigration of Buddhists from the
mainland. There are numerous monasteries and nunneries easily accessible
to the population. Taoism also has many adherents, although it takes a
second place to Buddhism. The clan system has survived to the New Territor¬
ies and many of the villages have an ancestral hall in which to keep the
ancestral tablets for veneration; it should be stated however, that the clan
system is breaking down everywhere to the Colony.
If present trends continue to the Colony on one side of "Hie Stoo-Hcmg
Kong boundary to future decades will be found a largely Christian Chinese
population speaking Cantonese within an Anglo-American city environment, and
on the other side will be found a Cormraist regime without religion other
than tlie concept of the advancement of the state, with greater uniformity
to dress and consumer goods but more variety to dialect and language. From






Another way in which the political boundary has been accentuated is
in the form of land holding on either side of it. China's recent agricult¬
ural experiments in collectivisation and Communes have been much publicised
and contrast with land tenure in Hong Kong. Following the acquisition of the
Hew Territories the Colony established a land court to hear the inhabitants'
land tenure claims. Holdings so established were confirmed by the Govern¬
ment and are known today as Old Schedule Lota. The work of the land court
came to an end in 1903 and land other than the Old Schedule Lots was claimed
as Crown property, the leases of which could be sold at public auction as in
Kowloon and Hong Kong* New Territories' leases bought from the Crown are
called Hew Grant Lota* However, the Government has always acknowledged the
rights of villages to land surrounding them where they may pasture their
cattle or bury their dead and so no Crown land is auctioned before the vill¬
agers have had a chance to object; no reasonable objection is ever ignored*
Much of the land of the Hew Territories is owned by clans which have
claims of many centuries to it* Traditionally a part of the money coining in
from renting such land is put in a fund for clan welfare, education or the
upkeep of religious buildings. Clan lands may not be sold without the
agreement of the clan members and the permission of the District Officer.
- oat of the Crcwn rents are paid in cash (rents are in kind elsewhere) at
a rate fixed when the land was leased so that in tamy older examples it is
1. Much of the material on Agriculture is from ft.J.Blackie: 'Agriculture
& Animal Husbandry Ventures'; Cathay Dress, Hong Kong 1934, & ft.J*
BlackieJ 'Report on Agriculture in Hong Kong'; Director of Agri¬
culture, Fisheries & Forestry, Hong Kong 1955*
very cheap by present day standards# On clan or privately owned lands
the rent of a piece of land in a two crop rice area per year will be
about 4Q - of the annual crop total. Holdings are snail and average under
2 acres with 5 acres being most exceptional.
In the Colony as a whole for 1964 the following break-down of land
use wa3 nadaj there was about 22^ square niles of urban development (5s^
of the total land area; which included roads and railways, III square
miles of steep and largely unusable land (28/») , 22s square miles of wood¬
land (a little over 5s/o of the total area) , 162 square miles of grass and
scrub (somewhat more than 40^4), 20 square miles of eroded land (5h) ,
mainly granite, 5g square miles of swamp and mangrove (lgp) much of which
is suitable for reclamation, 2 square miles of fish ponds (3^) which are
used for fish farming, and 32s square miles of arable land (just over 13,
over the total land area) which includes orchards and market gardens.
Relief tends to dominate what uses may be made of land. From the
point of view of the farmer all the readily cultivable land is being used
and the possibilities that remain are marginal. Over 80^ of the Colony
could be termed 1 agriculturally marginal land*, but the expanding urban
areas tend to encroach on the arable areas rather than the marginal land.
Where possible land for new industry is reclaimed from the sea but this
only partly stops the move into the arable lands. Agriculture is having
to become more intensive and to try and develop the marginal lands.
Similarly in 1937 there was a forest cover of 22 square miles, plus
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81 square miles of private forest lots, but during the Japanese occu¬
pation much of the timber was used, i'he postwar deforestation programme
2. Much of the material on forestry is from A.F.Robertson: 'A Review
of Forestry in Hong Kong with Policy Recommendations* }
Government of Hong Kong 1951*
has been brought into being to improve the water catchments, counteract
soil erosion and use lands not suited to other productive forms of use,
•the establishment of pure forests tends to be restricted to areas inr
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capable of more intensive development.'
To stimulate the production of food in the Colony the Government has
three Departments. The Agriculture and forestry Departnent is interested
in the best form of land utilization and gives advice and technical help
to farmers, the Co-operative Development and Fisheries Department, plus
the Hew Territories Administration^aie concerned with the fishermen in terr¬
itorial waters and the administration and organisation of every kind of co¬
operative grouping* Loans are available through the Kadoorie Agricultural
Aid Fund which was started in 1955 by the Government and the Kadoorie
brothers.
The nature of agriculture in Hong Kong is changing. Since 1954 the
area under two crop padi has fallen from 20,191 acres to 16,545 acres, the
land now being used for mainly vegetable production. A further 2,709 acres
of land is in one crop padi and 127 acres in upland rice. Rice production
is usually about 16,000 metric tons (1962 • 16,463 tons) worth approximate¬
ly £1,030,000 to the economy of Hong Kong. An average yield of padi from
an acre of two crop land is 1.2 metric tons, but the introduction of
better seed varieties, irrigation and the use of fertilisers produces 1.8
metric tons on average land or over 2 metric tons per acre on the better
land.
Land under permanent vegetable farming rose from 2,254 acres in 1954
to 6,464 acres in 1962 and was due to the conversion of 3*700 acres form¬
erly used for rice and the development of 530 acres of marginal land. In
3* Hong Kong J Report far the Year 1962J Gov. of Hong Kong 1963., p. 101.
addition 1,200 acres of two crop padi is used for winter vegetables# The
main crops of vegetables are white and flowering cabbage, Chinese lettuce
and kale, turnip, mustard, spinach, beans, cucumber, watercress, cauli¬
flower and tomatoes# Nightsoil is still very popular, as are other organic
manures, but there is an increasing use of artificial fertilisers# Pull
use is made of insecticides#
Sweet potatoes are important both for human consumption and feeding
pigs# There are 2,500 acres of sweet potatoes double cropped on the drier
lands, and 3 #3^0 acres as a crop following the second padi harvest# Sweet
potatoes yield an average of 4#3 tons per acre per crop# There are also
2,129 acres of other field crops such as soya beans, sugar care and pea¬
nuts# A modest production of fruit is expanding quickly#
Pish farming in tie New Territories is of increasing importance# It
is mainly located near the Deep Bay coast (Map I) , and totals 1,082 acres#
Grey mullet is the chief species, with carp, and edible goldfish also of
importance# Supplies of fry are often imported from China.
With regard to animal industries the shortage of land means that pigs
and poultry are the principal food animals reared in the Hong Kong area#
As with so many aspects of the Colony the Chinese strains are being replaced
by crosses or European stock such as Berkshirea, Mid-Whites and Large-
Whites in the pigs# Artificial insemination is expanding rapidly as a tech¬
nique in local pig production#
In the wetter parts of the Colony ducks and geese are raised both for
domestic consumption and export# Pigeons have become a thriving industry
and those marketed in 1962 brought in about £115,000# With regard to cattle
they are kept mainly for work purposes with only the surplus slaughtered#
There is one large dairy farm on Hong Kong Island and some smaller ones on
the outskirts of Kowloon#
As has bean seen afforestation is a comparatively new phenomena in
the Colony* In the main hilla are gross covered with shrubs and s .all
stands of scrub forest in the mare remote areas* Villagers have been in
the habit of cutting grass for fuel which, along with the dry season hill
fires, has led to the destruction of vegetation and the ensuing develop¬
ment of soil erosion over much of Hong Kong. So far 11,000 acres of for¬
est have been planted, mainly with pine and Brisbane box* Although the
encouragement of private plantation is promoted villagers are not convinced
of the profitability of forestry, a tree takes too long to grow* Therefore,
as in China, forestry is mainly the concern of the Government*
F ialiing
In I960 the various Government bodies dealing with the fishing indus¬
try were formed into the Co-operative Development and Fisheries Department,
to which was added in the same year the Fisheries Research Unit* The De¬
partment now covers most aspects of the fishing industry ranging from re¬
search to the provision of loans for fishermen to use in mechanising
their boats*
Hong Kong's fishing fleet is the largest of any centre in the Common¬
wealth* There are 10,000 Junks, and 25 trawlers of Japanese design. There
are approximately 80,000 seagoing fishermen (mainly Tanks.;. The Junks are
built locally and 95/ of the fleet is owner-operated* In 1958 the People's
Republic of China imposed restrictions on fishermen from Hong Kong using
the Kwsngtung area so that they now have to land part of their catch in
China with quotas varying from time to time and the restrictions being im¬
posed with varying rigidity* 5*2-99 Junks are now fully mechanised (196.3
figure)•
Fish are handled in Hong Kong by the Fish Marketing Organisation which
pays its coats by a 6^ co/isnisaion on all sales in wholesale markets. Since
1956 and the Marketing Ordinance this Organisation has been assisted by the
Fish Marketing Advisory Board. Since 1950 the main export market for Hong
Kong's fishing industry has been closed following an embargo placed on the
importation of salt and dried fish from the Colony by the People's Republic
of China and ao the domestic market la the aU-lrqjortant one. During 1»62
fresh fish sales in Hong Kong increased by 13,0, whilst salt and dried fish
sales decreased by 18, >, but unfortunately for the fishermen the wholesale
price of fresh fish fbll by 12fi> and that of salt and dried fish by 19,»
compared to 1961.
In 1950 a Registrar of Co-operative Societies was appointed. The
co-operative movement has since made great progress both in the fishing
industry and amongst the peasant farmers. Many of the co-operative societ¬
ies operate their own loan schemes# notably the fishermen's. In 1962 29
new co-operative societies were registered, making a total of 377*
Although the Government of Hang Kong is taking an increasing part in
the farming, fishing and forestry of the Colony there i3 again a marked
contrast to the developments north of the Sino-Hong Kong boundary. Hong
Kong is still very much a centre of private enterprise, perhaps the one
exception being forestry where tfie reaction of the individual tends to be
the same throughout the world. Similarly, the Chinese character of farm¬
ing and fishing is changing in Hong Kong, whether it is in the introduction
of European types of pig, European methods of mechanised fishing or the
greater emphasis on market gardening at the expense of South China's trad¬
itional crop of rice. Such provinces of China as Kwangtung are also chang¬
ing, but in a somewhat different way, as, for example, the continuing em¬
phasis there on rice production or the use of Chinese strains of pig. Hong
Kong has an economy developed to cater for the needs of the non-Ca.munist
world whilst Kwangtung is more inward looking and generally isolationist,
ilipeysl fteafflrqea
Iron ore, wolframte and graphite are mined in the Colony, and feld¬
spar, kaolin and quartz exploited by opencast methods* Japan takes Hong
Kong's exports of iron ore, the United States wolframite, Japan, Taiwan
and the Philippines the JCaolin whilst the feldspar and quartz is all con¬
sumed domestically by the enamelware and ceramic factories.
The iron ore is found at Ma On Shan (Map l) and is handled by a dress¬
ing plant with a daily capacity of 800 tons. A second dressing plant was
opened in I960 to treat low grade ores. Wolframite was only mined at Needle
Hill in 1963 33 the world market was previously offering a price which made
Hong Kong's modest deposits uneconomic. Although Hong Kong has a range of
mineral resources they are of limited economic importance being in strail
and scattered deposits which are expensive to work. Of late prospecting
has not brought to light any worthwhile new mineral deposits.
The control of all minerals is the right of the Crown (Mining Ordin¬
ance of I95K)» The Conaaiasioner of -.lines issues prospecting and mining
licences, and the Land Officer mining leases. Prospecting licences are
valid for 6 months up to a total of 5 yaars, as are mining licences, al¬
though the latter can be extended with the Governor's consent. Mining
leases can be granted for up to 21 years. In 1962 there were 2 mining
leases, 16 mining licences and 3 prospecting licences, all of which had
been issued to individuals or very modest mining companies. The Superin¬
tendent of Alines claims a 5,0 royalty on all mineral sales. Again, al¬
though the Government of Hang Kong plays a substantial part in the mineral
development of local resources, the emphasis in the Colony is upon private
development which is a concept hostile to the present attitude of the
Government of the People's Republic of China, and must lead to a diverg¬
ence of attitude either side of the "boundary. However, in conclusion it
should "be stressed that the mineral industry is not a good example to
quote because of its insignificanoe in the economy of Hong Kong.
Industry
Before the Second World War industry was of secondary importance to
Hong Kong's entrep'ot trade. But 'between 1950 and I960 (Hong Kong) changed
from being predominantly a trading centre closely linked with the China
trade, but an industrial nonentity, into a ca bination of two things: a
clearing-house for much of the trading and banking functions of other
countries in the Far bast and a manufacturing and exporting country of light
1
industrial products'. Local industry now accounts for over 75> of Hong
Kong's total exports.
The first of Hong Kong's industries had been the repair and building
of ships. In 1843 the 80 ton 'Celestial' had been launched. Today Hong
Kong is capable of producing vessels of over 6,000 tons deadweight, although
the building of Junks and pleasure craft finds a more readily available
market. Of greater importance is the ship-breaking industry in which Hong
Kong is one of the world's main centres. In 1962 amongst the vessels
broken up at Hong Kong wa3 the 'Strathnaver' (22,270 gross tons), the
•Canton* (16,003 tons) and the U.S. aircraft carrier 'iuget Sound*
(24,560 tons). Heavy industries include the production of machinery for




1. R*K»Hughes: 'Hang Kong - Far eastern I-.eeting Point'; The Geographical
Journal Vol. 129, December 1963. p.46o.
2. The following have been of importance in this section: I.Ingram: 'Hong
Kong*i H.M.S.O., London 1952. The Hong Kong Annual Reports & K.F.
Sacsepanik: 'The Economic Growth of Hong Kang'l Government of
Hong Kong 1953*
In 1899 a spinning mill was started, but closed later. In 1910 the
knitting of cotton singlets and vests was started with greater success#
In 1922 a weaving factory with 30 hand looms opened# At present the text¬
ile industry is Hong Kong's largest industry with 123,670 workers or 42, ■>
of the total labour force in registered and recorded factories and indus¬
trial undertakings# In 1962 the textile industry's exports accounted for
53,o of the total exports of domestic products# The manufacture and pro¬
cessing of cotton goods is the most important within the tactile industry#
There are 625*000 cotton spindles and production in 1962 was 250 million
pounds# Hong Kong's cotton mills are amongst the most well equipped and
modern in the world#
Hong Kong has about 20,000 looms producing piecegoods and in 1962 510
million square yard3 came from them. The Colony also weaves on impressive
range of other materials including rayon, carpets, woollen piecegoods and
military webbing# The most important garment production is shirts, but the
whole range of garment manufacture is participated in.
Textiles have tended to dominate local industry to an unhealthy ex¬
tent so efforts are being made to both diversify within the textile in¬
dustry (e.g# woollen knitwear exports were worth approximately £6,000,000
in 1961 (in Hong Kong dollars 91*200,000) , but increased by 93, > in value
in 1962) and in the introduction of new industries# For example in the
latter part of 1959 the beginnings of an electronics industry was seen with
the establishing of a firm asse;abling transistor radios from Imported parts#
By the end of 1962 there were 20 electronics companies. In 1961 263,000
transistor sets were exported whilst this figure rose to 1,047*000 radios
in 1962# Similar success has been achieved in plastics* air conditioners,
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furnishings, cameras, binoculars, stainless steel cutlery, clocks mid
pleasure craft. The rubber industry is also expanding quickly and absorbs
over a quarter of the Colony's kaolin production.
Industry in iiong hong benefits from low taxation, plentiful and reason¬
ably cheap labour, a free port and outstanding shipping and cahaercial fac¬
ilities. There are no local tx'ade restrictions. These factors have so far
successfully counteracted the handicaps of an absence of raw listeria la
locally, a scarcity of water and the limited land available for industrial
expansion, hong Kong is at present riding a trade boom. Imports in 1962
were 12jo higher than in 13&L and stood at 6,657*000,000 Hong Kong dollars
(about million;. Food was the principal import and accounted for 21&*
of the total, but also of prime importance were raw materials and semi¬
manufactured goods. China provided I8,<j of the total value in imports, ana
Japan was the next moat important. The value of the Colony's domestic ex-
pox-ts was about half that of the imports in 1962 and stood at 3,317*000*000
Hong Kong dollars, which was an increase of 13><> over 1961 (a Hong Kong dollar
is worth Vie.) By value the textile and garment industry provided 32/>
of the domestic exports, but plastic goods asms second with 11 v. Of prime
importance to iiang Kong is Consaonwe&lth Preference and Commonwealth coun¬
tries in 1562 took ijcrp) of domestic exports (by value)} the United States
took 26,/.
The entrepot trade was worth 1,070,000,000 Hong Kong dollars in 1962
(about £70 million). This was an increase of over 1961. Malaya was the
most important, with Japan next and China third in this trade of re-
exporting. The chief coraaodities were textiles, Jewellery, animal and
vegetable raw materials, pharmaceuticals and machinery.
Since 1958 there has been a campaign launched by the Hong Kong Tourist
Association to attract tourists to the Colony# This industry expanded by
13, in 1962 (total number of visitors was 253,016)• were Americans and
a further 3SM> were frcea Commonwealth countries, whilst the majority of the
remainder came from Southeast Asia, in 1939 Hong Kong only had 2,300 hotel
rooms suitable for tourists, but by the beginning of 1964 this figure ted
passed the 6,000 mark# The Tourist Association's 'Hong Kong Travel Bulletin'
now has an overseas circulation of more than 11,000 copies#
Barhaps before concluding the paragraphs on industry it is profitable
to lode et me of the commercial enterprises within Hong Kong, in this case
3
banking# The Banking Ordinance states that no institution may engage in
banking unless it has a licence from the Governor in Council# At the be¬
ginning of 1963 there were 92 licences valid and 46 banks permitted to deal
in foreign exchange. During 1962 the monthly clearings of the Hong Kong
Clearing House averaged ,€146,625,000. On December 31st 1362 deposits in trie
banks of Hong Kong totalled €2o9,437,500# and loans and advances to industry
came to £178,062,500.
In contrast to China * 3 concentration upon the development of heavy in¬
dustry Kong Kong is a producer of consumer goods. The economy is a free
enterprise one with Government participation strictly limited. liong hang
depends on world markets to a fez* greater extant than the industry of China
apparently does. To a certain extent iioag hang epitomises the American and
Western European approach to industrial and oousosrohal development, whilst
China ably represents the Ife rxist-Leziinist concept of the planned economy.
Hong hang's trade with the People's Republic of China is still of impressive
proportions, but it does little to break down the differences in outlook on
3# H.J.Tonkins: 'Report cm the Hong hong Banking System and
Recommendations for the Replacement; of the Banking Ordinance, 194B* J
Hong Kong Government, 1962.
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either aide of the boundary. But for the boundary it can be safely ass¬
umed that Hong Kong would now be part of the great resurgence of China,
but of far less significance industrially and commercially.
nmiryhrttw«i
Hong Kong grew tip because of its position as a ooamunications centre
on the coast of China. It was o focus for the rcutaways of much of the
eastern half of Asia. Initially of first iiz^jorttuic© were marine coiaauni-
cations which are today centred on the Port of Victoria (Map l) between
Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. Fifty-two moorings for ocean-going vessels
are maintained by the Marine Department and there is a wharf storage cap¬
acity of about a million tons. 700,000 gross tons of shipping is regis¬
tered at Hong Kong. During 1962 7fl37*221 tons of cargo was landed and
2,138,259 tons loaded.
Although marine transport is of great importance to the Colony with
regard to the effectiveness of internal administration and the significance
of the Sano-Hong Kong boundary it is land coiaminicaticns which predominate.
As Map I shows there is the Kowloon to Canton railway running from the
Kowloon. peninsula to Sham Chun on the boundary where it Joins the Chinese
section. Since 1949 passengers have had to change trains at the northern
bank of the Sham Chun River where the boundary comes into being which en¬
tails a walk of about 300 yards between the two termini. Goods traffic
is permitted by the Chinese to travel through without transhipment. On the
British section there are 12 passenger trains each way per day and usually
about 2 goods trains. Since 1949 the Kowloon to Canton railway has not
functioned with the freedom it enjoyed under the Nationalist regime. 89^
of the passengers (6,231,789 in 1962) carried travel within the Coloa^r area.
At present Hong Kong is engaged in the extension of the road network
within the Colony (Map l)* Muring 1362 a further 8 miles of (kwerranent
maintained roads oasoS into use, bringing the total to 524 miles* There is
192 miles of road cai Hong Kong Island, 141 miles in Kowloon and 191 miles
in the Hew Territories* Increasing traffic volume has demanded the improve-
rjsnt and widening of present roads more than the building of new motorways*
la the main Hong Hang's roads are good by European standards and ia^ressivs
by Asian, serving the centres of population with efficiency* Ho other state
bordering China is as well bound together by its transport network* The two
r.iost poorly served areas of the Colony are the Island of Lantau and a little
of the eastern part, but population densities are lew# hare. The number of
vehicles registered in Hang Kong as of December ylst 1962 nuahered 65,056
which was an increase of 7,250 over 1961* With regard to the Sino-Hong Kong
1
boundary 'there is no through motor traffic*•
The first flight to Hong Hong by aircraft was in 1911, but civil avi¬
ation was unimportant until the 1950' a* The original grass airfield on the
north shore of Kowloon Hay was extended and Hong Hong linked with the
Londcar*Singapore~Auatralia weekly Imperial Airways service in 1956* In 1957
Pan American Airways started a Iiong Hong-Mbnila-San Francisco service*
Following the Second world War civil aviation in Hong Hong restarted with
vigour* There was a need for a more ambitious airport and in 1956 a beginning
was jnade on a project to reclaim a site from the waters of Kcwloon Hay* A
runway 8,540 feet long was opened in 1556, and a new terminal in 196-2* 33kere
are two locally based airlines, Cathay Pacific operating to India, Japan,
1* H*H*Hughes5 'Hong Hong - Far Eastern Meeting Point* J Geographical
Journal, Vol* 129, December 1965, P»450*
the Hiillppines and Indonesia, and the Jaoau Air Transport Company flying
to Macau. 22 international airlines use Hong Kong on scheduled flights*
In 1962 passenger air traffic increased by 23»6;a (292,007 in and 299,397
out) , freight by 27»%o (2,097,015 kilos in and 4,883,108 kilos out), and
mail by 3*03^ (637,291 kilos in and 907,052 kilos out).
Also important in the communications of Hong Kong is the telegraph
service (3 million telegrams in 1962) > the radio telephone serving 84 coun¬
tries, Telex which links Hong Kong with 53 countries, and the Hong Kong
Telephone Company with 150,000 subscribers and reputedly the lowest charges
in the world. Also there are 1*2 daily newspapers, and 20 which appear once
or twice a week. The bulk of the daily paper sales are of the Chinese lang¬
uage newspapers (600,000 per day; , despite an increasing number of j~ngliah
speaking Chinese (there are 3 daily English language papers and 4 weeklies) ♦
There are three broadcasting organisations, Radio Hong Kong (government
owned) and Commercial Radio each have an English and Cantonese prograiaaa
operating for 17 hours daily. Rediffueion has two Chinese and one English
programme running 17 hours daily. Although only about 150,000 radio lic¬
ences are issued annually it can be said with reasonable certainty that
this is only a part of the total number of radios within the Colony. Irob-
ably moat families have a radio, and certainly all are within easy range of
a radio, in contrast to the situation which prevails in the Mongolian
People's Republic. In 1957 Rediffusion opened the first television service
which has been growing rapidly.
With regard to communications at present Iiong Kong is tied to the non-
Conraunist world. There is no road link with Communist China, and only a
tenuous rail connection. Within the Colony itself there is a comprehensive
transport network, and the ready availability of newspapers and radios
provides a vehicle far the imposition of the Ukrvernrasnt' s authority*
In contrast to most of the other border states dealt with in this study




With regard to physical geography Hong Kong is part of southern China.
But such considerations as the physical nature of the Colony can be over¬
whelmed by aspects of political and human geography when dealing with such
questions as the viability of Hong Kong. Is the Colony developing into a
separate entity? Despite the area being physically part of China does the
Sino-Hong Kong boundary represent a division between two increasingly di¬
vergent areas?
Hong Kong was established during the nineteenth Century as a centre
for British trade with China. It has fulfilled this purely economic func¬
tion admirably, and even since the advent of a hostile Chinese government
after 1949 trade with the mainland of China has been sizeable. Although
much of the area of what is now Hong Kong is to be returned to China at the
end of this Century, if the treaty obligations by which the British ac¬
quired the Rew Territories are to be fulfilled, there is at present in being
a Colony which is alien in many ways to mainland China.
Hong Kong is now a Colony which is economically independent. Despite
having been established to cater for trade with China since 194-5 it has
broadened economically so that this original purpose is now comparatively
unimportant. If Britain withdrew from Hong Kcaig there is little reason to
think other than Hong Kong could continue as an economically viable state.
The Colony* s industry is expanding rapidly, the port continues to be of im¬
portance as an entrepot, and the limitations of agriculture and mineral re¬
sources do not inhibit the well being of the area. Economically absorption
into China would be far less attractive than an ultimate independence. Hong
Kong's trade is with the world and a more provincial role would mean less
prosperity*
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By Asian standards Hong Kong has reached a sophisticated stage of
technological development as has been shown in the description of manu¬
facturing in this Section* It is perhaps unfair to make a comparison
with those other states sharing a boundary with China because of Hong
Kong's modest size, but it is the area with the most comprehensive corara-
unications network and probably the moat effective administration*
Politically Hong Kong's position is less enviable* Her citizens may
have one of the highest standards of living in Asia, but their future is
far from secure* Although representatives of the Chinese population have
a say in the governing of the Colony Hong Kong is still largely administ¬
ered from London* The British are in a difficult position as the Hew
Territories have to be returned to China in a little over 30 years time
which makes grooming for independence in Hong Kong somewhat futile* As
yet China has been content to allow Hang Kong its independence, probably
because it is such a useful contact with the ..est and it is only a quest¬
ion of waiting for the British treaty rights to expire anyway* There are
many forces for integration within Hong Kong, but the uncertainty of the
future is a disintegrating factor which overwhelms all else*
The bulk of the population of the Colony are Chinese, and yet Hong
Kong is becoming increasingly different in characteristics and outlook to
China. of the inhabitants of Hong Kong are refugees from the present
Peking government, whilst the rest cling to the older Chinese way of life
which is being demolished within China* The changes which are occurring
amongst the Chinese of Hong Kong differ from those of China* Like Japan
Hong Kong is a country within Asia which is becoming 'westernised*, cert¬
ainly in the outward appearances of the people and their environment (e.g.
skyscraper Hats and offices, neon signs, etc#;, and also probably in
many of their attitudes# China's path is a unique form of Caaaunism and
the end product may bear little resemblance to the industrial societies
of such European and American influenced countries as Hong Kong and Japan#
The administration within Hong Kong makes itself felt throughout the
Colony. Even the New Territories' clan system is fast disappearing so that
it cannot claim to hinder Hong Kong's functioning as a unit. There are
language differences which might lead to minor nationalisms, but the in¬
creasing predominance of Cantonese should eventually provide uniformity#
Hong Kong has the advantage of being part of the mainland of China
which means that the population is much more willing to think of it as
'home' in contrast to the Overseas' Chinese in places like Indonesia or
Thailand# The Hong Kong Chinese have also enjoyed equality of rights with
the British and other races since 1365, with the exception of the Japanese
occupation during the 19Ws, an event which led to greater appreciation
of British rule# Similarly, a steady stream of refugees from Cormunist
China has done much to convince the inhabitants of Hong Kong that life under
Peking's rule is not what Mao's propaganda would make it out to be.
The Bino-Hong Kong boundary comes within Bogga' 'Physical' or Hurts-
horn©'s 'Subsequent* categories of classification, being delimited and
demarcated along a river# As befits a boundary line between a Communist
state and a 'western* colony the Chinese have endeavoured to restrict move¬
ment across it, co-operating with the British to inhibit the number of
refugees from Kwangtung to Hong Kong# China is hostile to Hong Kong and
intends that the boundary should be an effective division within the
landscape# The fact that the line is delimited along a river is of no
significance as if it was a geometric line such as to be found along parts
of the Sino-Mongolian boundary it would be imposed with equal effective¬
ness* Except for a certain freedom with regard to trade the function of
the Sincr-Hong Kong boundary is to cut off a Coimnunist state from a West¬
ern committed area until such time as the latter can be successfully ab¬
sorbed into the former.
Although Hang Kong has reached a stage of territorial maturity the
same cannot be said for China. There is no possibility of either the
British government or Hong Kong making claim to territory at present under
foreign rule, but Baking can be expected to continue to expand its admin¬
istrative area. Despite Hong Kong being more of an entity than China its
independence will always be a relative thing* if Britain withdrew it would
seem unlikely that China would permit the survival of a city-state of
Hong Kong*
Hong Kong is the moat cohesive of the states bordering China, and yet
an area unlikely to survive as an independent country. The Colony enjoys
a smoothly working administra -ion and a good cammunications network. It
has a predominantly Chinese population hostile to its northern neighbour
and enjoying an increasingly prosperous econony. 'Nowhere in the world
are there better and more comprehensive schemes for the advancement of lit-
1
eracy and learning than in Hong Kong* and with education there comas an
increasing influence of 'Western' culture and thought. All children have
primary school places, with adequate facilities for the abler to go on to
secondary school and university. The educational system is modeled upon
the British, and if China does not gain Hong Kcng until 1897 whan the Mm
Territories' lease runs out Peking may find the Colony harder to assimilate
than her other problem areas of Tibet and Sinkiang. At present it can be
stated that Hong Kong in functioning effectively as a political unit, and
that the Sino-IIong Kong boundary provides a division within the landscape#
However, this situation is not expected to survive.
1. British Survey: 'Hong Kong*; No.209$ London 1962
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SECTION sKVBN j The Mongolian People's Republic
SbS CogBpffiigt poyderland
1
Sa^£M : Historical Developrgent.
ESSC&MttMtik AoM*
Before the Nineteenth Century the cultural differences between what
is now the ifongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of China
were due mainly to economic factors# Pastoral nomadism predominated in
Mongolia whilst the Chinese favoured irrigated agriculture. Lattimore
2
•writes 'it seems probable that what took place during the later neol¬
ithic and the Bronze Age, from perhaps 3000 B.C. to about 500 B.C., was a
broad but very slowly accelerating process of differentiation'. This was
not limited to a division along the present 3ino-Mongolian boundary, but
was over a wide area. In the centre of the developing Chinese culture (i.e.
the Yellow River bend} the ctxange was conspicuous by the second millenn¬
ium B.C., but nearer the edge of the steppe the effects were not beginning
to shew until perhaps the second half of the first millennium B.C. During
the antecedent period culture was at the same level in the various regions.
The Mongols were probably of the same stock as the northern Chinese but
were culturally different after the development of higher agriculture by
the Chinese. After the Chinese had abandoned the crude hoe agriculture and
progressed in agricultural techniques they were more restricted in their
geographical environment. It was possible for the Chinese to spread out-
1. In the history of Mongolia chapter the following references have been
used extensively: G-.Priters* 'Outer Mongolia & Its International Pos¬
ition', Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 19A9J O.Lattimare:
'Nationalism & Revolution in Mongolia', Oxford University Press, New
York 1955, 'Studies in Frontier History', Mouton, Paris 1962, 'Inner
Asian ""rontiers of China', Beacon edition, Boston 1962; & P.S.H.Tang*
'Russian & Soviet Policy in Manchuria & Outer Mongolia 1911-1931':
Duke University Press, Salem 1959.
2. O.Lattimore: 'Inner Asian Frontiers of China' J Beacon edition,
Boston 1962, p. 55*
wards from the great bend in the Yellow River to the Great Plain of north¬
ern China and there assimilate the tribes at a lower cultural level be¬
cause such geographical factors as climate, relief and soil permitted the
practising of their form of cultivation. But the steppe was an environ¬
ment which discouraged the use of the Chinese irrigated agriculture and en¬
abled the Mongols to resist any northward advances of the former, There
was a broad frontier sons between the lands of the Chinese and those of the
Mongols or * barbarians' for there was no precise line between those areas
which could support an irrigated agriculture and those which would not. The
differentiation between the Chinese cultivators and barbarian herders dev¬
eloped in the frontier area by experiment and initially the farmer did more
farming than the latter, whilst the barbarians tended more towards the keep¬
ing of anin&ls. Increasingly the steppe environment became mar© marginal
to the developing techniques of Chinese agriculture until the steppe soc¬
iety had at last to abandon any attempt to emulate the cultivators of the
agriculturally more favourable Chinese environment and commit themselves to
the steppe and the sort of economy it favoured* After committing themselves
the steppe peoples then had to adapt fully and efficiently to their envir¬
onment. This meant a limited use of agriculture and a specialisation on
pastoralism.
The specialism in irrigated agriculture was reached much earlier in
China than pastorelism was further north. By the second millennium B.C.
the Shang people of Honan-Shansi had already committed themselves to agri¬
culture and an urban life. It is not until the second half of the first
millennium B.C. that there is reference in Chinese records to horsemen in
the north. The Chinese had used chariots long before this, but apparently
their former foot-slogging rivals along the frontier had now taken to the
mapi.sino-mongolianborder. afterw.a.d.jckson1962,p28, o.lattimorei962?p52.
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horse* The use of the horse led to a quick development of a society of
mounted nomads who challenged the Chinese in the area with greater eff-
ectiveneas* Lattiraore puts the date of the developing clashes between
the mounted nomad society of the steppe and the agricultural economy of
the Chinese areas as in the Fourth and Third Centuries B.C. There was a
development in the steppe areas of a specialised use of horses with the
late refinement of the stirrup which permitted, amongst other things,
efficient mounted archery. Pastures were all-important to the Mongols
and there was a banding together of men under a leader to protect their
nomadic territories* A society of powerful princes grew out of these
first measures to protect the rights of the individual to graze his herd*
The self-sufficiency of the noraad economy led to a demand for the sort of
luxuries only a settled society could produce and which were used to dist¬
inguish the great from the lowly in the Mongol power strata. The tribal
leaders were of immense power because of their right to regulate the
tribe* s pastures* The leader drew tribute from his followers who also
served as his warriors* The chief might impress his followers further
by at times importing Chinese labour to start up a certain amount of agri¬
culture in marginal areas (Map I shows the general areas used). However,
it was always in the interests of the leader to keep in being a highly
mobile nomadic economy on which his paver rested securely*
Although the harse was the vehicle of war sheep were of greatest
importance in the Mongol economy. Sheep provided felt for the tent in
which the Mongol lived, skins for clothing, milk, butter and cheese, meat
3* O.Lattimore: * Origins of the Gkre&t Wall: A Frontier Concept in
'.ilteory & Practice'J Geographical eview Vol.27, October, 1937*
in winter and dung for fuel#
The conflicts of the Chinese and Idongols along the frontier were
those of a wealthy society labouring against a mobile way of life# Dur¬
ing periods of strength in China the Chinese were able to mount azmiss
of professional cavalry to compete with the Mongols in their awn type of
warfare, but this was so expensive that it could not be continued for
any great length of time* The effectiveness of the Mongol mobility was
later challenged by the trade in Mongolia being under the patronage of
the princes and wholly in Chinese hands, and the spread of the Lamaist
form of Buddhism#
Perhaps the greatest period of Mongol history was under Ghenghis
Khan# He cam© from the lower ranks of the tribal nobility and was stim¬
ulated in his early ambitions by a desire to revenge the death of his
father who had been killed in a Mongol conflict# Ghenghis Khan launched
upon a series of tribal wars which eventually placed each unit under a
chieftain loyal to hkoself# To weld together the Mongols without depriv¬
ing them of tlieir great strength of mobility by making them take to agri¬
culture, Ghenghis Khan chose Turkic Uighurs from the cases of Sinkiang
to create a written Mongol language and a primitive civil service* The
use of Uighura who were Hbstorian Christiana or Moslem and spoke a
Turkic language enabled the Mongols to bypasa the Chinese scholar-gentry
in their adminis tra lion needs#
Genghis' grandson Kublai Khan was the first Mongol to rule all of
China and continued his grandfather's policy of making sure the Mongols
were not stifled by Chinese bureaucracy# Prom 1280 to 1368 the Mongol
Yuan Dynasty ruled China largely through the Turkic Uighurs, Persians and
3U«
a sprinkling of other nationalities such as the Italian 1'arco Polo# At
its height the Mongol Empire stretched from the lands of the Eus in Eur¬
ope to the Pacific Ocean, with China the richest part of it#
The efforts of the Mongols during their rule of China to produce a
Mongol culture to compete with the dangerous sophistication of the Chin¬
ese mandarins led to the experimenting with Tibetan Lamaiam# This mod¬
ified form of Buddhism vanished from Mongolia with the fall of the Yuan
control of China and the advent of the Ming Dynasty in 1368# The Mongols,
having returned to their steppelnnda, had no need of a religion to bind
together the pastoral and agricultural dominions of the Empire# When Laror
aiam reappeared in the Sixteenth Century the first Mongol converts were
those nearest to China in what is now Inner Mongolia# The Mongols of Inner
Mongolia were more sympathetic to the Chinese Ming dynasty and with their
aid the Chinese had negated the threat of another Mongol invasion, although
they had been tunable to subject the area of Outer Mongolia# The G-reat Wall
frontier had been turned over to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia to use against
the more northerly Mongols# The Ming dynasty therefore had a protective
barrier of Mongol vassal states# But from the Sixteenth Century onwards
the Mongol tribes along the loop of the Yellow River regained their
strength and returned to pastoral nomadism and full mobility# Prom 1530
until his death in 1583 the Mongol leader of these tribes, Altan Khan, built
up an empire which stretched to Tibet# The Mongols made frequent excursions
into Shansi, Shansi and threatened Poking# Altan Khan re-introduced Lameism
to avoid the adoption of Chinese culture in his territories#
The death of Altan Khan also marked the rise of Manchu power along the
frontier# The Manchus were in alliance with the ..astern Mongols# The i'ianr
chus and their allies launched an attack into China which took Peking in
I&t4» Inner Mongolia went over to the Manchu cause in order to gain some
of the benefits of the fall of China without being faced with a challenge
of Manchu power from China. This gave the ianchus control of Manchuria,
Inner Mongolia and hansu along the northern frontier. To this inner front¬
ier sane the greatest of the hanchn .japerors K'ong Hsi (1d62-1723) added
an outer frontier area which owed allegiance to China, but was not direct¬
ly ruled by the Chinese; this included northern Manchuria, Outer and "west¬
ern Mongolia, the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang and Tibet. This was achieved
by waiting for the western Mongols to exhaust themselves in an attempt to
create a new Mongol Mmpire centred on the Altai Mountains and including
Outer iJongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. The Mongols of Outer Mongolia, the
Moslem rulers of Sinkiang and the Tibetans asked far Manchu help against
the V. ostein Mongols and the latiers* fledgling empire fell apart.
By this time the Lamaiat Church was of prime importance in the Mongol
lands. Living Buddhas had equal importance with the hereditary princes and
the Manchus managed to create a Mongol church which was independent of the
princes. The sons and nephews of ruling princes could not be selected as
Living Buddhas.
With the limitation of Mongol power under the Manchu Ch*ing Dynasty
nomadism was restricted within certain boundaries. The building of religious
foundations meant fixed property with territory attached and with a Living
Buddha controlling the inhabitants. Mobility was of lesser importance. There
was in influx of Chinese traders working for a number of large companies,
and Chinese artisans. The unemployed Mongols went into the monasteries so
that as many as of the male population might be monks.
nineteenth Century
Outer Mongolia, or what is now the Mongolian People* s Republic, was
never as effectively under the control of China, nor suffered as much from
Chinese and Laraaist exploitation as Inner Mongolia* The Chinese traders,
working in conjunction with the princes and lanes, made huge profits out
of the Mongols* Interest paid on debts might be as high as 500/) per annum
and when the Ch'ing empire fell in 1911 each Mongol household had a Chin¬
ese trading debt of 500 ounces of silver if the total of 15,000,000 taels
4
is averaged out throughout the Mongol areas*
The Mongols were obliged to raise military contingents for the Chin¬
ese Emperor when required to and during the Taiping uprising and the wars
against Britain and France in the Nineteenth Century Mongol troops were
very much in evidence* Almost all the Mongols were vassals of the Ch'ing
Emperor by the end of the rule of Ch'ien Lung (1736 to 1796 A*D.) and under
this vassalage, plus the parasitic administration of the Lama1st church
and princes, the Mongols did not prosper.
Under the influence of the lams the Mongols lost their warlike de¬
meanour* By the Nineteenth Century many of the monasteries owned 50/a of
the land and 7Q, > of the livestock* The average Mongol was better fed than
the average Chinese, but he should have been much more prosperous*
The subordination of the Fongol economy to Chinese traders during
the Nineteenth Century was further emphasised by the influx of Chinese
settlers during the latter part of the Century* The Chinese immigrants'
agriculture was not as intensive as that of China as the southern margins
of the Mongol territories were less able to support irrigation, but it
4* O.Lattiiaore; 'Inner Asien Frontiers of China* j
Beacon edition, Boston 1962, p*95«
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changed quickly the local econony. The railways made it possible to
export into China the grain produced in Inner Mongolia which had not been
feasible with bullock transport# A railway line was driven frota Peking
into Inner Mongolia# Another new farce which backed up the Chinese insai-
gration was the use of efficient firearms#
Twen1,iflfo Centiyy
As has been seen at the beginning of the Twentieth Century the term
'independence* was a relative thing for the Mongols# Due to their posit¬
ion they were open to the influences of both China and the vigorous, more
recent power of Russia# The development of a special relationship with
first Tsarist Russia, then after 1917 the Soviet Union, was largely the
outcome of the challenge whioh the Outer Mongolians felt China presented#
The challenge from the south was one of displacement rather than mere
alien rule. The Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia was actively en¬
couraged by the Ch'ing iimpire during its last decade. This Chinese immi¬
gration awakened a sense of nationalism amongst the Mongols north of
Inner Mongolia# Initially the nationalism was amongst the lamas and feu¬
dal chiefs who found their power challenged by the Chinese to a greater
extent than prior to the immigration# In desperation the leaders of Outer
Mongolia appealed to St# Petersburg#
Amidst this turmoil of Mongolian diplomacy the Manchu kropire was
fast failing# Although the Chinese Amban in Urga (Ulan Bator) might for¬
bid any intercourse between Outer Mongolia and Russia he had only a hand¬
ful of troops with which to stop the Mongolian delegation going to St#
Petersburg in June of 1911# iincouraged by revolution in China, and aided
by the Russians, the Mongols in November of 1911 declared their independ-
ence from the Manchus before the Dynasty had actually fallen and made
the Living Buddha of Urga the new head of state*
The new Republic of China felt it necessary for reasons of prestige
to try and regain the allegiance of those areas which had been under the
control of the Manchua* President Yuan* a efforts to charm the Outer Mon¬
golian administration bore little fruit* The Chinese became aware of the
efforts of the new Mongol state to win the sympathies of the princes of
Inner Mongolia* Swift and bloody action was taken against any signs of
revolt in Inner Mongolia, and troops were sent to the western part of the
province to reinforce the Chinese hold* A protest was presented to the
Russian Government asking them to abstain from interfering with any meas¬
ures the Chinese might feel necessary to re-establish order in Outer Mon¬
golia* The Russian Minister in Peking offered the Chinese an understand¬
ing over Outer Mongolia, but the Government of the Republic could not
agree to such a move in the face of hostile public opinion*
Towards the end of 1912 the Russians concluded a treaty with the Liv¬
ing Buddha and the Mongolian princes recognising the end of the former re¬
lationship between Cuter Mongolia and China* Although China had been
sending fresh divisions to Inner Mongolia she lacked the strength to re¬
take Outer Mongolia* The public outcry within China was allayed by launch¬
ing a war loan, an action which restored a certain amount of oalm* In Mov-
eraber of 1912 President Yuan received a telegram from the Living Buddha
announcing Outer Mongolia's Declaration of Independence*
Pressure was being exerted upon China by Russia to recognise three
conditions with regard to Outer Mongolia, namely no occupation, no admin¬
istration, nor any colonisation* Close relations were developed between
Urga and St* Petersburg which more or less forced China to open negotiat-
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ions with Russia in December of 1912* The Chinese submitted totally un¬
acceptable drafts for a treaty over Outer Mongolia; these were rejected
by Russia* St* Petersburg threatened China with retaliatory action
should she launch an attack into Outer Mongolia* Opposition to the moves
of the Chinese Government was met in the newly created parliament* In
July of 1913 the Chinese Foreign Minister resigned in despair* Finally
an agreement was readied whereby Russia recognised Chinese suzerainty
over Outer Mongolia, but China had to acknowledge the virtual independence
of the Mongolian Government and agree not to send troops or colonists into
Outer Mongolia. In order to put the treaty into force President Yuan pro¬
cured the formal liquidation of the Kuornintang, which provided much of
his opposition in China*
In December of 1913 the Mongolian Prime Minister gave the Chinese
Minister in St. Petersburg a note protesting against the Russo-Chinese
Treaty and declaring afresh Outer Mongolia's independence. In September
of 1914 a tripartite conference was held with the Chinese delegation in
an aggressive mood as Russia was involved in a Muropean war* Their de¬
mands cam© to what was practically the reduction of Outer Mongolia to a
Chinese colony* Negotiations were broken off until the beginning of 1915
due to the Sino-Russian impasse* The Chinese demanded equality of trad¬
ing rights with the Russians in Outer Mongolia which was refused. In
June of 1915 a tripartite agreement was finally signed in which China
recognised the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1913* A Chinese representative was
to take up residence in Outer Mongolia as a sign of the Suzerain of the
Republic of China*
Owing to their commitments in Durope, and later the Communist Revolt
of 1917# the Russians began to lose their former dominance in Outer Mongolia-
In May of 1917 the increasing Chinese econoraic position was demonstrated
with the opening of one of their banks in Urga. In 1918 the Chinese re¬
inforced their representative's bodyguard, set at 200 men by treaty, in
Outer Mongolia* By December of 1918 the Chinese Government was proclaim¬
ing their intention of terminating the treaty between the Republic and
Outer Mongolia* Negotiations were secretly begun between China and the
Mongols, but support for the former was limited* Backed by 4,000 troops
Cheng Li, the Chinese representative in Outer Mongolia, procured the prom¬
ise of the Living Buddha to abolish the autonomous government* rIhe draft
was sent to Peking for approval* But in October of 1919 General Hsu Shtr-
tseng arrived in Urga with a stronger policy towards the Mongols* His
demands were at first refused by the Mongols, but he exerted pressure until
they complied* The President of the Chinese Republic issued a mandate on
Noveriber 22nd 1919 which more or less restored the position of Outer Mon¬
golia to that which it had been under the Manchus* The brief rule of
General Hsu increased Chinese influence at the cost of Mongol hostility*
General Hsu was followed by Li Yuan, and then Chang Yi returned to Outer
Mongolia*
An attack into Outer Mongolia by a military adventurer, Baron Ungern
Sternberg, in October of 1920 was repulsed, but the victorious Chinese
commander Ch'u Ch'ih-hsiang permitted his troops to plunder and slaughter
the foreign residents* Sternberg returned, spreading the idea of Mongol
nationalism, taking Urga in February of 1921 and thereby abruptly ending
Chinese rule in Outer Mongolia* The Living Buddha was forced to appeal
unsuccessfully to Peking against the oppressive measures of Sternberg*
And so, to all intents and purposes, Chinese direct control over Outer
Mongolia came to an end*
Th© Mongols asked the Soviet Russians to help them against Sternberg
and the latter was defeated. On Nover ber 5th 1921 a Rusao-Mongalian
Treaty was signed recognising Outer Mongolia as an independent state. On
May 1st 1922 the Chinese Government lodged a complaint against this agree¬
ment. Unofficial discussions between the Soviet Union and China ended in
March of 1924 with the signing of a treaty draft recognising Outer Mongolia
as part of China; this was repudiated by the latter who demanded that Sov¬
iet troops be withdrawn from Outer Mongolia right away. However, in May of
1924 the Soviet Union formally recognised Chinese sovereignity over Outer
Mongolia.
But a month after this latter agreement the Living Buddha died and
Outer Mongolia declared herself the Mongolian Peopled Republic. This
demonstrated the Mongols' preference for the Russians to the Chinese, not
any particular partiality for Communism. China was torn by internal
strife which broke out into civil war in 1926, and from 1927 her diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union were broken off.
Chinese colonisation had advanced through Inner Mongolia and stood
poised to launch into the more fertile areas of Outer Mongolia. The Chin¬
ese expansion Into Outer Mongolia never came as in 1931 and 1932 the Japan¬
ese army occupied Manchuria which was the Chinese base for colonisation
operations against Mongolia. Direot postal communication between Outer
Mongolia and China ceased to exist. The Japanese took advantage of the
anti-Chinese feelings in Inner Mongolia to gain control of tlia Mongolian
Political Council under rince Teh. To counteract Prince Teh'3 influence
the Chinese established in 1936 the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council.
But Sino-lvlongolian hostility was too long established and a Mongal-
Japaneso army over-ran all but western Inner Mongolia.
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China turned to the Soviet Union. In 1936 the U.S.S.R. and the
Mongolian People's Republic had signed a protocol of Mutual Assistance
against which the Chinese had protested. 'fhe Chinese attitude was
changed by the concluding of a pact of non-aggression between China and
the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1937* Both Inner and Outer Mongolia
meant a lot to China, but under the circumstances in which she found her¬
self during the late 1930's she had to abandon all thoughts of re-establish¬
ing her authority in the north.
On April 13 th 1941 the U.S.S.R. and Japan signed a treaty of neutral¬
ity in which it was agreed to respect the position of Manchukuo and the
Mongolian People* s Republic. Prom Chungking the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Chung-hui had stated that Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo were Chinese
territory. In the same month of April the Soviet action was defended by
the Chinese Communists.
Up to 1945 the Kuoiaintang under Chiang's leadership had confirmed on
a number of occasions that they considered Outer Mongolia a part of China.
But on January 5th 1946 the Chinese Nationalists gave official recognition
to the Mongolian People's Republic. One of the prices Chiang Kai-shek
had to pay for Soviet participation against Japan was to agree to the hold¬
ing of a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia on October 20th 1945 to decide
whether the state wished to be independent. Diplomatic relations between
the Mongolian People*a Republic and Nationalist China were established
on February 13th 1946.
Soviet aid had been limited due to her own require:rents, but after
1946 and the signing of a new 10 year mutual assistance pact the U.S.S.R.
was able to increase its economic assistance to Ulan _ator. Ulan iiator
was linked by rail to the Trans-Siberian Railway* The first Five Year
Plan was launched in Outer Mongolia in 1948, largely based on Soviet aid*
In October of 1949 the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. In
1950 the Peking Oovernraent recognised the Mongolian People's Republic,
5
despite Mao's statement to Edgar Snow in 1936, 'When the People's Revo¬
lution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian Republic will
automatically become part of the Chinese federation, at their own will*'
A 10 year treaty of economic co-operation between Mongolia and China was
signed in 1952, greatly aiding Ulan Bator's second Five Year Plan which was
commenced in 1953* In 1955 Ulan Bator was linked with the Chinese railway
network*
Perhaps as late as 1955 Soviet influence within the Mongolian People's
Republic was unchallenged* It is still completely dominant as witness Ulan
Bator's participation on Moscow's side in the Sino-Soviet ideological clash.
But China since 1949 has attempted to remove her traditional image of agg¬
ressive coloniser of Mongol lands* Within Outer Mongolia the Chinese appear
to be trying to outdo the Soviet Union, whether by building the most im¬
pressive embassy in Ulan Bator or in the granting of aid*
A change of attitude on the part of the Chinese towards the Mongolian
People's Republic has also been signaled by the discussion of the Sino-
Mongol boundary delimitation* Whether the agreement signed between Ulan
Bator and Peking on December 26th 1962 includes a boundary delimitation, or
merely provides a basis for discussion, renins to be seen* What is of im¬
portance is the willingness of the Chinese for the first time to recognise
there is a political boundary between China and Outer Mongolia. The vast
5* Edgar Snow J 'Scorched Earth'i London 1941, p*289*
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areas of disputed land along the Sino-jMongolian boundary (Map I) are the
result of the Chinese and Mongols never having discussed before a delimit¬
ation. 'The Mongol line shown in Sap I is taken from the boundary delimit¬
ation on Mongolian and Soviet maps, whilst the Chinese line is that favoured
by maps published in China# iuxcept for the differences between the Mongol
pastoral economy and the irrigated agricultural ecanorry of the Chinese there
has been no boundary evolution of the type seen along moat of China's other
borderlands# There has been a careful delimitation of the Mongol-Soviet
boundary in the north, culminating in Moscow's annexation of fannu-Tuva in
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The Mongolian People's Republic extends 1*470 miles from east to
west and 780 miles from north to south. It runs from 52 degrees 15 min¬
utes Worth to 41 degrees 32 minutes North, and from 87 degrees 47 minutes
jiast to 119 degrees 54 minutes* East. It has a total boundary length of
about 4»400 miles of which 39,^ ia shared with the Soviet Union and 6l/J
with the People's Republic of China.
Basically Outer Mongolia is a dry plateau which rises from about
4*000 feet in the southeast to 5*500 feet in the central area (Map A).
The southern part of the country is occupied by the Gobi Desert which ex¬
tends into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of China# this is a flat
and monotonous wasteland, except for such hills as the Gurvan Shaik and
the Khurkhe Ula in the South Gobi. Towards the north and west mountains
such as the Khanghai arid the Mongolian Altai rise above the level of the
plateau, the Altai Mountains reaching heights of 15*000 feet. The Altai
Mountains extend into the U.S. S.R. and the Sinkiang~Uighur Autonomous
Region of China. They are natch faulted and deeply dissected and within
the Altai rises the River 0b. The 194k Soviet incorporation of the Tannu-
Tuva upland basin within its own area means that the Susso-, ongolian boundr
ary is now south of the Tannu Ola Mountains, hast of Tannu-Tuva the
Mongol-Soviet boundary stretches across the continuation of a deeply diss¬
ected plateau known here as the eastern Sayan Range. Next comes the
largest freshwater lake in Mongolia known as Khubsugol Nur and it is to the
1. In the chapter on the physical characteristics of the Mongolian People's
Republic the following references have been of significance: C.P.
Berkeley & F.K.Morris: 'The Geology of Mongolia'» American Museum of
Natural History Publications, New York 1927* G.W.Heiqy: 'Mongolia',
Joseph Crosfield, Harrington 1963# W.A.D.Jackson: 'Russo-Chinese
Borderlands'* Van Nostrand, Princeton 1962# I.Prejevalsky:
'Mongolia, the Xangut Country, & the Solitude of Northern Tibet',
Vols. I & II. * London 1876# & E.Thiel: 'The Soviet Far ast',
iraiger. New York. 1957*
north of this that the Russo-Mongolian boundary runs, passing across a
broad highland valley which is the main routeway between Irkutsk in
eastern Siberia and the Mongolian People' 3 Republic# After this there
is the Dzhedinsk Mountains stretching to the selenga River and the
Russo-Mongolian boundary uses a crestline in this range for its delim¬
itation. The Selenga River, which is the major one in Outer Mongolia,
drains northwards into Lake Baikal and provides a routeway between
Mongolia and the U.S.S.R. The Trans-Siberian Railway is connected with
Ulan Bator along the Selenga Valley. &ast of the Selenga River are a
number of low ranges which the Russo-Mongolian boundary crosses, but
after the Onon River the mountains give way to an undulating plateau
which typifies the country in which the Russo-Sino-Mangol boundaries
meet#
It is difficult to describe the Sino-Mangolian boundary with simi¬
lar precision as the 1962 border agreement between the Mongolian People's
Republic and the People's Republic of China has not been published as
yet# However, the landscape along the 2,700 mile boundary is a much less
complex one than the Russo-Mongolian one in the north. According to
Mongol maps published by the Soviet Union the Sino-llongolian boundary
starts in the west by running southeastwards along the crestline of the
Altai Mountains (Map A)# «fter leaving the mountains the boundary has
a somewhat arbitrary route across the Gobi Desert, the delimitation of
which has a certain variety on Soviet, Chinese and Mongol maps, as it
has also in the eastern plateau region# The Chinese have, amongst other
things, tended to incorporate the Mongol Altai Mountains within Sinkiang
in order to control the local streams and the dependent oases to the
west# The Chinese have favoured a number of more northerly crestlines.
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whether the Bino-Mongolian boundary has actually been delimited in
the agreement of December 1962 cannot be stated. The length taken to
publish details of the treaty contrasts to the prompt reporting in offic¬
ial Journals such as the 'Peking Review' which followed the Sino-Burraese,
Sino-fiepalese and 3ino-Pakiatani boundary delimitations. This suggests
that the initial agreement is probably merely a basis for further dis¬
cussion before a complete boundary delimitation is settled. One of the
main problems is that the Sino-Mongolian boundary has never before been
delimited by treaty and so there is no easy basis from which to negotiate.
The Mongolian People's Republic is therefore mountainous in the north
and west. In the south is the Gobi Desert which stretches eastwards to
become the Taklamakan Desert of the x'arim area of Binkiang and the Dzung-
arian Basin further north of this, eastern Outer Mongolia is an undulat¬
ing plateau extending into the Soviet Union and China.
As Map 8 demonstrates the geological make-up of the Mongolian area is
complex. Beginning in the western portion of the country the Altai Mount¬
ains are composed of Silurian, Tertiary and Upper Cretaceous rocks with
igneous intrusions and partly metamorphosed. The lower area of Ubsu Nur
further north is also metamorphic rocks with igneous intrusions. Similar¬
ly the more northerly mountains are metamorphic and Silurian with igneous
intrusions. The Selenga River basin flows mainly on Permian and Devonian
with some areas of Jurassic strata. Bast of the belenga River system
there are hills of Jurassic rock and igneous intrusions which give place
to the plateau lands which are composed of Tertiary, Upper Cretaceous,
Jurassic, Permian and Devonian rocks with igneous intrusions. The Gobi
Desert is underlain with Tertiary, Upper Cretaceous and Quarternsry
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intrusions are frequent throughout the area of the Mongolian People's
Republic.
The climate of the Mongolian People's Republic is extreme continental
with a great variation in daily, seasonal, and yearly temperatures and
rainfall. The summer maximum reaches over 90 degrees P., whilst the
•winter minimum falls as low as -50 degrees F. Diurnal variations have
been known to exceed 60 degrees F. Yiithin the state temperature varies
little with location, but altitude influences it more. However, although
the differences throughout the year may be dramatic, those from place to
place are not startling. Muren (Map c) in the north has an average annual
temperature which ranges between 25 and 30 degrees P., with an absolute
maximum of 92 degrees P., and an absolute minimum of -56 degrees P. Dalan
Bzadagad in the southern Gobi Desert at a lower elevation has an annual
average temperature ranging between 36 and 40 degrees P., and an absolute
maximum of 98 degrees P., and an absolute minimum of -33 degrees F»
in winter an area of intense high pressure forms over northern Mongol¬
ia caused mainly by the cooling of the land surface in the continental in¬
terior. Cold, dry air masses form which are cut off from movement south
by high mountains and so flow southwest into Central Asia. Winter winds
in Mongolia are slight and local. In summer and autumn Outer Mongolia is
an area of low pressure and sustained winds from the west bring rain.
70-80/. of the total precipitation falls in the sunnier months of July and
August. Rainfall everywhere in Outer Mongolia is small (Map C), but var¬
ies from area to area. During the years from 1955 to i960 Muren did not
fare as well as normal with a maximum of a little over 10 inches in i960
and a minimum of about 6 inches in 1957* Dalan bsadagad did well in 1955
T ' "
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with over 9 inches of rainfall, hut fell to about 3 inches in 1957. As
can be seen there is a yearly fluctuation in rainfall. In moat areas of
the Mongolian People's Republic these annual differences are critical. A
good year such as 1959 was throughout the country means excellent har¬
vests, but poor years like 1957 are serious for an econony based on past-
ore lism and agriculture.
with regard to climate and the Sino-iiongolian boundary it has been
suggested that there is a division between the Mongolian People's Re¬
public and China's Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. In Inner Mongolia
slightly more moist conditions than prevail in and north of the Gobi have
made dry farming more successful. Chinese immigrants have settled with
some success in Inner . ongolia so that they now greatly outnumber the
Mongols there which tends to support this hypothesis of a climatic div¬
ide. However, the division is an arbitrary one and leads a geographer
to wonder if, had the Mongolian People'3 Republic failed to con® into
being with Soviet backing, the Chinese advance aided by the railways might
have ignored the general area and continued some distance northwards;
after all, in a good year the southern Gobi gets almost 10 inches of
rainfall.
As the soil forming processes take plaoe in a continental climatic
regime they are characterised by a desert type which is coarse grained
and low in organic matter. Grey and chestnut soils predominate in areas
with a rainfall up to about 8 inches per year. Salt marsh soils are
comparatively common with up to 15/j of their content carbonates, sulphate
and chloride salts.
Map D illustrates the variety of soils, within the Mongolian People's
Republic. Phis variety is closely associated with climate and vegetation.
and has led to certain types of agriculture which will be dealt with
later in this study. The correlation between such elements of climate
as rainfall, and soils, and vegetation ia well brought out by a com¬
parison of distributions shewn in tops C, D, and £«
Vegetation has the advantage of giving the clearer picture of hew
physical geography characteristics can affect political geography, the
impact of soils geography is less obvious. IIow does a state such as
the Mongolian People's Republic integrate successfully into the pol¬
itical unit an area of salt desert such as that existing along nxuch of
the 3ino-ilongolian boundary, there is no economic development, nor popu¬
lation concentration to make it economically feasible to build a compre¬
hensive road network within the area? Perhaps a deterioration in Sino-
Mongol relations would warrant the imposition of the state administration
right up to the boundary. It is economically easier to integrate polit¬
ically an area such as the grasslands shown in the east in Map £• The
Ulan Bator administration is most effective in those areas of higher rain¬
fall, richer soil, and economically important vegetation (e.g. pasture or
trees, • But should 15ino-Mongolian relations deteriorate political con¬
siderations will outweight economic and there will be greater Mongol pol¬
itical activity in the areas of salt marsh soil, tore sand and salt des¬
ert.
Historically the Chinese culture and economy was based upon conditions
which enabled the practice of irrigated farming, whilst the Mongols were
pastoral nomads. The frontier a one between the Mongols and Chinese could
be used by farmers, but was less favourable to Chinese techniques than the
wetter areas further south and was too far from the areas of high popu¬
lation density to permit the transport of the agricultural surplus to the
markets of China. If the Chinese chanced farming this zone the bullocks
drawing a cart of grain would have consumed all the load before the main
markets of China could be reached. There was no pasture in China to feed
travelling bullocks as every acre of suitable land was farmed. Chinese
farming the frontier could only transport their grain surplus into Mongol
territories where pasture was the norm and therefore distance only a minor
problem Therefore the Chinese could only farm the frontier if they
meant to trade with the Mongol chieftains, and if the latter wished to en¬
courage them to do so.
The coming of the railways defeated the problem of transport of sur¬
plus to the main markets of China for farmers on the frontier, neverthe¬
less much of Outer Mongolia is not suited to cultivation because of such
considerations of physical geography as climate, soil and relief, and is
best left to stock raising. There is thus a broad frontier between what
is now the Mongolian People's Republic and the Chinese People's Republic
which divides the two differing ways of life largely the result of differ¬
ing physical environments. The Sino-Mongolian boundary, if and when it
is delimited and deinarcated, will be partly assisted in its function as a
division by the physical geography of the border area. The boundary will
not mark a precise divide in the physical geography as the differences
between the Mongolian and Chinese environments are not abruptj northern
Inner Mongolia supports a pastoral econoiry still despite Chinese efforts
to introduce dry farming, whilst Cuter Mongolia possesses cultivated areas.
There is a frontier zone which is the outcome of a number of factors, per¬
haps the most important being the physical geography.
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smsm mm 1 Cultural Characteristics
According to the Census of 1956 the Mongolian People's Republic
had a total population of 845,500 of which 420,300 were male and 425*200
were female. This means that Outer Mongolia has a population of about
one person per square mile which contrasts with touch of China to the
south# The Mongolians estimated their population in i960 to be 936*900
which is still a very assail one by Msian standards. According to offic¬
ial estimates in 191B Outer Mongolia had a population of 647*500 which
had risen to 738*200 by the time of the first Census in the Mongolian
People's Republic held in 1935* The Census of 1944 gave 759*200 as the
population of Outer Mongolia at that time. Efforts are being made to en¬
courage the birth rate in the country as there is a chronic labour short¬
age; in fact over 30,000 Chinese have been brought into the state on 5
year contracts and, although they tend to be segregated from the Mongol
communities in contrast to the freedom of movement afforded to the Russ¬
ians, at the end of their time the Chinese can take out iiongolian citizen¬
ship if they so desire. The birth rate has risen, for example it was
32.3 per thousand in 1955 and 43«2 per thousand in i960. The death rate ,
in 1955 was 11.Q per thousand of population and 10 per thousand in i960.
Births totalled 26,900 in 1555 and 41,200 in i960.
The greatest concentration of population in the Mongolian People's
Republic is the capital of Ulan Bator with a i960 total of 164,000. Acc-
1. The following have been of particular importance in this chapter!
D.BoddeJ 'China's Cultural Tradition*; Rinehart, Mew York 1956*
w.A.D.Jaclcson« 'The Eusso-Chineae Borderlands', Van Nos trend,
Princeton 1962; Q.Lattimare: 'Mongol Journeys', Jonathan Cape,
London 1941* 'Rationalism & Revolution in Mongolia', Oxford
University Press, Mew York 1955* 'Nomads & Commissars', Oxford
University Press 1962; & 'Studies in Frontier History',
Mouton, Paris 1962.
ordirjg to the 1956 Census report of this population 75*6/j of the total
claimed to be Khlaka Mongols (6,39,100) • The southern Mongols accounted
for 119*300 and to these can be aaded the Buzyats who make up 2»9> of
Outer Mongolia's population. There is, therefore, on overwhelming pred¬
ominance of Mongols within the Mongolian People's Republic* The Mongols
extend in their distribution into Inner Mongolia. Throughout the Mongol
tribes of Outer Mongolia there is a strong Mongol nationalism. However,
within the Mongolian People's Republic there are minority groups adding
discord. The largest minority group are the Turkic speaking Kazakhs loc¬
ated in the southeast corner of the state and extending into the Sinkiang-
Uighur Autonomous Region of China. In 1956 the Kazakhs within Outer
Mongolia numbered 36,700, or 4*3/° of the total population. There were
also 13,400 Russians, a one experts of temporary residence, but many settled
along the Mongol-Soviet boundary area. There were more Chinese than Russ¬
ians, numbering 16,200 in 1956 (1»9> of the population) • The Chinese were
mainly labourers under contract or technicians, although there were some
Chinese farmers along the southern boundary. The rest of the population
is made up of a diversity of nationalities ranging from the few Uighura in
the southeast to the various embassy staffs in Ulan Bator and the t hnic-
ians from Bastern Burope.
The Mongolian People's Republic has discouraged religious beliefs
amongst its citizens as befits a Coiimunist country. Before the advent of
Communism as has been seen (Chapter One) amongst the Mongols Laroaism was
all powerful* but since the success of the administration in gaining the
independent status of Outer Mongolia it has been on the wane. Latnaism is
nominally a Buddhist belief, but includes influences from .Nestorian
Christianity and Manichaeism. It is still adhered to by may of the
older Mongols* but is similar in status and appeal to the Russian Orth¬
odox Church in the U.S.S.R. The Kazakhs are nominally Moslems, but
their conversion to Islam has never been fully effective.
As might be expected Mongol physical characteristics decline with
a move westwards. The Turkic peoples such as the Uighurs and Kazakhs
illustrate well this point. They are a 'racial' mixture and include a
good amount of Alpine stock which becomes more noticeable the more west¬
erly the position. Within the Mongolian People's Republic the physical
differences between the iongols and Kazakhs are small.
Like the Mongols the Turkic minorities within Outer Mongolia have
traditionally had a pastoral economy. This leads to a greater sympathy
between the two groups than between a pastoral people such as the Kazakhs
and farmers like the Han Chinese. However, it would be incorrect to state
that the Mongolian People's Republic has no minority problem, it is more
a case of the problem being less pressing than within China. Allegiance
to the state amongst the Kazakhs and Uighurs still takes second place to
the tribal group.
There is not such a gulf between the Mongols and Kazakhs in language
as there is between the Mongols and Chinese. Chinese is a member of the
Sino-Thai family of languages which includes many of the Indochinese
group. The Turkic and Mongol languages belong to the same family of
2
Ural-Altaic speech. Lattimore suggests that the Ural Altaic languages
spread from the northern forest areas into the steppelands and steppe oases.
Steppe life became identified with the Ural Altaic languages so that when
there was a retreat of Sino-Thai speakers into the steppe they were con-
2. O.Lattiraore: 'Inner Asian Frontiers of China'I Beacon
edition, Boston 1962, pp.456-459.
verted to the former languages (e.g. the Mongols). Similarly, the Sino-
fhai languages became associated with the sort of sedentary life favour¬
ed by the Chinese and the agricultural mentality moulded the speech. There
is no physical difference of importance between the Mongols and Chinese,
but the differences in speech and economy have produced a cultural gulf
which over-rides all other factors in their relationship.
Although a Mongol can learn more easily the language of the Kazakh
or Uighur than that of the Chinese the fact that the Mongolian People's
Republic contains a sizeable minority speaking an afcien tongue does lead
to disunity within the state. The Kazakh and Uighur minority feels sym¬
pathy with those Turkic peoples within China and the U.S.S.R., but per¬
haps not to the same degree as the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, outnumber¬
ed five to one by Chinese immigrants, look towards the mongolian
People's Republic.
Both China and Outer Mongolia have endeavoured to curb the nomadic
life of their citizens, but the oino-Mongol boundary is not enforced with
any rigidnessj the effort to settle the nomads in Mongolia has been aimed
at improving the productivity of the herds and the grazing land. It has
been a change from nomadism to ranching and the resulting increase in
productivity has apparently made the transition acceptable to both the
Mongols and the minority groups. Differences in religious belief in this
economially progressing secular state are hardly worthy of a mention. Im¬
pressive improvements in the standard of living and the advent of universal
education is leading to the break down of cultural differences. Although
the Mongols are nationalistic they are not so in the aggressively superior
way of the Chinese. There Is a cleavage between the Mongols and the Chin¬
ese in their mutual 'frontier' (rather than 'boundary') zone which is not




CHAPTER POUR : The economy
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Unlike China Outer Mongolia has followed a policy of putting as much
investment into agriculture as into industry. The Mongolian People's Re¬
public launched her first Five Xear Plan in 1948* This was followed in
1252 by a second Five Xear Elan, and then in 1958 a Three Xear Plan. At
present the Mongolian economy is being reshaped by the Third Five Xear
Plan (1961-1965) under which it is hoped agricultural production will in¬
crease by 80/:> and industrial by HO,). In I960 Outer Mongolia invested
98.4 million tugriks (there are U.2 tugriks to £l) in agriculture of which
0.4 was for repair and reconstruction work, and 113*7 million tugriks on
industry of which 18.8 million tugriks was for repair and reconstruction,
hew construction in agriculture was therefore 98 million tugriks and in
industry 95 million tugriks which is a pattern which has prevailed in all
the Mongolian development years, for example in 1959 new construction in
industry was 61.6 million tugriks and for agriculture was 66 million tug¬
riks. The total capital investment by the Mongolian People's Republic, and
excluding aid from other countries, continues to increase considerably;
the First Five Xear Plan saw the investment of 203*7 mill ion tugriks, the
Second 598.7 million tugriks, the Three Xear Plan 961.1 million tugriks and
1. Throughout this section on the Mongolian People's Republic statistical
material has cone mainly from "The National Economy of the People's
Republic far 40 years' which was published (in English) in Ulan Bator
in 1961. Also important in this chapter have been Berkeley & Morris *
'The Geology of Mongolia', American Museum of Natural History lubli-
cationa, New Xork 1927# G.W.HemyJ 'Mongolia, An Economic Handbook',
Joseph Crosfield, Warrington 1963# & EUWia&a* 'Geographical Limit¬
ations to Food Production in the Mongolian People's Republic', Annals
of Assoc. of Aasr. Geogs. Vol. 41# tor 1951*









U K=U N DER KHAN
YAYUGODZYR
C=CHOl REN
LEAD/ZINC |-y | COPPER CRETACEO
LOWER
CRETACEOUS
SOURCE'.AS FOR MAP 2 .
364*
in 1961 of the Third Five leer Plan 643*8 million tugriks -was spent. The
Mongolian People's Republic has also been receiving the highest per capita
foreign aid in the Canmunist bloc; between 1957 and 1962 the Mongols re¬
ceived £166 per head of population which was double that granted to Albania
which is the next largest beneficiary. Between 1957 and 1962 the Soviet
Union offered Ulan Bator £125 million and China gave £41 mill ion which is
roughly seven times the aid (on a per capita basis) given by the two coun¬
tries to Cuba.
In i960 130,587,000 hectares, or 83.%j of the land area being used,
was classified as 'pasture* (in Map I this includes rough grazing, camel
grazing and most of the cattle grazing) . 0.8,8 of the land used could be
termed 'meadow' as it is 1,311,000 hectares of better watared pastureland.
In i960 there was only 415,000 hectares of arable or 0.3/j of the total.
9.65,3 of the land in use (i.e. land which is in some way productive, this
excludes high mountain and desert) was covered by forest (15,010,000
hectares;•
Tho distribution of this land use is shewn in Bap 1. There is desert
and semi-desert camel grazing along the 3ino-Mongol boundary and this con¬
tinues into Inner Mongolia, Kansu and Sinkxang. The Altai and .Shanghai
Mountains, plus an area further north, are too high to be productive.
North of the Gobi .Desert there is a modest improvement in rainfall which
produces a rough grazing covering much of the Mongolian People's Republic
and which is used for sheep. The northern part of the state has the
better quality oattle grazing, plu3 the main forest areas and the only large
region of arable farming to the northwest of Ulan Bator. Nowhere do the
international boundaries mark a division in the land use, nor as yet has








there been touch serious attempt to change the pattern, although China
has plana for turning Inner Mongolia into one of the great granaries of
the People's Republic#
In Map 2 an attempt is made to generalise the agricultural picture
in the Mongolian People's Republic by dividing the state and the adjoin¬
ing areas into four regions# The first is the eastern steppelands in
which have been placed much of the administrative areas of Choibalsan,
Khentei and Sukhe Bator (MapfiO • This produces a third of Outer Mongol¬
ia's hay and is famed for horses and cattle# The second region has a
variety of land use3, but might be called 'woodland and steppe*# It in¬
cludes much of Selenga, Central, Bulgan, Arkhangai, Khubaugal and Daabkhan.
This region produces most of Outer Mongolia's grain, most of the milk
production, over half the cattle and half the hay and is not unimportant
for sheep. Region Three is that of the Gobi steppelands and includes
most of bast Gobi, Middle Gobi, Uver Khanghai and Bayan Khongor# Here are
30/o of Outer Mongolia's sheep, 6o>, of her camels and 1%o of her cattle#
There is no hay production and grain wily in a very few areas whore irri¬
gation is possible. The mountain and steppe of the fourth region includes
Bayan Ulgy, Kobdo, Ubsunur and Gobi Altai# The Gobi part of this region
is one of the important sheep areas of Outer Mongolia and the most import¬
ant goat herding area* Ubsunur is mainly an area of pastoralism producing
horses and sheep# There is a certain amount of transhuraance in summer to
take advantage of the good pastures found up the mountain sides# The first
region extends into the Soviet Union and China, the second into the U.S.S.R#
the third into China and the fourth into the U»3#S#R# and China#
Agriculture has been modelled upon that of the Soviet Union# In 1%0
there were 91 co-operatives which had risen to 727 in 1958# but after this
the agricultural co-operatives were mde into larger units so that whilst
there were on an average 98 households to a co-operative in 1957 by I960
there were 475 households (a total of 354 co-operatives) • In 1940 there
were 10 state farms, whilst in I960 there were 25* In 1947 only 0*2,i of all
livestock was owned by the co-operatives, but by I960 73*8/• was# The in¬
fluence of Chinese ideas of agricultural organisation is negligible in
the Mongolian People's Republic, and Soviet methods are always those to
which the Mongols adhere*
In 1957 livestock products accounted far 82.6/s of the agricultural
production (by value) and crops 17*4^ % 1959 there was an increase in
the importance of crept so that they provided 20*2$ and livestock 79*3,->*
Since then there have been some fluctuations, but the ratio of 80$ live¬
stock to 20, • crop tends to predominate* The raising of livestock is the
traditional mainstay of the economy of Outer Mongolia and it continues
to predominate* It is best suited to the uncertain and extreme climate.
The recent trend has been not to increase the numbers, but to improve the
animals* In fact in a year of poor weather fodder is inadequate for the
present numbers and water and shelter add to the problem* Wood is pro¬
vided free to both private owners and the co-operatives so that shelter
may be built for the livestock (the latest figure available is for 1957
when 30$ of the livestock could be provided with shelter) • Despite an
ambitious programme for constructing wells there is stall a shortage of
water during a dry year. The state farms lead the efforts to improve the
breed and in recent .years it has been possible to introduce a sheep which
is well adapted to the poor pasture of much of Outer Mongolia which will
give up to 100$ mare medium staple wool than the local Mongolian sheep.










State policy has been directed towards the encourage; ent of livestock
production with regular increases in the procure.nent prices and the or¬
ganising of the majority of private breeders into co-operatives in order
to make economic use of veterinary care, fodder, water and marketing
facilities*
Between 1959 and 1961 weather conditions were the worst they had been
for a number of years* Veterinary staff during this period proved insuff¬
icient in numbers, winter pastures were deeply covered with snow, and the
summers were exceptionally dry* In 1961 autumn floods destroyed most of
the hay and much of the other feed on a scale worse than ever recorded be¬
fore* During these two years livestock losses totalled about 3*5 million,
the most sorely hit areas being Gobi Altai, Bayan Khongor, South Gobi and
Kobdo (Map4A)» Although this set back hindered Outer J.longolia' s develop¬
ment plans the years since have been a little above average*
As Figure I demonstrates there have been changes in the make-up of
Outer Mongolia's livestock over the years* The increase in the number of
goats and camels is due to their ability to live off rough pasture. Im¬
provement in stock has led to decreasing numbers of cattle and sheep* The
number of horses has remained about the same, although with increasing
mechanisation a decline can be expected* Although pigs and poultry are
of less importance in the economy at present their numbers are increasing
rapidly, notably an the state farms which are the spearhead of progress in
the agriculture of the Mongolian People's Republic*
The Government buys all livestock products for sale within the state*
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in production between 1947 and 1961.
Livestook farming within the People's Republic is booming due to the ever
increasing needs of the U*S»S*R* which takes on average 70,j of a"H
Mongolia's exports* In I960 88*6/i of Outer Mongolia's total exports were
livestock products*
The i4ongolian climate is not generally suited to the growing of grain
and vegetables, but since 1957 great effort has been put into increasing
the area of production* Between 1957 and i960 the sown area under grain
was trebled and that under silage and fodder crops quadrupled* The vege¬
table and po to area did not change much* The increase in area was mainly
on the state farms and appears to be connected with the Soviet Union's
efforts to produoe more* To begin with the Mongols were lucky as the weath¬
er was favourable and grain production by I960 increased five times and
fodder crops by over two times* There was then a set-back with the weather
and despite an enormous increase in acreage sown the 1961 grain harvest was
only 50,-j better than that of 1957 and for hay only about 65^ better. In
I960 7/o of Outer Mongolia's exports had been grain but in 1961 she had to
import grain# This brings home the basic unsuitability of most of the Mon¬
golian People's Republic for the cultivation of crop® other than on a gam¬
bler' s basis*
In 3541 the total area under crops was 26,600 hectares* This had in¬
creased to 85,200 hectares in 1957 and 582,200 hectares in 1961 (the com¬
parison of the 1957 and 1961 figures shows the later failure of the expan¬
sion when the area was increased over fourfold and the total crop by only
50/ ' in most cases) • In 1941 25,500 hectares of the total was grain and
1,500 hectares vegetables and potatoes* Of the 1957 total 75,700 hect¬
ares was grain and 5,300 hectares vegetables and potatoes, the rest being
fodder crops* Of the 1961 total 534,700 hectares was under grain crops.
Throughout grain has predominated, although recently the Mongols have been
receiving Chinese aid to increase their vegetable and potato farming, one
of the notable examples being a large truck farm constructed by the Chinese
on the outskirts of Ulan Bator with a storage capacity for 2,000 tons of
vegetables#
Not only has the area under crops been increasing, but the mechanis¬
ation of agriculture has been taking place at a much higher rate than in
the People' s Republic of China# China suffers from an excess of popu¬
lation whilst the Mongolian People's Republic is desperately short of agri¬
cultural labour# In 1%8 Outer Mongolia had 165 tractors, but by I960 this
figure had risen to 3,211 tractors# Houghing, 3owingyharvesting and hay¬
making are now fully mechanised#
The agriculture of the Mongolian People's Republic is wedded to the
economy of the Soviet Union# In I960 Outer Mongolia's exports were worth
£144,800,000 of which the U#S.S.R» took £109,900,000 worth and China a mere
£6,550,000# AH of the Soviet Union's imports from Mongolia were in the
form of agricultural produce# The U#S#S#R's agriculture has failed to keep
up with her increases in population and industrial production, so the Mon¬
golian People's Republic supplements the Soviet economy with its surplus#
If anything the trade between Peking and Ulan Bator is declining# As might
be expected under the circumstances Outer Mongolia is a member of the Soviet
Union's answer to the Common Market, namely Coraecon which also includes
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Bast Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania, but
does not include China#
The total forest area is about 12 million hectares which gives 131
hectares per head of population. The tinker resources are estimated to
be 1,220 million cubic metres of which 96,0 is coniferous# The yearly
growth is 10 million cubic metres* The main types of tree are Siberian
larch In the northern areas# some dwarf elm in the south and poplar in
the southwest* The Mongolian People's Republic is self sufficient in most
forest products*
Reao^rqe? and Ir^tQ-
The Mongolian People's Republic has modest deposits of a number of
minerals, and exploration continues to try and establish whether there are
others* Map 3 shows the probable distribution of Outer Mongolia's mineral
wealth* Coal and oil are of increasing importance (in 1960 employed 1530
and 350 workers respectively) • In 1362 coal production totalled 851*000
tons which made Outer Mongolia independent of Soviet imparts* The main
mines axe at Sain Shand, bzun Mod* Yugodzyr and Under Khan (Map 3) • Oil
production is still as yet modest and Mongolia has to import over half her
annual needs from the U*3. S.R* Other important minerals now being mined
include fluorspar# pyrites# gold# silver and iron# but as yet the Mongol¬
ian People's Republic has hardly begun to exploit the mineral raining poss¬
ibilities* Shortage of labour and inaccessibility hinder much of the
mineral developroent*
Up to 1956 Mongolian industry was confined mainly to milk processing
(which as late as 1953 accounted for 50,» of all food processing), wool
washing# the curing of hides* and some coal mining* Sinoo 1956 the Soviet
Union# sane East European countries and China have equipped a number of
industrial plants in the Mongolian People's Republic to make use of local
materials* The Ulan Bator area dominates in the new developments* By
value in 1957 food and light industry accounted for 6o,* of production and
heavy industry 40, .', but by 190 the percentages were about equal.
Using 1947 as a base year (i.e. 100.0) to compare increases in in¬
dustrial output the figure for all of Mongolian industry in 19&L was 4G>4*4,
with the most dramatic increases in building material production (1171.9)
and electricity (902.5)* The increase in building isaterial production has
been caused by the change from the ,yurt* or tent to the house. With regard
to electricity Ulan Bator demonstrates a Communist attitude prevalent since
Lenin's advocacy of increased electrical capacity in the 1920*s. All towns
within the Republic now have electricity, as do all state farms and an in¬
creasing number of the smaller rural centres (electricity production in 1952
was 22.7 million Kwh, in 1962 174*9 million Kwh.).
Again somewhat in contrast to China there is great emphasis upon con¬
sumer goods production in the Mongolian People's Republic ranging from foot¬
wear to confectionery. Industry has two facet® in that it either produces
for the home market or it processes the state's traditional products such
as hides* The character of Mongolia's industrial development is largely
determined by the import requirements of the U.S.S.R., and the exports which
can be procured from the Soviet Union.
The administration in Ulan Bator has accepted tee country's difficult
position between the giants of the Soviet Union and China, but endeavours
to keep on good terms with both of them. The fact that Outer Mongolia is a
Communist state between two other Communist states has been to her advantage.
Considerable help lias been given to the Mongolian People's Republic in the
setting up of industrial plants by bote the Soviet Union and tee People's
Republic of China, aid which in all probability might not have been forth¬
coming if Mongolia had been either neutralist or sympathetic to the
Western countries.
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A good transport system, supplemented by such other carrnunicationo
as radio, television, telephones and telegraph facilities, can provide
the most useful of tools for a government trying to bring effective pol¬
itical control to all areas of the state. The Mongolian People's Repub¬
lic lacks such a network. Low population densities, lack of capital and
labour, and the agricultural nature of the economy have all inhibited the
development of a comprehensive communications system throughout the
state area.
As in the Soviet Union railways make up the most importance branch
of Outer Mongolia's transportation network, carrying 97*2 i of all freight
in 1957 and 93*9/- in I960. This compares with read transport'3 share in
freight in 1957 being 2»Zu of the total and rising to S.j in I960, and the
trifling amount carried by water and air#
The main railway line (Map 4) runs from the Mongol-Soviet boundary
via Sukhe Bator to Ulan Bator (completed in 1949) * and than via Dzamin
Ude to the People's Republic of China (completed in 1956). The Ulan Bator
railway was built with Soviet and Chinese aid and provides a through conn¬
ection between Moscow and Peking. The main workshops are at Ulan Bator,
but there are other depots at Sain Shand, Dzamin Ude and Choiran. A narrcw
gauge line in eastern Outer Mongolia lilies Choibalsan and Tainsag Bulak with
the Soviet Union at Soloviev. In 1952 there was 4-20 miles of railway track
in the Mongolian People's Republic, which had increased to 860 miles in
1955 and 873 miles in i960. The average length of the journeys declined
from a 1957 figure of 524 miles to 485 miles in I960. As the railways pro¬
vide the only efficient and economic form of transport within Outer Mongolia
f ' n
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they are overworked. The railways provide a useful economic outlet to
the U.3.S.H. and China, but their raodeat dimensions make them of limited
use in the task of welding together the state area into a cohesive pol¬
itical unit, however, the passengers carried have been rapidly increas¬
ing in number even if the mileage of new line has not.
Since 1952 the length of so called roads has kept steady at about
47,005 miles (Map 4) i this includes practically every dirt trade in the
state and there is not really am road which qualifies for the term
1 modern' • For example the road programme for improvement in 19&1 consist¬
ed of 52 miles of embellishment by turning earth roads into rubble and
earth roads, and the construction of 13 wooden bridges. In the con¬
struction of a more modern road system the Mongolian People's Republic is
limited by the low density of population throughout the state, arid the
related lack of labour and capital to carry out such a programme. In i960
the average road freight journey was only 36 miles# The average length of
a passenger Journey by road in i960 was only 4 miles. There are nine road
connections with Chinese territory (Map 4) and seven with Soviet areas, but
road transport within the Mongolian People's Republic is catering mainly
for local needs and to supplement the railways. In I960 with regard to motor
transport freight the rat busy province was Choibalsan in the northeast,
with Ulan Bator next, followed by Daabkhan (7»H) and Arkhanghai (-MA).
Selenga, due to its modest size (it i- the smallest of the provinces) and
he convenience of the railway, had the least use of road freighting. Ulan
Bator and Choibalsan are he new centres of industry. In passengers Ulan
Bator's road transport carried he most, ha lowest was again Selenga
province.
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Of increasing significance within Outer Mongolia is air transport#
Ulan i>ator is linked with Moscow and Peking, and most of the larger settle¬
ments in the Mongolian People's Republic have air fields* Air freight was
modest in I960 but had increased 43/j over the 1959 figure. During the same
period there was a similar rise in air passenger travel. However, despite
the possibilities with regard to air transport it is unlikely to compensate
for the inadequacies of the road and rail network.
Other forms of communication which are increasing in importance are
post offices (30 in 1947 and 230 in i960), telegraph offices (20 in 1947*
25 in I960), radio relay stations (52 in i960 and 76 in 1961), and tele¬
phone exchanges (25 in 1947 end 56 in I960), The post office handled 1.2
million letters and 3*100 parcels in 1947 end 6.6 million letters and
49,600 parcels in I960. Similarly telegrams dispatched rose from 531*000
in 1947 to 630,000 in I960, 'flier© were only 5*554 telephones in Outer
Mongolia in I960, and although this is double the 1947 figure (2,615) it
represents very slow progress.
The communications network within the Mongolian People's Republic
is that of an economically underdeveloped country. It prevents the eff¬
ective political administration of the state area because of its limiting
inadequacies. Outer Mongolia needs to improve all aspects of the state
corsaunications system; the situation i3 well represented by the figures
for radios within the country in i960, these totalled 24*000 or I set for
every 35 people. There is an area between China and the U.S.S.R. which
has a distinctive flavour because of Mongol nationalism but this does not
conform to the present political limits of the Mongolian People's Republic.
There is, therefore, a need to impose effective government from Ulan dator
throughout the state area so those zones which are not allied to the state
by Mongol nationalism will not break away. Nothing is more important in
the promotion of effective government from Ulan Bator than adequate coerar
unications, whether to influence by propaganda, or by easy access.
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The itongolian People's Republic is a member of the United Rations
and has formal diplomatic relations with thirty countries. The first
norr-CofiTiiuniat state recognised Outer Mongolia in 1955 (it was India;*
Up until 1955 Ulan Bator was a satellite of the U.S.S.R*, in fact in
the early 1940* a Stalin had considered incorporating this state the size
of . estem Europe into the Soviet Union. Since the Kiidr-1950's the Mon¬
gols have been showing a great deal move Independence, although their
connections with Moscow still predominate in all their foreign relations*
They procure most of their needs from the U*S.S«R* and export most of
their surplus to the north* The situation is typified by the distribut¬
ion of Mongol students abroad! of the total of 3*000 Mongols at foreign
universities in 19&t- over 2,000 were in Soviet universities, whilst most
of the rest were in those institutions of higher learning of the Baatern
European Communist countries* Only a handful were at Chinese universit¬
ies* If there is any challenge to the Mongolian state's claim to be a
separate entity it comes from the north, not the south*
Outer Mongolia is a state which has conaa into being to fulfil the
demands of Mongol nationalism* The bulk of the population is Mongol and
this is the strength of the Mongolian People's Republic* There are strong
forces within the state to challenge the effectiveness of the central gov¬
ernment's administration, but the regiias ruling from Ulan Bator has a
success based primarily upon Mongol nationalism backed by Soviet patronage.
what are the forces of disintegration within the Mongolian People's
Republic? One of the strongest challenges faced by the Mongols throughout
their history has been that of Chinese culture* Pew civilisations have
had the assimilation power of the Chinese; the Chinese were always willing
to accept as equals those of other groups #10 were willing to adhere to
the Chinese culture. Just as Europe has indulged in cultural missioniz-
ing since the Sixteenth Century, so for many centuries Chinese civilisation
has expanded outwards. It was not until the late Nineteenth Century that
the possibility of being swamped by Chinese culture beoame crucial to the
Mongols, the Han Chinese having accepted certain technical innovations from
Europe to broaden their field of influence (e.g. the railway), This chall¬
enge from the south also produced a stimulation of Mongol nationalism. How¬
ever, alone the longols would have not been strong enough to counteract the
impact of Chinese culture based on Han immigration. The outcome was an
appeal to their neighbour in the north, first in the form of Tsarist Russia,
and after 1917 the Soviet Union. Although it would seem unlikely that the
U.S.S.R. will absorb the Mongolian People's Republic into its state area,
the price paid by the Mongols for the neutralising of the threat from the
south has been a relationship with the Soviet Union which makes their in¬
dependence only nominal in many ways. Outer Mongolia is perhaps the most
classic example of a Soviet satellite at present in existence, although it
would be easy to under@otir.sate the amount of independence enjoyed by the
administration in Ulan Bator. The Mongolian economy is tied closely to that
of the U.S.S.R., the administrative machine within the state is modelled
upon that of Moscow, and it would not be feasible for Ulan Bator to support
Peking in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. The Mongolia-Soviet bound¬
ary has little significance because of the amicable relations existing be¬
tween the two states, and the dependence of the Mongolian People's Republic
upon the Soviet Union for its continuing independence. Although Ulan Bator
endeavours to remain on good terms with Peking the Mongols are still worried
by the possibility of cultural absorption by the Chinese; this is probably
the prime reason for the decrease in the number of Chinese labourers within
Outer Mongolia during the past year* The continuance of the Mongolian
People's Republic as a separate entity depends to a great extent upon Soviet
patronage which must be bought at the coat of perhaps excessive Soviet in¬
fluence in Mongol affairs* This is not resented by the Mongol nationalists
as Soviet patronage is preferable to Chinese cultural absorption*
Besides the disintegrating factors involved in a snail, but distinct,
cultural group being placed between two vast states Outer Mongolia has
certain internal weaknesses which do not assist the effectiveness of the
central authority within the state area* The population is evenly, but
sparsely, spread over the country which makes administration from Ulan Bator
difficult* The sane problem of sparse population leads to the need for a
comprehensive transport network without the capital available to support
it car if it was built any possibility of it being economic to run* Perhaps
the greatest vehicle still largely unexploited with regard to producing a
feeling of unity throughout the state area is radio and, later, television*
It is surprising that a Communist state has not made greater use of such
forms of communication*
The minority groups such as the Kazakhs within Outer Mongolia are not
as yet militant, but do represent a challenge to the coherence of the Mongol
state* If handled carelessly the Kaaakhs or Uighurs could bring about dis¬
unity within the Mongolian People's Republic, but they represent only a
small part of the total population and it may prove possible to culturally
absorb them when such developments as the educational programme is fully
effective*
The totalitarian nature of Coranunist government makes administration
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within a country like Outer Mongolia somewhat easier. But often hinder¬
ing the Mongol government is the level of technology within the state.
Since gaining independence the Mongolian People*s Republic has trade im¬
pressive progress, but has far to go before it resembles technologically
an Asian state such as Japan. A sophisticated technology makes the ad¬
ministration of a state easier because the vehicles for the various branches
of government are more comprehensive and of a higher standard.
State administrations often tend to become less effective the further
from the centre of government. This is true of the Mongolian People's
Republic, notably in the south along the Sino-Mbngolian Boundary. In the
main the southern area is leas developed economically than the rest of
Outer Mongolia. Here there has been traditionally a frontier zone be¬
tween the herdsmen Mongols and the cultivating Chinese. A frontier zone
still exists in the south, although the delimitation of a boundary would
provide a regularising feature in the area. The .^ongol and Chinese ver¬
sions of the Sino-Mongol boundary have all been within Boggs' 'Compound*
or Hartshorne's 'Subsequent* categories, being made up of geometric lines
and delimitation along minor physical features. Map I shews part of the
boundary upon which the Chinese and Mongols have long agreed and it is a
A
straight line delimitation. But the bulk of the delimitation in both the
Chinese and Mongol versions has been along minor physical features such
as in Map la. which is part of the Mongolian line. Although it has failed
to come out clearly on Map la, the western part of the line is along some
very low hills (orestline), whilst the eastern section is along a minor
watershed. The discrepancies in the delimitation of the Sino-Mongolian
boundary may have already been overcome following the 1962 treaty, but if
not they will not be of great importance until such time as the Chinese
and Mongols decide to extend their effective administration right up to
the boundary# At present Sino-Mongolian relations are reasonably good
despite the traditional Mongol mistrust of the Chinese and Ulan Bator's
favouring of the Soviet position in the ideological conflict between
Peking and Moscow* Die boundary, whether it has been delimited or not,
is not being effectively imposed upon the human geography of the front¬
ier sons and is therefore only of limited significance*
It cannot be said that the Mongolian People's Republic represents
an entity other than on the grounds of Mongol nationalism and an ©conoay
which is predominantly pastoral, however, this is a sounder basis for
unity than can be found in such states as Burma with a ioWe of nation¬
alities and cultural levels* The effectiveness of the central adminis¬
tration within the area of Outer Mongolia is largely inhibited by under¬
developed conraunications and sparsely distributed population* The via¬
bility of the state is also limited by the excessive influence of the
Soviet Union within the Mongolian People's Republic, but without whose
patronage the state would not and could not exist in face of the threat
from the south* Neither of the boundaries (i.e. the Soviet-Mongolian
and the Sino-Mongolian) provide divisions within the landscape* Soviet-
Mongol relations are such as to limit the functions of the boundary be¬
tween the two states to a minimum, whilst there exists between China
and Mongolia a frontier zone within which there is a transition from the
livestock economy of the Mongols to the cultivation of the Chinese* If
the boundary was to be drawn according to the human geography of the
frontier zone it would probably be further south of the Mongol version
and include those areas of Inner Mongolia, Kansu and Sinkiang where Chin¬
ese efforts to introduce dry fanning have proven unsuccessful and live¬
stock herding still remains dominant*
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•The concept of international boundaries now prevailing is of recent
origin* As late as the Eighteenth Century most national groups were
separated one from the other by aones either con^jletely unsettled or at
least less intensely developed than the norm for the national area* The
term 'frontier' denotes such a zom, having breadth as well as linear di-
1
mansion* • Today China has a number of frontier aones, some of which she
is trying to assimilate into the state area, but others which she appears
content to leave for the present as they are* Such a comparatively under¬
developed and vast state could not expect to have the coherence over its
area enjoyed by the technically more advanced countries such as the
United Kingdom*
Within China there are a number of minorities unrelated to the Han,
such as the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang, and also a body of Han Chinese
who are hostile to the rule of Peking, such as the Chinese Moslems (Dungana) •
Similarly, there has been a traditional economic division between the north
and south of China, leading to a difference in outlook between the drier
northern wheat lands and the rise areas of the south* In much the same way
there has tended to be a division in Inner Mongolia between the dry farming
lands of the Chinese and the pastoral economy of the Mongolians*
Increasing technological ability makes physical considerationsof lass
and less importance. This is well illustrated by northern China where
first the vise of irrigation enabled the Chinese to expand into areas which
they could not farm before when they relied solely upon rainfall* But
1* U»S*State Department, Geographic Keport Ho*I* 'Boundary Concepts
& Definitions'; Washington, April 28th* 1981, p*l*
then the advent of railways in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century
permitted an expansion into the more northerly lands* The adminis¬
tration in Peking has a plan to convert the whole of the pastoral areas
of Inner Mongolia into a wheat growing belt# There is at present a
frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and China (despite the
possibility that the boundary may have been delimited) as Mongol past-
oralism predominates in the boundary region* V,hen Chinese technology
permits the growing of wheat up to the boundary line the broad border
zone will have ceased to exist* The position with regard to the Sino-
Mongolian border area is reasonably typical of the situation prevailing
along much of the periphery of China's cere area*
Many of the northern areas of the Himalayan states such as India,
Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan have close relations with Tibet, both in pop¬
ulation and cultural characteristics* This might give China a good
basis from which to claim these areas, but she has yet to make Tibet
itself a part of the People's Republic in other than imperial terns.
Since the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1550-53. there has been a hostil¬
ity to the Han which has frequently broken out in violent revolt* The
building of a road and rail network binding Tibet more closely with the
rest of China has begun to pay handsome dividends for Peking, but it
will be a long tine before Tibet can be considered 'Chinese*• The Han
form of assimilation whereby Chinese immigrants eventually swamp the
indigenlous population as in Inner Mongolia is at present being put into
effect in Tibet* In Imier Mongolia there are now five times as many
Chinese as Mongols, but the suggestion for Tibet is that to the present
Tibetan population of up to 5 million inhabitants as many as 16 million
Chinese farmers and administrators can be added* This is the sort of
 
integration which is largely irrestible, although it is worth noting
that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia welcome^ the Japanese forces and fought
with them against the Chinese during the Sine-Japanese War of 1937-45* A
dissident minority is, however, preferable to a dissident majority#
Such difference® as those which arc found between northern and
southern China would be of decreasing significance if the conmunications
within China were more comprehensive# Regional differences are encour¬
aged by regional isolation and the building of a good road and railway
network is the first requirement if China is to become an entity#
Communist China has concluded boundary agreements with Outer Mon¬
golia, Pakistan, Nepal and Burma# Map I shows the dates of delimitation
of China*s boundaries, and also their type according to Boggs* classifi¬
cation# As it is as yet uncertain whether the Sino-I.iongolian agreement
included a boundary delimitation a question mark has been placed after the
date# Those without dates have as yet been undelimited# China finds the
MacMahon boundary delimitation of 1914 in the area of the North Kast
Frontier Agency of India unacceptable# Of the boundaries only that between
China and Hong Kong can be said to provide an effective divide upon the
landscape with the impact of the two central authorities felt fully up to
the line# An effort is being made in Central Asia since the deteriorat¬
ion of Sino-Soviet relations to make the Sino-Sovdet boundary in this area
more effective with the mobility of the indigenous nomadic tribes inhib¬
ited# This attitude towards the Sino-Soviet boundary contrasts to that
prevailing in Peking regarding the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Korean lines#
China appears to have the friendliest of relations with the latter two
Cormmist states, and this is reflected in the boundary area where
administration is relaxed, ^accept for the Korean minority in China
the Kino-Korean boundary makes an effective division both in the
physical geography and the human geography of the border area. Such
is not the case with the Sino-Vietnarasse boundary, nor many of China's
other southern borderlands. Here Chinese assimilation of the minority
groups has not as yet had much effect and there is a scattering along
the boundaries of peoples of limited culture owing allegiance only to
their tribe.
China's core area is in her eastern provinces and the impact of
Chinese influence decreases the further from the core area one goes.
Laos, Bhutan or Northwestern India are marginal to the influences of Han
culture and the predominance of tribal, rather than state, allegianoe in
the boundary areas makes any delimitation of limited geographical sig¬
nificance. Neither of the latter two states have effectively delimited
their boundaries with China. Until the advent of Conmunist power in Pek¬
ing the borders of China in moat areas were underdeveloped and little
explored lands providing frontiers with other states equally unconcerned
in most cases with defining mora precisely the boundaries. The Chinese
invasion of Tibet in 1950-51* and the following hostility of the Tibet¬
an population, led to Peking endeavouring to close Tibet's southern
boundaries so that for a number of years the freedom of movement tradit¬
ional between Tibet and India, Tibet and Nepal, Tibet and Sikkim, and Tibet
and Bhutan daring the trading season decreased dramatically, but with the
stabilising of the situation in Tibet China has once again relaxed trade
in the Himalayan area, and also stopped restricting the movement of the
tribesman within the areas straddling the boundaries (with the exception
of the Sino-Indian boarder).
The ideological dispute between Communist China and the U.S.3.R.,
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despite Chinese claims that 'We want unity, not a split', has had a cert¬
ain amount of effect along Chinese boundaries with the Soviet Union, al¬
though it must be appreciated that the attitude towards non-Coranunist
states is the same. As Coraaunist countries both China and the U.3.3.R. are
adherents to the ultimate concept of an all-Coommist world. Although
China may advocate the use of force for establishing Communist regimes and
the Soviet Union more peaceful methods there is a threat to the non-
Camunist states along the boundaries of both. .Despite a disagreement China
is not likely to suggest a military conquest of the Soviet Union or the
Mongolian People's Republic as they are Comaunist states, but Laos is a
quite different matter.
There appears to be certain priorities regarding the non-Consaunist
states bordering China as apparently it is possible for Peking to reach a
boundary agreement with the western allied Pakistan, but not the major
neutralist state of India. However, Pakistan aoes not challenge China's
predominance within Asia as does India, and this must make the humiliation
of the latter of much importance to a Peking determined to spread the in¬
fluence of Chinese Communism as widely as possible. The easy defeat of
the Indian troops established in the eyes of many Asian leaders that Hew
Delhi offered no protection against the power of China. Having gained
control of the highway through Aksai Chin in the most complete manner, and
having done much to crush Indian influence in Asia, the present position
2. Leader article in the 'People's Daily*; Peking, July 13th, 1963*
jjrevailing along the Sino-Indian borders may be quite acceptable to Peking#
It is not against the interests of China to have a frontier between India
and China rather than a delimited and demarcated boundary.
With the exception of Laos, where the Communist 'revolution* is well
under way, the minor neutralist states provide no challenge to Chinese
supremacy within Asia and can be treated by Peking with a generosity vhich
is not available to India. The boundary with i^iepal has been delimited and
demarcated and now China is increasing her influence within her neighbour
by transport links and the granting of aid. The Coaiaunost parties in Nepal,
Sikkim, Bhutan and Afghanistan are practically non-existent, and that within
Burma has been largely defeated, so possibly Peking feels there is more to
be gained by increasing Chinese influence in these states by peaceful means
than the launching of military attack which would increase hostility to¬
wards China in Asia and which could not expect much support from sympathis¬
ers within the attacked countries.
In many respects it is surprising that China has been so active in her
border areas since 1949* considering the disunity over much of China itself.
China is not territorially mature as the whole of the state area has not
been integrated, and yet Peking still has territorial ambitions with regard
to the surrounding areas. Even in the Han Chinese core area although the
written language leads to cultural cohesion, the differences in the spoken
language have been emphasised over centuries of regional isolation so that
there is a gulf between the northerner and the southerner. Similarly,
economic cohesion is a post-1949 phenomena which has arrived with the Comm¬
unist ideas of state planning, but which has had an uphill fight against
the conservatism of tlie population, and has seen the failure of such pro-
jects as that of the Cosnrunes#
The divisions within China are not a modern development# The south
and north divided between the Fourth and Sixth Centuries A.D# y and again
in the Twelfth Century A.D. when the Kin Tartars ruled north of the Yang¬
tze and the Sung Empire was still dominant in the south. Today such
provincial divisions as those of Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia still
defy integration# But the Han Chinese have the advantages of a stronger
culture, and overwhelmingly superior numbers# The building up of a good
communications network in such fringe zones as Sinkiang, and the deter¬
mination of Chinese economic planners to counteract the pre-eminence of
the eastern areas of China in industry and commerce by a movement west¬
wards, will mean the eventual swamping of the local cultures and tribal
loyalties# However, the cohesive force of Chinese culture and adminis¬
tration has as yet had only a short time in which to implement policy in
the non-Han provinces# Under a totalitarian dictatorship such as that
prevailing in Peking progress towards welding China's area into an entity
will be faster than it has been in a parliamentary democracy such as Can¬
ada, but it will be many years before the secular state can absorb the
Moslem Dungans or La,^aist Tibetans# Assuming that such factors as comm¬
unications within the peripheries are adequate by 1970, it cannot be ex¬
pected that the generation which has matured in an environment of non-Han
traditions can be successfully converted both to Corammiam and Chinese cult¬
ure. The following generation is the one raore likely to be successfully
absorbed by the Chinese so that it is perhaps not too dangerous a prodr
iction to make to say that it would seem likely that it may be the end
of this century before such anti-Chinese considerations as Uighur or Kazakh
nationalism have been overcome#
One of the Marxist concepts to which Peking periodically pays lip
service is that of the eventual withering away of the state# In 1958 it
was proclaimed that at some future date the only function of the state
would be to protect the population from external attack# But since 1952
Peking has taken a number of steps to increase the powers of the central
authorities in China# In the purge of the Communist leaders Kao Kang and
Jao Shu-shih the main charge was one of developing local power at the
expense of the central authority# *Centralisation of power has been a
consistent purpose of strong Chinese governments over the past two thous¬
and years, and oentrifugal forces in the direction of provincial or reg-
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ional autanoasy have represented a persistent counteraction to it.' Perhaps
the most dramatic challenge to the efforts of Peking to centralise power
within China since 1943 has come from Tibet# Here in 1957 the Chinese had
to retreat, and withdrew their Han cadres and promised not to introduce
any reforms until after 1962# But this did not satisfy the Tibetans who
rose in rebellion in March of 1959, with the Dalai Lama fleeing to India
in the same year. Chinese troops were reinforced in Tibet and all signs
of opposition ruthlessly crushed# kfforts were made to seal off Tibet
along the Himalayan border, a state of affairs which has since been relaxed#
In conclusion it can be said that China does not make a single unit,
nor have the majority of her borders, even where delimited as boundaries,
become divisions in the geography of the periphery areas of the state.
China is a multinational state surrounded by other countries which in the
3* A.B.Barnett; 1 Communist China & Asia* J Council on Foreign
Relations & Vintage Bocks, Hew Xork 1961, p#26.
main share a similar problem of dissident minorities. As it is hoped
it has been shown there are exceptions, such as Hong Kong and the
Sino-Hong Kong boundary, or possibly Korea and the Sino-Korean bound¬
ary, so that any generalisation on the Chinese borderlands, or China
itself, has its limitations. In the past the main problem in the
failure of the Han Chinese to integrate their frontier zones would
seem to be the poor coniatjnications within the state as a whole, but
particularly in the minority areas. A good road and railway network
will lead to the collapse of a minority culture as witness the decline
of the Welsh tongue in recent years, or the complete disappearance of
the Cornish language in the Nineteenth Century. Language differences
especially lead to minority groups, and language differences themr
selves survive because of isolationism. As has been proven in the
Manchu and Mongol areas of China there is little difference between the
Han and the minority groups once the Chinese culture has been accepted.
Even the distinctive head shape of the Manchus was found to be the out¬
come of their using wooden pillows for their children to sleep on. If
the minority areas are brought more closely within the Chinese field of
influence by means of efficient communications (road, rail, air, radio
and television) there will be a breaking down of local nationalisms, and
greater state coherence. A change of attitude amongst the minorities
will not only lead to China having more the appearance of a single
entity, but due to a shift of allegiance (notably away from the tribe to
the state; the frontier zones will become integrated within the country,
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Appendix A.The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty.
"The Government ©f the People' s Republic ®f China and. the Government
•f the Union «f Burraa,with a view te promoting an ever-all settlement #f
the Sino-Buraese boundary question and te consolidating and further
developing friendly relations between China and Burma,have agreed to
conclude the present Agreement under the guidance of the Five principles
ef Peaceful Ce-existenee and have agreed as fellowst
Article li
The Contracting Parties agree te set up immediately a joint
committee composed ef an equal number ef delegates frem each side and
charge it,in accordance with the provisions ef the present Agreement,te
discuss and work eut solutions en the concrete questions regarding the
Sine-Burmese boundary enumerated in Article 2 ef the present Agreement,
conduct surveys ef the boundary and set up boundary markers,and draft a
Sine-Burmese Boundary Treaty.The joint committee shall held regular
meetings in the capitals ©f the two countries or any ether places in the
two ceuntries.
Article 2t
Th« Contracting Parties agree that the existing issues concerning
the Sine-Burmese boundary shall be settled in accordance with the
following previsions»
1 )With the exception of the area of Hpimaw,Gawlum and Kangfang, the ontiro
undelimited boundary from the hi^i conieal peak to the western extremity
of the Sino-Burmeso boundary shall be delimited along the traditional
customary line,that is to say,from the high conical peak northward aleng
the watershed between the Taiping, the 3iwoli,the Nu (Salween) and tho
Tulung (Taron ) Rivers on the ©no hand and the Nmai Hka River on the
other,up to the place where it crosses the Tulung (Taren) River between
Chingdam and Nhkumkang,and then along the watershed between the Tulung
(Taren) and the Tsayul (Zayul) Rivers on the one hand and all the upper
tributaries ©f the Irrawaddy River,except for the Tulung (Taron) River,
on the ether,up to the western extremity of the Sine-Burmese boundary.The
joint committee shall send out joint survey teams composed of equal
numbers of persons from each side to conduct surveys along the above-
mentioned watersheds so as to determine the specific alignment of this
section of the boundary lino ant to set up boundary markers.
2)The Butmm Government ha® agreed to return t® China the area ®f
Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang whioh belongs t« China.As t® the extent ®f
thi® area t® he returned t® China,it is t® he discussed and determined
hy the joint ••mmittee in accordance with the proposals put forward
and marked on map® hy the Governments @f Burma and China ®n February
4th, 1957 and July 26th,1957 respectively.After determining the extent
•f this area t® he returned t® China,the joint committee shall send ®ut
joint survey teams composed ®f an equal number of persons from each
side to eonduet on the spot survey of the specific ali<piment of this
section of the boundary lino and to set up boundary markers,
3)In order to abrogate the 'perpetual lease* by Burma of the Meng Mao
Triangular Area (Namwan Assigned Tract) at the junction of the Namwan
and the Shweli Rivers,which belongs to China, the Chinese Government has
agreed to turn over this area to Burma to become part of the territory
of the Union of Burma.In exchange,the Burmese Government has agreed to
turn over to China to become part of Chinese territory the areas under
the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes,which are west of the
boundary line from the junction of the Nam Ting and the Nampa. Rivers
to the number one marker on the southern delimited section of th®
boundary as defined in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and
British Governments on June 18th,1941»As t® the extent of this area to
be turned over to China, the Chinese and the Burmese Governments put
forward proposals marked on maps on July 26th,1957 and June 4th, 1959
respectively.The area where the proposals of the two Governments
definitely coincide will be turned over to China.Where the proposals
of the two Governments differ as to the area under the jurisdiction of
the Panhung tribe,the joint committee will send out a team composed of
an equal number of persons from each side to ascertain on the spot as
to whether it is under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes
so as to determine whether it is to be turned over to China.After the
extent of the areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao
tribes to be turned over to China has been thus determined,the joint
committee will send out joint survey teams composed of an equal number
of persons from each side to conduct on the spot survey of the specific
alignment of this section of the boundary line and to set tip boundary
markers.
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4)Except fer the adjustment provided fer in paragraph 3 *f this Article,
the section ef the "boundary from the junction of the Nam Ting and the
Nampa Rivers te the number one marker en the southern delimited section
of the "boundary shall "be delimited as defined in the notes exchanged
between the Chinese and the British Governments en June 18th,1941.The
joint committee shall send out joint survey teams composed of equal
numbers of persons from each side to carry out delimitation and demarcation
along this section of the boundary lino and sot up boundary markers.
Article 3f
The Contracting Parties agree that the jeint eeramittee,after
werking out selutiena fer the existing issues concerning the Sine-Burmese
boundary as enumerated in Article 2 of the present Agreement,shall be
responsible fer drafting a Sine-Burmese Boundary Treaty,which shall cover
net only all the sections of the boundary as mentioned in Article 2 @f the
present Agreement,but alse the sections of the boundary which were already-
delimited in the past and need no adjustment.After being signed by -the
Governments of the two countries and coming into effect, the new Boundary
Treaty shall replace all old treaties and notes exchanged concerning the
boundary between the two countries.The Chinese Government,in line with its
policy of being consistently opposed to foreign prerogatives and respeeting
the sovereignty of ether countries,renounces China's right of participation
in mining enterprises at Lufang of Burma as provided in the notes exchanged
between the Chinese and the British Governments en June 18th,1941.
Article 4i
1)The present Agreement is subject te ratification and the Instruments
of Ratification will be exchanged in Rangoon as soon as possible.
2)The present Agreement will come into force immediately on the exchange
of the Instruments of Ratification and shall automatically cease te be
in force when the Sine-Burmese Boundary Treaty te be signed by the two
Governments eemes into ferce.
Done in duplicate in Peking en January 28th,i960,in the Chinese
and English languages,both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government ef the Fer the Government of the
People's Republic ef China* Union ef Burma*
Chcu En-lai. No Win.
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Appendix B.The Sine-Pakistani Boundary Treaty.
"The Government ef the People1 s Republic ef China and the Government
•f Pakistan,having agreed,with a view te ensuring the prevailing peaee
and tranquility en the border,te formally delimit and demareate the boundary
between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas,the defence of which is
under the actual control of Pakistan,in a spirit of fairness,reasonableness,
mutual understanding and mutual accomodation, and on the basis of Ten
principles enunciated in the Bandung Conference|being convinced that this
would not only give full expression to the desire ef the peoples ef China
and Pakistan for developing good neighbourly and friendly relations,but
also help safeguard Asian and world peace|have resolved for thi,« purpose
te conclude the present Agreement and appointed their respective
plenipotentiaries and have agreed upon the following!
Article 1»
In view ef the fact that the boundary between China's inkiang
and the contiguous areas,tie defence ef which is under the actual control
of Pakistan,has never been formally delimited,the two Parties agree to
delimit It en the basis ef the traditional customary boundary line,including
natural features, and in a spirit ef equality,mutual benefit, and friendly
co-operation.
Article 2i
l)ln accordance with the principle expounded in Article One of the present
Agreement,the two Parties have fixed,as follows,the alignment of the entire
boundary line between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas,the
defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan,
i)Commencing from its northwestern extremity at Height 5,630 metres (a
peak,the reference coordinates of which are approximately Longitude
74 degrees 34 minutes K.and Latitude 37 degrees 3 minutes N.),the
boundary line runs generally eastward and then southeastward strictly
along the main watershed between the tributaries ef the Teshkurgan
River ef the Tarim River system on the one hand and the tributaries
of the Hunza River of the Indus River system on the ether hand,
passing through the Kilik Daban (Dawan),the Mintaka Daban (Pass),the
Kharchanai 3)aban (named en the Chinese map only), the Kutejilga Daban
(named on the Chinese map only),and the Parpik Pass (named en the
Pakistan map only),and reaches the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass).
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ii)After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass),the
boundary line runs generally southward aleng the above mentioned
main watershed up to a mountain tep south of the Daban (Pass),where
it leaves the main watershed to follow the crest of a spur lying
generally in a southeasterly direction,which is the watershed between
the Akjilga River (a nameless corresponding river on the Pakistan
map) on the one hand, and the Ta^i dumbash (Oprang River) and the
Keliman 3u (Oprang Jilga) on the other hand.According to the map of
the Chinese side,the boundary line,after leaving the southeastern
extremity of this spur,runs along a small section of the middle line
of the bed of the Keliman 3u t© reach its confluence with the Keleehin
River.According to the map of the Pakistan side,the boundary line,
after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur,reaches the sharp
bend of the aiakagam or Muztagh River.
iii)Fr©m the aforesaid point,the boundary line runs up the Keleehin River
(Shakagam or Mizta^i River) along the middle line of its bed to its
confluence (reference coordinates Longitude 76 degrees 2 minutes E.and
Latitude 36 degrees 26 minutes N. )with the Sorbulak Daria (ihimahal
River or Braldu River).
iv)Frem the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers,the boundary lino,
according to the map of the Chinese side,ascends the crest of a spur
and runs along it to join the Karakorast Range main watershed at a
mountain top (reference coordinates approximately Longitude 75 degrees
54 minutes E.and Latitude 36 degrees 15 minutes N.),which on this map
is shown as belonging to Uierbulak Mountain.According to the map of
the Pakistan side,the boundary line from the confluence of the above-
mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a correspending spur and
runs along it,passing through Hei^it 6,520 (21,390 feet) till it joins
the Karakoram Range main watershed at a peak (reference coordinates
approximately Longitude 75 degrees 57 minutes E.and Latitude 36 degrees
3 minutes N.).
v)Thence,the boundary line,running generally southward and then
eastward, strictly follows the Karakoram Range main watershed which
separates the Tarim River drainage system from the Indus River
drainage system,passing through the East Musta{£i Pass (Muztagh Pass),
the top of the Chegri Peak (K2),the top of the Broad Peak,the top of
the Gasherbrum Mountain (8,068),Indirakoli Pass (named on the Chinese
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map only) and the top ef the Teram Kangri Peak,and reaches its south¬
eastern extremity at the Karskerani Pass.
2)The alignment of the entire boundary line,as described in Section One
of this Article,has been drawn en the 1/1,000,000 scale map of the Chineee
side in Chinese and the 1/1,000,000 scale map of the Pakistan side in
English,which are signed and attached t® the present Agreement.
3)In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are net fully
identical in their representatien ef the tepographical features,"the twe
Parties have agreed that the actual features en the ground shall prevail,
so far as the location and the alignment ef the boundary described in
Section One is concerned|and that they will be determined as far as
possible by joint survey on the ground.
Article 3»
The two Parties have agreed thati
1)Wherever the boundary fellows a river, the middle line ef the river bed
shall be the boundary 1 iftej and that
2)Wherever the boundary passes through Daban (Pass),the waterparting line
thereof shall be the boundary line.
Article 4#
1)The two Parties have agreed t® set up,as soon as possible,a Joint
Boundary Demarcation Corned s sion. Eaeh. Bide will appoint a Chairman,
one or mere Members and a certain number of Advisers and technical
staff.The Joint Boundary Commission is charged with the responsibility,
in accordance with the provisions ©f the present Agreement,te hold
oonorete discussions on and carry out the following tasks jointly*
i)To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground,as
stated in Article Two of the present Agreement,so as to set up boundary
markers at places considered appropriate by the two Parties and to
delineate the boundary line on the jointly prepared maps,
ii)To draft a Protocol setting forth in detail the alignment ef the
entire boundary line and location of all the boundary markers and
prepare and get printed detailed maps to be attached to the Protocol
with the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers
shewn on them.
2)The aforesaid Protocol,upon being; signed by the representatives of the
Governments ef the twe countries,shall become an Annex to the present
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Agreement,and the detailed maps shall replace the attached maps te
the pre .sent Agreement.
3)Up©n the conclusion of the above-mentioned Protocol,the tasks of the
Joint Commission shall be terminated.
Article 5»
fihe tvo Parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the
boundary which may arise after the delimitation of the boundary line
actually existing between the two countries shall be settled peacefully
by the two sides through friendly consultations.
Article 61
The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement ef the
Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the severeiga authority
concerned will r®-©pen negotiations with the Government of the People's
Republic of China,on the boundary,as described in Article Two of the
Present Agreement,of Kashmir,no as to sign a Boundary Treaty t® replace the
present Agreement.
Provided that in the event ®f that sovereign authority being
Pakistan, the previsions of this Agreement and the aforesaid Protocel shall
be maintained in the formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between Pakistan
and the People's Republic of China.
Article 7I
The present Agreement shall enter into force ©n the date ef its
signature.
Appendix C.The Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty.
"The Chairman of the people's Republic of China and His Majesty
the King ®f Nepal,being of the agreed opinion that a formal settlement
of the question of the boundary between China and Nepal ia of fundamental
interest to tho peoples of the two countries*noting with satisfaction that
the friendly relations of long standing between the two countries hare
undergone further development since the establishment of diplomatie
relations between the tw© countries and that the two Parties have,in
accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and in a spirit
of fairness,reasonableness,mutual understanding and mutual accomodation,
smoothly achieved an overall settlement of the boundary question between
the two countries through friendly consultationsjfirmly believing that
the formal delimitation of the entire boundary between the two countries
and its consolidation as a boundary of peace and friendship not only
constitute a milestone in the further development of the friendly relations
between China and Nepal,but also arc a contribution towards the
strengthening of peace in Asia and the world{have resolved for this purpose
to conclude the present Treaty on the basis of the Agreement between the
Government of the People's Republic of China and hi -- Majesty's Government
of Nepal on the Question ©f the Boundary between the Twe Countries of
March 21,1960 end have agreed upon the following*
Article 1*
The Contracting Parties,bp sing themselves on the traditional
customary boundary lino and having .jointly conducted neces; «ry on-the-spot
investigations and surveys and made certain adjustments in accordance with
the principles and needs ef equality,mutual benefit,friendship and mutual
accomodation,hereby agree on the fellowing alignment of the entire
boundary line from west to east,Chinese territory being north of the line
and Nepalese territory south thereeft
1 )The Chinese-Nepalee© boundary line starts from the point where the
watershed between the Kali River and the Tinker River meets the watershed
between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) Riper on the one hand
and the Tihkar River on the other hand, thence it runs southeastward*
along the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Kamali)
River on the one hand and the Tinkar River and the ;5eti River en the
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®ther hand,pas ing throu^t iumachisa (Lipudhura) snowy mountain
ridge and Tinkarlipu (Lipudhura) Pass to Pehlin (Urai) Pass.
2)F-"om Pehlin (Urai) Pass,the boundary line ru s along the mountain
ridge outheastwards for about 500 metres,then northeastwards t©
Height 5655 metres,thence conti ues to run along the mountain ridge
northwestwards t® T® jang (Thar®dhunga Tuppa),then northeastwards
passing through Height 55HO.6 metres to Chimala Pass,the'oe it runs
generally northwe;• twardsfpassing through Chimala to Lungmachiehku®
(Numoche Tuppa) {the- ce the boundary line runs generally eastwards,
passing through Paia®w®tunku# (Kitko Tuppe) and tl-ien runs along
Chokartung (Kitko) mountain c-"pur down to the Chilungpa (Yadangre)
stream,theit follows the Chilungpa (Yadangre) stream northwards
to it junction with the Mapehu (Kamali) River,then it follows the
Map ehu (Karnali) River generally eastwards to Yusa (Kilsa).At Yusa
(Hilea),the boxmdary line departs from the Mapchu (Kamali) River
and runs northeastwards along the mountain spur up t® Chialosa
(Takule),then along the mountain ridge,pas sing through Kumalatse
(Kumalapche),Kangpa®chekuo (Ghanbochhek©) and Mainipaimiku®
(Manepamango) to Kangku@na (Kan garje), then northwards passing
through Kangchupeng (Kandumbu) and Height 6550 metres to Nalakankar.
5)From Nalakankar, the boundary line runs generally nertheastwards along
the watershed between the tributaries flowing into the Manasarewar
Lake a^d the tributaries of the Fumla Karnali River passing through
Nalakankar Pass to Latsela (Lapche) Pass;thence it runs generally
rsutbeastwards along the watershed betwee- the tributaries flowing
into the Manasarowar Lake and the tributaries of the Machuau River
an the ®re hand and the tributaries of the Huml*. Karali River, the
Mugu Kamali River and the Panjang Khola on the other hand,passing
through Changla mountain, amja Pass,Khung (Thau) Pass and Marem Pass
to Pindu Pass, then it continues to run south eastwards along the
watershed between the tributaries of the Maohuan River ®n the one
hand and the tributaries of the Barbung River and the Kali Gar i daki
River ©n the other hand gradually turning northeastwards to Height
6214.1 metres.
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4)From Height 6214.1 metres, the boundary line runs northeastwards along
the mountain pur,passing through Height 5025 metres and crossing the
Aigarchube (dngarchhu) stream t® Height 5029 metres;thence it runs
generally eastwards along Tuchu (Thukchu) mountain npur,passing
■through Height 4730 metres and Bungla (Panglham) to the foot of
Tingli Bhodh# spur at its northwestern end,then turns northeastwards
and runs along the southern bank of the Roumachushui (Hhamarohhushu)
seasonal stream to the foot of Tingli Bhodh® spur at its northeastern
endjthence turns ,southeastwards,cresses the junction of two seasonal
streams flowing northwards,and run- to the junction of three
seasonal streams flowing northwards,and then up the eastern stream
of the above three seasenal streams to Height 4697.9 metres,then
turns southwestwarda crossing a seasonal stream to Height 4605.8
metres{thence it rune generally eutheastwardu pasing through
Pengpengla (Phusrphula) and then along Chukomaburi (Chhukomapoj)
mountain ridge,passing throu^i Height 4676.6 metres and Height
4754.9 metres to Hei^it 4798.6 metres,thence along the mountain
ridgo northeastwards passing through Rsiabala,then generally
eastwards passing threugh Height 5044.1 metres to Chaklo.
5)Frem Chakle, the boundary line runs generally southwards along the
watershed between the tributaries of the Yalu Tsangpo River and the
tributaries of the Kali Gandaki River,passing through Height 6724
metres to Lugula Pass,thence it runs generally eastwards along
Lugula snowy mountain and the watershed between the tributaries of
the Yalu Tsangpo River and the tributaries of the Marshiyangdi River
t© Gya (Gyala) Pass.
6)From Qya (Gyala) Pass,the boundary line runs along the mountain ridgo
eastwards to Height 5782 metres,then southeaatwards to Lajing Pass,then
it run along Lajing mountain ridge,passing through Height 5442 metres
and Lachsng (Lajung) Pass to He]tg£vfc 5236 metres,then turns southwestwards
to Sangiaude snowy mountain;thenee generally seutheastwards and continues
to run along Lajing mountain ridgs,passing through Height 6139 metres
to Height 5494 metres,and then in a straight line cresses the Lougar
(Tom) River to Hei^t 5724 metres;thence the boundary lino runs
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generally northeastwards along the snowy nountain ridge,passing
through Height 5672 metres te Thaple Pass.
7)Fram Thaple Pass,the boundary line runs generally northeastwards along
the anowy mountain ridge,passing through Tsariyan^cang snowy mountain
to Khojanjthense it continues to run gonerally southwards along the
snowy mountain ridge,passing through Lailatsaching Pass,Pashue snowy
mountain and Langpo snowy mountain to Yangrenkangri (Yangra) snowy
mountain.
8)Prom Yangronkangri (Yangra) snowy mountain, the beundary line runs
along the mountain ridge southwards to Tsalasungkuo and then
generally eastwards and then northeastwards along a dry stream bed
and passes through Jirapo (Kerabas) t® reach the Sangching (Sanjen)
River,then follows the river southeastwards,passes through its junction
with the C.hangehieh (Bhryange) Hiver and continues to follow the
Sangching (banjen) River to a point where a small mountain spur south
of Genjungma (Pangshung) pasture ground snd north of Ghhaharey pasture
ground meets with the Sangehing (Sanjen) Hiver5then it run. " along the
above small mountain spur eastwards and then southe estwards to Height
4656.4 metres,then runs eastwards to the Black Tepjthence it runs
along a mountain spur t® the junction of the Bhurlung Hiver and the
Tanghsiaka (Khesadhang) stream, then run - eastwards along the Bhurlung
River to its junction with the Kyereng River;thenoe follows the
Kyereng River southwards and then eastwards to its junotion with the
Tangling Tsangpo (Lende) River;then runs northeastwards up to the
junction of the Tungling Tsangpo (Lende) River and the Guebashiaohu (Jamba)
along the Tungling Tsangp© (Lende) River through Rasua Bridge;thence
turns eastwards up the Guobashiaohu (Jambu) stream,passing through the
junction of the Chusumdo Tsangpo River and the Phuriphu Tsangpo River,
both the tributaries of the upper Gu®bashiaohu (Jamba) stream, to reach
■the boundary marker point at Chusumd®.
9)From the boundary marker at Chusumdo, the boundary line runs generally
south-eastwards along the ridge of Tsogakangri (tfeto Pokhari) snowy
m@untain,Langtang snowy mountain,Barley mountain and Gulinchin (Phurbo
Ghyachu) mountain to Ghakesumu (Kharaney) mountain;thence runs down to
reach the Changnibaohu (Kharaney) River and then follows the river
southwards to its .junction with the Beohu (Bhote K®si) River;then
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fallows the Bhochu (Bh@te X®si) River southwards,pas sing threugh Dalaima
(Bhaise) Bridge t® the junction of the Bhochu (Bh®t® Kosi) River and
the Junchu (Jum) River;thence eastwards up the Junchu (Jum) River t®
its source at Tsaje mountain (Jura Khola K® Sir K® Tuppa); theno® the
boundary line runs generally northwards along the mountain ridge to
Chora® Pemari (Height 6208.8 metres).
10)15?®® Chcrae Pam&ri (Hei^it 6208.8 metres),the boundary line runs generally
northwards along the mountain ridge t® Height 5914*8 metres,then generally
northeastwards along Shondem® Kangri ( Sudemo) snowy mountain passing
through Height 5148 metres,and then crosses tw® tributarios «f the
Sh ondemo Chu (Shcngdemo) stream,passing through Sh endemo (Sudom®) which
lies between the above tw® tributari®s t® Gyanbayan, then runs along
Gyanbayan mountain spur downwards,cr®ss«8 th® Pinbhu Tsangp® River (the
western tributary ef the Lapehe River),and then along the mountain spur
up t® Height 5570.5 metres at Sebebori (Kerlang Pari K® Tippa);thenc®
the boundary tump southeastward.* along the mountain spur downwards,
crosses the Lapche Khung Tsangpo River (the eastern tributary ®f the
Lapche River),then it runs along Bidin Kangri (Riding) snowy mountain
to Height 5597*2 metres;thence the boundary line turns westwards along
the mountain ridge t® Height 5444*2 metres at Kab®b®ri (Haling), then
generally southward* along Rasurakungp® (Rishinggumb®) mountain ridge t®
Niehlu (Niule) Bridge.
11)Prom Niehlu (Niule) Bridge,the boundary line run generally eastwards
t® Chejemaa (Ganri Shankar),and then eastwards along the mountain ridge
and then northwards along the watershed between the Rengshar River and
the Rongbuk River on the one hand and the tributaries of the Dudhkosi
River ®n the ©-ther hand to Nangpa Pass, and then runs generally
southeastward* along the mountain ridge,passing through Ch® Oyu
mountain,Pumoli mountain (Gnire Langur),Mount Jolko Lungma (Sagar
M&tha) and Lhotse,to Makalu mountsin;then runs eoutheastwards and then
eastwards along the mountain ridge t® P®pti Pass.
12)Pr®m P®pti Pass,the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge
eastwards passing through Tsagala (Kspu Dada) to Kharala (Khade
Dada),and then generally northeastwards passing through Lanap®
(Lhanakpu) and Chebura (Chhipung) t® the source ®f the Hunchunehu
(fhumjung) River;then it fellows the Unchunohu (shuajung) River
to its junction with the track leading from Kimathangka t® Chentang,
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then it runs along the track te toe bridge en toe Xharma Tsangp®
(Kama) River;thence it rime generally southeastwards along the
Kharma Tsangp© (Kama.) River passing through it .junction with toe
Pengchu (Arun) River, and then al ong toe Pengchu (Arun) River te its
junction with toe Nndang River,toen continues to follow toe Pengohu
(Arun) River westwards to its junction with toe Tsokangchingpo
(Chhekeng) Riverfthence the boundary line departs from the pengchu
(Arun) River and runs generally eastwards along a mountain spur
passing through Angde and Dalai (Tele) Pass t© Dalaila (Tale),and
then run - along the mountain ridge passing through Jungkan (Dukan),
Kei.jtmgka.ri (Kh&ohunkho), Renlangbu (Relinbu) and Sulula to reach
Ragla (Rakha) Pass,
l3)Pr<wn Ragla (Rakha) Pass,the boundary line runs generally eastwards
along the watershed between the tributaries ®f the Nadang River and
toe tributaries of the Yaru River on the on* hand and toe tributaries
of toe Tamur River on the ether hand, pas sing threu^i Ombola (Om'bak)
Pass,Theputala (Tiptala) Pas *,Yangmakhsngla (Kangla) Pass and Cnabukla
t® toe terminal point where the watershed between toe Khar River and
the Chabuk River meets toe watershed between the Khar River and the
Lhonak River.
The entire boundary line between toe two eeuutries as
described in the present Article is shown on the 1*500,000 maps of too
entire boundary attached to the pre ant Treaty?toe location of toe
temporally boundary markers erected by both aides and toe detailed
alignment of certain sectiens of the boundary are shown on the 1*50,000
maps of thone sections attached to toe present Treaty.
Article 2|
The Contracting Parties have agreed that wherever the boundary
fellows a river,the midstream line shall be the boundaiy.In case a
boundary river changes its eeur~,e.toe original line of the boundary shall
remain unchanged in the absence of other agreements between the twe Parties,
Article 3«
After the signing of the present Treaty,the Chinese- epalese
Joint Boundary Committee censtituted in pursuance of the Agreement of
March 21,1960 between the two Parties on toe question of toe boundary
between the two countries shall set up permanent boundary markers as
li.
necessary an the boundary line between the twe countries,and then
draft a protocol sotting forth in detail the alignment of the entire
boundary line and the location of the permanent boundary markers,with
detailed maps attached thereto showing the boundary line and the location
of the permanent boundary markers.The above-mentioned protocol,upon being
signed by the Governments of the two eountriea, shall become an annex to
the present Treaty and the detailed maps shall replace the maps now
attached to the present Treaty.
Upon the signing of the above mentioned protocol,the tasks
of the Chinese-Uepalese Joint Boundary Committee shall be terminated,and
the Agreement of March 21,1960 between the two Parties on the question of tha
boundary between the two countries shall cease to be in force.
Article 4t
The Contracting Parties have agreed that any dispute concerning
the boundary which may arise after the formal delimitation of the boundary
between the two countries shall be settled by the two Parties through
friendly consultations.
Article 5l
The present Treaty shall come into forco en the day of the
signing of the Treaty.
Done in duplicate in Peking on October 5> 1961,in the Chinese,
Nepalese and English languages,all three texts being equally authentic.
Liu yhao-ohi Mahendra Bir flikram Shah Deva
Chairman of the People's His Majesty the King
Republic of China of Nepal
